CWE-89
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.
27535 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-R284-MXRR-F624
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-02 15:30 – Updated: 2026-05-20 12:30Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability in Ekol Informatics Website Template allows SQL Injection.This issue affects Website Template: through 20231215.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-6436"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-02T13:15:08Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (\u0027SQL Injection\u0027) vulnerability in Ekol Informatics Website Template allows SQL Injection.This issue affects Website Template: through 20231215.",
"id": "GHSA-r284-mxrr-f624",
"modified": "2026-05-20T12:30:35Z",
"published": "2024-01-02T15:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6436"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://siberguvenlik.gov.tr/guvenlik-bildirimleri/detay/tr-24-0001"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.usom.gov.tr/bildirim/tr-24-0001"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R28R-5Q2M-WH2X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:54 – Updated: 2024-03-21 03:33GORM before 1.9.10 allows SQL injection via incomplete parentheses.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-15562"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-26T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "GORM before 1.9.10 allows SQL injection via incomplete parentheses.",
"id": "GHSA-r28r-5q2m-wh2x",
"modified": "2024-03-21T03:33:41Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:54:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-15562"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gorm/gorm/issues/2517#issuecomment-638145427"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gorm/gorm/pull/2519"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gorm/gorm/pull/2674"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jinzhu/gorm/pull/2519"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jinzhu/gorm/releases/tag/v1.9.10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R299-2J2M-9J73
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-22 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-29 00:00Online Railway Reservation System v1.0 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the id parameter at /orrs/admin/trains/manage_train.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-33055"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-21T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Online Railway Reservation System v1.0 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the id parameter at /orrs/admin/trains/manage_train.php.",
"id": "GHSA-r299-2j2m-9j73",
"modified": "2022-06-29T00:00:27Z",
"published": "2022-06-22T00:00:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-33055"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/k0xx11/bug_report/blob/main/vendors/oretnom23/online-railway-reservation-system/SQLi-3.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R29C-P472-3P96
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-22 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-29 00:01The Simple Link Directory WordPress plugin before 7.7.2 does not validate and escape the post_id parameter before using it in a SQL statement via the qcopd_upvote_action AJAX action (available to unauthenticated and authenticated users), leading to an unauthenticated SQL Injection
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-0760"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-21T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The Simple Link Directory WordPress plugin before 7.7.2 does not validate and escape the post_id parameter before using it in a SQL statement via the qcopd_upvote_action AJAX action (available to unauthenticated and authenticated users), leading to an unauthenticated SQL Injection",
"id": "GHSA-r29c-p472-3p96",
"modified": "2022-03-29T00:01:24Z",
"published": "2022-03-22T00:00:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0760"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/2684915"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/1c83ed73-ef02-45c0-a9ab-68a3468d2210"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R2C3-2VCP-2QX5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-08 03:32 – Updated: 2024-02-10 06:30jshERP v3.3 is vulnerable to SQL Injection. The com.jsh.erp.controller.DepotHeadController: com.jsh.erp.utils.BaseResponseInfo findInOutMaterialCount() function of jshERP does not filter column and order parameters well enough, and an attacker can construct malicious payload to bypass jshERP's protection mechanism in safeSqlParse method for sql injection.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-24003"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-08T02:15:07Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "jshERP v3.3 is vulnerable to SQL Injection. The com.jsh.erp.controller.DepotHeadController: com.jsh.erp.utils.BaseResponseInfo findInOutMaterialCount() function of jshERP does not filter `column` and `order` parameters well enough, and an attacker can construct malicious payload to bypass jshERP\u0027s protection mechanism in `safeSqlParse` method for sql injection.",
"id": "GHSA-r2c3-2vcp-2qx5",
"modified": "2024-02-10T06:30:19Z",
"published": "2024-02-08T03:32:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24003"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jishenghua/jshERP/issues/99"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cxcxcxcxcxcxcxc/cxcxcxcxcxcxcxc/blob/main/cxcxcxcxcxc/about-2024/24003.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R2F4-FF2P-XC64
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-28 20:47 – Updated: 2026-07-10 19:08My name is Oscar Uribe, Security Researcher at Fluid Attacks. I am reaching out because we have identified a security vulnerability in Pimcore 12.3.3 that we would like to report to you so we can coordinate a responsible disclosure together.
