CWE-918
AllowedServer-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
4755 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-C2FV-2FMJ-9XRX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-28 06:30 – Updated: 2026-05-05 20:25Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-p4hc-9pjh-55c8. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
Versions of the package ssrfcheck below 1.2.0 are vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to an incomplete denylist of IP address ranges. Specifically, the package fails to classify the reserved IP address space 224.0.0.0/4 (Multicast) as invalid. This oversight allows attackers to craft requests targeting these multicast addresses.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "ssrfcheck"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-28T16:42:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-28T05:16:20Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-p4hc-9pjh-55c8. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n### Original Description\nVersions of the package ssrfcheck below 1.2.0 are vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) due to an incomplete denylist of IP address ranges. Specifically, the package fails to classify the reserved IP address space 224.0.0.0/4 (Multicast) as invalid. This oversight allows attackers to craft requests targeting these multicast addresses.",
"id": "GHSA-c2fv-2fmj-9xrx",
"modified": "2026-05-05T20:25:33Z",
"published": "2025-07-28T06:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8267"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/felippe-regazio/ssrfcheck/issues/5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/felippe-regazio/ssrfcheck/commit/9507b49fd764f2a1a1d1e3b9ee577b7545e6950e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/lirantal/2976840639df824cb3abe60d13c65e04"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/felippe-regazio/ssrfcheck"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-SSRFCHECK-9510756"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: ssrfcheck has Incomplete IP Address Deny List that leads to Server-Side Request Forgery Vulnerability",
"withdrawn": "2026-05-05T20:25:33Z"
}
GHSA-C2RM-G55X-8HR5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 20:52 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:44Summary
The isBlockedUrl() denylist introduced in nuxt-og-image@6.2.5 to remediate GHSA-pqhr-mp3f-hrpp (Dmitry Prokhorov / Positive Technologies, March 2026) is incomplete. The patch advisory states "Decimal/hexadecimal IP encoding bypasses are also handled" — that part is true (Node's WHATWG URL parser canonicalizes those forms before validation), but the v6.2.5 implementation misses two independent surfaces in the latest release 6.4.8:
- IPv6 prefix list is incomplete. The IPv6 branch checks only
bare === "::1" || startsWith("fc") || startsWith("fd") || startsWith("fe80"). It misses: [::ffff:7f00:1]— IPv6-mapped IPv4 loopback in pure-hex form (RE_MAPPED_V4 regex requires dotted-quad). Reaches 127.0.0.1 on a single-stack-IPv4 host with no other primitive needed.[fec0::/10](RFC 3879 site-local — deprecated but still routable on legacy networks)[5f00::/16](RFC 9602 SRv6 SIDs)[3fff::/20](RFC 9637 IPv6 documentation v2)-
[64:ff9b:1::/48](RFC 8215 NAT64 local-use, including embedded IPv4 loopback[64:ff9b:1::7f00:1]) -
No redirect re-validation.
isBlockedUrlruns once on the initial<img src>. The subsequent$fetch(decodedSrc, ...)(ofetch, default redirect-follow) follows 30x responses with no second-pass validation. Any allowed origin that returns a 302 to an internal IP — S3 redirect rules, GCS, Azure, CloudFront, any user-content CDN where the attacker can place a single redirect — completes the SSRF.
The net result is that the v6.2.5 SSRF advisory is bypassable in two distinct ways. The same root family as #29 / #38 (ipx) but in a different code path with different gaps — nuxt-og-image does not delegate to ipx, it ships its own validator, and that validator has fresh issues that survived the prior fix.
Affected
| Package | Version | Role |
|---|---|---|
nuxt-og-image |
6.4.8 (latest) |
default OG-image generator for Nuxt apps |
@nuxtjs/og-image (alias) |
same | re-export, same code path |
The vulnerable code lives in dist/runtime/server/og-image/core/plugins/imageSrc.js and is enforced for every <img src> (and style="background-image: url(...)") inside an OG image component, on production builds (!import.meta.dev).
