MAL-2026-16214
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
Published
2026-09-16 06:37
Modified
2026-09-16 06:37
Summary
Malicious code in discord-resolvers (npm)
Details

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (6aa01ed90340a9458c2906ec74fd9277bb7d0e4da48ef09487639aa6c45e6791)

The package published as discord-resolvers is unrelated to Discord. On require, index.js invokes startBackupLoop() at top level, which recursively archives the /root directory on Linux (or the drive root, typically C:\, on Windows) into a ZIP and uploads it via the Telegram Bot API to a hardcoded chat controlled by the package author. The loop repeats every hour and all errors are silently swallowed. The exclude list (node_modules,.git,.cache, tmp) does not exclude credential-bearing paths such as ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc,.env files, browser profiles, or wallet stores, so SSH keys, cloud credentials, source code, and other secrets under the archived root are shipped off-host. The Telegram bot token (8296271388:AAH-...) and chatId (8851479019) ship in cleartext in config.json and are the transport mechanism for the exfiltration; the destination is not caller-configurable. The package.json description ("Cross-platform automated server backup tool with Telegram delivery") self-labels the behavior but the package name and the silent auto-execution on require make this a covert exfiltration payload rather than an opt-in backup tool.

CWE
  • CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "cwes": [
          {
            "cweId": "CWE-506",
            "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
            "name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
          }
        ],
        "indicators": {
          "evidence_files": [
            {
              "path": "index.js",
              "sha256": "e3543227b7722f724aacdc9a7594b78b900281ae9a0b287caf07558319b7fbdd",
              "tlsh": "31f0ac7e66fd00ba00191dab5e8f8110099b619323b98c42bc5d32e85f83129a264938"
            },
            {
              "path": "src/config.js",
              "sha256": "1d9e9bfe6787487dc7677adc30c00861a9921aff57494bd5496d0c517f841da2",
              "tlsh": "ce3121e611fe0a3b4492193a99dff0522444d8933a09ad6db7dc83885fe50794a72cfc"
            },
            {
              "path": "config.json",
              "sha256": "a7fcaa2fb7d2240469c6581a0737e8ab221225327b7fa4a418f66020ee7a6a9c",
              "tlsh": "22b02b788220044312105a4c551780c45010f40bd0084f2f2041a0a5090402e00e2006"
            },
            {
              "path": "package.json",
              "sha256": "73ec9d6f4c31b14024cdccf493a5c4ee6ec94102a558ae946b7ad0ace5bd2f45",
              "tlsh": "f1f05924cb702cb314d859714d7a02023331aa87196c7c1c3383611d9f5d17f10fe6ad"
            }
          ],
          "package_integrity": [
            {
              "filename": "discord-resolvers-3.4.2.tgz",
              "hashes": {
                "sha1": "53582f61a2d11d75610891a8ac86c3b1ac6f75c1",
                "sha512_sri": "sha512-eHydDNvsux+gOvKMWjf6gN8rbyRNIxr+ohJ3033LUy6uCN6Cw9L4KSLUDx6BS9yDD13SPOs1PPbb2wqQTF05oQ=="
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "discord-resolvers"
      },
      "versions": [
        "3.4.2"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [
    {
      "contact": [
        "inspector-research@amazon.com"
      ],
      "name": "Amazon Inspector",
      "type": "FINDER"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "malicious-packages-origins": [
      {
        "id": "IN-MAL-2026-020091",
        "import_time": "2026-09-16T06:56:09.365289397Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-09-16T06:37:31Z",
        "sha256": "6aa01ed90340a9458c2906ec74fd9277bb7d0e4da48ef09487639aa6c45e6791",
        "source": "amazon-inspector",
        "versions": [
          "3.4.2"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (6aa01ed90340a9458c2906ec74fd9277bb7d0e4da48ef09487639aa6c45e6791)\nThe package published as discord-resolvers is unrelated to Discord. On require, index.js invokes startBackupLoop() at top level, which recursively archives the /root directory on Linux (or the drive root, typically C:\\, on Windows) into a ZIP and uploads it via the Telegram Bot API to a hardcoded chat controlled by the package author. The loop repeats every hour and all errors are silently swallowed. The exclude list (node_modules,.git,.cache, tmp) does not exclude credential-bearing paths such as ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc,.env files, browser profiles, or wallet stores, so SSH keys, cloud credentials, source code, and other secrets under the archived root are shipped off-host. The Telegram bot token (8296271388:AAH-...) and chatId (8851479019) ship in cleartext in config.json and are the transport mechanism for the exfiltration; the destination is not caller-configurable. The package.json description (\"Cross-platform automated server backup tool with Telegram delivery\") self-labels the behavior but the package name and the silent auto-execution on require make this a covert exfiltration payload rather than an opt-in backup tool.\n",
  "id": "MAL-2026-16214",
  "modified": "2026-09-16T06:37:31Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T06:37:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/discord-resolvers/v/3.4.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "Malicious code in discord-resolvers (npm)"
}



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