Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-863

Allowed-with-Review

Incorrect Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

5818 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-89FJ-J4J5-CH8F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:20 – Updated: 2022-10-27 19:00
VLAI
Details

An improper access control vulnerability was reported in some Motorola-branded Binatone Hubble Cameras which could allow an unauthenticated attacker on the same network as the device to access administrative pages that could result in information disclosure or device firmware update with verified firmware.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-3793"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-11-12T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An improper access control vulnerability was reported in some Motorola-branded Binatone Hubble Cameras which could allow an unauthenticated attacker on the same network as the device to access administrative pages that could result in information disclosure or device firmware update with verified firmware.",
  "id": "GHSA-89fj-j4j5-ch8f",
  "modified": "2022-10-27T19:00:29Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:20:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3793"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://binatoneglobal.com/security-advisory"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-89H5-3M3X-C8HJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-19 00:30 – Updated: 2022-11-23 15:30
VLAI
Details

Block BYPASS vulnerability in iQ Block Country plugin <= 1.2.18 on WordPress.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-41155"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-11-19T00:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Block BYPASS vulnerability in iQ Block Country plugin \u003c= 1.2.18 on WordPress.",
  "id": "GHSA-89h5-3m3x-c8hj",
  "modified": "2022-11-23T15:30:23Z",
  "published": "2022-11-19T00:30:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-41155"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/iq-block-country/wordpress-iq-block-country-plugin-1-2-18-block-bypass-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/iq-block-country/#developers"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-89Q6-98XX-4FFW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-17 14:26 – Updated: 2024-07-22 16:54
VLAI
Summary
Silverstripe Reports are still accessible even when `canView()` returns false
Details

Reports can be accessed by their direct URL by any user who has access to view the reports admin section, even if the canView() method for that report returns false.

References

  • https://www.silverstripe.org/download/security-releases/cve-2024-29885
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "silverstripe/reports"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-29885"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-17T14:26:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-17T20:15:05Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Reports can be accessed by their direct URL by any user who has access to view the reports admin section, even if the `canView()` method for that report returns `false`.\n\n## References\n- https://www.silverstripe.org/download/security-releases/cve-2024-29885\n",
  "id": "GHSA-89q6-98xx-4ffw",
  "modified": "2024-07-22T16:54:50Z",
  "published": "2024-07-17T14:26:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverstripe/silverstripe-reports/security/advisories/GHSA-89q6-98xx-4ffw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-29885"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverstripe/silverstripe-reports/commit/0351106c18ad4246d983b5f4e082c09c382121f4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/silverstripe/reports/CVE-2024-29885.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverstripe/silverstripe-reports"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.silverstripe.org/download/security-releases/cve-2024-29885"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Silverstripe Reports are still accessible even when `canView()` returns false"
}

GHSA-89XV-GH3P-MRVG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-27 03:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:42
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in the Hyundai Gen5W_L in-vehicle infotainment system AE_E_PE_EUR.S5W_L001.001.211214. The AppUpgrade binary file, which is used during the firmware installation process, can be modified by an attacker to bypass the digital signature check. This indirectly allows an attacker to install custom firmware in the IVI system.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-26246"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-04-27T01:15:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in the Hyundai Gen5W_L in-vehicle infotainment system AE_E_PE_EUR.S5W_L001.001.211214. The AppUpgrade binary file, which is used during the firmware installation process, can be modified by an attacker to bypass the digital signature check. This indirectly allows an attacker to install custom firmware in the IVI system.",
  "id": "GHSA-89xv-gh3p-mrvg",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T03:42:33Z",
  "published": "2023-04-27T03:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-26246"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sowhat.iit.cnr.it"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sowhat.iit.cnr.it:8443/can-work/chimaera"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sowhat.iit.cnr.it:8443/can-work/chimaera/-/blob/main/Report/IIT-01-2023.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8C4M-2WPP-9QMH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-29 18:33 – Updated: 2025-09-29 18:33
VLAI
Details

VMware Tools for Windows contains an improper authorisation vulnerability due to the way it handles user access controls. A malicious actor with non-administrative privileges on a guest VM, who is already authenticated through vCenter or ESX may exploit this issue to access other guest VMs. Successful exploitation requires knowledge of credentials of the targeted VMs and vCenter or ESX.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-41246"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-29T16:15:37Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "VMware Tools for Windows contains an improper authorisation\u00a0vulnerability due to the way it handles user access controls.\u00a0A malicious actor with non-administrative privileges on a guest VM, who is already authenticated through vCenter or ESX may exploit this issue to access other guest VMs. Successful exploitation requires knowledge of credentials of the targeted VMs and vCenter or ESX.",
  "id": "GHSA-8c4m-2wpp-9qmh",
  "modified": "2025-09-29T18:33:13Z",
  "published": "2025-09-29T18:33:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-41246"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/36149"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8C6P-V837-77F6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-16 19:38 – Updated: 2024-11-19 16:25
VLAI
Summary
Harbor fails to validate the user permissions when updating tag immutability policies
Details