Vulnerable code (imageSrc.js, verbatim)
function isPrivateIPv4(a, b) {
if (a === 127) return true;
if (a === 10) return true;
if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true;
if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true;
if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true;
if (a === 0) return true;
return false;
}
function isBlockedUrl(url) {
let parsed;
try { parsed = new URL(url); } catch { return true; }
if (parsed.protocol !== "http:" && parsed.protocol !== "https:") return true;
const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();
const bare = hostname.replace(RE_IPV6_BRACKETS, "");
if (bare === "localhost" || bare.endsWith(".localhost")) return true;
const mappedV4 = bare.match(RE_MAPPED_V4); // /^::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$/
const ip = mappedV4 ? mappedV4[1] : bare;
const parts = ip.split(".");
if (parts.length === 4 && parts.every((p) => RE_DIGIT_ONLY.test(p))) {
/* dotted-decimal IPv4 path */
}
if (RE_INT_IP.test(ip)) {
/* single-integer IPv4 path */
}
if (bare === "::1" || bare.startsWith("fc") || bare.startsWith("fd") || bare.startsWith("fe80"))
return true; // ← gap: only 4 IPv6 prefixes
return false; // ← everything else is "public"
}
// Then:
async function doResolveSrcToBuffer(src, kind, ctx) {
...
if (!import.meta.dev && isBlockedUrl(decodedSrc)) {
return { blocked: true };
}
const buffer = await $fetch(decodedSrc, { // ← follows 30x by default
responseType: "arrayBuffer",
timeout: fetchTimeout,
});
...
}
Two distinct issues:
- The IPv6 prefix list is hand-rolled (
fc,fd,fe80,::1) and inherits no taxonomy fromipaddr.jsor any RFC table. $fetchisofetch, which wraps Nodefetch()with defaultredirect: "follow". The validator does not run on the redirect target.
Reproducer (verbatim, no host privilege)
End-to-end test of isBlockedUrl on a corpus of internal-IP forms, paired with empirical fetch() confirming which forms actually reach loopback. Verbatim output:
isBlockedUrl? fetch reaches loopback? url
------------- ----------------------- ---
✓ blocked YES http://127.0.0.1:8765/ (control: dotted-decimal loopback)
✓ blocked YES http://localhost:8765/ (control)
✓ blocked no(ECONNREFUSED) http://[::1]:8765/ (control: IPv6 loopback)
✓ blocked no(EHOSTUNREACH) http://169.254.169.254:8765/ (control: AWS IMDS)
✓ blocked YES http://2130706433:8765/ (control: decimal-int IPv4)
✓ blocked YES http://0x7f000001:8765/ (control: hex-int IPv4)
✓ blocked YES http://0177.0.0.1:8765/ (control: octal — URL parser canonicalizes)
✓ blocked YES http://127.1:8765/ (control: shorthand — URL parser canonicalizes)
✗ NOT blocked YES http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:8765/ (BYPASS: IPv6-mapped, hex form)
✗ NOT blocked no(unreachable) http://[fec0::1]:8765/ (BYPASS: RFC 3879 site-local)
✗ NOT blocked no(unreachable) http://[5f00::1]:8765/ (BYPASS: RFC 9602 SRv6)
✗ NOT blocked no(unreachable) http://[3fff::1]:8765/ (BYPASS: RFC 9637 docs)
✗ NOT blocked no(unreachable) http://[64:ff9b:1::1]:8765/ (BYPASS: RFC 8215 NAT64)
✗ NOT blocked no(unreachable) http://[64:ff9b:1::7f00:1]:8765/ (BYPASS: NAT64 + embedded loopback)
The first six bypass rows say "✗ NOT blocked" — that is isBlockedUrl returning false (i.e., "this URL is fine to fetch") for each of those addresses. The "fetch reaches loopback" column shows that [::ffff:7f00:1] actually round-trips to 127.0.0.1 on a single-stack-IPv4 dev box; the four cluster ranges are unreachable on the dev box but succeed on dual-stack / k8s / NAT64 / SRv6 networks where any of these prefixes is internally bound.
The "control" rows confirm the bypass set is minimal — the validator catches the obvious cases. The bypasses are the cases the prefix list forgot.
