CWE-89
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.
27482 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-3X4Q-669M-Q5VC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-24 12:30 – Updated: 2024-12-24 12:30The Appointment Booking Calendar Plugin and Scheduling Plugin – BookingPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the 'category' parameter of the 'bookingpress_form' shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.21 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-11726"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-24T11:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Appointment Booking Calendar Plugin and Scheduling Plugin \u2013 BookingPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the \u0027category\u0027 parameter of the \u0027bookingpress_form\u0027 shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.21 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.",
"id": "GHSA-3x4q-669m-q5vc",
"modified": "2024-12-24T12:30:42Z",
"published": "2024-12-24T12:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3206780/bookingpress-appointment-booking/trunk/core/classes/frontend/class.bookingpress_appointment_bookings.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/6d081b89-1b98-4f4f-8728-d1ea676d7afd?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3X5M-CPRF-M4F4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-22 00:00 – Updated: 2022-01-27 00:02MCMS v5.2.4 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via /ms/mdiy/model/importJson.do.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-23314"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-21T00:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "MCMS v5.2.4 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via /ms/mdiy/model/importJson.do.",
"id": "GHSA-3x5m-cprf-m4f4",
"modified": "2022-01-27T00:02:03Z",
"published": "2022-01-22T00:00:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23314"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitee.com/mingSoft/MCMS/issues/I4Q4OT"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-3X5R-5VR4-PH83
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-31 00:00 – Updated: 2022-09-02 00:01Library Management System v1.0 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the id parameter at /staff/edit_book_details.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-36709"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-30T00:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Library Management System v1.0 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the id parameter at /staff/edit_book_details.php.",
"id": "GHSA-3x5r-5vr4-ph83",
"modified": "2022-09-02T00:01:14Z",
"published": "2022-08-31T00:00:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36709"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/k0xx11/bug_report/blob/main/vendors/kingbhob02/library-management-system/SQLi-6.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3X62-5WXC-9C6P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:10 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:10Roxy-WI through 5.2.2.0 allows authenticated SQL injection via select_servers.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-38168"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-07T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Roxy-WI through 5.2.2.0 allows authenticated SQL injection via select_servers.",
"id": "GHSA-3x62-5wxc-9c6p",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:10:20Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:10:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38168"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hap-wi/roxy-wi/issues/285"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-3X67-4C2C-W45M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-16 21:19 – Updated: 2026-03-20 21:19Summary
The MyList configuration feature in Admidio allows authenticated users to define custom list column layouts. User-supplied column names, sort directions, and filter conditions are stored in the adm_list_columns table via prepared statements (safe storage), but are later read back and interpolated directly into dynamically constructed SQL queries without sanitization or parameterization. This is a classic second-order SQL injection: safe write, unsafe read.
An attacker can inject arbitrary SQL through these stored values to read, modify, or delete any data in the database, potentially achieving full database compromise.
Details
Step 1: Storing the Payload (Safe Write)
In modules/groups-roles/mylist_function.php (lines 89-115), user-supplied POST array values for column names, sort directions, and filter conditions are accepted. The only validation on column values is a prefix check (must start with usr_ or mem_). Sort and condition values have no validation at all. These values are stored in the database via ListConfiguration::addColumn() which calls Entity::save() using prepared statements -- so the INSERT/UPDATE is safe.
Key source file references:
- D:\bugcrowd\admidio\repo\modules\groups-roles\mylist_function.php lines 89-115
- D:\bugcrowd\admidio\repo\src\Roles\Entity\ListConfiguration.php lines 106-116
Step 2: Triggering the Payload (Unsafe Read)
When the list is viewed (via lists_show.php), ListConfiguration::getSql() reads the stored values and interpolates them directly into SQL in four locations:
Injection Point 1 -- lsc_special_field in SELECT clause:
File D:\bugcrowd\admidio\repo\src\Roles\Entity\ListConfiguration.php lines 739-770.
The lsc_special_field value is read from the database and used as a column name in the SELECT clause. Only three values (mem_duration, mem_begin, mem_end) get special handling; all others fall through to the default case where the raw value is used directly as both $dbColumnName and $sqlColumnName, then interpolated into the SQL as $dbColumnName AS $sqlColumnName.
