CWE-862
Allowed-with-ReviewMissing Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
15037 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-8FG5-FMJ3-F344
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-06 15:30 – Updated: 2024-07-06 15:30Missing Authorization vulnerability in WpDevArt Responsive Image Gallery, Gallery Album.This issue affects Responsive Image Gallery, Gallery Album: from n/a through 2.0.3.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-37542"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-06T13:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in WpDevArt Responsive Image Gallery, Gallery Album.This issue affects Responsive Image Gallery, Gallery Album: from n/a through 2.0.3.",
"id": "GHSA-8fg5-fmj3-f344",
"modified": "2024-07-06T15:30:57Z",
"published": "2024-07-06T15:30:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37542"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/gallery-album/wordpress-gallery-image-and-video-gallery-with-thumbnails-plugin-2-0-3-broken-access-control-vulnerability-2?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8FG7-5VQQ-795M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-04 06:31 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33The All in One Time Clock Lite plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access due to a missing authorization check in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.3. This is due to the plugin exposing admin-level AJAX actions to unauthenticated users via wp_ajax_nopriv_ hooks, while relying only on a nonce check without capability checks. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create published pages, create shift records with integrity issues, and download time reports containing PII (employee names and work schedules).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-11758"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-04T05:16:02Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The All in One Time Clock Lite plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access due to a missing authorization check in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.3. This is due to the plugin exposing admin-level AJAX actions to unauthenticated users via wp_ajax_nopriv_ hooks, while relying only on a nonce check without capability checks. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create published pages, create shift records with integrity issues, and download time reports containing PII (employee names and work schedules).",
"id": "GHSA-8fg7-5vqq-795m",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:57Z",
"published": "2025-11-04T06:31:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11758"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/aio-time-clock-lite/tags/2.0.1/aio-time-clock-lite-actions.php#L1447"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/aio-time-clock-lite/tags/2.0.1/aio-time-clock-lite-actions.php#L26"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/aio-time-clock-lite/tags/2.0.1/aio-time-clock-lite-actions.php#L442"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3388144"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/28246279-ecd8-4731-a4cc-64a3a4167323?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8FJW-GV37-439Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-16 00:00 – Updated: 2022-10-27 19:00Unauthenticated Arbitrary Options Update vulnerability leading to full website compromise discovered in Image Hover Effects Ultimate (versions <= 9.6.1) WordPress plugin.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-36888"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-12-15T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Unauthenticated Arbitrary Options Update vulnerability leading to full website compromise discovered in Image Hover Effects Ultimate (versions \u003c= 9.6.1) WordPress plugin.",
"id": "GHSA-8fjw-gv37-439q",
"modified": "2022-10-27T19:00:29Z",
"published": "2021-12-16T00:00:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36888"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/image-hover-effects-ultimate/wordpress-image-hover-effects-ultimate-plugin-9-6-1-unauthenticated-arbitrary-options-update-leading-to-full-website-compromise"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/image-hover-effects-ultimate/#developers"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8FM3-MPC3-QF9V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-04 21:31 – Updated: 2025-09-05 18:31In multiple locations, there is a possible way to view icons belonging to another user due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-0076"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-04T19:15:34Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "In multiple locations, there is a possible way to view icons belonging to another user due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.",
"id": "GHSA-8fm3-mpc3-qf9v",
"modified": "2025-09-05T18:31:19Z",
"published": "2025-09-04T21:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0076"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/d6ad7f34eaf5f0452b93a650265ee432288c0978"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2025-09-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8FP3-W5P8-PPF5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-16 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-16 15:30The Customer Reviews for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized email sending due to a missing capability check on the send_test_email() function in all versions up to, and including, 5.46.0. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to send arbitrary test emails.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-3243"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-16T13:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Customer Reviews for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized email sending due to a missing capability check on the send_test_email() function in all versions up to, and including, 5.46.0. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to send arbitrary test emails.",
"id": "GHSA-8fp3-w5p8-ppf5",
"modified": "2024-04-16T15:30:25Z",
"published": "2024-04-16T15:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3243"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/customer-reviews-woocommerce/trunk/includes/settings/class-cr-settings-review-discount.php#L506"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3069811/customer-reviews-woocommerce/trunk/includes/settings/class-cr-settings-review-discount.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a0e80e63-f4f7-44cc-ae29-72e7847d7448?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8FQ9-273G-6MRG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 18:49 – Updated: 2026-07-18 17:22Summary
A critical missing authorization flaw exists in Avo's association attach workflow. The UI and GET /resources/:resource/:id/:related/new path can check attach_<association>?, but the actual write endpoint, POST /resources/:resource/:id/:related, does not run the same authorization check before mutating the association.