Class 2: redirect amplifier
$fetch(url, { responseType: "arrayBuffer", timeout }) follows 30x by default. Confirmed empirically — ofetch('http://lab.menna.website/test/redirect-to-loopback') (where lab.menna.website returns 302 Location: http://127.0.0.1/) ends with <no response> fetch failed after the connect attempt to 127.0.0.1:80, proving the redirect was followed. On a target where the redirect destination has a service bound, the bytes round-trip back through the OG renderer.
Same primitive as #29 / #38 (ipx redirect bypass), in a different validator. The fix recommendations for #29 also apply here, with the same trade-offs.
Impact
A Nuxt application that uses nuxt-og-image (the official-recommended OG generator) and includes any user-influenced URL in an OG component is vulnerable to SSRF that returns the bytes of the internal response as part of the rendered OG image:
- Class 1 directly:
<img src="http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:PORT/path">reaches 127.0.0.1 on the OG worker. If the dev's deployment has anything bound to loopback (admin dashboards, internal HTTP-RPC, Redis HTTP UI, anything running alongside the function on the same machine in self-hosted setups), it leaks. - Class 1 cluster: the IPv6 cluster ranges trigger only on dual-stack / k8s / NAT64 networks — but those are exactly the production targets where SSRF matters most.
- Class 2 redirect: any allowed CDN with a redirect rule extends the reach to all RFC 1918 / loopback / link-local space.
nuxt-og-image is the OG-image module recommended in Nuxt's official documentation; it is shipped with Nuxt UI templates and is one of the top-2 Nuxt modules by GitHub stars. The user-facing primitive in real apps is "title/avatar comes from a request param" — exactly the same <NuxtLink to="/og?avatar=..."> pattern Nuxt docs encourage.
Suggested fix
Three non-exclusive options:
- Replace the hand-rolled IPv6 prefix list with
ipaddr.js'srange()predicate (or equivalent), then either: - explicitly deny the four cluster ranges that
ipaddr.jscurrently misses (fec0::/10,5f00::/16,3fff::/20,64:ff9b:1::/48), or - wait for the
ipaddr.jsupstream patch (see Vercel #27 — same gap, separately disclosed) and bump. -
In any case, also catch
[::ffff:7f00:1]either by wideningRE_MAPPED_V4or by classifying any::ffff:address as the embedded IPv4. -
Pass
redirect: "manual"in$fetchdefaults and reject 3xx. (Compareastro:assets, which already does this —await fetch(url, { redirect: "manual" })and explicit 3xx-rejection.) -
Pin the validated IP to the connection. Resolve the hostname once during validation, then pass a custom
undici.Agentwithconnect.lookupreturning the resolved IP only. This closes both the IPv6 bypass class (the resolved IP is checked again) and the redirect class (post-30x lookup is forced to the original IP). Reference:request-filtering-agenton npm.
(2) alone closes Class 2. (1) alone closes Class 1. (3) closes both with one change.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nuxt-og-image"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.2.5"
},
{
"fixed": "6.4.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44589"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T20:52:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T19:16:38Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `isBlockedUrl()` denylist introduced in `nuxt-og-image@6.2.5` to remediate **GHSA-pqhr-mp3f-hrpp** (Dmitry Prokhorov / Positive Technologies, March 2026) is incomplete. The patch advisory states \"Decimal/hexadecimal IP encoding bypasses are also handled\" \u2014 that part is true (Node\u0027s WHATWG URL parser canonicalizes those forms before validation), but the v6.2.5 implementation misses two independent surfaces in the latest release `6.4.8`:\n\n1. **IPv6 prefix list is incomplete.** The IPv6 branch checks only `bare === \"::1\" || startsWith(\"fc\") || startsWith(\"fd\") || startsWith(\"fe80\")`. It misses:\n - `[::ffff:7f00:1]` \u2014 IPv6-mapped IPv4 loopback in pure-hex form (RE_MAPPED_V4 regex requires dotted-quad). **Reaches 127.0.0.1 on a single-stack-IPv4 host with no other primitive needed.**\n - `[fec0::/10]` (RFC 3879 site-local \u2014 deprecated but still routable on legacy networks)\n - `[5f00::/16]` (RFC 9602 SRv6 SIDs)\n - `[3fff::/20]` (RFC 9637 IPv6 documentation v2)\n - `[64:ff9b:1::/48]` (RFC 8215 NAT64 local-use, including embedded IPv4 loopback `[64:ff9b:1::7f00:1]`)\n\n2. **No redirect re-validation.** `isBlockedUrl` runs once on the initial `\u003cimg src\u003e`. The subsequent `$fetch(decodedSrc, ...)` (ofetch, default redirect-follow) follows 30x responses with no second-pass validation. Any allowed origin that returns a 302 to an internal IP \u2014 S3 redirect rules, GCS, Azure, CloudFront, any user-content CDN where the attacker can place a single redirect \u2014 completes the SSRF.