Injection Point 2 -- lsc_sort in ORDER BY clause:
File D:\bugcrowd\admidio\repo\src\Roles\Entity\ListConfiguration.php lines 790-792.
The lsc_sort value is appended directly after the column name in the ORDER BY clause.
Injection Point 3 -- lsc_special_field in search conditions:
File D:\bugcrowd\admidio\repo\src\Roles\Entity\ListConfiguration.php lines 611-621.
The lsc_special_field value is interpolated into COALESCE() expressions used in search WHERE conditions.
Injection Point 4 -- lsc_filter via ConditionParser:
File D:\bugcrowd\admidio\repo\src\Roles\ValueObject\ConditionParser.php line 347.
The ConditionParser appends raw characters from the stored filter value to the SQL string. A single quote can break out of the SQL string context.
Root Cause
The addColumn() method and mylist_function.php accept arbitrary strings for column names, sort directions, and filter conditions. The only gate for column names is a prefix check (usr_ or mem_), which is trivially satisfied by an attacker (e.g., usr_id) UNION SELECT ...). No allowlist of valid column names exists. No server-side validation of sort values exists (should only allow ASC/DESC/empty). The frontend <select> element only offers ASC/DESC, but this is trivially bypassed by POSTing arbitrary values.
PoC
Prerequisites: Logged-in user with list edit permission (default: all logged-in users).
Step 1: Save a list config with SQL injection in lsc_special_field
curl -X POST "https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/groups-roles/mylist_function.php?mode=save_temporary" \
-H "Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=<session>" \
-d "adm_csrf_token=<csrf_token>" \
-d "column[]=usr_login_name" \
-d "column[]=usr_id FROM adm_users)--" \
-d "sort[]=" \
-d "sort[]=" \
-d "condition[]=" \
-d "condition[]=" \
-d "sel_roles[]=<valid_role_uuid>"
The second column value usr_id FROM adm_users)-- starts with usr_ so it passes the prefix check. When read back in getSql(), it is interpolated directly as a column expression in the SQL SELECT clause.
Step 2: Sort-based injection (simpler, no prefix check needed)
curl -X POST "https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/groups-roles/mylist_function.php?mode=save_temporary" \
-H "Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=<session>" \
-d "adm_csrf_token=<csrf_token>" \
-d "column[]=usr_login_name" \
-d "sort[]=ASC,(SELECT+CASE+WHEN+(1=1)+THEN+1+ELSE+1/0+END)" \
-d "condition[]=" \
-d "sel_roles[]=<valid_role_uuid>"
This injects into the ORDER BY clause. The sort value has zero server-side validation.
Step 3: The save_temporary mode automatically redirects to lists_show.php which calls ListConfiguration::getSql(), executing the injected SQL.
Impact
- Data Exfiltration: An attacker can extract any data from the database including password hashes, email addresses, personal data of all members, and application configuration.
- Data Modification: With stacked queries (supported by MySQL with PDO), the attacker can modify or delete data.
- Privilege Escalation: Password hashes can be extracted and cracked, or admin accounts can be directly modified.
- Full Database Compromise: The entire database is accessible through this vulnerability.
The attack requires authentication and CSRF token, but:
1. Any logged-in user has this permission by default (when groups_roles_edit_lists = 1).
2. The CSRF token is available in the same session.
3. The injected payload persists in the database and triggers every time anyone views the list.
Recommended Fix
Fix 1: Allowlist for lsc_special_field
Add a strict allowlist of valid special field names before calling addColumn() in mylist_function.php. The list should match exactly the field names supported in getSql() and the JavaScript on mylist.php.
Fix 2: Validate lsc_sort values
In ListConfiguration::addColumn(), validate that the sort parameter is one of ASC, DESC, or empty string before storing it.
Fix 3: Defense-in-depth validation in ListConfiguration::getSql()
Also validate the lsc_special_field value against an allowlist in getSql() before interpolating it into the SQL string. This protects against payloads already stored in the database.
Fix 4: Escape filter values in ConditionParser
Use parameterized queries or at minimum escape single quotes in ConditionParser::makeSqlStatement().