As a result, an authenticated low-privileged Avo user can bypass hidden/disabled attach controls and directly attach related records to a parent record by sending a crafted POST request. In applications where associations represent teams, tenants, roles, projects, users, memberships, ownership, or other authorization-bearing relationships, this can lead to privilege escalation and cross-tenant data exposure.
Details
The association attach route writes relationships through Avo::AssociationsController#create:
# config/routes.rb
post "/:resource_name/:id/:related_name", to: "associations#create", as: "associations_create"
The controller registers an attach authorization callback only for new, not for create:
# app/controllers/avo/associations_controller.rb
before_action :set_attachment_record, only: [:create, :destroy]
before_action :authorize_index_action, only: :index
before_action :authorize_attach_action, only: :new
before_action :authorize_detach_action, only: :destroy
The new action is only the form-rendering step. The actual mutation happens in create:
def create
if create_association
create_success_action
else
create_fail_action
end
end
create_association then attaches the attacker-supplied related record to the parent:
def create_association
association_name = BaseResource.valid_association_name(@record, association_from_params)
perform_action_and_record_errors do
if through_reflection? && additional_params.present?
new_join_record.save
elsif has_many_reflection? || through_reflection?
@record.send(association_name) << @attachment_record
else
@record.send(:"#{association_name}=", @attachment_record)
@record.save!
end
end
end
The only attach-specific authorization helper is:
def authorize_attach_action
authorize_if_defined "attach_#{@field.id}?"
end
Because this helper is bound only to new, a policy that denies attach_users?, attach_teams?, attach_roles?, or similar methods blocks the UI/form path but does not protect the write path.
This is inconsistent with the detach path, which does authorize the mutating destroy action:
before_action :authorize_detach_action, only: :destroy
The bug is especially dangerous because Avo already treats association authorization as an access-control boundary in UI components:
# lib/avo/concerns/checks_assoc_authorization.rb
method_name = :"#{policy_method}_#{association_name}?".to_sym
if service.has_method?(method_name, raise_exception: false)
service.authorize_action(method_name, record:, raise_exception: false)
else
!Avo.configuration.explicit_authorization
end
However, server-side enforcement is missing on the actual attach POST endpoint.
Proof of Concept
Prerequisites:
- A Rails application mounts Avo, for example at
/admin. - Avo authorization is enabled.
- A low-privileged user can authenticate to Avo.
- A parent record and a related record are both reachable by ID.
- The relevant policy denies attaching the relationship, for example:
def attach_users?
false
end
Example target scenario:
- Parent resource:
projects - Parent ID:
1 - Related association:
users - Related user ID to attach:
42 - Expected policy: low-privileged users must not be able to attach users to projects.
The UI/form request may be blocked:
GET /admin/resources/projects/1/users/new
But the direct write endpoint can still be invoked:
POST /admin/resources/projects/1/users
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
authenticity_token=<CSRF>&fields[related_id]=42
Run the attached PoC:
python poc_avo_association_attach_bypass.py \
--base-url http://localhost:3000 \
--avo-root /admin \
--cookie "_app_session=<LOW_PRIVILEGED_SESSION_COOKIE>" \
--parent-resource projects \
--parent-id 1 \
--related-name users \
--related-id 42 \
--check-new
If GET /new is forbidden or redirected but the direct POST succeeds, the authorization bypass is confirmed.
To perform the actual attach:
python poc_avo_association_attach_bypass.py \
--base-url http://localhost:3000 \
--avo-root /admin \
--cookie "_app_session=<LOW_PRIVILEGED_SESSION_COOKIE>" \
--parent-resource projects \
--parent-id 1 \
--related-name users \
--related-id 42 \
--confirm-attach
Expected vulnerable result:
- The low-privileged user can attach the related record despite
attach_<association>?being denied. - The parent record now includes the related record.
Impact
This vulnerability allows unauthorized relationship manipulation through Avo.