As part of our standard disclosure measures, we follow a timeline (outlined at https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/policy), which is aligned with ISO/IEC 29147:2018 and ISO/IEC 30111:2019. In short, the timeline works as follows: we ask for acknowledgment of the report within a few days of your first accessing it, and from there, we are happy to coordinate a joint disclosure date with you, typically within 90 days of the initial discovery. This gives your team reasonable time to assess, develop, and release a fix.
We have reserved the CVE ID "CVE-2026-5394" for this issue, and the advisory will eventually be published at https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/dragons. We are committed to coordinating the timing of that publication with you.
Please feel free to reach out if you have any questions about the report, the process, or the timeline. We are glad to work with you on this.
Description
An authenticated administrative user who can import or save DataObject class definitions can inject attacker-controlled composite index metadata and trigger unintended SQL execution in the backend.
The vulnerable flow accepts compositeIndices from imported JSON, stores the values without strict validation, and later concatenates them directly into ALTER TABLE ... DROP INDEX and ALTER TABLE ... ADD INDEX statements executed through Doctrine DBAL.
Although the original report focused on compositeIndices.index_key, independent code review shows that the strongest and most reliable injection point is compositeIndices.index_columns, because it is inserted verbatim inside the ADD INDEX (...) clause. This permits injection of additional ALTER TABLE subclauses against Pimcore object tables without relying on stacked queries.
Vulnerability
Root cause
- Source:
Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition\Service::importClassDefinitionFromJson()acceptscompositeIndicesdirectly from imported JSON.- Assignment:
Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition::setCompositeIndices()does not enforce an allowlist for index names or column names.- The only special handling is a ManyToOne relation rewrite to
__idand__type, which is not a security control. - Sink:
Pimcore\Model\DataObject\Traits\CompositeIndexTrait::updateCompositeIndices()builds raw SQL with string concatenation and executes it via$this->db->executeQuery(...).- Missing protection:
quoteIdentifier()is used for theSHOW INDEXESquery, but not for the dynamicALTER TABLEstatements.- No server-side schema validation restricts
index_keyorindex_columnsto known safe identifier characters.
Confirmed source-to-sink path
importClassDefinitionFromJson()decodes attacker-controlled JSON and forwardscompositeIndices.setCompositeIndices()stores those values without sanitizing identifier content.ClassDefinition::save()reachesClassDefinition\Dao::update().Dao::update()callsupdateCompositeIndices()for:object_store_<classId>object_query_<classId>Localizedfield\Daoalso callsupdateCompositeIndices()for:- localized query tables
- localized store tables
Why this is exploitable
The vulnerable ADD INDEX statement is built as:
'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');'
$columnName is produced from implode(',', $columns) and is not quoted or validated. A malicious index_columns element such as:
slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` --
produces SQL of the form:
ALTER TABLE `object_query_<id>` ADD INDEX `c_poc_idx` (slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- );
This remains a single ALTER TABLE statement, so the base vulnerability does not depend on multi-statement support. The attacker can inject additional DDL clauses affecting the target Pimcore object table.
Impact
The issue allows a privileged attacker to alter backend SQL behavior during class-definition import/save and modify schema on Pimcore object tables associated with the affected class.
Practical impact includes: - unauthorized schema modification on object query/store tables - backend denial of service by breaking expected table layout - data integrity impact for DataObject storage and queries
index_key is also concatenated into SQL without proper identifier escaping, but the most defensible exploitation path is through index_columns.
Relevant code:
- models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Service.php:92-137
- models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php:994-1006
- models/DataObject/Traits/CompositeIndexTrait.php:30-85
- models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Dao.php:217-218
- models/DataObject/Localizedfield/Dao.php:945-951
PoC
Application-level PoC
Preconditions:
- valid authenticated administrative session
- ability to import or save a class definition containing compositeIndices
The original report reproduced the issue through an authenticated Studio endpoint:
POST /pimcore-studio/api/class/definition/configuration-view/detail/1/import
Minimal malicious JSON fragment:
{
"compositeIndices": [
{
"index_key": "poc_idx",
"index_type": "query",
"index_columns": [
"slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- "
]
}
]
}
Reproduction:
1. Authenticate as an administrator with permission to manage/import class definitions.
2. Export an existing class definition or prepare a valid class-definition JSON document.
3. Replace only the compositeIndices section with the payload above.
4. Import the modified definition or save the class through the administrative workflow.
Expected result:
- Pimcore reaches updateCompositeIndices() during class save/import.
