MAL-2026-17362
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical
forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into
the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated w:mex FOLLOW
query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter
JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the
victim's account to channels it never asked to join.
The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork.
The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.
Affected package: @kelvdra/baileys (npm), version(s): 1.0.6-rc.1, 1.0.6, 1.0.5-rc.3.
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (839545967c959062f79d5b217758730bd2c6a69219949c2eea494e75e3cfc12a)
package.json in @kelvdra/baileys@1.0.6-rc.4 declares the dependency libsignal as github:Kelvdra/libsignal with no version, tag, or commit SHA. On npm install, npm resolves this specifier to the current tip of the referenced repository's default branch and installs whatever bytes it returns, running any lifecycle scripts contained within them, with no integrity check. The dependency source is not the npm registry and not a pinned commit, so the code that lands on the installer's machine can change at any moment without any change to this package. Control of that GitHub account or repository translates directly into install-time code execution on every installer of this package.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "76ffcc4611eed87ec41e5c51d2cf17f07a2a98bed50de91dc06a278d23c79456",
"tlsh": "bb41ad11ca798cf305e532e868e65003a5304a479c58bc3c379d83ac9f8e25f77baa5d"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "baileys-1.0.6-rc.4.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "f4da41c3c18c4029ddc69f2fb10efb519aba771c",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-leeWcoBw7hc/st5huMT3IUvAr+jjT6zyxM7XbBy10Mm5BqDIHJy3/yNSZIg/arLyTO9qF/n557FSy9yFdEDbIQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@kelvdra/baileys"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.0.6-rc.1",
"1.0.6",
"1.0.5-rc.3",
"1.0.6-rc.4"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"name": "OX Security",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020868",
"import_time": "2026-10-01T17:18:04.314207215Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-01T17:02:55Z",
"sha256": "839545967c959062f79d5b217758730bd2c6a69219949c2eea494e75e3cfc12a",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.6-rc.4"
]
}
]
},
"details": "This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical\nforks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into\nthe WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated `w:mex` FOLLOW\nquery (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter\nJIDs, using the installer\u0027s own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the\nvictim\u0027s account to channels it never asked to join.\n\nThe target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques\nobserved across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code\narray reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote\nJSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change\nafter installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying\nmechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after\nconnect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per\nfork.\n\nThe malicious action abuses the installer\u0027s own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and\nsubscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish\npersistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.\n\nAffected package: @kelvdra/baileys (npm), version(s): 1.0.6-rc.1, 1.0.6, 1.0.5-rc.3.\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (839545967c959062f79d5b217758730bd2c6a69219949c2eea494e75e3cfc12a)\npackage.json in @kelvdra/baileys@1.0.6-rc.4 declares the dependency `libsignal` as `github:Kelvdra/libsignal` with no version, tag, or commit SHA. On `npm install`, npm resolves this specifier to the current tip of the referenced repository\u0027s default branch and installs whatever bytes it returns, running any lifecycle scripts contained within them, with no integrity check. The dependency source is not the npm registry and not a pinned commit, so the code that lands on the installer\u0027s machine can change at any moment without any change to this package. Control of that GitHub account or repository translates directly into install-time code execution on every installer of this package.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17362",
"modified": "2026-10-01T17:20:23.518622769Z",
"published": "2026-10-01T17:02:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ARTICLE",
"url": "https://www.ox.security/blog/phantomsub-malicious-npm-campaign-secretly-adds-users-to-whatsapp-spam-channels/"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@kelvdra/baileys/v/1.0.6-rc.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in @kelvdra/baileys (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.