GHSA-GHMH-JHMJ-WCMF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-22 22:57 – Updated: 2026-06-22 22:57
VLAI
Summary
nebula-mesh's stores enrollment tokens unhashed in SQLite
Details

internal/store/sqlite.go:1177,1192,1221,1245 — the enrollment_tokens.token column holds the raw UUID token. ConsumeToken does WHERE token = ? against the raw string. Compare with operator_api_keys.key_hash, which is SHA-256 hex (constructed in internal/api/middleware.go:51-53).

Affected

All released versions up to v0.3.0.

Threat model

Read access to nebula-mgmt.db: backup, snapshot, file-system access, future SQL-injection sink. The principle of defense-in-depth: API keys are hashed at rest; enrollment tokens — which grant the same lifecycle authority over a host's identity — are not.

An attacker who reads the DB before a legitimate agent enrolls can consume the single-use token first, mint a cert against their own keypair, and take the agent's intended Nebula identity.

Suggested fix

  1. Schema migration: rename enrollment_tokens.tokentoken_hash (or add the new column and drop the old after backfill of pending rows).
  2. Store SHA-256 of token on create: go sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token)) row.TokenHash = hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
  3. ConsumeToken accepts the raw token, hashes once, looks up by hash, atomically marks consumed.

Side bonus: take this opportunity to switch the token format from uuid.New().String() (122 bits) to hex.EncodeToString(crypto/rand 32 bytes) (256 bits), matching the project's session-token and API-key conventions. UUIDs are recognisable in logs and crash dumps; opaque hex blends in.

TOTP recovery codes appear to already be SHA-256 hashed at rest (internal/web/totp.go:74-78) — confirming that pattern is intentional elsewhere, just missed here.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.3.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/juev/nebula-mesh"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-312"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T22:57:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "`internal/store/sqlite.go:1177,1192,1221,1245` \u2014 the `enrollment_tokens.token` column holds the raw UUID token. `ConsumeToken` does `WHERE token = ?` against the raw string. Compare with `operator_api_keys.key_hash`, which is SHA-256 hex (constructed in `internal/api/middleware.go:51-53`).\n\n## Affected\nAll released versions up to v0.3.0.\n\n## Threat model\nRead access to `nebula-mgmt.db`: backup, snapshot, file-system access, future SQL-injection sink. The principle of defense-in-depth: API keys are hashed at rest; enrollment tokens \u2014 which grant the same lifecycle authority over a host\u0027s identity \u2014 are not.\n\nAn attacker who reads the DB before a legitimate agent enrolls can consume the single-use token first, mint a cert against their own keypair, and take the agent\u0027s intended Nebula identity.\n\n## Suggested fix\n1. Schema migration: rename `enrollment_tokens.token` \u2192 `token_hash` (or add the new column and drop the old after backfill of pending rows).\n2. Store SHA-256 of token on create:\n   ```go\n   sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))\n   row.TokenHash = hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])\n   ```\n3. `ConsumeToken` accepts the raw token, hashes once, looks up by hash, atomically marks consumed.\n\nSide bonus: take this opportunity to switch the token format from `uuid.New().String()` (122 bits) to `hex.EncodeToString(crypto/rand 32 bytes)` (256 bits), matching the project\u0027s session-token and API-key conventions. UUIDs are recognisable in logs and crash dumps; opaque hex blends in.\n\nTOTP recovery codes appear to already be SHA-256 hashed at rest (`internal/web/totp.go:74-78`) \u2014 confirming that pattern is intentional elsewhere, just missed here.",
  "id": "GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf",
  "modified": "2026-06-22T22:57:27Z",
  "published": "2026-06-22T22:57:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "nebula-mesh\u0027s stores enrollment tokens unhashed in SQLite"
}


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