GHSA-7PPR-R889-MCF2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 22:28 – Updated: 2026-07-24 22:28
VLAI
Summary
blaze: Unbounded WebSocket message aggregation in http4s-blaze-server
Details

Summary

http4s-blaze-server aggregates the fragments of an incoming WebSocket message with no limit on total size or fragment count. A client that completes a WebSocket handshake can send an unterminated fragmented message and drive unbounded heap growth in the server JVM, resulting in denial of service via OutOfMemoryError.

Impact

Any http4s application serving WebSocket routes over BlazeServerBuilder is affected; no non-default configuration is required, and maxWebSocketBufferSize does not bound the aggregate (it bounds only individual frames). A single connection sending continuation frames that never set FIN forces the server to buffer every fragment until the heap is exhausted, terminating the JVM with OutOfMemoryError on the blaze selector thread. Small fragments amplify the cost through per-frame object overhead, so a modest volume of wire bytes is sufficient. Where the WebSocket endpoint is reachable without authentication the attacker is unauthenticated and remote; where the handshake requires a principal, any authenticated client can still trigger it.

Workarounds

  • No blaze-server configuration bounds the aggregate; maxWebSocketBufferSize is not a mitigation.
  • Terminate/limit WebSocket traffic at a fronting layer that enforces message-size and fragment limits, or disable WebSocket routes.
  • Longer term: blaze is EOL upstream; plan migration to a maintained backend (e.g. ember).
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.http4s:http4s-blaze-server_2.13"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.23.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.http4s:http4s-blaze-server_2.13"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0-M1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.0-M42"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.http4s:http4s-blaze-server_2.12"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.23.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.http4s:http4s-blaze-server_3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0-M1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.0-M42"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T22:28:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`http4s-blaze-server` aggregates the fragments of an incoming WebSocket\nmessage with no limit on total size or fragment count. A client that\ncompletes a WebSocket handshake can send an unterminated fragmented\nmessage and drive unbounded heap growth in the server JVM, resulting in\ndenial of service via `OutOfMemoryError`.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny http4s application serving WebSocket routes over\n`BlazeServerBuilder` is affected; no non-default configuration is required,\nand `maxWebSocketBufferSize` does not bound the aggregate (it bounds only\nindividual frames). A single connection sending continuation frames that\nnever set FIN forces the server to buffer every fragment until the heap is\nexhausted, terminating the JVM with `OutOfMemoryError` on the blaze\nselector thread. Small fragments amplify the cost through per-frame object\noverhead, so a modest volume of wire bytes is sufficient. Where the\nWebSocket endpoint is reachable without authentication the attacker is\nunauthenticated and remote; where the handshake requires a principal, any\nauthenticated client can still trigger it.\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- No blaze-server configuration bounds the aggregate; `maxWebSocketBufferSize`\n  is not a mitigation.\n- Terminate/limit WebSocket traffic at a fronting layer that enforces\n  message-size and fragment limits, or disable WebSocket routes.\n- Longer term: blaze is EOL upstream; plan migration to a maintained\n  backend (e.g. ember).",
  "id": "GHSA-7ppr-r889-mcf2",
  "modified": "2026-07-24T22:28:05Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T22:28:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/http4s/blaze/security/advisories/GHSA-7ppr-r889-mcf2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/http4s/blaze/commit/173e8ca820a0d12110bfe409c72e9b9c3d28d471"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/http4s/blaze/commit/2ae13a74d55209b6573d5228d1aa94f0361a75d0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/http4s/blaze/commit/fadbe6d0f7f59045425688d313c8d4804973d12f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/http4s/blaze"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/http4s/blaze/releases/tag/v0.23.18"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/http4s/blaze/releases/tag/v1.0.0-M42"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "blaze: Unbounded WebSocket message aggregation in http4s-blaze-server"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…