CWE-862
Allowed-with-ReviewMissing Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
15215 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-6C2X-GCP3-GP73
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 19:51 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:52Global Knowledge Base Enumeration via knowledge-bases Meta-Collection
Affected Component
Retrieval collection access validation:
- backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py (lines 2330-2355, _validate_collection_access)
- backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py (query endpoints, e.g. POST /query/doc)
Affected Versions
Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions with the knowledge base subsystem.
Description
The _validate_collection_access function uses an incomplete allowlist that only enforces ownership checks for collections matching user-memory-* and file-* patterns. All other collection names pass through unchecked — including the system-level knowledge-bases meta-collection, which stores the IDs, names, and descriptions of every knowledge base on the instance.
Any authenticated user can query this meta-collection directly via the retrieval query endpoints to obtain a global index of all knowledge bases across all users.
# retrieval.py:2330-2355 — incomplete collection allowlist
def _validate_collection_access(user, collection_name, ...):
if collection_name.startswith('user-memory-'):
# Check user-memory ownership
...
elif collection_name.startswith('file-'):
# Check file access
...
# Everything else (including "knowledge-bases") passes through unchecked
This finding is the enabler for the KB destruction (process/web), KB content injection (process/file), and RAG vector search access bypass findings — all of which require knowing a target KB's UUID. Without this enumeration, UUIDs are random and practically unguessable; with it, UUIDs across the entire instance are trivially obtained.
CVSS 3.1 Breakdown
| Metric | Value | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector | Network (N) | Exploited remotely via API call |
| Attack Complexity | Low (L) | Single API call |
| Privileges Required | Low (L) | Requires any authenticated user account |
| User Interaction | None (N) | No victim interaction required |
| Scope | Unchanged (U) | Impact within the knowledge base boundary |
| Confidentiality | Low (L) | Discloses KB metadata (IDs, names, descriptions) across all users |
| Integrity | None (N) | No direct data modification |
| Availability | None (N) | No denial of service |
Attack Scenario
- Attacker (any authenticated user) sends:
POST /api/v1/retrieval/query/doc { "collection_name": "knowledge-bases", "query": "confidential" } _validate_collection_accessdoes not recognize theknowledge-basesprefix and lets the request pass.- The vector search returns the most relevant documents from the meta-collection — knowledge base records including their UUIDs, names, and descriptions — across all users on the instance.
- Attacker varies the query to enumerate more KBs:
"project","internal","private", etc. - Attacker now has a full target list for subsequent attacks (destruction, poisoning, content extraction).
Impact
- Information disclosure: KB names and descriptions may reveal sensitive project names, internal initiatives, or user activities
- Enabler for other attacks: Unlocks the following findings by supplying the required target UUIDs:
- KB destruction/poisoning via
process/web - Cross-user content injection via
process/file - RAG vector search access bypass in
retrieval/utils.py - Transforms these from theoretical (requires UUID guessing) to trivially exploitable (UUIDs enumerable)
Preconditions
- Attacker must have a valid user account
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "open-webui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44557"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-862",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T19:51:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T20:16:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# Global Knowledge Base Enumeration via knowledge-bases Meta-Collection\n\n## Affected Component\n\nRetrieval collection access validation:\n- `backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py` (lines 2330-2355, `_validate_collection_access`)\n- `backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py` (query endpoints, e.g. `POST /query/doc`)\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nCurrent main branch (commit `6fdd19bf1`) and likely all versions with the knowledge base subsystem.\n\n## Description\n\nThe `_validate_collection_access` function uses an incomplete allowlist that only enforces ownership checks for collections matching `user-memory-*` and `file-*` patterns. All other collection names pass through unchecked \u2014 including the system-level `knowledge-bases` meta-collection, which stores the IDs, names, and descriptions of every knowledge base on the instance.\n\nAny authenticated user can query this meta-collection directly via the retrieval query endpoints to obtain a global index of all knowledge bases across all users.\n\n```python\n# retrieval.py:2330-2355 \u2014 incomplete collection allowlist\ndef _validate_collection_access(user, collection_name, ...):\n if collection_name.startswith(\u0027user-memory-\u0027):\n # Check user-memory ownership\n ...\n elif collection_name.startswith(\u0027file-\u0027):\n # Check file access\n ...