Depending on the affected association, the impact can include:
- Privilege escalation by attaching a user to an admin group, privileged project, tenant, organization, role, or membership record.
- Cross-tenant data exposure when tenant/user/project membership determines record visibility.
- Integrity loss by changing ownership, assignment, access-control relationships, or business workflow state.
- Policy bypass even when Avo UI controls correctly hide the attach button or deny the attach form.
Recommended Fix
Enforce attach authorization on the mutating endpoint.
At minimum:
before_action :authorize_attach_action, only: [:new, :create]
Additionally:
- Authorize against the parent record and the selected related record before writing the relationship.
- Ensure
createfails closed whenattach_<association>?is missing andexplicit_authorizationis enabled. - Add regression tests that directly POST to
/resources/:resource_name/:id/:related_namewhileattach_<association>?returnsfalse. - Verify
has_many,has_one,has_many :through, andhas_and_belongs_to_manyassociation paths all enforce the same server-side authorization.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.32.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "avo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.32.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "avo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0.beta.1"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.0.beta.51"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55518"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T18:49:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-17T21:17:09Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA critical missing authorization flaw exists in Avo\u0027s association attach workflow. The UI and `GET /resources/:resource/:id/:related/new` path can check `attach_\u003cassociation\u003e?`, but the actual write endpoint, `POST /resources/:resource/:id/:related`, does not run the same authorization check before mutating the association.\n\nAs a result, an authenticated low-privileged Avo user can bypass hidden/disabled attach controls and directly attach related records to a parent record by sending a crafted POST request. In applications where associations represent teams, tenants, roles, projects, users, memberships, ownership, or other authorization-bearing relationships, this can lead to privilege escalation and cross-tenant data exposure.\n\n## Details\n\nThe association attach route writes relationships through `Avo::AssociationsController#create`:\n\n```ruby\n# config/routes.rb\npost \"/:resource_name/:id/:related_name\", to: \"associations#create\", as: \"associations_create\"\n```\n\nThe controller registers an attach authorization callback only for `new`, not for `create`:\n\n```ruby\n# app/controllers/avo/associations_controller.rb\nbefore_action :set_attachment_record, only: [:create, :destroy]\nbefore_action :authorize_index_action, only: :index\nbefore_action :authorize_attach_action, only: :new\nbefore_action :authorize_detach_action, only: :destroy\n```\n\nThe `new` action is only the form-rendering step. The actual mutation happens in `create`:\n\n```ruby\ndef create\n if create_association\n create_success_action\n else\n create_fail_action\n end\nend\n```\n\n`create_association` then attaches the attacker-supplied related record to the parent:\n\n```ruby\ndef create_association\n association_name = BaseResource.valid_association_name(@record, association_from_params)\n\n perform_action_and_record_errors do\n if through_reflection? \u0026\u0026 additional_params.present?\n new_join_record.save\n elsif has_many_reflection? || through_reflection?\n @record.send(association_name) \u003c\u003c @attachment_record\n else\n @record.send(:\"#{association_name}=\", @attachment_record)\n @record.save!\n end\n end\nend\n```\n\nThe only attach-specific authorization helper is:\n\n```ruby\ndef authorize_attach_action\n authorize_if_defined \"attach_#{@field.id}?\"\nend\n```\n\nBecause this helper is bound only to `new`, a policy that denies `attach_users?`, `attach_teams?`, `attach_roles?`, or similar methods blocks the UI/form path but does not protect the write path.\n\nThis is inconsistent with the detach path, which does authorize the mutating `destroy` action:\n\n```ruby\nbefore_action :authorize_detach_action, only: :destroy\n```\n\nThe bug is especially dangerous because Avo already treats association authorization as an access-control boundary in UI components:\n\n```ruby\n# lib/avo/concerns/checks_assoc_authorization.rb\nmethod_name = :\"#{policy_method}_#{association_name}?\".to_sym\n\nif service.has_method?(method_name, raise_exception: false)\n service.authorize_action(method_name, record:, raise_exception: false)\nelse\n !Avo.configuration.explicit_authorization\nend\n```\n\nHowever, server-side enforcement is missing on the actual attach POST endpoint.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nPrerequisites:\n\n1. A Rails application mounts Avo, for example at `/admin`.