Vulnerability-Lookup

MAL-2026-16278

Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages

Published

2026-09-18 02:57

Modified

2026-09-18 02:57

Summary

Malicious code in xzvbailey (npm)

Details

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (f961ec09baa139430fb2b04c3fef5350f16f659c8de585787a26f3c8535fca38)

package.json declares the libsignal dependency as github:tenka-san/libsignal-node, a non-registry source pointing at a personal GitHub account with no tag or commit SHA. On npm install, npm fetches whatever the default branch's HEAD points to at that moment and runs any lifecycle scripts inside the cloned repo, so the owner of that account controls code that executes on the installer's machine. The account is unrelated to the upstream Baileys/libsignal publishers, and the package's own metadata is inconsistent (homepage and repository fields point at a Telegram URL while the bug tracker points at a different GitHub org, pou-code/Baileys), which is consistent with a repackaged Baileys lure rather than a legitimate fork.

CWE

CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.

Credits

Amazon Inspector inspector-research@amazon.com

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "cwes": [
          {
            "cweId": "CWE-506",
            "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
            "name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
          }
        ],
        "indicators": {
          "evidence_files": [
            {
              "path": "package.json",
              "sha256": "ef4bbfcac581b8457f72a2486783a71e585a137f6d94f085dfbbd5eb2b1f22a3",
              "tlsh": "7f81ca35ce58ce630ac526e8a9bc0042947559539ec5fc1cb3540bac8f5e15f72b9b3e"
            }
          ],
          "package_integrity": [
            {
              "filename": "xzvbailey-1.0.0.tgz",
              "hashes": {
                "sha1": "ad6777905f771eb03888cbf10c3eb47f529ead64",
                "sha512_sri": "sha512-UOCn31g0A/HIgrDwLI5zc0iqi7NCIKEqIF8ncDFkUJQJuOIFHE8VYYTE2DbtEe9W8j2c3BXDSs/KMDfabdeTPw=="
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "xzvbailey"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1.0.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [
    {
      "contact": [
        "inspector-research@amazon.com"
      ],
      "name": "Amazon Inspector",
      "type": "FINDER"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "malicious-packages-origins": [
      {
        "id": "IN-MAL-2026-020176",
        "import_time": "2026-09-18T03:21:13.3865549Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-09-18T02:57:47Z",
        "sha256": "f961ec09baa139430fb2b04c3fef5350f16f659c8de585787a26f3c8535fca38",
        "source": "amazon-inspector",
        "versions": [
          "1.0.0"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (f961ec09baa139430fb2b04c3fef5350f16f659c8de585787a26f3c8535fca38)\npackage.json declares the `libsignal` dependency as `github:tenka-san/libsignal-node`, a non-registry source pointing at a personal GitHub account with no tag or commit SHA. On `npm install`, npm fetches whatever the default branch\u0027s HEAD points to at that moment and runs any lifecycle scripts inside the cloned repo, so the owner of that account controls code that executes on the installer\u0027s machine. The account is unrelated to the upstream Baileys/libsignal publishers, and the package\u0027s own metadata is inconsistent (homepage and repository fields point at a Telegram URL while the bug tracker points at a different GitHub org, `pou-code/Baileys`), which is consistent with a repackaged Baileys lure rather than a legitimate fork.\n",
  "id": "MAL-2026-16278",
  "modified": "2026-09-18T02:57:47Z",
  "published": "2026-09-18T02:57:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/xzvbailey/v/1.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "Malicious code in xzvbailey (npm)"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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