\n\nThe net result is that the v6.2.5 SSRF advisory is bypassable in two distinct ways. The same root family as #29 / #38 (ipx) but in a **different code path with different gaps** \u2014 `nuxt-og-image` does not delegate to `ipx`, it ships its own validator, and that validator has fresh issues that survived the prior fix.\n\n## Affected\n\n| Package | Version | Role |\n|------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|\n| `nuxt-og-image` | `6.4.8` (latest) | default OG-image generator for Nuxt apps |\n| `@nuxtjs/og-image` (alias) | same | re-export, same code path |\n\nThe vulnerable code lives in `dist/runtime/server/og-image/core/plugins/imageSrc.js` and is enforced for every `\u003cimg src\u003e` (and `style=\"background-image: url(...)\"`) inside an OG image component, on production builds (`!import.meta.dev`).\n\n## Vulnerable code (`imageSrc.js`, verbatim)\n\n```js\nfunction isPrivateIPv4(a, b) {\n if (a === 127) return true;\n if (a === 10) return true;\n if (a === 172 \u0026\u0026 b \u003e= 16 \u0026\u0026 b \u003c= 31) return true;\n if (a === 192 \u0026\u0026 b === 168) return true;\n if (a === 169 \u0026\u0026 b === 254) return true;\n if (a === 0) return true;\n return false;\n}\nfunction isBlockedUrl(url) {\n let parsed;\n try { parsed = new URL(url); } catch { return true; }\n if (parsed.protocol !== \"http:\" \u0026\u0026 parsed.protocol !== \"https:\") return true;\n const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();\n const bare = hostname.replace(RE_IPV6_BRACKETS, \"\");\n if (bare === \"localhost\" || bare.endsWith(\".localhost\")) return true;\n const mappedV4 = bare.match(RE_MAPPED_V4); // /^::ffff:(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)$/\n const ip = mappedV4 ? mappedV4[1] : bare;\n const parts = ip.split(\".\");\n if (parts.length === 4 \u0026\u0026 parts.every((p) =\u003e RE_DIGIT_ONLY.test(p))) {\n /* dotted-decimal IPv4 path */\n }\n if (RE_INT_IP.test(ip)) {\n /* single-integer IPv4 path */\n }\n if (bare === \"::1\" || bare.startsWith(\"fc\") || bare.startsWith(\"fd\") || bare.startsWith(\"fe80\"))\n return true; // \u2190 gap: only 4 IPv6 prefixes\n return false; // \u2190 everything else is \"public\"\n}\n\n// Then:\nasync function doResolveSrcToBuffer(src, kind, ctx) {\n ...\n if (!import.meta.dev \u0026\u0026 isBlockedUrl(decodedSrc)) {\n return { blocked: true };\n }\n const buffer = await $fetch(decodedSrc, { // \u2190 follows 30x by default\n responseType: \"arrayBuffer\",\n timeout: fetchTimeout,\n });\n ...\n}\n```\n\nTwo distinct issues:\n\n- **The IPv6 prefix list is hand-rolled** (`fc`, `fd`, `fe80`, `::1`) and inherits no taxonomy from `ipaddr.js` or any RFC table.\n- **`$fetch` is `ofetch`**, which wraps Node `fetch()` with default `redirect: \"follow\"`. The validator does not run on the redirect target.\n\n## Reproducer (verbatim, no host privilege)\n\nEnd-to-end test of `isBlockedUrl` on a corpus of internal-IP forms, paired with empirical `fetch()` confirming which forms actually reach loopback. Verbatim output:\n\n```\n isBlockedUrl? fetch reaches loopback? url\n ------------- ----------------------- ---\n \u2713 blocked YES http://127.0.0.1:8765/ (control: dotted-decimal loopback)\n \u2713 blocked YES http://localhost:8765/ (control)\n \u2713 blocked no(ECONNREFUSED) http://[::1]:8765/ (control: IPv6 loopback)\n \u2713 blocked no(EHOSTUNREACH) http://169.254.169.254:8765/ (control: AWS IMDS)\n \u2713 blocked YES http://2130706433:8765/ (control: decimal-int IPv4)\n \u2713 blocked YES http://0x7f000001:8765/ (control: hex-int IPv4)\n \u2713 blocked YES http://0177.0.0.1:8765/ (control: octal \u2014 URL parser canonicalizes)\n \u2713 blocked YES http://127.1:8765/ (control: shorthand \u2014 URL parser canonicalizes)\n\n \u2717 NOT blocked YES http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:8765/ (BYPASS: IPv6-mapped, hex form)\n \u2717 NOT blocked no(unreachable) http://[fec0::1]:8765/ (BYPASS: RFC 3879 site-local)\n \u2717 NOT blocked no(unreachable) http://[5f00::1]:8765/ (BYPASS: RFC 9602 SRv6)\n \u2717 NOT blocked no(unreachable) http://[3fff::1]:8765/ (BYPASS: RFC 9637 docs)\n \u2717 NOT blocked no(unreachable) http://[64:ff9b:1::1]:8765/ (BYPASS: RFC 8215 NAT64)\n \u2717 NOT blocked no(unreachable) http://[64:ff9b:1::7f00:1]:8765/ (BYPASS: NAT64 + embedded loopback)\n```\n\nThe first six bypass rows say \"\u2717 NOT blocked\" \u2014 that is `isBlockedUrl` returning `false` (i.e., \"this URL is fine to fetch\") for each of those addresses. The \"fetch reaches loopback\" column shows that `[::ffff:7f00:1]` actually round-trips to 127.0.0.1 on a single-stack-IPv4 dev box; the four cluster ranges are unreachable on the dev box but succeed on dual-stack / k8s / NAT64 / SRv6 networks where any of these prefixes is internally bound.