\n # Everything else (including \"knowledge-bases\") passes through unchecked\n```\n\nThis finding is the enabler for the KB destruction (`process/web`), KB content injection (`process/file`), and RAG vector search access bypass findings \u2014 all of which require knowing a target KB\u0027s UUID. Without this enumeration, UUIDs are random and practically unguessable; with it, UUIDs across the entire instance are trivially obtained.\n\n## CVSS 3.1 Breakdown\n\n| Metric | Value | Rationale |\n|--------|-------|-----------|\n| Attack Vector | Network (N) | Exploited remotely via API call |\n| Attack Complexity | Low (L) | Single API call |\n| Privileges Required | Low (L) | Requires any authenticated user account |\n| User Interaction | None (N) | No victim interaction required |\n| Scope | Unchanged (U) | Impact within the knowledge base boundary |\n| Confidentiality | Low (L) | Discloses KB metadata (IDs, names, descriptions) across all users |\n| Integrity | None (N) | No direct data modification |\n| Availability | None (N) | No denial of service |\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n1. Attacker (any authenticated user) sends:\n ```\n POST /api/v1/retrieval/query/doc\n {\n \"collection_name\": \"knowledge-bases\",\n \"query\": \"confidential\"\n }\n ```\n2. `_validate_collection_access` does not recognize the `knowledge-bases` prefix and lets the request pass.\n3. The vector search returns the most relevant documents from the meta-collection \u2014 knowledge base records including their UUIDs, names, and descriptions \u2014 across all users on the instance.\n4. Attacker varies the query to enumerate more KBs: `\"project\"`, `\"internal\"`, `\"private\"`, etc.\n5. Attacker now has a full target list for subsequent attacks (destruction, poisoning, content extraction).\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Information disclosure:** KB names and descriptions may reveal sensitive project names, internal initiatives, or user activities\n- **Enabler for other attacks:** Unlocks the following findings by supplying the required target UUIDs:\n - KB destruction/poisoning via `process/web`\n - Cross-user content injection via `process/file`\n - RAG vector search access bypass in `retrieval/utils.py`\n- Transforms these from theoretical (requires UUID guessing) to trivially exploitable (UUIDs enumerable)\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Attacker must have a valid user account",
"id": "GHSA-6c2x-gcp3-gp73",
"modified": "2026-05-15T23:52:57Z",
"published": "2026-05-08T19:51:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-6c2x-gcp3-gp73"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44557"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Open WebUI vulnerable to Global Knowledge Base Enumeration via knowledge-bases Meta-Collection"
}
GHSA-6C37-PJH3-94V6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-03 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:34Missing Authorization vulnerability in enituretechnology Small Package Quotes – Worldwide Express Edition allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects Small Package Quotes – Worldwide Express Edition: from n/a through 5.2.19.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-30915"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-03T14:15:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in enituretechnology Small Package Quotes \u2013 Worldwide Express Edition allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects Small Package Quotes \u2013 Worldwide Express Edition: from n/a through 5.2.19.",
"id": "GHSA-6c37-pjh3-94v6",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:34:27Z",
"published": "2025-04-03T15:31:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30915"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/small-package-quotes-wwe-edition/vulnerability/wordpress-small-package-quotes-worldwide-express-edition-plugin-5-2-19-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6C3H-GXFP-37VM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-19 18:31 – Updated: 2026-02-20 18:31Missing Authorization vulnerability in cmsmasters CMSMasters Content Composer cmsmasters-content-composer allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects CMSMasters Content Composer: from n/a through <= 2.5.8.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23547"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-19T09:16:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in cmsmasters CMSMasters Content Composer cmsmasters-content-composer allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects CMSMasters Content Composer: from n/a through \u003c= 2.5.8.",
"id": "GHSA-6c3h-gxfp-37vm",
"modified": "2026-02-20T18:31:27Z",
"published": "2026-02-19T18:31:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23547"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/cmsmasters-content-composer/vulnerability/wordpress-cmsmasters-content-composer-plugin-2-5-8-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6C46-P6J5-3F49
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 20:37 – Updated: 2026-01-13 20:37Problem
Backend users with access to the redirects module and write permission on the sys_redirect table were able to read, create, and modify any redirect record - without restriction to the user’s own file‑mounts or web‑mounts. This allowed attackers to insert or alter redirects pointing to arbitrary URLs - facilitating phishing or other malicious redirect attacks.
