GHSA-MPWR-8VM7-H73F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-17 21:56 – Updated: 2026-08-17 21:56
VLAI
Summary
package pkcs12: Authentication bypass in Decode functions
Details
Decode, DecodeChain, DecodeTrustStore, and ToPEM can incorrectly accept PKCS#12 files which were encoded with the wrong password, due to a failure to reject excessively-short PBMAC1 keys. Users who decode PKCS#12 files from untrusted sources and rely on the password for authentication can be tricked into accepting malicious PKCS#12 files. Users who only decode PKCS#12 files from trusted sources are not affected.
Thanks to Pavol Žáčik (Red Hat) and Alex Gaynor (Anthropic) for finding and reporting the same issue in OpenSSL (CVE-2026-34181).
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "software.sslmate.com/src/go-pkcs12"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.7.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-17T21:56:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "`Decode`, `DecodeChain`, `DecodeTrustStore`, and `ToPEM` can incorrectly accept PKCS#12 files which were encoded with the wrong password, due to a failure to reject excessively-short PBMAC1 keys. Users who decode PKCS#12 files from untrusted sources and rely on the password for authentication can be tricked into accepting malicious PKCS#12 files. Users who only decode PKCS#12 files from trusted sources are not affected.\n\nThanks to Pavol \u017d\u00e1\u010dik (Red Hat) and Alex Gaynor (Anthropic) for finding and reporting the same issue in OpenSSL ([CVE-2026-34181](https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-34181)).",
"id": "GHSA-mpwr-8vm7-h73f",
"modified": "2026-08-17T21:56:01Z",
"published": "2026-08-17T21:56:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SSLMate/go-pkcs12/security/advisories/GHSA-mpwr-8vm7-h73f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/SSLMate/go-pkcs12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-34181"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "package pkcs12: Authentication bypass in Decode functions"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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