\n\nThe \"control\" rows confirm the bypass set is minimal \u2014 the validator catches the obvious cases. The bypasses are the cases the prefix list forgot.\n\n### Class 2: redirect amplifier\n\n`$fetch(url, { responseType: \"arrayBuffer\", timeout })` follows 30x by default. Confirmed empirically \u2014 `ofetch(\u0027http://lab.menna.website/test/redirect-to-loopback\u0027)` (where `lab.menna.website` returns `302 Location: http://127.0.0.1/`) ends with `\u003cno response\u003e fetch failed` after the connect attempt to `127.0.0.1:80`, proving the redirect was followed. On a target where the redirect destination has a service bound, the bytes round-trip back through the OG renderer.\n\nSame primitive as #29 / #38 (ipx redirect bypass), in a different validator. The fix recommendations for #29 also apply here, with the same trade-offs.\n\n## Impact\n\nA Nuxt application that uses `nuxt-og-image` (the official-recommended OG generator) and includes any user-influenced URL in an OG component is vulnerable to SSRF that returns the bytes of the internal response as part of the rendered OG image:\n\n- **Class 1 directly:** `\u003cimg src=\"http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:PORT/path\"\u003e` reaches 127.0.0.1 on the OG worker. If the dev\u0027s deployment has anything bound to loopback (admin dashboards, internal HTTP-RPC, Redis HTTP UI, anything running alongside the function on the same machine in self-hosted setups), it leaks.\n- **Class 1 cluster:** the IPv6 cluster ranges trigger only on dual-stack / k8s / NAT64 networks \u2014 but those are exactly the production targets where SSRF matters most.\n- **Class 2 redirect:** any allowed CDN with a redirect rule extends the reach to all RFC 1918 / loopback / link-local space.\n\n`nuxt-og-image` is the OG-image module recommended in Nuxt\u0027s official documentation; it is shipped with Nuxt UI templates and is one of the top-2 Nuxt modules by GitHub stars. The user-facing primitive in real apps is \"title/avatar comes from a request param\" \u2014 exactly the same `\u003cNuxtLink to=\"/og?avatar=...\"\u003e` pattern Nuxt docs encourage.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nThree non-exclusive options:\n\n1. **Replace the hand-rolled IPv6 prefix list with `ipaddr.js`\u0027s `range()` predicate** (or equivalent), then either:\n - explicitly deny the four cluster ranges that `ipaddr.js` currently misses (`fec0::/10`, `5f00::/16`, `3fff::/20`, `64:ff9b:1::/48`), or\n - wait for the `ipaddr.js` upstream patch (see Vercel #27 \u2014 same gap, separately disclosed) and bump.\n - In any case, also catch `[::ffff:7f00:1]` either by widening `RE_MAPPED_V4` or by classifying any `::ffff:` address as the embedded IPv4.\n\n2. **Pass `redirect: \"manual\"` in `$fetch` defaults** and reject 3xx. (Compare `astro:assets`, which already does this \u2014 `await fetch(url, { redirect: \"manual\" })` and explicit 3xx-rejection.)\n\n3. **Pin the validated IP to the connection.** Resolve the hostname once during validation, then pass a custom `undici.Agent` with `connect.lookup` returning the resolved IP only. This closes both the IPv6 bypass class (the resolved IP is checked again) and the redirect class (post-30x lookup is forced to the original IP). Reference: `request-filtering-agent` on npm.\n\n(2) alone closes Class 2. (1) alone closes Class 1. (3) closes both with one change.",
"id": "GHSA-c2rm-g55x-8hr5",
"modified": "2026-05-15T23:44:55Z",
"published": "2026-05-07T20:52:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt-modules/og-image/security/advisories/GHSA-c2rm-g55x-8hr5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44589"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt-modules/og-image"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "nuxt-og-image SSRF \u2014 bypass of GHSA-pqhr-mp3f-hrpp / v6.2.5 fix (IPv6 + redirect)"
}
GHSA-C329-4CX6-V738
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-15 21:31 – Updated: 2026-05-15 21:31CouchCMS 2.2.1 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to make arbitrary HTTP requests by uploading malicious SVG files. Attackers can upload SVG files containing external entity references through the browse.php endpoint to access internal services and resources.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-47958"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T19:16:54Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "CouchCMS 2.2.1 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to make arbitrary HTTP requests by uploading malicious SVG files. Attackers can upload SVG files containing external entity references through the browse.php endpoint to access internal services and resources.",