- The backend executes an attacker-influenced ALTER TABLE statement against the target object table.
- The affected class table is modified unexpectedly, for example by dropping a column or otherwise changing schema.
Minimal source-level confirmation
The behavior is directly visible from the code path:
$newIndicesMap['c_' . $key] = implode(',', $columns);
$columnName = $newIndicesMap[$key];
$this->db->executeQuery(
'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');'
);
No escaping or allowlist validation is applied to $columns before they are interpolated into SQL.
Evidence of Exploitation
- Video of exploitation:
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/64a49147-12a5-4550-ba22-cb4383523557
- Static evidence:
Our security policy
We have reserved the ID CVE-2026-5394 to refer to this issue from now on.
System Information
Pimcore Platform
Version v12.3.3
Database layer: doctrine/dbal ^4.4
Operating System: Any
References
Github Repository: https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore Security: https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 12.3.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "pimcore/pimcore"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "12.0.0-RC1"
},
{
"fixed": "12.3.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.5.16"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "pimcore/pimcore"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.5.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "pimcore/pimcore"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-5394"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-28T20:47:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "My name is Oscar Uribe, Security Researcher at Fluid Attacks. I am reaching out because we have identified a security vulnerability in Pimcore 12.3.3 that we would like to report to you so we can coordinate a responsible disclosure together.\n\nAs part of our standard disclosure measures, we follow a timeline (outlined at https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/policy), which is aligned with ISO/IEC 29147:2018 and ISO/IEC 30111:2019. In short, the timeline works as follows: we ask for acknowledgment of the report within a few days of your first accessing it, and from there, we are happy to coordinate a joint disclosure date with you, typically within 90 days of the initial discovery. This gives your team reasonable time to assess, develop, and release a fix.\n\nWe have reserved the CVE ID **\"CVE-2026-5394\"** for this issue, and the advisory will eventually be published at [https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/dragons](https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/dragons). We are committed to coordinating the timing of that publication with you.\n\nPlease feel free to reach out if you have any questions about the report, the process, or the timeline. We are glad to work with you on this.\n\n## Description\nAn authenticated administrative user who can import or save DataObject class definitions can inject attacker-controlled composite index metadata and trigger unintended SQL execution in the backend.\n\nThe vulnerable flow accepts `compositeIndices` from imported JSON, stores the values without strict validation, and later concatenates them directly into `ALTER TABLE ... DROP INDEX` and `ALTER TABLE ... ADD INDEX` statements executed through Doctrine DBAL.\n\nAlthough the original report focused on `compositeIndices.index_key`, independent code review shows that the strongest and most reliable injection point is `compositeIndices.index_columns`, because it is inserted verbatim inside the `ADD INDEX (...)` clause. This permits injection of additional `ALTER TABLE` subclauses against Pimcore object tables without relying on stacked queries.\n\n## Vulnerability\n### Root cause\n1. Source:\n - `Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Service::importClassDefinitionFromJson()` accepts `compositeIndices` directly from imported JSON.\n2. Assignment:\n - `Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition::setCompositeIndices()` does not enforce an allowlist for index names or column names.\n - The only special handling is a ManyToOne relation rewrite to `__id` and `__type`, which is not a security control.\n3. Sink:\n - `Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\Traits\\CompositeIndexTrait::updateCompositeIndices()` builds raw SQL with string concatenation and executes it via `$this-\u003edb-\u003eexecuteQuery(...)`.\n4. Missing protection:\n - `quoteIdentifier()` is used for the `SHOW INDEXES` query, but not for the dynamic `ALTER TABLE` statements.\n - No server-side schema validation restricts `index_key` or `index_columns` to known safe identifier characters.\n\n### Confirmed source-to-sink path\n1. `importClassDefinitionFromJson()` decodes attacker-controlled JSON and forwards `compositeIndices`.\n2. `setCompositeIndices()` stores those values without sanitizing identifier content.\n3. `ClassDefinition::save()` reaches `ClassDefinition\\Dao::update()`.\n4. `Dao::update()` calls `updateCompositeIndices()` for:\n - `object_store_\u003cclassId\u003e`\n - `object_query_\u003cclassId\u003e`\n5. `Localizedfield\\Dao` also calls `updateCompositeIndices()` for:\n - localized query tables\n - localized store tables\n\n### Why this is exploitable\nThe vulnerable `ADD INDEX` statement is built as:\n\n```php\n\u0027ALTER TABLE `\u0027.$table.\u0027` ADD INDEX `\u0027 . $key.\u0027` (\u0027.$columnName.\u0027);\u0027\n```\n\n`$columnName` is produced from `implode(\u0027,\u0027, $columns)` and is not quoted or validated. A malicious `index_columns` element such as:\n\n```text\nslider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- \n```\n\nproduces SQL of the form:\n\n```sql\nALTER TABLE `object_query_\u003cid\u003e` ADD INDEX `c_poc_idx` (slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- );\n```\n\nThis remains a single `ALTER TABLE` statement, so the base vulnerability does not depend on multi-statement support. The attacker can inject additional DDL clauses affecting the target Pimcore object table.