\n2. Avo authorization is enabled.\n3. A low-privileged user can authenticate to Avo.\n4. A parent record and a related record are both reachable by ID.\n5. The relevant policy denies attaching the relationship, for example:\n\n```ruby\ndef attach_users?\n false\nend\n```\n\nExample target scenario:\n\n- Parent resource: `projects`\n- Parent ID: `1`\n- Related association: `users`\n- Related user ID to attach: `42`\n- Expected policy: low-privileged users must not be able to attach users to projects.\n\nThe UI/form request may be blocked:\n\n```http\nGET /admin/resources/projects/1/users/new\n```\n\nBut the direct write endpoint can still be invoked:\n\n```http\nPOST /admin/resources/projects/1/users\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\nauthenticity_token=\u003cCSRF\u003e\u0026fields[related_id]=42\n```\n\nRun the attached PoC:\n\n```bash\npython poc_avo_association_attach_bypass.py \\\n --base-url http://localhost:3000 \\\n --avo-root /admin \\\n --cookie \"_app_session=\u003cLOW_PRIVILEGED_SESSION_COOKIE\u003e\" \\\n --parent-resource projects \\\n --parent-id 1 \\\n --related-name users \\\n --related-id 42 \\\n --check-new\n```\n\nIf `GET /new` is forbidden or redirected but the direct POST succeeds, the authorization bypass is confirmed.\n\nTo perform the actual attach:\n\n```bash\npython poc_avo_association_attach_bypass.py \\\n --base-url http://localhost:3000 \\\n --avo-root /admin \\\n --cookie \"_app_session=\u003cLOW_PRIVILEGED_SESSION_COOKIE\u003e\" \\\n --parent-resource projects \\\n --parent-id 1 \\\n --related-name users \\\n --related-id 42 \\\n --confirm-attach\n```\n\nExpected vulnerable result:\n\n- The low-privileged user can attach the related record despite `attach_\u003cassociation\u003e?` being denied.\n- The parent record now includes the related record.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows unauthorized relationship manipulation through Avo.\n\nDepending on the affected association, the impact can include:\n\n- Privilege escalation by attaching a user to an admin group, privileged project, tenant, organization, role, or membership record.\n- Cross-tenant data exposure when tenant/user/project membership determines record visibility.\n- Integrity loss by changing ownership, assignment, access-control relationships, or business workflow state.\n- Policy bypass even when Avo UI controls correctly hide the attach button or deny the attach form.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nEnforce attach authorization on the mutating endpoint.\n\nAt minimum:\n\n```ruby\nbefore_action :authorize_attach_action, only: [:new, :create]\n```\n\nAdditionally:\n\n1. Authorize against the parent record and the selected related record before writing the relationship.\n2. Ensure `create` fails closed when `attach_\u003cassociation\u003e?` is missing and `explicit_authorization` is enabled.\n3. Add regression tests that directly POST to `/resources/:resource_name/:id/:related_name` while `attach_\u003cassociation\u003e?` returns `false`.\n4. Verify `has_many`, `has_one`, `has_many :through`, and `has_and_belongs_to_many` association paths all enforce the same server-side authorization.",
"id": "GHSA-8fq9-273g-6mrg",
"modified": "2026-07-18T17:22:29Z",
"published": "2026-06-17T18:49:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/avo-hq/avo/security/advisories/GHSA-8fq9-273g-6mrg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55518"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/avo-hq/avo/pull/4568"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/avo-hq/avo/commit/995928e586fd1788dd496bd51c4dbe4a79cb2b9c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/avo-hq/avo"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/avo-hq/avo/releases/tag/v3.32.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/avo/CVE-2026-55518.yml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55518"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Avo: Missing Authorization in Avo Association Attach Endpoint Allows Unauthorized Relationship Manipulation and Privilege Escalation"
}
GHSA-8FQH-H88G-3X9C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-01 15:32 – Updated: 2024-11-01 15:32Missing Authorization vulnerability in CozyThemes ReviveNews allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs.This issue affects ReviveNews: from n/a through 1.0.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43974"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-01T15:15:50Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in CozyThemes ReviveNews allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs.This issue affects ReviveNews: from n/a through 1.0.2.",
"id": "GHSA-8fqh-h88g-3x9c",
"modified": "2024-11-01T15:32:00Z",
