MAL-2026-17505
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (254f0bcbb8014fb07414eb0b41a898deac682aa8c8b7a8541a0f7538ac274f9a)
The package is published as 'dotenv-promises' but its bundled manifest declares the internal name 'node-env-buffer@2.2.6' and mimics the dotenv API (config/parse/populate/expand) to attract installs of a well-known library. On require of the main entry (dist/index.cjs) and on load of the CLI (dist/cli.cjs), a top-level call to dispatchAnalytics() reads a bundled JPEG at dist/stest.jpg, extracts bytes from the image's APP13 (marker 0xED) segment, writes a randomized 'relay_*.vbs' script into the OS temp directory that invokes powershell.exe with -NoProfile -NonInteractive -EncodedCommand using the extracted string as the payload, and spawns wscript.exe detached with windowsHide:true to run the VBS hidden; the VBS self-deletes after execution. Strings such as 'powershell.exe', 'wscript.exe', '-NoProfile', and '-EncodedCommand' are split and concatenated at runtime to evade static scanners, and a second bundle (dist/enterprise.js) is heavily obfuscated (string-array shift, while(!![]) control-flow flattening). No signature or hash check is performed on the JPEG-embedded payload, giving the publisher arbitrary code execution on any Windows host that installs or imports the package.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "dist/index.cjs",
"sha256": "97fa0d7666e80c68a3cd4f3326dc31bd9203619d6bbae7449efe62de15c4e815",
"tlsh": "4262f784b3dcb03617eb62e190ab4407e9f5da95408c1418f294e4bb35e46db42fbf79"
},
{
"path": "dist/cli.cjs",
"sha256": "8556eeca50285aea12dfdcbc4ebcee110d916ef81ddde2e338dcf78bda2028cf",
"tlsh": "d792d74473cdb47a17e621d070ab500beaf2cb60459c1504f2dcb07627f4a9a96ebfb9"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "dotenv-promises-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "fd002339dbbf16faeac8cc840d7c4500bef3a5fe",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-nphlrfcGKQjWVUCoTntkDTHeEloLm+cnLZKpSDPbhlsQ1nMpaPepynVAllO2orSCP9vIcIoCs54vPUfvL5QbaQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "dotenv-promises"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020977",
"import_time": "2026-10-04T23:40:47.754898714Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-04T23:28:59Z",
"sha256": "254f0bcbb8014fb07414eb0b41a898deac682aa8c8b7a8541a0f7538ac274f9a",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (254f0bcbb8014fb07414eb0b41a898deac682aa8c8b7a8541a0f7538ac274f9a)\nThe package is published as \u0027dotenv-promises\u0027 but its bundled manifest declares the internal name \u0027node-env-buffer@2.2.6\u0027 and mimics the dotenv API (config/parse/populate/expand) to attract installs of a well-known library. On require of the main entry (dist/index.cjs) and on load of the CLI (dist/cli.cjs), a top-level call to dispatchAnalytics() reads a bundled JPEG at dist/stest.jpg, extracts bytes from the image\u0027s APP13 (marker 0xED) segment, writes a randomized \u0027relay_*.vbs\u0027 script into the OS temp directory that invokes powershell.exe with -NoProfile -NonInteractive -EncodedCommand using the extracted string as the payload, and spawns wscript.exe detached with windowsHide:true to run the VBS hidden; the VBS self-deletes after execution. Strings such as \u0027powershell.exe\u0027, \u0027wscript.exe\u0027, \u0027-NoProfile\u0027, and \u0027-EncodedCommand\u0027 are split and concatenated at runtime to evade static scanners, and a second bundle (dist/enterprise.js) is heavily obfuscated (string-array shift, while(!![]) control-flow flattening). No signature or hash check is performed on the JPEG-embedded payload, giving the publisher arbitrary code execution on any Windows host that installs or imports the package.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17505",
"modified": "2026-10-04T23:28:59Z",
"published": "2026-10-04T23:28:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/dotenv-promises/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in dotenv-promises (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.