MAL-2026-16214
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (6aa01ed90340a9458c2906ec74fd9277bb7d0e4da48ef09487639aa6c45e6791)
The package published as discord-resolvers is unrelated to Discord. On require, index.js invokes startBackupLoop() at top level, which recursively archives the /root directory on Linux (or the drive root, typically C:\, on Windows) into a ZIP and uploads it via the Telegram Bot API to a hardcoded chat controlled by the package author. The loop repeats every hour and all errors are silently swallowed. The exclude list (node_modules,.git,.cache, tmp) does not exclude credential-bearing paths such as ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc,.env files, browser profiles, or wallet stores, so SSH keys, cloud credentials, source code, and other secrets under the archived root are shipped off-host. The Telegram bot token (8296271388:AAH-...) and chatId (8851479019) ship in cleartext in config.json and are the transport mechanism for the exfiltration; the destination is not caller-configurable. The package.json description ("Cross-platform automated server backup tool with Telegram delivery") self-labels the behavior but the package name and the silent auto-execution on require make this a covert exfiltration payload rather than an opt-in backup tool.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "index.js",
"sha256": "e3543227b7722f724aacdc9a7594b78b900281ae9a0b287caf07558319b7fbdd",
"tlsh": "31f0ac7e66fd00ba00191dab5e8f8110099b619323b98c42bc5d32e85f83129a264938"
},
{
"path": "src/config.js",
"sha256": "1d9e9bfe6787487dc7677adc30c00861a9921aff57494bd5496d0c517f841da2",
"tlsh": "ce3121e611fe0a3b4492193a99dff0522444d8933a09ad6db7dc83885fe50794a72cfc"
},
{
"path": "config.json",
"sha256": "a7fcaa2fb7d2240469c6581a0737e8ab221225327b7fa4a418f66020ee7a6a9c",
"tlsh": "22b02b788220044312105a4c551780c45010f40bd0084f2f2041a0a5090402e00e2006"
},
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "73ec9d6f4c31b14024cdccf493a5c4ee6ec94102a558ae946b7ad0ace5bd2f45",
"tlsh": "f1f05924cb702cb314d859714d7a02023331aa87196c7c1c3383611d9f5d17f10fe6ad"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "discord-resolvers-3.4.2.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "53582f61a2d11d75610891a8ac86c3b1ac6f75c1",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-eHydDNvsux+gOvKMWjf6gN8rbyRNIxr+ohJ3033LUy6uCN6Cw9L4KSLUDx6BS9yDD13SPOs1PPbb2wqQTF05oQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "discord-resolvers"
},
"versions": [
"3.4.2"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020091",
"import_time": "2026-09-16T06:56:09.365289397Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-16T06:37:31Z",
"sha256": "6aa01ed90340a9458c2906ec74fd9277bb7d0e4da48ef09487639aa6c45e6791",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"3.4.2"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (6aa01ed90340a9458c2906ec74fd9277bb7d0e4da48ef09487639aa6c45e6791)\nThe package published as discord-resolvers is unrelated to Discord. On require, index.js invokes startBackupLoop() at top level, which recursively archives the /root directory on Linux (or the drive root, typically C:\\, on Windows) into a ZIP and uploads it via the Telegram Bot API to a hardcoded chat controlled by the package author. The loop repeats every hour and all errors are silently swallowed. The exclude list (node_modules,.git,.cache, tmp) does not exclude credential-bearing paths such as ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc,.env files, browser profiles, or wallet stores, so SSH keys, cloud credentials, source code, and other secrets under the archived root are shipped off-host. The Telegram bot token (8296271388:AAH-...) and chatId (8851479019) ship in cleartext in config.json and are the transport mechanism for the exfiltration; the destination is not caller-configurable. The package.json description (\"Cross-platform automated server backup tool with Telegram delivery\") self-labels the behavior but the package name and the silent auto-execution on require make this a covert exfiltration payload rather than an opt-in backup tool.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16214",
"modified": "2026-09-16T06:37:31Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T06:37:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/discord-resolvers/v/3.4.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in discord-resolvers (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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