"published": "2024-11-01T15:32:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43974"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/revivenews/wordpress-revivenews-theme-1-0-2-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8FVQ-G6JM-836R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-09 18:30 – Updated: 2026-01-20 15:32Missing Authorization vulnerability in mmattax Formstack Online Forms formstack allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Formstack Online Forms: from n/a through <= 2.0.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-62738"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T16:18:02Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in mmattax Formstack Online Forms formstack allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Formstack Online Forms: from n/a through \u003c= 2.0.2.",
"id": "GHSA-8fvq-g6jm-836r",
"modified": "2026-01-20T15:32:02Z",
"published": "2025-12-09T18:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62738"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/formstack/vulnerability/wordpress-formstack-online-forms-plugin-2-0-2-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vdp.patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/formstack/vulnerability/wordpress-formstack-online-forms-plugin-2-0-2-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8G2J-5XH3-R35M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-19 21:30 – Updated: 2026-02-20 18:31Missing Authorization vulnerability in SeedProd Coming Soon Page, Under Construction & Maintenance Mode by SeedProd coming-soon allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Coming Soon Page, Under Construction & Maintenance Mode by SeedProd: from n/a through <= 6.19.7.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27368"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-19T21:18:33Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in SeedProd Coming Soon Page, Under Construction \u0026 Maintenance Mode by SeedProd coming-soon allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Coming Soon Page, Under Construction \u0026 Maintenance Mode by SeedProd: from n/a through \u003c= 6.19.7.",
"id": "GHSA-8g2j-5xh3-r35m",
"modified": "2026-02-20T18:31:32Z",
"published": "2026-02-19T21:30:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27368"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/coming-soon/vulnerability/wordpress-coming-soon-page-under-construction-maintenance-mode-by-seedprod-plugin-6-19-7-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8G2P-PQM3-FCFH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-01 14:23 – Updated: 2026-06-01 14:23Summary
Type: Privilege escalation / cross-tenant member injection. The POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members endpoint is gated only by require_workspace_member(workspace_id) (default min_role="member") and forwards the request body's user_id and role straight into MemberService.add(workspace_id, user_id, role), which has no caller-permission check. A user with the lowest workspace privilege can add any user (including a new attacker-controlled second account, or an existing account they want to grief) as owner of the workspace.
File: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py, lines 92-101; services/member_service.py, lines 26-38.
Root cause: MemberService.add validates only that role is in VALID_ROLES = {"owner", "admin", "member"} — the value, not the caller's right to assign it. The route's Depends(require_workspace_member) resolves to the default min_role="member". So a member-level token plus one POST gives the attacker an alternate identity with owner role inside the same workspace, bypassing every owner-only operation that would otherwise gate them.
Affected Code
File 1: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py, lines 92-101.
@router.post("/{workspace_id}/members", response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
async def add_member(
workspace_id: str,
body: MemberAdd,
user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member), # <-- BUG: defaults to min_role="member"
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
member_svc = MemberService(session)
member = await member_svc.add(workspace_id, body.user_id, body.role) # <-- writes any (user, role)
return MemberResponse.model_validate(member)
File 2: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py, lines 26-38.
async def add(
self,
workspace_id: str,
user_id: str,
role: str = "member",
) -> Member:
"""Add a user to a workspace."""
if role not in VALID_ROLES: # only validates the value
raise ValueError(f"Invalid role: {role}. Must be one of {VALID_ROLES}")
member = Member(workspace_id=workspace_id, user_id=user_id, role=role)
self._session.add(member) # <-- BUG: no caller-permission check
await self._session.flush()
return member
Why it's wrong: workspace member management is the textbook capability that must be gated on owner role. The role hierarchy is implemented (MemberService.has_role, member_service.py:80-96), the dependency-tunable min_role parameter exists (require_workspace_member(min_role), deps.py:58), but the POST .../members route uses neither. The VALID_ROLES enum check is purely cosmetic — it accepts "owner" from any caller because the route never asked whether the caller has the right to assign that role.