Solution
Update to TYPO3 versions 10.4.55 ELTS, 11.5.49 ELTS, 12.4.41 LTS, 13.4.23 LTS, 14.0.2 that fix the problem described.
Credits
Thanks to Georg Dümmler for reporting this issue, and to TYPO3 security team member Elias Häußler for fixing it.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 14.0.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms-redirects"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "14.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 13.4.22"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms-redirects"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "13.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "13.4.23"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 12.4.40"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms-redirects"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "12.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "12.4.41"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.5.48"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms-redirects"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.5.49"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.4.54"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms-redirects"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.4.55"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59021"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-13T20:37:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-13T12:15:50Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Problem\nBackend users with access to the redirects module and write permission on the `sys_redirect` table were able to read, create, and modify any redirect record - without restriction to the user\u2019s own file\u2011mounts or web\u2011mounts. This allowed attackers to insert or alter redirects pointing to arbitrary URLs - facilitating phishing or other malicious redirect attacks.\n\n### Solution\nUpdate to TYPO3 versions 10.4.55 ELTS, 11.5.49 ELTS, 12.4.41 LTS, 13.4.23 LTS, 14.0.2 that fix the problem described.\n\n### Credits\nThanks to Georg D\u00fcmmler for reporting this issue, and to TYPO3 security team member Elias H\u00e4u\u00dfler for fixing it.\n\n### References\n* [TYPO3-CORE-SA-2026-002](https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2026-002)",
"id": "GHSA-6c46-p6j5-3f49",
"modified": "2026-01-13T20:37:37Z",
"published": "2026-01-13T20:37:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TYPO3/typo3/security/advisories/GHSA-6c46-p6j5-3f49"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59021"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TYPO3/typo3/commit/8a46abd8993e3a5a31a834dcd6c8f91adef57ce4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TYPO3/typo3/commit/bac370df5c1c3fcf5ebc1c030fbd2bec86d6a686"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TYPO3/typo3/commit/fbbae3b9a40d0420207ef7af990cdf1ac0612c0b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/TYPO3/typo3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2026-002"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "TYPO3 CMS Allows Broken Access Control in Redirects Module"
}
GHSA-6C4C-5HCJ-J9PJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-12 09:30 – Updated: 2024-06-12 09:30Missing Authorization vulnerability in Brett Shumaker Simple Staff List.This issue affects Simple Staff List: from n/a through 2.2.4.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-51526"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-12T09:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Brett Shumaker Simple Staff List.This issue affects Simple Staff List: from n/a through 2.2.4.",
"id": "GHSA-6c4c-5hcj-j9pj",
"modified": "2024-06-12T09:30:48Z",
"published": "2024-06-12T09:30:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-51526"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/simple-staff-list/wordpress-simple-staff-list-plugin-2-2-4-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6C66-33PW-Q83J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-11 12:32 – Updated: 2026-06-11 12:32A Missing Authorization vulnerability in the playbook import functionality in Dialogflow CX on Google Cloud Platform allows an authenticated user with specific roles to escalate privileges and potentially take over a GCP project using a maliciously crafted playbook import.
This vulnerability was patched on 15 March 2026, and no customer action is needed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-4764"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-11T12:16:31Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A Missing Authorization vulnerability in the playbook import functionality in Dialogflow CX on Google Cloud Platform allows an authenticated user with specific roles to escalate privileges and potentially take over a GCP project using a maliciously crafted playbook import.\n\n\nThis vulnerability was patched on 15 March 2026, and no customer action is needed.",
"id": "GHSA-6c66-33pw-q83j",
"modified": "2026-06-11T12:32:44Z",
"published": "2026-06-11T12:32:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4764"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.cloud.google.com/dialogflow/docs/release-notes#May_07_2026"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Clear",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-6C6R-5XR4-CR5M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 20:22 – Updated: 2026-07-21 20:22Summary
Gitea's issue and comment attachment update paths accept attachment UUIDs without verifying that each attachment belongs to the target issue/comment repository. If an authenticated attacker knows a victim attachment UUID, they can re-link that attachment to an attacker-controlled issue or comment, causing later attachment access checks to use the attacker's repository authorization context.
Affected
- Component: web issue/comment attachment handling.
- Confirmed version:
maincommita39b2775edcb3ba53def96794491b91335117d81(v1.27.0-dev-352-ga39b2775ed). - Fixed in: not fixed at the time of validation.