Impact

Harbor fails to validate the user permissions when updating tag immutability policies - API call:

PUT /projects/{project_name_or_id}/immutabletagrules/{immutable_rule_id}

By sending a request to update a tag immutability policy with an id that belongs to a project that the currently authenticated user doesn’t have access to, the attacker could modify tag immutability policies configured in other projects.

Patches

This and similar issues are fixed in Harbor v2.5.2 and later. Please upgrade as soon as possible.

Workarounds

There are no workarounds available.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in the Harbor GitHub repository

Credits

Thanks to Gal Goldstein and Daniel Abeles from Oxeye Security for reporting this issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.10.12"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/goharbor/harbor"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.10.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.4.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/goharbor/harbor"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.5.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/goharbor/harbor"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.5.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-31669"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-09-16T19:38:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-14T12:15:16Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nHarbor fails to validate the user permissions when updating tag immutability policies - API call:\n\n  PUT /projects/{project_name_or_id}/immutabletagrules/{immutable_rule_id}\n\nBy sending a request to update a tag immutability policy with an id that belongs to a\nproject that the currently authenticated user doesn\u2019t have access to, the attacker could\nmodify tag immutability policies configured in other projects.\n\n### Patches\nThis and similar issues are fixed in Harbor v2.5.2 and later. Please upgrade as soon as possible.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere are no workarounds available.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [the Harbor GitHub repository](https://github.com/goharbor/harbor)\n\n### Credits\nThanks to [Gal Goldstein](https://www.linkedin.com/in/gal-goldshtein/) and [Daniel Abeles](https://www.linkedin.com/in/daniel-abeles/) from [Oxeye Security](https://www.oxeye.io/) for reporting this issue.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-8c6p-v837-77f6",
  "modified": "2024-11-19T16:25:11Z",
  "published": "2022-09-16T19:38:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/security/advisories/GHSA-8c6p-v837-77f6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31669"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/goharbor/harbor"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Harbor fails to validate the user permissions when updating tag immutability policies"
}

GHSA-8C7X-FQJF-H7Q7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:44 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:44
VLAI
Details

Zoho ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus before 11134 allows an Authentication Bypass (only during SAML login).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-35682"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-03-13T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Zoho ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus before 11134 allows an Authentication Bypass (only during SAML login).",
  "id": "GHSA-8c7x-fqjf-h7q7",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:44:31Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:44:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-35682"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.manageengine.com/products/service-desk/on-premises/readme.html#11134"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-8CFG-3C2Q-HX8X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-01 15:32 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:32
VLAI
Details

Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in WPChill Htaccess File Editor allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs.

This issue affects Htaccess File Editor: from n/a through 1.0.18.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-49256"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-01T15:15:56Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in WPChill Htaccess File Editor allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs.\n\nThis issue affects Htaccess File Editor: from n/a through 1.0.18.",
  "id": "GHSA-8cfg-3c2q-hx8x",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:32:17Z",
  "published": "2024-11-01T15:32:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49256"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/htaccess-file-editor/vulnerability/wordpress-htaccess-file-editor-plugin-1-0-18-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/htaccess-file-editor/wordpress-htaccess-file-editor-plugin-1-0-18-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8CHW-QPP9-9385

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-05 18:31 – Updated: 2024-12-05 18:31
VLAI
Details

Mattermost versions 9.7.x <= 9.7.5, 9.8.x <= 9.8.2 and 9.9.x <= 9.9.2 fail to properly propagate permission scheme updates across cluster nodes which allows a user to keep old permissions, even if the permission scheme has been updated.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-12247"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-05T16:15:25Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Mattermost versions 9.7.x \u003c= 9.7.5, 9.8.x \u003c= 9.8.2 and 9.9.x \u003c= 9.9.2 fail to properly propagate permission scheme updates across cluster nodes which allows a user to keep old permissions, even if the permission scheme has been updated.",
  "id": "GHSA-8chw-qpp9-9385",
  "modified": "2024-12-05T18:31:03Z",
  "published": "2024-12-05T18:31:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12247"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8CMM-J6C4-RR8V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 21:17 – Updated: 2026-03-25 21:17
VLAI
Summary
Vikunja has Cross-Project Information Disclosure via Task Relations — Missing Authorization Check on Related Task Read
Details

Summary

When the Vikunja API returns tasks, it populates the related_tasks field with full task objects for all related tasks without checking whether the requesting user has read permission on those tasks' projects. An authenticated user who can read a task that has cross-project relations will receive full details (title, description, due dates, priority, percent completion, project ID, etc.) of tasks in projects they have no access to.