Exploit Chain
- Attacker registers two accounts (or recruits a member account on the target workspace
W). Account A is an existing member ofW; Account B is a fresh signup the attacker controls (any account on the platform —auth/registeris open by default). State: attacker holds tokens for both A and B. - Attacker authenticates as Account A and POSTs
Authorization: Bearer <A_jwt>toPOST /workspaces/W/memberswith body{"user_id": "<B_user_id>", "role": "owner"}. State: control flow entersadd_member. require_workspace_member(W, A)passes (A is a member).MemberService.add(W, B, "owner")writes a new rowMember(workspace_id=W, user_id=B, role="owner"). State: Account B is now a workspace-W owner.- Attacker switches to Account B and acts as workspace owner — change settings, add/remove members, delete the workspace, or pivot to the companion advisories' primitives. State: attacker holds owner of any workspace they had member access to, via a fresh attacker-controlled identity that the original workspace's audit logs cannot easily attribute to A.
- Final state: with one member-level token plus one POST, the attacker plants an owner-role identity on any workspace they can reach. The same primitive lets the attacker invite a competitor or external-vendor account into the workspace as owner, exfiltrating the workspace's content under that competitor's name.
Security Impact
Severity: sec-critical. CVSS 9.1: network attack, low complexity, low privileges (member tier), no user interaction, scope changed (the new owner is a different security principal), high confidentiality and integrity, no availability claim.
Attacker capability: with one workspace-member token plus one POST request, the attacker grants owner-tier access to any user_id on the platform. From there, full workspace control via the Account B token, plus indirect attribution: the original workspace's audit logs see "user A added user B as owner" but the audit trail cannot tell that B is attacker-controlled.
Preconditions: praisonai-platform is deployed multi-tenant; the attacker has any membership token in the target workspace; the attacker can register or knows any other user_id on the platform.
Differential: source-inspection-verified. The asymmetry between MemberService.has_role (clearly tiered) and add_member's default min_role="member" confirms the gap. With the suggested fix below, the gate refuses the member-tier token, the elevated POST returns 403, and the second-identity owner is never created.
Suggested Fix
--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py
+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py
@@ -90,11 +90,15 @@
+def _require_workspace_owner(workspace_id: str, user, session):
+ return require_workspace_member(workspace_id, user, session, min_role="owner")
+
@router.post("/{workspace_id}/members", response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
async def add_member(
workspace_id: str,
body: MemberAdd,
- user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
+ user: AuthIdentity = Depends(_require_workspace_owner),
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
member_svc = MemberService(session)
+ if body.role == "owner" and not await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, "owner"):
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Only owners can add other owners")
member = await member_svc.add(workspace_id, body.user_id, body.role)
The four other workspace mutation endpoints (update_workspace, delete_workspace, update_member_role, remove_member) exhibit the same default-min-role gap and are filed as their own advisories.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai-platform"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47413"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-01T14:23:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n**Type:** Privilege escalation / cross-tenant member injection. The `POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=\"member\"`) and forwards the request body\u0027s `user_id` and `role` straight into `MemberService.add(workspace_id, user_id, role)`, which has no caller-permission check. A user with the lowest workspace privilege can add any user (including a new attacker-controlled second account, or an existing account they want to grief) as owner of the workspace.\n**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 92-101; `services/member_service.py`, lines 26-38.\n**Root cause:** `MemberService.add` validates only that `role` is in `VALID_ROLES = {\"owner\", \"admin\", \"member\"}` \u2014 the value, not the caller\u0027s right to assign it. The route\u0027s `Depends(require_workspace_member)` resolves to the default `min_role=\"member\"`. So a member-level token plus one POST gives the attacker an alternate identity with owner role inside the same workspace, bypassing every owner-only operation that *would* otherwise gate them.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 92-101.\n\n```python\n@router.post(\"/{workspace_id}/members\", response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)\nasync def add_member(\n workspace_id: str,\n body: MemberAdd,\n user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member), # \u003c-- BUG: defaults to min_role=\"member\"\n session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n):\n member_svc = MemberService(session)\n member = await member_svc.add(workspace_id, body.user_id, body.role) # \u003c-- writes any (user, role)\n return MemberResponse.model_validate(member)\n```\n\n**File 2:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py`, lines 26-38.