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.0.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "admidio/admidio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32813"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-16T21:19:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T02:16:35Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe MyList configuration feature in Admidio allows authenticated users to define custom list column layouts. User-supplied column names, sort directions, and filter conditions are stored in the `adm_list_columns` table via prepared statements (safe storage), but are later read back and interpolated directly into dynamically constructed SQL queries without sanitization or parameterization. This is a classic second-order SQL injection: safe write, unsafe read.\n\nAn attacker can inject arbitrary SQL through these stored values to read, modify, or delete any data in the database, potentially achieving full database compromise.\n\n## Details\n\n### Step 1: Storing the Payload (Safe Write)\n\nIn `modules/groups-roles/mylist_function.php` (lines 89-115), user-supplied POST array values for column names, sort directions, and filter conditions are accepted. The only validation on column values is a prefix check (must start with `usr_` or `mem_`). Sort and condition values have no validation at all. These values are stored in the database via `ListConfiguration::addColumn()` which calls `Entity::save()` using prepared statements -- so the INSERT/UPDATE is safe.\n\nKey source file references:\n- `D:\\bugcrowd\\admidio\\repo\\modules\\groups-roles\\mylist_function.php` lines 89-115\n- `D:\\bugcrowd\\admidio\\repo\\src\\Roles\\Entity\\ListConfiguration.php` lines 106-116\n\n### Step 2: Triggering the Payload (Unsafe Read)\n\nWhen the list is viewed (via `lists_show.php`), `ListConfiguration::getSql()` reads the stored values and interpolates them directly into SQL in four locations:\n\n**Injection Point 1 -- lsc_special_field in SELECT clause:**\nFile `D:\\bugcrowd\\admidio\\repo\\src\\Roles\\Entity\\ListConfiguration.php` lines 739-770.\nThe `lsc_special_field` value is read from the database and used as a column name in the SELECT clause. Only three values (`mem_duration`, `mem_begin`, `mem_end`) get special handling; all others fall through to the `default` case where the raw value is used directly as both `$dbColumnName` and `$sqlColumnName`, then interpolated into the SQL as `$dbColumnName AS $sqlColumnName`.\n\n**Injection Point 2 -- lsc_sort in ORDER BY clause:**\nFile `D:\\bugcrowd\\admidio\\repo\\src\\Roles\\Entity\\ListConfiguration.php` lines 790-792.\nThe `lsc_sort` value is appended directly after the column name in the ORDER BY clause.\n\n**Injection Point 3 -- lsc_special_field in search conditions:**\nFile `D:\\bugcrowd\\admidio\\repo\\src\\Roles\\Entity\\ListConfiguration.php` lines 611-621.\nThe `lsc_special_field` value is interpolated into COALESCE() expressions used in search WHERE conditions.\n\n**Injection Point 4 -- lsc_filter via ConditionParser:**\nFile `D:\\bugcrowd\\admidio\\repo\\src\\Roles\\ValueObject\\ConditionParser.php` line 347.\nThe ConditionParser appends raw characters from the stored filter value to the SQL string. A single quote can break out of the SQL string context.\n\n### Root Cause\n\nThe `addColumn()` method and `mylist_function.php` accept arbitrary strings for column names, sort directions, and filter conditions. The only gate for column names is a prefix check (`usr_` or `mem_`), which is trivially satisfied by an attacker (e.g., `usr_id) UNION SELECT ...`). No allowlist of valid column names exists. No server-side validation of sort values exists (should only allow ASC/DESC/empty). The frontend `\u003cselect\u003e` element only offers ASC/DESC, but this is trivially bypassed by POSTing arbitrary values.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** Logged-in user with list edit permission (default: all logged-in users).\n\n**Step 1: Save a list config with SQL injection in lsc_special_field**\n\n```\ncurl -X POST \"https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/groups-roles/mylist_function.php?mode=save_temporary\" \\\n -H \"Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=\u003csession\u003e\" \\\n -d \"adm_csrf_token=\u003ccsrf_token\u003e\" \\\n -d \"column[]=usr_login_name\" \\\n -d \"column[]=usr_id FROM adm_users)--\" \\\n -d \"sort[]=\" \\\n -d \"sort[]=\" \\\n -d \"condition[]=\" \\\n -d \"condition[]=\" \\\n -d \"sel_roles[]=\u003cvalid_role_uuid\u003e\"\n```\n\nThe second column value `usr_id FROM adm_users)--` starts with `usr_` so it passes the prefix check. When read back in `getSql()`, it is interpolated directly as a column expression in the SQL SELECT clause.