CVE-2026-80693 (GCVE-0-2026-80693)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-28 06:52 – Updated: 2026-08-29 06:22
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
idpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array
idpf_get_reg_intr_vecs() fills the caller-allocated reg_vals[] array from
the VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply in adapter->req_vec_chunks, bounding
its inner loop only by the per-chunk num_vectors. The array is sized
separately: idpf_intr_reg_init() allocates
kzalloc_objs(struct idpf_vec_regs, total_vecs) from
caps.num_allocated_vectors and only checks the returned count after the
fill. The sum of per-chunk num_vectors is never reconciled against
total_vecs, so a reply with a small num_allocated_vectors but chunks
summing higher writes past the end of reg_vals[].
Impact: a control plane (a PF or hypervisor device model) that returns a
VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply whose per-chunk num_vectors sum exceeds
num_allocated_vectors writes struct idpf_vec_regs entries past the end of
the reg_vals kmalloc allocation (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write).
Bound the fill loop to the array capacity passed in by the callers,
mirroring the sibling idpf_vport_get_q_reg(). The existing
num_regs < num_vecs check then rejects an undersized reply without the
out-of-bounds write happening first.
Severity
9.3 (Critical)
Assigner
References
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
d4d5587182664b0c4ab6d3556ce881cb975507c2 , < 41bb8748124d0d8ee5d8e1eace9dfbc874bc9564
(git)
Affected: d4d5587182664b0c4ab6d3556ce881cb975507c2 , < 9f7007ee9858c99aa43101bc8352c672fee85644 (git) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
6.7
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.7 (semver) Unaffected: 7.1.8 , ≤ 7.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_dev.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_vf_dev.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "41bb8748124d0d8ee5d8e1eace9dfbc874bc9564",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d4d5587182664b0c4ab6d3556ce881cb975507c2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9f7007ee9858c99aa43101bc8352c672fee85644",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d4d5587182664b0c4ab6d3556ce881cb975507c2",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_dev.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_vf_dev.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c",
"drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.7"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.7",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.1.8",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.7",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.7",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nidpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array\n\nidpf_get_reg_intr_vecs() fills the caller-allocated reg_vals[] array from\nthe VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply in adapter-\u003ereq_vec_chunks, bounding\nits inner loop only by the per-chunk num_vectors. The array is sized\nseparately: idpf_intr_reg_init() allocates\nkzalloc_objs(struct idpf_vec_regs, total_vecs) from\ncaps.num_allocated_vectors and only checks the returned count after the\nfill. The sum of per-chunk num_vectors is never reconciled against\ntotal_vecs, so a reply with a small num_allocated_vectors but chunks\nsumming higher writes past the end of reg_vals[].\n\nImpact: a control plane (a PF or hypervisor device model) that returns a\nVIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply whose per-chunk num_vectors sum exceeds\nnum_allocated_vectors writes struct idpf_vec_regs entries past the end of\nthe reg_vals kmalloc allocation (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write).\n\nBound the fill loop to the array capacity passed in by the callers,\nmirroring the sibling idpf_vport_get_q_reg(). The existing\nnum_regs \u003c num_vecs check then rejects an undersized reply without the\nout-of-bounds write happening first."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 9.3,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "AV:L - The bug is reached only when the idpf driver processes a VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply over the PCIe virtchnl/mailbox control queue during idpf_vc_core_init()/idpf_vport_intr_init(); there is no network packet, syscall, or netlink path into idpf_get_reg_intr_vecs().\nAC:L - A malicious control plane fully controls GET_CAPS num_allocated_vectors and per-chunk num_vectors in the ALLOC_VECTORS reply, so the slab out-of-bounds write is deterministic on driver init or hardware-reset re-init without races or attacker-uncontrollable memory layout.\nPR:N - Exploitation requires no credentials on the victim OS; a malicious PF, hypervisor device model, or NIC firmware can inject the crafted virtchnl reply during probe/reset before any local user action, including in cloud VMs where tenants never administer the control plane.\nUI:N - No victim interaction is required beyond normal driver bring-up; cloud and server images auto-probe the Intel idpf PF/VF and open netdevs at boot, so the attacker need not wait for a user to mount, click, or manually configure the interface.\nS:C - The attack crosses the SR-IOV/virtio control-plane boundary: a hypervisor or device firmware outside the guest/host kernel trust domain corrupts kernel heap memory inside the idpf driver security authority, matching other virtchnl isolation-breaker CVEs.\nC:H - The flaw is a kmalloc slab out-of-bounds write of attacker-influenced struct idpf_vec_regs entries (dyn_ctl_reg, itrn_reg, itrn_index_spacing); such heap corruption can disclose adjacent slab objects and be groomed into an arbitrary kernel read primitive.\nI:H - Each overfilled entry writes 12 bytes of control-plane-supplied register metadata past reg_vals[], giving a repeatable heap overflow primitive that can corrupt adjacent allocations and be leveraged for control-flow hijack or privilege escalation in the victim kernel.\nA:H - Writing far beyond the reg_vals[] allocation corrupts slab metadata or adjacent kernel objects and can immediately oops/panic the host or guest kernel; hardware-reset recovery re-enters idpf_vc_core_init(), allowing repeated crash or re-exploitation attempts."
