GHSA-GHMH-JHMJ-WCMF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-22 22:57 – Updated: 2026-06-22 22:57internal/store/sqlite.go:1177,1192,1221,1245 — the enrollment_tokens.token column holds the raw UUID token. ConsumeToken does WHERE token = ? against the raw string. Compare with operator_api_keys.key_hash, which is SHA-256 hex (constructed in internal/api/middleware.go:51-53).
Affected
All released versions up to v0.3.0.
Threat model
Read access to nebula-mgmt.db: backup, snapshot, file-system access, future SQL-injection sink. The principle of defense-in-depth: API keys are hashed at rest; enrollment tokens — which grant the same lifecycle authority over a host's identity — are not.
An attacker who reads the DB before a legitimate agent enrolls can consume the single-use token first, mint a cert against their own keypair, and take the agent's intended Nebula identity.
Suggested fix
- Schema migration: rename
enrollment_tokens.token→token_hash(or add the new column and drop the old after backfill of pending rows). - Store SHA-256 of token on create:
go sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token)) row.TokenHash = hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]) ConsumeTokenaccepts the raw token, hashes once, looks up by hash, atomically marks consumed.
Side bonus: take this opportunity to switch the token format from uuid.New().String() (122 bits) to hex.EncodeToString(crypto/rand 32 bytes) (256 bits), matching the project's session-token and API-key conventions. UUIDs are recognisable in logs and crash dumps; opaque hex blends in.
TOTP recovery codes appear to already be SHA-256 hashed at rest (internal/web/totp.go:74-78) — confirming that pattern is intentional elsewhere, just missed here.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.3.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/juev/nebula-mesh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-312"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T22:57:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "`internal/store/sqlite.go:1177,1192,1221,1245` \u2014 the `enrollment_tokens.token` column holds the raw UUID token. `ConsumeToken` does `WHERE token = ?` against the raw string. Compare with `operator_api_keys.key_hash`, which is SHA-256 hex (constructed in `internal/api/middleware.go:51-53`).\n\n## Affected\nAll released versions up to v0.3.0.\n\n## Threat model\nRead access to `nebula-mgmt.db`: backup, snapshot, file-system access, future SQL-injection sink. The principle of defense-in-depth: API keys are hashed at rest; enrollment tokens \u2014 which grant the same lifecycle authority over a host\u0027s identity \u2014 are not.\n\nAn attacker who reads the DB before a legitimate agent enrolls can consume the single-use token first, mint a cert against their own keypair, and take the agent\u0027s intended Nebula identity.\n\n## Suggested fix\n1. Schema migration: rename `enrollment_tokens.token` \u2192 `token_hash` (or add the new column and drop the old after backfill of pending rows).\n2. Store SHA-256 of token on create:\n ```go\n sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))\n row.TokenHash = hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])\n ```\n3. `ConsumeToken` accepts the raw token, hashes once, looks up by hash, atomically marks consumed.\n\nSide bonus: take this opportunity to switch the token format from `uuid.New().String()` (122 bits) to `hex.EncodeToString(crypto/rand 32 bytes)` (256 bits), matching the project\u0027s session-token and API-key conventions. UUIDs are recognisable in logs and crash dumps; opaque hex blends in.\n\nTOTP recovery codes appear to already be SHA-256 hashed at rest (`internal/web/totp.go:74-78`) \u2014 confirming that pattern is intentional elsewhere, just missed here.",
"id": "GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf",
"modified": "2026-06-22T22:57:27Z",
"published": "2026-06-22T22:57:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "nebula-mesh\u0027s stores enrollment tokens unhashed in SQLite"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.