- Other versions: not exhaustively tested. The affected code path appears structurally similar to versions that contain the current issue/comment attachment update logic.
Description / Root Cause
files[] values from issue/comment edit flows are passed to updateAttachments in routers/web/repo/issue.go:589-629. That helper calls:
models/issues/issue_update.go:267-278(UpdateIssueAttachments)models/issues/comment.go:623-642(UpdateCommentAttachments)
Both functions load attachments by UUID and update the attachment linkage, but neither validates that the attachment row's RepoID matches the repository of the target issue/comment. They also do not reject attachments already linked to a different issue/comment.
Attachment reads then use the linked issue/release repository to decide access:
services/repository/repository.go:185-207returns the repository ID fromIssueIDorReleaseID.routers/web/repo/attachment.go:153-184checks read permission on that linked repository.routers/web/repo/attachment.go:216-224opens and serves the file from the attachment's storage path after the linked-repository permission check succeeds.
For the global /attachments/{uuid} route in routers/web/web.go:872-876, there is no current repository context, so the early attach.RepoID mismatch check in ServeAttachment does not protect against this re-linking case.
A patched sibling path already demonstrates the intended invariant: models/repo/release.go:179-215 rejects release attachments whose RepoID differs from the release repository. That guard was introduced for CVE-2026-20736, but the issue/comment paths still lack an equivalent check.
Impact
An attacker who can edit an issue/comment in a repository they can read can move a known victim attachment UUID into that repository's authorization context. After the re-link, the attachment download path resolves access against the attacker-controlled repository while serving the original attachment file.
This can disclose private issue/comment attachments if the attacker has obtained the UUID through prior legitimate access, copied links, notification content, logs, browser history, or another exposure. The attack does not require write access to the victim repository.
Reproduction Summary
Full HTTP/E2E observation:
- A local Gitea server was started with an isolated SQLite database.
- A victim user created private repositories, private issues, and issue attachments containing unique marker strings.
- An attacker user first attempted to download each victim attachment through
/attachments/{uuid}and received404. - The attacker then submitted the victim UUID through the real issue edit route in an attacker-controlled public repository.
- The same attacker could then download the victim issue attachment through
/attachments/{uuid}and received200; the response body contained the unique issue marker. - The attacker repeated the flow through the real comment edit route and could download the second victim attachment with
200; the response body contained the unique comment marker.
Model-level issue-path behavior:
- A fixture attachment with
RepoID = 2andIssueID = 4was passed toUpdateIssueAttachmentsfor attacker issueID = 1, whoseRepoID = 1. - The call succeeded.
- The attachment row still had
RepoID = 2, but itsIssueIDwas changed to the attacker issue. GetAttachmentLinkedTypeAndRepoIDthen resolved the attachment to attacker repositoryRepoID = 1.
Model-level comment-path behavior:
- The same cross-repository attachment UUID was passed to
UpdateCommentAttachmentsfor attacker commentID = 1. - The call succeeded.
- The attachment row still had
RepoID = 2, but itsIssueIDandCommentIDwere changed to the attacker's issue/comment. - The linked repository used for access checks became attacker repository
RepoID = 1.
Negative control:
- Existing release test
TestAddReleaseAttachmentsRejectsDifferentRepopasses and confirms the release path rejects the same class of cross-repository attachment linkage.
Detailed verifier and step-by-step runbook are available on request.
Suggested Fix
Add repository and linkage validation before updating issue/comment attachments.
Recommended checks:
- Load the target issue for
UpdateIssueAttachmentsand derive itsRepoID. - Load the target comment's issue for
UpdateCommentAttachmentsand derive itsRepoID. - Reject any attachment whose
RepoIDdiffers from the target issue repository. - Reject attachments already linked to a different issue/comment/release, except for attachments already linked to the same object being updated.
- If caller context is available at the web/service layer, also require new unlinked attachments to belong to the current actor or to have been uploaded in the current edit session.
- Preserve any legacy
RepoID = 0migration behavior only when it can be proven safe for the target repository.
Also consider a cleanup/audit query for existing inconsistent rows where attachment.issue_id != 0 and attachment.repo_id differs from the linked issue repository.