\n\n```python\nasync def add(\n self,\n workspace_id: str,\n user_id: str,\n role: str = \"member\",\n) -\u003e Member:\n \"\"\"Add a user to a workspace.\"\"\"\n if role not in VALID_ROLES: # only validates the value\n raise ValueError(f\"Invalid role: {role}. Must be one of {VALID_ROLES}\")\n member = Member(workspace_id=workspace_id, user_id=user_id, role=role)\n self._session.add(member) # \u003c-- BUG: no caller-permission check\n await self._session.flush()\n return member\n```\n\n**Why it\u0027s wrong:** workspace member management is the textbook capability that must be gated on owner role. The role hierarchy is implemented (`MemberService.has_role`, member_service.py:80-96), the dependency-tunable `min_role` parameter exists (`require_workspace_member(min_role)`, deps.py:58), but the `POST .../members` route uses neither. The `VALID_ROLES` enum check is purely cosmetic \u2014 it accepts `\"owner\"` from any caller because the route never asked whether the caller has the right to assign that role.\n\n## Exploit Chain\n\n1. Attacker registers two accounts (or recruits a member account on the target workspace `W`). Account A is an existing member of `W`; Account B is a fresh signup the attacker controls (any account on the platform \u2014 `auth/register` is open by default). State: attacker holds tokens for both A and B.\n2. Attacker authenticates as Account A and POSTs `Authorization: Bearer \u003cA_jwt\u003e` to `POST /workspaces/W/members` with body `{\"user_id\": \"\u003cB_user_id\u003e\", \"role\": \"owner\"}`. State: control flow enters `add_member`.\n3. `require_workspace_member(W, A)` passes (A is a member). `MemberService.add(W, B, \"owner\")` writes a new row `Member(workspace_id=W, user_id=B, role=\"owner\")`. State: Account B is now a workspace-W owner.\n4. Attacker switches to Account B and acts as workspace owner \u2014 change settings, add/remove members, delete the workspace, or pivot to the companion advisories\u0027 primitives. State: attacker holds owner of any workspace they had member access to, via a fresh attacker-controlled identity that the original workspace\u0027s audit logs cannot easily attribute to A.\n5. Final state: with one member-level token plus one POST, the attacker plants an owner-role identity on any workspace they can reach. The same primitive lets the attacker invite a competitor or external-vendor account into the workspace as owner, exfiltrating the workspace\u0027s content under that competitor\u0027s name.\n\n## Security Impact\n\n**Severity:** sec-critical. CVSS 9.1: network attack, low complexity, low privileges (member tier), no user interaction, scope changed (the new owner is a different security principal), high confidentiality and integrity, no availability claim.\n**Attacker capability:** with one workspace-member token plus one POST request, the attacker grants owner-tier access to any user_id on the platform. From there, full workspace control via the Account B token, plus indirect attribution: the original workspace\u0027s audit logs see \"user A added user B as owner\" but the audit trail cannot tell that B is attacker-controlled.\n**Preconditions:** `praisonai-platform` is deployed multi-tenant; the attacker has any membership token in the target workspace; the attacker can register or knows any other user_id on the platform.\n**Differential:** source-inspection-verified. The asymmetry between `MemberService.has_role` (clearly tiered) and `add_member`\u0027s default `min_role=\"member\"` confirms the gap. With the suggested fix below, the gate refuses the member-tier token, the elevated POST returns 403, and the second-identity owner is never created.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n@@ -90,11 +90,15 @@\n+def _require_workspace_owner(workspace_id: str, user, session):\n+ return require_workspace_member(workspace_id, user, session, min_role=\"owner\")\n+\n @router.post(\"/{workspace_id}/members\", response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)\n async def add_member(\n workspace_id: str,\n body: MemberAdd,\n- user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),\n+ user: AuthIdentity = Depends(_require_workspace_owner),\n session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n ):\n member_svc = MemberService(session)\n+ if body.role == \"owner\" and not await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, \"owner\"):\n+ raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=\"Only owners can add other owners\")\n member = await member_svc.add(workspace_id, body.user_id, body.role)\n```\n\nThe four other workspace mutation endpoints (`update_workspace`, `delete_workspace`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`) exhibit the same default-min-role gap and are filed as their own advisories.",
"id": "GHSA-8g2p-pqm3-fcfh",
"modified": "2026-06-01T14:23:39Z",
"published": "2026-06-01T14:23:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-8g2p-pqm3-fcfh"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can add arbitrary user as owner via POST /workspaces/{id}/members"
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.