\n\n### Impact\nThe issue allows a privileged attacker to alter backend SQL behavior during class-definition import/save and modify schema on Pimcore object tables associated with the affected class.\n\nPractical impact includes:\n- unauthorized schema modification on object query/store tables\n- backend denial of service by breaking expected table layout\n- data integrity impact for DataObject storage and queries\n\n`index_key` is also concatenated into SQL without proper identifier escaping, but the most defensible exploitation path is through `index_columns`.\n\nRelevant code:\n- `models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Service.php:92-137`\n- `models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php:994-1006`\n- `models/DataObject/Traits/CompositeIndexTrait.php:30-85`\n- `models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Dao.php:217-218`\n- `models/DataObject/Localizedfield/Dao.php:945-951`\n\n## PoC\n### Application-level PoC\nPreconditions:\n- valid authenticated administrative session\n- ability to import or save a class definition containing `compositeIndices`\n\nThe original report reproduced the issue through an authenticated Studio endpoint:\n\n```http\nPOST /pimcore-studio/api/class/definition/configuration-view/detail/1/import\n```\n\nMinimal malicious JSON fragment:\n\n```json\n{\n \"compositeIndices\": [\n {\n \"index_key\": \"poc_idx\",\n \"index_type\": \"query\",\n \"index_columns\": [\n \"slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- \"\n ]\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\nReproduction:\n1. Authenticate as an administrator with permission to manage/import class definitions.\n2. Export an existing class definition or prepare a valid class-definition JSON document.\n3. Replace only the `compositeIndices` section with the payload above.\n4. Import the modified definition or save the class through the administrative workflow.\n\nExpected result:\n- Pimcore reaches `updateCompositeIndices()` during class save/import.\n- The backend executes an attacker-influenced `ALTER TABLE` statement against the target object table.\n- The affected class table is modified unexpectedly, for example by dropping a column or otherwise changing schema.\n\n### Minimal source-level confirmation\nThe behavior is directly visible from the code path:\n\n```php\n$newIndicesMap[\u0027c_\u0027 . $key] = implode(\u0027,\u0027, $columns);\n$columnName = $newIndicesMap[$key];\n$this-\u003edb-\u003eexecuteQuery(\n \u0027ALTER TABLE `\u0027.$table.\u0027` ADD INDEX `\u0027 . $key.\u0027` (\u0027.$columnName.\u0027);\u0027\n);\n```\n\nNo escaping or allowlist validation is applied to `$columns` before they are interpolated into SQL.\n\n## Evidence of Exploitation\n\n- Video of exploitation:\n\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/64a49147-12a5-4550-ba22-cb4383523557\n\n- Static evidence:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"3004\" height=\"1686\" alt=\"Dragons-img\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2e920636-ce7e-4f8b-b80c-88fb3c4c5299\" /\u003e\n\n## Our security policy\nWe have reserved the ID CVE-2026-5394 to refer to this issue from now on.\n\n[Disclosure policy](https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/policy)\n\n## System Information\nPimcore Platform\nVersion `v12.3.3`\nDatabase layer: `doctrine/dbal` `^4.4`\nOperating System: Any\n\n## References\nGithub Repository: https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore\nSecurity: https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security",
"id": "GHSA-r2f4-ff2p-xc64",
"modified": "2026-07-10T19:08:01Z",
"published": "2026-05-28T20:47:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/GHSA-r2f4-ff2p-xc64"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5394"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/pull/19108"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/commit/6df625ff74015dc11f4bbe76170ce45bbd5dd61d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fluidattacks.com/es/advisories/dragons"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/releases/tag/v12.3.7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Pimcore Platform - SQL Injection in DataObject composite index handling during class definition import/save"
}
GHSA-R2G9-MQFM-6GVV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:19 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:19SQL injection vulnerability in ejemplo/paises.php in isiAJAX 1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the id parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-0881"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-03-12T15:20:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SQL injection vulnerability in ejemplo/paises.php in isiAJAX 1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the id parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-r2g9-mqfm-6gvv",
"modified": "2022-05-02T03:19:05Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:19:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-0881"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/49113"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/8167"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-R2GP-PPPJ-C93J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:48 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:48School Equipment Monitoring System 1.0 allows SQL injection via the login screen, related to include/user.vb.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-18806"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-11-16T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "School Equipment Monitoring System 1.0 allows SQL injection via the login screen, related to include/user.vb.",