Regression Tests
Add tests that fail before the fix and pass after it:
UpdateIssueAttachmentsrejects an attachment whoseRepoIDdiffers from the target issue'sRepoID.UpdateCommentAttachmentsrejects an attachment whoseRepoIDdiffers from the target comment issue'sRepoID.- Same-repository unlinked attachment linking still works for normal issue/comment editing.
- Attachments already linked to a different issue/comment cannot be moved by passing their UUID in
files[]. - Existing release guard test remains passing.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "code.gitea.io/gitea"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.27.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-57886"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T20:22:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nGitea\u0027s issue and comment attachment update paths accept attachment UUIDs without verifying that each attachment belongs to the target issue/comment repository. If an authenticated attacker knows a victim attachment UUID, they can re-link that attachment to an attacker-controlled issue or comment, causing later attachment access checks to use the attacker\u0027s repository authorization context.\n\n## Affected\n\n- Component: web issue/comment attachment handling.\n- Confirmed version: `main` commit `a39b2775edcb3ba53def96794491b91335117d81` (`v1.27.0-dev-352-ga39b2775ed`).\n- Fixed in: not fixed at the time of validation.\n- Other versions: not exhaustively tested. The affected code path appears structurally similar to versions that contain the current issue/comment attachment update logic.\n\n## Description / Root Cause\n\n`files[]` values from issue/comment edit flows are passed to `updateAttachments` in `routers/web/repo/issue.go:589-629`. That helper calls:\n\n- `models/issues/issue_update.go:267-278` (`UpdateIssueAttachments`)\n- `models/issues/comment.go:623-642` (`UpdateCommentAttachments`)\n\nBoth functions load attachments by UUID and update the attachment linkage, but neither validates that the attachment row\u0027s `RepoID` matches the repository of the target issue/comment. They also do not reject attachments already linked to a different issue/comment.\n\nAttachment reads then use the linked issue/release repository to decide access:\n\n- `services/repository/repository.go:185-207` returns the repository ID from `IssueID` or `ReleaseID`.\n- `routers/web/repo/attachment.go:153-184` checks read permission on that linked repository.\n- `routers/web/repo/attachment.go:216-224` opens and serves the file from the attachment\u0027s storage path after the linked-repository permission check succeeds.\n\nFor the global `/attachments/{uuid}` route in `routers/web/web.go:872-876`, there is no current repository context, so the early `attach.RepoID` mismatch check in `ServeAttachment` does not protect against this re-linking case.\n\nA patched sibling path already demonstrates the intended invariant: `models/repo/release.go:179-215` rejects release attachments whose `RepoID` differs from the release repository. That guard was introduced for CVE-2026-20736, but the issue/comment paths still lack an equivalent check.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can edit an issue/comment in a repository they can read can move a known victim attachment UUID into that repository\u0027s authorization context. After the re-link, the attachment download path resolves access against the attacker-controlled repository while serving the original attachment file.\n\nThis can disclose private issue/comment attachments if the attacker has obtained the UUID through prior legitimate access, copied links, notification content, logs, browser history, or another exposure. The attack does not require write access to the victim repository.\n\n## Reproduction Summary\n\nFull HTTP/E2E observation:\n\n- A local Gitea server was started with an isolated SQLite database.\n- A victim user created private repositories, private issues, and issue attachments containing unique marker strings.\n- An attacker user first attempted to download each victim attachment through `/attachments/{uuid}` and received `404`.\n- The attacker then submitted the victim UUID through the real issue edit route in an attacker-controlled public repository.\n- The same attacker could then download the victim issue attachment through `/attachments/{uuid}` and received `200`; the response body contained the unique issue marker.\n- The attacker repeated the flow through the real comment edit route and could download the second victim attachment with `200`; the response body contained the unique comment marker.\n\nModel-level issue-path behavior:\n\n- A fixture attachment with `RepoID = 2` and `IssueID = 4` was passed to `UpdateIssueAttachments` for attacker issue `ID = 1`, whose `RepoID = 1`.\n- The call succeeded.\n- The attachment row still had `RepoID = 2`, but its `IssueID` was changed to the attacker issue.\n- `GetAttachmentLinkedTypeAndRepoID` then resolved the attachment to attacker repository `RepoID = 1`.\n\nModel-level comment-path behavior:\n\n- The same cross-repository attachment UUID was passed to `UpdateCommentAttachments` for attacker comment `ID = 1`.\n- The call succeeded.\n- The attachment row still had `RepoID = 2`, but its `IssueID` and `CommentID` were changed to the attacker\u0027s issue/comment.\n- The linked repository used for access checks became attacker repository `RepoID = 1`.\n\nNegative control:\n\n- Existing release test `TestAddReleaseAttachmentsRejectsDifferentRepo` passes and confirms the release path rejects the same class of cross-repository attachment linkage.