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-29T06:22:17.090Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/41bb8748124d0d8ee5d8e1eace9dfbc874bc9564"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f7007ee9858c99aa43101bc8352c672fee85644"
}
],
"title": "idpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-80693",
"datePublished": "2026-08-28T06:52:56.131Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-26T14:34:25.785Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-29T06:22:17.090Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-80693",
"date": "2026-08-29",
"epss": "0.00131",
"percentile": "0.02998"
},
"nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-80693\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2026-08-28T08:16:54.787\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-08-29T07:16:51.463\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nidpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array\\n\\nidpf_get_reg_intr_vecs() fills the caller-allocated reg_vals[] array from\\nthe VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply in adapter-\u003ereq_vec_chunks, bounding\\nits inner loop only by the per-chunk num_vectors. The array is sized\\nseparately: idpf_intr_reg_init() allocates\\nkzalloc_objs(struct idpf_vec_regs, total_vecs) from\\ncaps.num_allocated_vectors and only checks the returned count after the\\nfill. The sum of per-chunk num_vectors is never reconciled against\\ntotal_vecs, so a reply with a small num_allocated_vectors but chunks\\nsumming higher writes past the end of reg_vals[].\\n\\nImpact: a control plane (a PF or hypervisor device model) that returns a\\nVIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply whose per-chunk num_vectors sum exceeds\\nnum_allocated_vectors writes struct idpf_vec_regs entries past the end of\\nthe reg_vals kmalloc allocation (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write).\\n\\nBound the fill loop to the array capacity passed in by the callers,\\nmirroring the sibling idpf_vport_get_q_reg(). The existing\\nnum_regs \u003c num_vecs check then rejects an undersized reply without the\\nout-of-bounds write happening first.\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"programFiles\":[\"drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_dev.c\",\"drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_vf_dev.c\",\"drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c\",\"drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.h\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"d4d5587182664b0c4ab6d3556ce881cb975507c2\",\"lessThan\":\"41bb8748124d0d8ee5d8e1eace9dfbc874bc9564\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"d4d5587182664b0c4ab6d3556ce881cb975507c2\",\"lessThan\":\"9f7007ee9858c99aa43101bc8352c672fee85644\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]},{\"vendor\":\"Linux\",\"product\":\"Linux\",\"defaultStatus\":\"affected\",\"programFiles\":[\"drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_dev.c\",\"drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_vf_dev.c\",\"drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c\",\"drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.h\"],\"repo\":\"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"6.7\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"0\",\"lessThan\":\"6.7\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.1.8\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"7.1.*\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"},{\"version\":\"7.2\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"*\",\"versionType\":\"original_commit_for_fix\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H\",\"baseScore\":9.3,\"baseSeverity\":\"CRITICAL\",\"attackVector\":\"LOCAL\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"NONE\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"CHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"integrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":2.5,\"impactScore\":6.0}]},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/41bb8748124d0d8ee5d8e1eace9dfbc874bc9564\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f7007ee9858c99aa43101bc8352c672fee85644\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"}]}}"
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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