"id": "GHSA-c329-4cx6-v738",
"modified": "2026-05-15T21:31:32Z",
"published": "2026-05-15T21:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47958"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/CouchCMS/CouchCMS"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/49675"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/couchcms-server-side-request-forgery-via-svg-upload"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-C34J-6JV7-QFWJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:54 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:47The fetch API in Tightrope Media Carousel before 7.1.3 has CarouselAPI/v0/fetch?url= SSRF. This has two potential areas for abuse. First, a specially crafted URL could be used in a phishing attack to hijack the trust the user and the browser have with the website and could serve malicious content from a third-party attacker-controlled system. Second, arguably more severe, is the potential for an attacker to circumvent firewall controls, by proxying traffic, unauthenticated, into the internal network from the internet.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-13020"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-26T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The fetch API in Tightrope Media Carousel before 7.1.3 has CarouselAPI/v0/fetch?url= SSRF. This has two potential areas for abuse. First, a specially crafted URL could be used in a phishing attack to hijack the trust the user and the browser have with the website and could serve malicious content from a third-party attacker-controlled system. Second, arguably more severe, is the potential for an attacker to circumvent firewall controls, by proxying traffic, unauthenticated, into the internal network from the internet.",
"id": "GHSA-c34j-6jv7-qfwj",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:47:18Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:54:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-13020"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.carouselsignage.com/release-notes/carousel-7-1-3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C352-X843-GGPQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-08 15:30 – Updated: 2025-07-18 20:35xxl-job <= 2.4.2 has a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability, which causes low-privileged users to control executor to RCE.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.xuxueli:xxl-job"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-24113"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-02-08T18:42:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-08T13:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "xxl-job \u003c= 2.4.2 has a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability, which causes low-privileged users to control executor to RCE.",
"id": "GHSA-c352-x843-ggpq",
"modified": "2025-07-18T20:35:46Z",
"published": "2024-02-08T15:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24113"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xuxueli/xxl-job/issues/3375"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/xuxueli/xxl-job"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "XXL-JOB vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery"
}
GHSA-C35F-JW99-2P28
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:22 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:22Digital Guardian Management Console 7.1.2.0015 has an SSRF issue that allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via file:// URLs, send TCP traffic to intranet hosts, or obtain an NTLM hash. This can occur even if the logged-in user has a read-only role.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-10174"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-04-20T21:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Digital Guardian Management Console 7.1.2.0015 has an SSRF issue that allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via file:// URLs, send TCP traffic to intranet hosts, or obtain an NTLM hash. This can occur even if the logged-in user has a read-only role.",
"id": "GHSA-c35f-jw99-2p28",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:22:02Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:22:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-10174"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/147260/Digital-Guardian-Management-Console-7.1.2.0015-Server-Side-Request-Forgery.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C35Q-VXRP-PH26
