GHSA-H3M5-P59H-X88P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-31 23:42 – Updated: 2026-03-31 23:42
VLAI
Summary
openssl-encrypt has visible password in process list via --password CLI argument
Details
Summary
Passwords passed via the --password / -p CLI argument in openssl_encrypt/modules/crypt_cli_subparser.py at lines 150-154 are visible to any user on the system via ps aux or /proc/[pid]/cmdline.
Affected Code
subparser.add_argument(
"--password", "-p",
help="Password (will prompt if not provided, or use CRYPT_PASSWORD environment variable)",
)
Similarly, --keystore-password exposes the keystore password.
Impact
On multi-user systems, any user can observe the encryption password by listing processes. The CRYPT_PASSWORD environment variable alternative is also visible via /proc/[pid]/environ (though with slightly restricted access).
Recommended Fix
- Document the security implications prominently
- Recommend interactive prompting (already supported) as the secure default
- Consider supporting password file descriptors (
--password-fd) or reading from stdin - Consider marking the argument as deprecated in favor of interactive prompting
Fix
Fixed in commit e78a366 on branch releases/1.4.x — added --password-file and --password-fd arguments; added OPENSSL_ENCRYPT_PASSWORD env var support; --password now emits deprecation warning.
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "openssl-encrypt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-256"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-31T23:42:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nPasswords passed via the `--password` / `-p` CLI argument in `openssl_encrypt/modules/crypt_cli_subparser.py` at **lines 150-154** are visible to any user on the system via `ps aux` or `/proc/[pid]/cmdline`.\n\n### Affected Code\n\n```python\nsubparser.add_argument(\n \"--password\", \"-p\",\n help=\"Password (will prompt if not provided, or use CRYPT_PASSWORD environment variable)\",\n)\n```\n\nSimilarly, `--keystore-password` exposes the keystore password.\n\n### Impact\n\nOn multi-user systems, any user can observe the encryption password by listing processes. The `CRYPT_PASSWORD` environment variable alternative is also visible via `/proc/[pid]/environ` (though with slightly restricted access).\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\n- Document the security implications prominently\n- Recommend interactive prompting (already supported) as the secure default\n- Consider supporting password file descriptors (`--password-fd`) or reading from stdin\n- Consider marking the argument as deprecated in favor of interactive prompting\n\n### Fix\n\nFixed in commit `e78a366` on branch `releases/1.4.x` \u2014 added --password-file and --password-fd arguments; added OPENSSL_ENCRYPT_PASSWORD env var support; --password now emits deprecation warning.",
"id": "GHSA-h3m5-p59h-x88p",
"modified": "2026-03-31T23:42:17Z",
"published": "2026-03-31T23:42:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jahlives/openssl_encrypt/security/advisories/GHSA-h3m5-p59h-x88p"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jahlives/openssl_encrypt/commit/e78a3666e4592f3538adaaa6be8f5f04356174db"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jahlives/openssl_encrypt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "openssl-encrypt has visible password in process list via --password CLI argument"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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