\n\nDetailed verifier and step-by-step runbook are available on request.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAdd repository and linkage validation before updating issue/comment attachments.\n\nRecommended checks:\n\n- Load the target issue for `UpdateIssueAttachments` and derive its `RepoID`.\n- Load the target comment\u0027s issue for `UpdateCommentAttachments` and derive its `RepoID`.\n- Reject any attachment whose `RepoID` differs from the target issue repository.\n- Reject attachments already linked to a different issue/comment/release, except for attachments already linked to the same object being updated.\n- If caller context is available at the web/service layer, also require new unlinked attachments to belong to the current actor or to have been uploaded in the current edit session.\n- Preserve any legacy `RepoID = 0` migration behavior only when it can be proven safe for the target repository.\n\nAlso consider a cleanup/audit query for existing inconsistent rows where `attachment.issue_id != 0` and `attachment.repo_id` differs from the linked issue repository.\n\n## Regression Tests\n\nAdd tests that fail before the fix and pass after it:\n\n- `UpdateIssueAttachments` rejects an attachment whose `RepoID` differs from the target issue\u0027s `RepoID`.\n- `UpdateCommentAttachments` rejects an attachment whose `RepoID` differs from the target comment issue\u0027s `RepoID`.\n- Same-repository unlinked attachment linking still works for normal issue/comment editing.\n- Attachments already linked to a different issue/comment cannot be moved by passing their UUID in `files[]`.\n- Existing release guard test remains passing.",
"id": "GHSA-6c6r-5xr4-cr5m",
"modified": "2026-07-21T20:22:58Z",
"published": "2026-07-21T20:22:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-6c6r-5xr4-cr5m"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38406"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38426"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/de4b8277e9cb576f2315fb03b5ab6478b42a1d31"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/f69e15afe7496cc62e96dab244629c69eb31a7bf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Gitea: Cross-repository issue/comment attachment re-linking can expose private attachment content"
}
GHSA-6CC3-6HQ4-GC95
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-22 18:30 – Updated: 2026-01-26 21:30Missing Authorization vulnerability in Brecht WP Recipe Maker wp-recipe-maker allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects WP Recipe Maker: from n/a through <= 10.2.4.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24357"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-22T17:16:39Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Brecht WP Recipe Maker wp-recipe-maker allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects WP Recipe Maker: from n/a through \u003c= 10.2.4.",
"id": "GHSA-6cc3-6hq4-gc95",
"modified": "2026-01-26T21:30:34Z",
"published": "2026-01-22T18:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24357"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/wp-recipe-maker/vulnerability/wordpress-wp-recipe-maker-plugin-10-2-4-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6CC6-Q8X8-H7VM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-27 06:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:32The Thank You Page Customizer for WooCommerce – Increase Your Sales plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized execution of shortcodes due to a missing capability check on the get_text_editor_content() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.2. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to execute arbitrary shortcodes.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-1687"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-27T06:15:45Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Thank You Page Customizer for WooCommerce \u2013 Increase Your Sales plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized execution of shortcodes due to a missing capability check on the get_text_editor_content() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.2. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to execute arbitrary shortcodes.",
"id": "GHSA-6cc6-q8x8-h7vm",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:32:36Z",
"published": "2024-02-27T06:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1687"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3041096%40woo-thank-you-page-customizer\u0026new=3041096%40woo-thank-you-page-customizer\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/310afe02-3a51-4633-b359-65ae58d0c032?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6CCG-P595-WXJR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-04 03:30 – Updated: 2023-12-07 00:30In imsservice, there is a possible way to write permission usage records of an app due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-42671"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-04T01:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In imsservice, there is a possible way to write permission usage records of an app due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed",
"id": "GHSA-6ccg-p595-wxjr",
"modified": "2023-12-07T00:30:37Z",
"published": "2023-12-04T03:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-42671"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.unisoc.com/en_us/secy/announcementDetail/https://www.unisoc.com/en_us/secy/announcementDetail/1731138365803266049"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.