Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
When audit logging is enabled (zookeeper.audit.enable=true), an unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary fields into Apache ZooKeeper's audit log by sending a digest authentication request with tab characters (\t) embedded in the username. Because the audit log uses tab-separated key=value format, the injected tabs are parsed as legitimate field separators, allowing the attacker to spoof audit results (e.g., injecting result=success), forge operation types, and corrupt forensic evidence.
A log injection vulnerability in Apache ZooKeeper allows a client that can call setACL to inject forged key-value fields into zookeeper_audit.log. When audit logging is enabled, the server serializes attacker-controlled digest ACL ids into the acl= audit field without escaping tab characters. Because audit events are emitted as tab-separated key=value records, a crafted ACL id can make one successful setAcl event appear to contain forged fields such as operation=delete and znode=/forged. This undermines the integrity of downstream audit parsing, alerting, and incident response.
This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 through 3.9.5, from 3.8.0 through 3.8.6.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.6 or 3.8.7, which fixes the issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Bitnami",
"name": "zookeeper",
"purl": "pkg:bitnami/zookeeper"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.8.7"
},
{
"introduced": "3.9.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.9.6"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-84439"
],
"database_specific": {
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:apache:zookeeper:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"severity": "Medium"
},
"details": "When audit logging is enabled (zookeeper.audit.enable=true), an unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary fields into Apache ZooKeeper\u0027s audit log by sending a digest authentication request with tab characters (\\t) embedded in the username. Because the audit log uses tab-separated\u00a0key=value\u00a0format, the injected tabs are parsed as legitimate field separators, allowing the attacker to spoof audit results (e.g., injecting\u00a0result=success), forge operation types, and corrupt forensic evidence.\n\nA log injection vulnerability in Apache ZooKeeper allows a client that can call\u00a0setACL\u00a0to inject forged key-value fields into\u00a0zookeeper_audit.log. When audit logging is enabled, the server serializes attacker-controlled digest ACL ids into the\u00a0acl=\u00a0audit field without escaping tab characters. Because audit events are emitted as tab-separated\u00a0key=value\u00a0records, a crafted ACL id can make one successful\u00a0setAcl\u00a0event appear to contain forged fields such as\u00a0operation=delete\u00a0and\u00a0znode=/forged. This undermines the integrity of downstream audit parsing, alerting, and incident response.\n\nThis issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 through 3.9.5, from 3.8.0 through 3.8.6.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.6 or 3.8.7, which fixes the issue.",
"id": "BIT-zookeeper-2026-84439",
"modified": "2026-09-19T09:02:05.474Z",
"published": "2026-09-19T08:51:29.865Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/15/6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/b7qnjvqjh393l0j07tmnb5ggg40sx3m6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84439"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.6.2",
"summary": "Apache ZooKeeper: Audit log injection via unsanitized output from multiple sources"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.