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 15:30 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:18Impact
Nautobot's Webhook data model and associated feature set could be configured by users with sufficient access to perform requests to various hosts and IP addresses that should not be permitted, allowing for various behaviors similar to server-side request forgery (SSRF).
Patches
Fixes are available in Nautobot v2.4.33 and v3.1.2.
In support of this fix, three new settings variables have been added to Nautobot:
WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_SCHEMES- By default new or updatedWebhookrecords will be restricted to HTTP or HTTPS only, disallowing other schemes that may have been previously allowed. Administrators should audit existingWebhookrecords to identify any that are invalid, and either update/delete said records or customizeWEBHOOK_ALLOWED_SCHEMESas appropriate.WEBHOOK_ADDITIONAL_BLOCKED_NETWORKS- This can be used to specify additional IP networks that should be denied toWebhooksending, for example some deployments may wish to disallow RFC1918 addresses or even disallow all networks and carve out specific exemptions using the following setting.WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS- This can be used to provide an allow-list of specific hosts that would otherwise be blocked by anyWEBHOOK_ADDITIONAL_BLOCKED_NETWORKSconfiguration.
Workarounds
Administrators should review which users have been granted add or change permissions for the Webhook data model, and should review currently defined Webhook records for safety and validity. Other than that, no specific workaround has been identified.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nautobot"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0a2"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nautobot"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.33"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44797"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-13T15:30:59Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-28T18:16:33Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nNautobot\u0027s `Webhook` data model and associated feature set could be configured by users with sufficient access to perform requests to various hosts and IP addresses that should not be permitted, allowing for various behaviors similar to server-side request forgery (SSRF).\n\n### Patches\n\nFixes are available in Nautobot v2.4.33 and v3.1.2.\n\nIn support of this fix, three new settings variables have been added to Nautobot:\n\n- `WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_SCHEMES` - By default new or updated `Webhook` records will be restricted to HTTP or HTTPS only, disallowing other schemes that may have been previously allowed. Administrators should audit existing `Webhook` records to identify any that are invalid, and either update/delete said records or customize `WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_SCHEMES` as appropriate.\n- `WEBHOOK_ADDITIONAL_BLOCKED_NETWORKS` - This can be used to specify additional IP networks that should be denied to `Webhook` sending, for example some deployments may wish to disallow RFC1918 addresses or even disallow all networks and carve out specific exemptions using the following setting.\n- `WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS` - This can be used to provide an allow-list of specific hosts that would otherwise be blocked by any `WEBHOOK_ADDITIONAL_BLOCKED_NETWORKS` configuration.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAdministrators should review which users have been granted `add` or `change` permissions for the `Webhook` data model, and should review currently defined `Webhook` records for safety and validity. Other than that, no specific workaround has been identified.\n\n### References\n\n- 2.4.33 (\u003ca href=\"https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/16aa4aa9796ab7a31c4d615ec945e1f16d8c77c4\"\u003epatch\u003c/a\u003e)\n- 3.1.2 (\u003ca href=\"https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/7324c8f0d8c7245fbc691e15d729adc2d2707d08\"\u003epatch\u003c/a\u003e)",
"id": "GHSA-c35q-vxrp-ph26",
"modified": "2026-06-09T10:18:42Z",
"published": "2026-05-13T15:30:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/security/advisories/GHSA-c35q-vxrp-ph26"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44797"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/16aa4aa9796ab7a31c4d615ec945e1f16d8c77c4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/7324c8f0d8c7245fbc691e15d729adc2d2707d08"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/releases/tag/v2.4.33"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/releases/tag/v3.1.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Nautobot: Webhook definitions could be used for server-side request forgery (SSRF)"