Details

The vulnerability is in addRelatedTasksToTasks() at pkg/models/tasks.go:496-548. This function is called by addMoreInfoToTasks() (line 773) during every task read operation — both project task listings (GET /api/v1/projects/{id}/views/{id}/tasks) and single task reads (GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}).

The function fetches all related tasks directly from the database without any permission filtering:

// pkg/models/tasks.go:496-548
func addRelatedTasksToTasks(s *xorm.Session, taskIDs []int64, taskMap map[int64]*Task, a web.Auth) (err error) {
    relatedTasks := []*TaskRelation{}
    err = s.In("task_id", taskIDs).Find(&relatedTasks)
    // ...
    fullRelatedTasks := make(map[int64]*Task)
    err = s.In("id", relatedTaskIDs).Find(&fullRelatedTasks)  // Line 514: NO permission check
    // ...
    for _, rt := range relatedTasks {
        // Directly adds to response without checking if user can read the related task
        taskMap[rt.TaskID].RelatedTasks[rt.RelationKind] = append(
            taskMap[rt.TaskID].RelatedTasks[rt.RelationKind], otherTask)
    }
}

The a web.Auth parameter is received but only used for determining favorites (line 519), never for access control on the related tasks themselves.

In contrast, addBucketsToTasks() (line 550+) in the same file correctly filters enrichment data by calling getAllRawProjects(s, a, ...) to scope results to projects the requesting user can access.

While task relation creation properly enforces authorization (task_relation_permissions.go:32-52 checks write access on the base task and read access on the other task), the relation display path does not re-check permissions for the current reader. This means a privileged user can create a relation that then leaks data to all other users who can read the base task.

PoC

Setup: Two users (User A, User B), two projects (Project-Shared, Project-Private). - User A has access to both projects. - User B has access only to Project-Shared. - Task 1 exists in Project-Shared, Task 2 exists in Project-Private.

Step 1: User A creates a relation between the two tasks

# As User A (who has access to both projects)
curl -X PUT "http://localhost:3456/api/v1/tasks/TASK1_ID/relations" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer USER_A_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"other_task_id": TASK2_ID, "relation_kind": "related"}'

Expected: 201 Created (User A has write on Task 1, read on Task 2).

Step 2: User B reads tasks from the shared project

# As User B (who has NO access to Project-Private)
curl "http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/PROJECT_SHARED_ID/views/VIEW_ID/tasks" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer USER_B_TOKEN"

Expected: Task 1 should be returned, but related_tasks should NOT include Task 2.

Actual result: The response includes Task 1 with the related_tasks field containing the full Task 2 object, including its title, description, due_date, priority, percent_done, project_id, and other metadata — despite User B having no access to Project-Private.

Impact

  • Information disclosure: Any authenticated user can read the full metadata of tasks in projects they do not have access to, as long as a relation exists from a task they can read.
  • Leaked fields include: title, description, due dates, start dates, priority, percent completion, project ID, hex color, task index, done status, repeat configuration, cover image attachment ID, and creation/update timestamps.
  • Project structure disclosure: The project_id field reveals the existence and IDs of private projects.
  • No user interaction required: Once a privileged user creates a cross-project relation (which is intentionally allowed), the data leak is automatic for all readers of the base task.
  • Blast radius: Affects all Vikunja instances with cross-project task relations. In multi-tenant or team environments where projects have different access scopes, this undermines project-level access control.

Recommended Fix

Filter related tasks by the requesting user's read permissions before adding them to the response. In addRelatedTasksToTasks(), after fetching full task objects, check that the user can read each related task's project:

func addRelatedTasksToTasks(s *xorm.Session, taskIDs []int64, taskMap map[int64]*Task, a web.Auth) (err error) {
    relatedTasks := []*TaskRelation{}
    err = s.In("task_id", taskIDs).Find(&relatedTasks)
    if err != nil {
        return
    }

    var relatedTaskIDs []int64
    for _, rt := range relatedTasks {
        relatedTaskIDs = append(relatedTaskIDs, rt.OtherTaskID)
    }

    if len(relatedTaskIDs) == 0 {
        return
    }

    fullRelatedTasks := make(map[int64]*Task)
    err = s.In("id", relatedTaskIDs).Find(&fullRelatedTasks)
    if err != nil {
        return
    }

