MAL-2026-16292
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (5425b12d827e5327939280ed16ddd0a613b28d0d728a0a8b193f342a666c65e9)
package.json declares scripts.install: node index.js, which loads lib/core.js. On npm install, that module reads os.userInfo().username, os.hostname(), and the current working directory basename, concatenates them with a fixed 'swutils' prefix and a timestamp using '.' as separators, and issues a dns.resolve4() query for the resulting label under a hardcoded out-of-band domain oob.algamil7x.xyz. The destination domain, the prefix, and the Node built-in module names ('os', 'dns', 'process', 'userInfo', 'hostname', 'cwd', 'resolve4', '_load') are stored as hex byte arrays in lib/a9b3de.js and lib/f8a2cd.js and reassembled at runtime via String.fromCharCode, with the runtime imported through module.constructor._load rather than a normal require. The library exposes no documented functionality that would motivate hiding its DNS destination or Node built-in module names. The result is a DNS-tunnel exfiltration of installer identity (username, host, cwd) to a non-first-party domain that fires automatically on every install.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "lib/core.js",
"sha256": "e8db4e234f8aca0a53f56e9bde4aa9bd939d30fa32bae71ef6922650fda47395",
"tlsh": "3af02d69b393c48f97e096d1360a53d18859c2c0e7cf4195f7bc4a87904e7d1cac596a"
},
{
"path": "lib/f8a2cd.js",
"sha256": "f7942b52b33a05f44ce43c1cc581fa1140cbbef03acdba961ade9f4a44cb03e1",
"tlsh": "73f0595166a3d19f77d69ac35f4190a0acb60a40b60ed0d5fa2c1bde00eeb13e9c54b0"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "utils-9.9.10.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "b10d2340c3c76712deb370e44304acdacdba5b60",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-2G+TNP9wmKgx9pG5o9jlridw0kxtmz6vkY/H0VAfwsHFEluZiX94KzOLo9uFwdr/x/XrZFS+iDQTwSOzfnTqcg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@shared-web/utils"
},
"versions": [
"9.9.10"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020192",
"import_time": "2026-09-18T20:38:14.115437652Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-18T20:25:56Z",
"sha256": "5425b12d827e5327939280ed16ddd0a613b28d0d728a0a8b193f342a666c65e9",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"9.9.10"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (5425b12d827e5327939280ed16ddd0a613b28d0d728a0a8b193f342a666c65e9)\npackage.json declares scripts.install: node index.js, which loads lib/core.js. On npm install, that module reads os.userInfo().username, os.hostname(), and the current working directory basename, concatenates them with a fixed \u0027swutils\u0027 prefix and a timestamp using \u0027.\u0027 as separators, and issues a dns.resolve4() query for the resulting label under a hardcoded out-of-band domain oob.algamil7x.xyz. The destination domain, the prefix, and the Node built-in module names (\u0027os\u0027, \u0027dns\u0027, \u0027process\u0027, \u0027userInfo\u0027, \u0027hostname\u0027, \u0027cwd\u0027, \u0027resolve4\u0027, \u0027_load\u0027) are stored as hex byte arrays in lib/a9b3de.js and lib/f8a2cd.js and reassembled at runtime via String.fromCharCode, with the runtime imported through module.constructor._load rather than a normal require. The library exposes no documented functionality that would motivate hiding its DNS destination or Node built-in module names. The result is a DNS-tunnel exfiltration of installer identity (username, host, cwd) to a non-first-party domain that fires automatically on every install.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16292",
"modified": "2026-09-18T20:25:56Z",
"published": "2026-09-18T20:25:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@shared-web/utils/v/9.9.10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in @shared-web/utils (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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