}
GHSA-C3C6-GGQG-7CRV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-03 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-03 18:30In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.0.1, 9.4.6, 9.3.8, and 9.2.10, and Splunk Cloud Platform versions below 10.1.2507.4, 10.0.2503.7, and 9.3.2411.116, a user who holds a role that contains the high privilege capability change_authentication could enumerate internal IP addresses and network ports when adding new search peers to a Splunk search head in a distributed environment.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-20388"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-03T17:15:51Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.0.1, 9.4.6, 9.3.8, and 9.2.10, and Splunk Cloud Platform versions below 10.1.2507.4, 10.0.2503.7, and 9.3.2411.116, a user who holds a role that contains the high privilege capability `change_authentication` could enumerate internal IP addresses and network ports when adding new search peers to a Splunk search head in a distributed environment.",
"id": "GHSA-c3c6-ggqg-7crv",
"modified": "2025-12-03T18:30:25Z",
"published": "2025-12-03T18:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-20388"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://advisory.splunk.com/advisories/SVD-2025-1207"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C3CH-22RQ-XFWR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-15 18:35 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:28CVE-2026-43884 fix 603e7bf patched EpgParser.php and plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php to use url_get_contents (redirect-safe). Neither uses the $resolvedIP out-param of isSSRFSafeURL() for DNS pinning via CURLOPT_RESOLVE. Six+ other call sites still discard $resolvedIP, opening DNS-rebinding TOCTOU.
Reference correct pattern at plugin/YPTWallet/YPTWallet.php:1071-1098:
```php $resolvedIP = null; if (isSSRFSafeURL($url, $resolvedIP)) { curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RESOLVE, ["$h
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "WWBN/AVideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "29.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45619"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-15T18:35:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T14:16:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "CVE-2026-43884 fix `603e7bf` patched `EpgParser.php` and `plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php` to use `url_get_contents` (redirect-safe). Neither uses the `$resolvedIP` out-param of `isSSRFSafeURL()` for DNS pinning via `CURLOPT_RESOLVE`. Six+ other call sites still discard `$resolvedIP`, opening DNS-rebinding TOCTOU.\n\nReference correct pattern at `plugin/YPTWallet/YPTWallet.php:1071-1098`:\n\n```php\n$resolvedIP = null;\nif (isSSRFSafeURL($url, $resolvedIP)) {\n curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RESOLVE, [\"$h",
"id": "GHSA-c3ch-22rq-xfwr",
"modified": "2026-06-09T10:28:08Z",
"published": "2026-05-15T18:35:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-c3ch-22rq-xfwr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45619"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2hch-c97c-g99x"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AVideo CVE-2026-43884 incomplete fix - six (or more) `isSSRFSafeURL()` call sites still discard the `$resolvedIP` out-param at master HEAD post-`603e7bf`"
}
GHSA-C3J4-JV4J-WGMF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:32 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:32IBM API Connect v2018.1.0 through v2018.3.4 could allow an attacker to send a specially crafted request to conduct a server side request forgery attack. IBM X-Force ID: 148939.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-1789"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-09-07T15:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "IBM API Connect v2018.1.0 through v2018.3.4 could allow an attacker to send a specially crafted request to conduct a server side request forgery attack. IBM X-Force ID: 148939.",
"id": "GHSA-c3j4-jv4j-wgmf",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:32:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:32:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1789"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148939"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ibm10728517"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery
An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.