\n\n**Step 2: Sort-based injection (simpler, no prefix check needed)**\n\n```\ncurl -X POST \"https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/groups-roles/mylist_function.php?mode=save_temporary\" \\\n -H \"Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=\u003csession\u003e\" \\\n -d \"adm_csrf_token=\u003ccsrf_token\u003e\" \\\n -d \"column[]=usr_login_name\" \\\n -d \"sort[]=ASC,(SELECT+CASE+WHEN+(1=1)+THEN+1+ELSE+1/0+END)\" \\\n -d \"condition[]=\" \\\n -d \"sel_roles[]=\u003cvalid_role_uuid\u003e\"\n```\n\nThis injects into the ORDER BY clause. The sort value has zero server-side validation.\n\n**Step 3:** The `save_temporary` mode automatically redirects to `lists_show.php` which calls `ListConfiguration::getSql()`, executing the injected SQL.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Data Exfiltration:** An attacker can extract any data from the database including password hashes, email addresses, personal data of all members, and application configuration.\n- **Data Modification:** With stacked queries (supported by MySQL with PDO), the attacker can modify or delete data.\n- **Privilege Escalation:** Password hashes can be extracted and cracked, or admin accounts can be directly modified.\n- **Full Database Compromise:** The entire database is accessible through this vulnerability.\n\nThe attack requires authentication and CSRF token, but:\n1. Any logged-in user has this permission by default (when `groups_roles_edit_lists = 1`).\n2. The CSRF token is available in the same session.\n3. The injected payload persists in the database and triggers every time anyone views the list.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n### Fix 1: Allowlist for lsc_special_field\n\nAdd a strict allowlist of valid special field names before calling `addColumn()` in `mylist_function.php`. The list should match exactly the field names supported in `getSql()` and the JavaScript on `mylist.php`.\n\n### Fix 2: Validate lsc_sort values\n\nIn `ListConfiguration::addColumn()`, validate that the sort parameter is one of ASC, DESC, or empty string before storing it.\n\n### Fix 3: Defense-in-depth validation in ListConfiguration::getSql()\n\nAlso validate the `lsc_special_field` value against an allowlist in `getSql()` before interpolating it into the SQL string. This protects against payloads already stored in the database.\n\n### Fix 4: Escape filter values in ConditionParser\n\nUse parameterized queries or at minimum escape single quotes in `ConditionParser::makeSqlStatement()`.",
"id": "GHSA-3x67-4c2c-w45m",
"modified": "2026-03-20T21:19:34Z",
"published": "2026-03-16T21:19:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-3x67-4c2c-w45m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32813"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/commit/3473bf5a7aa1bfc5043e73979719396276f4189f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Admidio has a Second-Order SQL Injection via List Configuration (lsc_special_field, lsc_sort, lsc_filter)"
}
GHSA-3X6W-4V79-6W3X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 04:04 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:49Advance Online Learning Management Script 3.1 has SQL Injection via the courselist.php subcatid or popcourseid parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-17599"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-12-13T09:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Advance Online Learning Management Script 3.1 has SQL Injection via the courselist.php subcatid or popcourseid parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-3x6w-4v79-6w3x",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:49:55Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T04:04:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-17599"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/145300/Advance-Online-Learning-Management-Script-3.1-SQL-Injection.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43264"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3X74-43V8-RVP5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:38 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:38In /framework/modules/notfound/controllers/notfoundController.php of Exponent CMS 2.4.0 patch1, untrusted input is passed into getSearchResults. The method getSearchResults is defined in the search model with the parameter '$term' used directly in SQL. Impact is a SQL injection.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-9287"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2016-11-15T11:59:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In /framework/modules/notfound/controllers/notfoundController.php of Exponent CMS 2.4.0 patch1, untrusted input is passed into getSearchResults. The method getSearchResults is defined in the search model with the parameter \u0027$term\u0027 used directly in SQL. Impact is a SQL injection.",