    // Filter related tasks by user's read permission
    allowedProjectIDs := make(map[int64]bool)
    checkedProjectIDs := make(map[int64]bool)
    for _, t := range fullRelatedTasks {
        if checkedProjectIDs[t.ProjectID] {
            continue
        }
        checkedProjectIDs[t.ProjectID] = true
        p := &Project{ID: t.ProjectID}
        canRead, _, err := p.CanRead(s, a)
        if err != nil {
            log.Errorf("Could not check project read permission: %v", err)
            continue
        }
        if canRead {
            allowedProjectIDs[t.ProjectID] = true
        }
    }

    taskFavorites, err := getFavorites(s, relatedTaskIDs, a, FavoriteKindTask)
    if err != nil {
        return err
    }

    for _, rt := range relatedTasks {
        task, has := fullRelatedTasks[rt.OtherTaskID]
        if !has {
            continue
        }
        // Skip related tasks the user cannot access
        if !allowedProjectIDs[task.ProjectID] {
            continue
        }
        fullRelatedTasks[rt.OtherTaskID].IsFavorite = taskFavorites[rt.OtherTaskID]
        otherTask := &Task{}
        err = copier.Copy(otherTask, fullRelatedTasks[rt.OtherTaskID])
        if err != nil {
            log.Errorf("Could not duplicate task object: %v", err)
            continue
        }
        otherTask.RelatedTasks = nil
        taskMap[rt.TaskID].RelatedTasks[rt.RelationKind] = append(
            taskMap[rt.TaskID].RelatedTasks[rt.RelationKind], otherTask)
    }

