MAL-2026-16478
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (f94b74862f327effaa43c1d01c4fd769626f73214d0706b80fef8b8a395cc3e8)
On npm install, the declared postinstall hook runs node index.js, which reads os.hostname() and a timestamp, base64-encodes the JSON payload, and issues an HTTPS GET to https://estimator-nemeses-unwatched.ngrok-free.dev/canary?d=<base64>. The destination is a hardcoded ngrok tunnel unrelated to any registry or vendor infrastructure, and the beacon fires automatically without any caller action or opt-in. The package's own metadata describes it as a Dependency Confusion to RCE proof-of-concept, and the install-time callback carries the installer's internal hostname to an external third party.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "index.js",
"sha256": "6ff2d04134b8ce45ad5086c9818ff39def86396d581dbef1542a7a957209406d",
"tlsh": "9ce0c0f022e0d1a01d3037c0c252ac1fd16bf16538a552a1b7ae01d4ca4243299f3e9c"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "event-hunter-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "83ca86d9e43cf1dc8bcdad3be7dce43ec7dcff25",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-fOARMhsP9kCI1GjXgZPEGJg194NiSSSqzElIlKRg8RRJ6XxSdU6JLdQaUKNWradPM7YEveEAtYg8yLOTplYRcg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "event-hunter"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020494",
"import_time": "2026-09-23T14:19:31.953567157Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-23T14:14:28Z",
"sha256": "f94b74862f327effaa43c1d01c4fd769626f73214d0706b80fef8b8a395cc3e8",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (f94b74862f327effaa43c1d01c4fd769626f73214d0706b80fef8b8a395cc3e8)\nOn `npm install`, the declared postinstall hook runs `node index.js`, which reads `os.hostname()` and a timestamp, base64-encodes the JSON payload, and issues an HTTPS GET to `https://estimator-nemeses-unwatched.ngrok-free.dev/canary?d=\u003cbase64\u003e`. The destination is a hardcoded ngrok tunnel unrelated to any registry or vendor infrastructure, and the beacon fires automatically without any caller action or opt-in. The package\u0027s own metadata describes it as a `Dependency Confusion to RCE` proof-of-concept, and the install-time callback carries the installer\u0027s internal hostname to an external third party.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16478",
"modified": "2026-09-23T14:14:28Z",
"published": "2026-09-23T14:14:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/event-hunter/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in event-hunter (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.