"id": "GHSA-3x74-43v8-rvp5",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:38:38Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:38:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-9287"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/exponentcms/exponent-cms/commit/4327ea96b3de89440693e06d03038121aa1fdcea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/94322"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3X88-87X6-RHC4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:12 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:12An issue was discovered in Form Tools through 3.0.20. SQL Injection can occur via the export_group_id field when a low-privileged user (client) tries to export a form with data, e.g., manipulation of modules/export_manager/export.php?export_group_id=1&export_group_1_results=all&export_type_id=1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-38145"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-31T05:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Form Tools through 3.0.20. SQL Injection can occur via the export_group_id field when a low-privileged user (client) tries to export a form with data, e.g., manipulation of modules/export_manager/export.php?export_group_id=1\u0026export_group_1_results=all\u0026export_type_id=1.",
"id": "GHSA-3x88-87x6-rhc4",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:12:39Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:12:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38145"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bernardofsr.github.io/blog/2021/form-tools"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bernardofsr/CVEs-With-PoC/blob/main/PoCs/Form%20Tools/README.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/formtools/core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.formtools.org"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-3X9M-QXJ4-GFF3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-31 15:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 15:30Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability in CRM Perks Database for Contact Form 7, WPforms, Elementor forms contact-form-entries allows SQL Injection.This issue affects Database for Contact Form 7, WPforms, Elementor forms: from n/a through 1.3.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-31212"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-31T15:15:08Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (\u0027SQL Injection\u0027) vulnerability in CRM Perks Database for Contact Form 7, WPforms, Elementor forms contact-form-entries allows SQL Injection.This issue affects Database for Contact Form 7, WPforms, Elementor forms: from n/a through 1.3.0.",
"id": "GHSA-3x9m-qxj4-gff3",
"modified": "2026-04-28T15:30:30Z",
"published": "2023-10-31T15:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-31212"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/contact-form-entries/vulnerability/wordpress-contact-form-entries-plugin-1-3-0-auth-sql-injection-sqli-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/contact-form-entries/wordpress-contact-form-entries-plugin-1-3-0-auth-sql-injection-sqli-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3XCQ-8MJW-H6MX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 20:02 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:44Summary of CVE-2026-22599 Vulnerability Details
- CVE: CVE-2026-22599
- CVSS v3.1 Vector:
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N(9.3 — Critical) - Affected Versions:
@strapi/content-type-builder<=5.33.1 (v5),@strapi/plugin-content-type-builder<=4.26.0 (v4) - How to Patch: Immediately update your Strapi to >=5.33.2 (v5) or >=4.26.1 (v4)
Description of CVE-2026-22599
A database-query injection vulnerability existed in the Strapi Content-Type Builder write API. An authenticated administrator could inject arbitrary database statements through the column.defaultTo attribute when creating or modifying a content type. Setting defaultTo as a tuple [value, { isRaw: true }] caused the value to be passed directly into Knex's db.connection.raw() during schema migration without sanitization, allowing arbitrary statement execution at the database layer. Depending on the database engine, this enabled arbitrary file read via database utility functions, denial of service via forced server crash on schema-migration error, and on engines that permit external program execution, remote code execution against the database server.
The patch addresses this by restricting all Content-Type Builder write APIs to development mode only. Production deployments running v5.33.2 or later return 404 for requests against /content-type-builder/content-types and related endpoints, removing the network-reachable attack surface entirely.
