GHSA-H7P7-W5GC-XJ3W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-13 14:16 – Updated: 2026-08-13 14:16Summary
A client that can submit message history to a Pydantic AI UI adapter can reference arbitrary files in the application's model-provider or cloud-storage account. The server forwards the reference to the model provider, which fetches it using the server's own credentials, allowing the client to read files it should not have access to.
Details
UI adapters reconstruct file parts from client-submitted message history and forward them to the model provider. File URL parts are validated against a scheme allowlist before being forwarded, but UploadedFile references — which point to a file by provider file ID or cloud-storage URI (e.g. s3://…, gs://…) — were forwarded without validation.
Because the provider resolves an UploadedFile using the server-side identity (IAM role, service account, or provider API key) rather than the client's, a client that crafts message history containing an attacker-chosen UploadedFile can cause the server to read objects belonging to its own account or to other tenants, given a referenceable identifier.
Impact
Applications that pass untrusted client-submitted message history to an agent through a UI adapter (such as the Vercel AI adapter). Exploitation requires the attacker to reference a valid file identifier; depending on how the application names objects, such identifiers are not always unguessable.
Patches
Upgrade to 1.106.0 (1.x) or 2.0.0b6 (the 2.x beta line), which validate UploadedFile references on client-submitted messages the same way file URLs are validated.
Workarounds
If users cannot upgrade, do not pass untrusted client-submitted message history to the agent, or strip UploadedFile parts from incoming messages before running the agent.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pydantic-ai-slim"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.65.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.106.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pydantic-ai-slim"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0b1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.0b6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pydantic-ai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.65.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.106.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pydantic-ai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0b1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.0b6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54249"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-13T14:16:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-29T21:17:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA client that can submit message history to a Pydantic AI UI adapter can reference arbitrary files in the application\u0027s model-provider or cloud-storage account. The server forwards the reference to the model provider, which fetches it using the server\u0027s own credentials, allowing the client to read files it should not have access to.\n\n### Details\n\nUI adapters reconstruct file parts from client-submitted message history and forward them to the model provider. File **URL** parts are validated against a scheme allowlist before being forwarded, but `UploadedFile` references \u2014 which point to a file by provider file ID or cloud-storage URI (e.g. `s3://\u2026`, `gs://\u2026`) \u2014 were forwarded without validation.\n\nBecause the provider resolves an `UploadedFile` using the server-side identity (IAM role, service account, or provider API key) rather than the client\u0027s, a client that crafts message history containing an attacker-chosen `UploadedFile` can cause the server to read objects belonging to its own account or to other tenants, given a referenceable identifier.\n\n### Impact\n\nApplications that pass untrusted client-submitted message history to an agent through a UI adapter (such as the Vercel AI adapter). Exploitation requires the attacker to reference a valid file identifier; depending on how the application names objects, such identifiers are not always unguessable.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to `1.106.0` (1.x) or `2.0.0b6` (the 2.x beta line), which validate `UploadedFile` references on client-submitted messages the same way file URLs are validated.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf users cannot upgrade, do not pass untrusted client-submitted message history to the agent, or strip `UploadedFile` parts from incoming messages before running the agent.",
"id": "GHSA-h7p7-w5gc-xj3w",
"modified": "2026-08-13T14:16:26Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T14:16:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai/security/advisories/GHSA-h7p7-w5gc-xj3w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54249"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai/releases/tag/v1.106.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai/releases/tag/v2.0.0b6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Pydantic AI: Unvalidated UploadedFile references in UI adapters allow server-side file access using the application\u0027s credentials"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.