"id": "GHSA-r2gp-pppj-c93j",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:48:06Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:48:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-18806"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/149996/School-Equipment-Monitoring-System-1.0-SQL-Injection.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R2HG-9RVC-4FMW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-23 21:31 – Updated: 2025-06-23 21:31A vulnerability classified as critical was found in code-projects Simple Pizza Ordering System 1.0. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /addcatexec.php. The manipulation of the argument textfield leads to sql injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-6480"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-74",
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-22T15:15:20Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability classified as critical was found in code-projects Simple Pizza Ordering System 1.0. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /addcatexec.php. The manipulation of the argument textfield leads to sql injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-r2hg-9rvc-4fmw",
"modified": "2025-06-23T21:31:50Z",
"published": "2025-06-23T21:31:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6480"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rom4j/cve/issues/2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://code-projects.org"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.313588"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.313588"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.600684"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-R2HM-C5MG-67WP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-21 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:47Phpjabbers PHP Shopping Cart 4.2 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the id parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-43274"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-21T14:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Phpjabbers PHP Shopping Cart 4.2 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the id parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-r2hm-c5mg-67wp",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:47:38Z",
"published": "2023-09-21T15:30:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43274"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nu11secur1ty/CVE-nu11secur1ty/tree/main/vendors/phpjabbers/2023/PHP-Shopping-Cart-4.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
- Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
- While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
- Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the "'" apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded.
- When feasible, it may be safest to disallow meta-characters entirely, instead of escaping them. This will provide some defense in depth. After the data is entered into the database, later processes may neglect to escape meta-characters before use, and you may not have control over those processes.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-109: Object Relational Mapping Injection
An attacker leverages a weakness present in the database access layer code generated with an Object Relational Mapping (ORM) tool or a weakness in the way that a developer used a persistence framework to inject their own SQL commands to be executed against the underlying database. The attack here is similar to plain SQL injection, except that the application does not use JDBC to directly talk to the database, but instead it uses a data access layer generated by an ORM tool or framework (e.g. Hibernate). While most of the time code generated by an ORM tool contains safe access methods that are immune to SQL injection, sometimes either due to some weakness in the generated code or due to the fact that the developer failed to use the generated access methods properly, SQL injection is still possible.
CAPEC-110: SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering
An attacker modifies the parameters of the SOAP message that is sent from the service consumer to the service provider to initiate a SQL injection attack. On the service provider side, the SOAP message is parsed and parameters are not properly validated before being used to access a database in a way that does not use parameter binding, thus enabling the attacker to control the structure of the executed SQL query. This pattern describes a SQL injection attack with the delivery mechanism being a SOAP message.
CAPEC-470: Expanding Control over the Operating System from the Database
An attacker is able to leverage access gained to the database to read / write data to the file system, compromise the operating system, create a tunnel for accessing the host machine, and use this access to potentially attack other machines on the same network as the database machine. Traditionally SQL injections attacks are viewed as a way to gain unauthorized read access to the data stored in the database, modify the data in the database, delete the data, etc. However, almost every data base management system (DBMS) system includes facilities that if compromised allow an attacker complete access to the file system, operating system, and full access to the host running the database. The attacker can then use this privileged access to launch subsequent attacks. These facilities include dropping into a command shell, creating user defined functions that can call system level libraries present on the host machine, stored procedures, etc.
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the application intended. SQL Injection results from failure of the application to appropriately validate input.
CAPEC-7: Blind SQL Injection
Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.