IoC's for CVE-2026-22599
Indicators that an instance running an unpatched version may have been exploited:
- HTTP access logs containing POST or PUT requests to
/content-type-builder/content-typesfrom a non-internal source. Regex pattern:(POST|PUT)\s+/content-type-builder/ - Database server logs containing unexpected DEFAULT clause values that reference filesystem-access or program-execution helper functions of your database engine
- Strapi server crashes immediately following a content-type creation or update, observed as the Node process exiting during the schema-migration step
- Files appearing under unexpected paths on the database host that match content-type DEFAULT values from the application
- Newly-created content-types named or shaped to extract specific data (attribute names like
passwd,etc,env,config)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@strapi/content-type-builder"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.33.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@strapi/plugin-content-type-builder"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.26.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22599"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-13T20:02:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T19:16:29Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary of CVE-2026-22599 Vulnerability Details\n\n- CVE: CVE-2026-22599\n- CVSS v3.1 Vector: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N` (9.3 \u2014 Critical)\n- Affected Versions: `@strapi/content-type-builder` \u003c=5.33.1 (v5), `@strapi/plugin-content-type-builder` \u003c=4.26.0 (v4)\n- How to Patch: Immediately update your Strapi to \u003e=5.33.2 (v5) or \u003e=4.26.1 (v4)\n\n### Description of CVE-2026-22599\n\nA database-query injection vulnerability existed in the Strapi Content-Type Builder write API. An authenticated administrator could inject arbitrary database statements through the `column.defaultTo` attribute when creating or modifying a content type. Setting `defaultTo` as a tuple `[value, { isRaw: true }]` caused the value to be passed directly into Knex\u0027s `db.connection.raw()` during schema migration without sanitization, allowing arbitrary statement execution at the database layer. Depending on the database engine, this enabled arbitrary file read via database utility functions, denial of service via forced server crash on schema-migration error, and on engines that permit external program execution, remote code execution against the database server.\n\nThe patch addresses this by restricting all Content-Type Builder write APIs to development mode only. Production deployments running v5.33.2 or later return 404 for requests against `/content-type-builder/content-types` and related endpoints, removing the network-reachable attack surface entirely.\n\n### IoC\u0027s for CVE-2026-22599\n\nIndicators that an instance running an unpatched version may have been exploited:\n\n- HTTP access logs containing POST or PUT requests to `/content-type-builder/content-types` from a non-internal source. Regex pattern: `(POST|PUT)\\s+/content-type-builder/`\n- Database server logs containing unexpected DEFAULT clause values that reference filesystem-access or program-execution helper functions of your database engine\n- Strapi server crashes immediately following a content-type creation or update, observed as the Node process exiting during the schema-migration step\n- Files appearing under unexpected paths on the database host that match content-type DEFAULT values from the application\n- Newly-created content-types named or shaped to extract specific data (attribute names like `passwd`, `etc`, `env`, `config`)",
"id": "GHSA-3xcq-8mjw-h6mx",
"modified": "2026-05-15T23:44:24Z",
"published": "2026-05-13T20:02:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/security/advisories/GHSA-3xcq-8mjw-h6mx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22599"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/releases/tag/v4.26.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/releases/tag/v5.33.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Strapi Vulnerable to SQL Injection in Content Type Builder"
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
- Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
- While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
- Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the "'" apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded.
- When feasible, it may be safest to disallow meta-characters entirely, instead of escaping them. This will provide some defense in depth. After the data is entered into the database, later processes may neglect to escape meta-characters before use, and you may not have control over those processes.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-109: Object Relational Mapping Injection
An attacker leverages a weakness present in the database access layer code generated with an Object Relational Mapping (ORM) tool or a weakness in the way that a developer used a persistence framework to inject their own SQL commands to be executed against the underlying database. The attack here is similar to plain SQL injection, except that the application does not use JDBC to directly talk to the database, but instead it uses a data access layer generated by an ORM tool or framework (e.g. Hibernate). While most of the time code generated by an ORM tool contains safe access methods that are immune to SQL injection, sometimes either due to some weakness in the generated code or due to the fact that the developer failed to use the generated access methods properly, SQL injection is still possible.
CAPEC-110: SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering
An attacker modifies the parameters of the SOAP message that is sent from the service consumer to the service provider to initiate a SQL injection attack. On the service provider side, the SOAP message is parsed and parameters are not properly validated before being used to access a database in a way that does not use parameter binding, thus enabling the attacker to control the structure of the executed SQL query. This pattern describes a SQL injection attack with the delivery mechanism being a SOAP message.
CAPEC-470: Expanding Control over the Operating System from the Database
An attacker is able to leverage access gained to the database to read / write data to the file system, compromise the operating system, create a tunnel for accessing the host machine, and use this access to potentially attack other machines on the same network as the database machine. Traditionally SQL injections attacks are viewed as a way to gain unauthorized read access to the data stored in the database, modify the data in the database, delete the data, etc. However, almost every data base management system (DBMS) system includes facilities that if compromised allow an attacker complete access to the file system, operating system, and full access to the host running the database. The attacker can then use this privileged access to launch subsequent attacks. These facilities include dropping into a command shell, creating user defined functions that can call system level libraries present on the host machine, stored procedures, etc.
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the application intended. SQL Injection results from failure of the application to appropriately validate input.
CAPEC-7: Blind SQL Injection
Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.