    return
}

This checks project-level read permission once per unique project ID (cached in allowedProjectIDs) and skips related tasks from projects the user cannot access.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.2.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "code.vikunja.io/api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33676"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T21:17:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-24T16:16:34Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWhen the Vikunja API returns tasks, it populates the `related_tasks` field with full task objects for all related tasks without checking whether the requesting user has read permission on those tasks\u0027 projects. An authenticated user who can read a task that has cross-project relations will receive full details (title, description, due dates, priority, percent completion, project ID, etc.) of tasks in projects they have no access to.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability is in `addRelatedTasksToTasks()` at `pkg/models/tasks.go:496-548`. This function is called by `addMoreInfoToTasks()` (line 773) during every task read operation \u2014 both project task listings (`GET /api/v1/projects/{id}/views/{id}/tasks`) and single task reads (`GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}`).\n\nThe function fetches all related tasks directly from the database without any permission filtering:\n\n```go\n// pkg/models/tasks.go:496-548\nfunc addRelatedTasksToTasks(s *xorm.Session, taskIDs []int64, taskMap map[int64]*Task, a web.Auth) (err error) {\n    relatedTasks := []*TaskRelation{}\n    err = s.In(\"task_id\", taskIDs).Find(\u0026relatedTasks)\n    // ...\n    fullRelatedTasks := make(map[int64]*Task)\n    err = s.In(\"id\", relatedTaskIDs).Find(\u0026fullRelatedTasks)  // Line 514: NO permission check\n    // ...\n    for _, rt := range relatedTasks {\n        // Directly adds to response without checking if user can read the related task\n        taskMap[rt.TaskID].RelatedTasks[rt.RelationKind] = append(\n            taskMap[rt.TaskID].RelatedTasks[rt.RelationKind], otherTask)\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe `a web.Auth` parameter is received but only used for determining favorites (line 519), never for access control on the related tasks themselves.\n\nIn contrast, `addBucketsToTasks()` (line 550+) in the same file correctly filters enrichment data by calling `getAllRawProjects(s, a, ...)` to scope results to projects the requesting user can access.\n\nWhile task relation **creation** properly enforces authorization (`task_relation_permissions.go:32-52` checks write access on the base task and read access on the other task), the relation **display** path does not re-check permissions for the current reader. This means a privileged user can create a relation that then leaks data to all other users who can read the base task.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Setup:** Two users (User A, User B), two projects (Project-Shared, Project-Private).\n- User A has access to both projects.\n- User B has access only to Project-Shared.\n- Task 1 exists in Project-Shared, Task 2 exists in Project-Private.\n\n**Step 1: User A creates a relation between the two tasks**\n\n```bash\n# As User A (who has access to both projects)\ncurl -X PUT \"http://localhost:3456/api/v1/tasks/TASK1_ID/relations\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer USER_A_TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"other_task_id\": TASK2_ID, \"relation_kind\": \"related\"}\u0027\n```\n\nExpected: 201 Created (User A has write on Task 1, read on Task 2).\n\n**Step 2: User B reads tasks from the shared project**\n\n```bash\n# As User B (who has NO access to Project-Private)\ncurl \"http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/PROJECT_SHARED_ID/views/VIEW_ID/tasks\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer USER_B_TOKEN\"\n```\n\nExpected: Task 1 should be returned, but related_tasks should NOT include Task 2.\n\n**Actual result:** The response includes Task 1 with the `related_tasks` field containing the full Task 2 object, including its `title`, `description`, `due_date`, `priority`, `percent_done`, `project_id`, and other metadata \u2014 despite User B having no access to Project-Private.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Information disclosure**: Any authenticated user can read the full metadata of tasks in projects they do not have access to, as long as a relation exists from a task they can read.\n- **Leaked fields include**: title, description, due dates, start dates, priority, percent completion, project ID, hex color, task index, done status, repeat configuration, cover image attachment ID, and creation/update timestamps.\n- **Project structure disclosure**: The `project_id` field reveals the existence and IDs of private projects.\n- **No user interaction required**: Once a privileged user creates a cross-project relation (which is intentionally allowed), the data leak is automatic for all readers of the base task.\n- **Blast radius**: Affects all Vikunja instances with cross-project task relations. In multi-tenant or team environments where projects have different access scopes, this undermines project-level access control.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nFilter related tasks by the requesting user\u0027s read permissions before adding them to the response. In `addRelatedTasksToTasks()`, after fetching full task objects, check that the user can read each related task\u0027s project:\n\n```go\nfunc addRelatedTasksToTasks(s *xorm.Session, taskIDs []int64, taskMap map[int64]*Task, a web.Auth) (err error) {\n    relatedTasks := []*TaskRelation{}\n    err = s.In(\"task_id\", taskIDs).Find(\u0026relatedTasks)\n    if err != nil {\n        return\n    }\n\n    var relatedTaskIDs []int64\n    for _, rt := range relatedTasks {\n        relatedTaskIDs = append(relatedTaskIDs, rt.OtherTaskID)\n    }\n\n    if len(relatedTaskIDs) == 0 {\n        return\n    }\n\n    fullRelatedTasks := make(map[int64]*Task)\n    err = s.In(\"id\", relatedTaskIDs).Find(\u0026fullRelatedTasks)\n    if err != nil {\n        return\n    }\n\n    // Filter related tasks by user\u0027s read permission\n    allowedProjectIDs := make(map[int64]bool)\n    checkedProjectIDs := make(map[int64]bool)\n    for _, t := range fullRelatedTasks {\n        if checkedProjectIDs[t.ProjectID] {\n            continue\n        }\n        checkedProjectIDs[t.ProjectID] = true\n        p := \u0026Project{ID: t.ProjectID}\n        canRead, _, err := p.CanRead(s, a)\n        if err != nil {\n            log.Errorf(\"Could not check project read permission: %v\", err)\n            continue\n        }\n        if canRead {\n            allowedProjectIDs[t.ProjectID] = true\n        }\n    }\n\n    taskFavorites, err := getFavorites(s, relatedTaskIDs, a, FavoriteKindTask)\n    if err != nil {\n        return err\n    }\n\n    for _, rt := range relatedTasks {\n        task, has := fullRelatedTasks[rt.OtherTaskID]\n        if !has {\n            continue\n        }\n        // Skip related tasks the user cannot access\n        if !allowedProjectIDs[task.ProjectID] {\n            continue\n        }\n        fullRelatedTasks[rt.OtherTaskID].IsFavorite = taskFavorites[rt.OtherTaskID]\n        otherTask := \u0026Task{}\n        err = copier.Copy(otherTask, fullRelatedTasks[rt.OtherTaskID])\n        if err != nil {\n            log.Errorf(\"Could not duplicate task object: %v\", err)\n            continue\n        }\n        otherTask.RelatedTasks = nil\n        taskMap[rt.TaskID].RelatedTasks[rt.RelationKind] = append(\n            taskMap[rt.TaskID].RelatedTasks[rt.RelationKind], otherTask)\n    }\n\n    return\n}\n```\n\nThis checks project-level read permission once per unique project ID (cached in `allowedProjectIDs`) and skips related tasks from projects the user cannot access.",
  "id": "GHSA-8cmm-j6c4-rr8v",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T21:17:12Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T21:17:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-8cmm-j6c4-rr8v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33676"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/2449"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/833f2aec006ac0f6643c41872e45dd79220b9174"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.2.2-was-released"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vikunja has Cross-Project Information Disclosure via Task Relations \u2014 Missing Authorization Check on Related Task Read"
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.