CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8322 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-P8FP-8747-QJ72
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:13 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:13An issue was discovered on AudioCodes 450HD IP Phone devices with firmware 3.0.0.535.106. The traceroute and ping functionality, which uses a parameter in a request to command.cgi from the Monitoring page in the web UI, unsafely puts user-alterable data directly into an OS command, leading to Remote Code Execution via shell metacharacters in the query string.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-5757"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-04-01T17:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered on AudioCodes 450HD IP Phone devices with firmware 3.0.0.535.106. The traceroute and ping functionality, which uses a parameter in a request to command.cgi from the Monitoring page in the web UI, unsafely puts user-alterable data directly into an OS command, leading to Remote Code Execution via shell metacharacters in the query string.",
"id": "GHSA-p8fp-8747-qj72",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:13:14Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:13:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-5757"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/CVEs/tree/master/CVE-2018-5757"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P8GC-JWRX-PF65
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-09 09:31 – Updated: 2025-01-09 15:31Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability allows OS Command Injection as root This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers before version 24120701.
Likelihood: Moderate – The binary does not seem to be used by the web interface, so it might be more difficult to find. It seems to be largely the same binary as used by the Iocharger Pedestal charging station, however. The attacker will also need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the binary, or convince a user with such access to execute a crafted HTTP request.
Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and delete files and services.
CVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, but the level of authentication does not matter (PR:L), nor is any user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a full compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), and compromised devices can be used to pivot into networks that should potentially not be accessible (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43653"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-09T08:15:27Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command (\u0027Command Injection\u0027) vulnerability\u00a0 allows OS Command Injection as root\nThis issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers before version 24120701.\n\nLikelihood: Moderate \u2013 The \u003credacted\u003e binary does not seem to be used by the web interface, so it might be more difficult to find. It seems to be largely the same binary as used by the Iocharger Pedestal charging station, however. The attacker will also need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the \u003credacted\u003e binary, or convince a user with such access to execute a crafted HTTP request.\n\nImpact: Critical \u2013 The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and delete\nfiles and services.\n\nCVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, but the level of authentication does not matter (PR:L), nor is any user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a full compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), and compromised devices can be used to pivot into networks that should potentially not be accessible (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y).",
"id": "GHSA-p8gc-jwrx-pf65",
"modified": "2025-01-09T15:31:51Z",
"published": "2025-01-09T09:31:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43653"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://csirt.divd.nl/CVE-2024-43653"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://csirt.divd.nl/DIVD-2024-00035"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://iocharger.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:P/AU:Y/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-P8GP-2W28-MHWG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-02 18:10 – Updated: 2026-02-03 16:12Summary
A Command Injection vulnerability allows authenticated users with write permissions to execute arbitrary shell commands on the Signal K server when the set-system-time plugin is enabled. Unauthenticated users can also exploit this vulnerability if security is disabled on the Signal K server. This occurs due to unsafe construction of shell commands when processing navigation.datetime values received via WebSocket delta messages.
Details
Product: Signal K set-system-time plugin
Repository: https://github.com/SignalK/set-system-time
File: index.js, lines 60-71
stream.onValue(function (datetime) {
var child
if (process.platform == 'win32') {
console.error("Set-system-time supports only linux-like os's")
} else {
if( ! plugin.useNetworkTime(options) ){
const useSudo = typeof options.sudo === 'undefined' || options.sudo
const setDate = `date --iso-8601 -u -s "${datetime}"` // ← VULNERABLE
const command = useSudo
? `if sudo -n date &> /dev/null ; then sudo ${setDate} ; else exit 3 ; fi`
: setDate
child = require('child_process').spawn('sh', ['-c', command]) // ← EXECUTES SHELL
The vulnerability has three components:
- Unsanitized Input: The
datetimevalue fromnavigation.datetimeSignal K path is directly interpolated into a shell command without validation - Shell Execution: The command is executed via
spawn('sh', ['-c', command]), which interprets shell metacharacters - Sudo Privileges: The plugin can execute with root privileges if
sudois misconfigured, instructions to limit passwordless sudo to the /bin/date binary helps mitigate this but RCE can still be achieved with the privileges of the user that installed it.
PoC
Exploitation Requirements
- Signal K server with security enabled, if disabled credentials not required
- Valid user credentials with
readwriteoradminpermissions - set-system-time plugin installed and enabled
- Signal K server installed on a Linux OS
- Passwordless sudo configured, official instructions will do this for the
datecommand which is enough to satisfy the if condition
"""
Run provided POC:
python3 poc.py --host signalkserver_IP -u username -p password
Payload: Creates /tmp/signalk-RCE.txt to prove code execution
"""
Impact
An attacker that has write privileges either through security on the Signal K server being disabled or valid credentials with read/write permissions can execute arbitrary commands on the server with the privileges of the SignalK process or root if sudo is misconfigured. This enables complete system compromise.
Recommendations
-
Replace shell-based execution with child_process.execFile() so user-controlled input is passed as arguments rather than interpreted by a shell.
-
Validate that navigation.datetime conforms to an expected ISO-8601 format to improve robustness.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@signalk/set-system-time"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23515"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-02T18:10:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-02T23:16:07Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA Command Injection vulnerability allows authenticated users with write permissions to execute arbitrary shell commands on the Signal K server when the set-system-time plugin is enabled. Unauthenticated users can also exploit this vulnerability if security is disabled on the Signal K server. This occurs due to unsafe construction of shell commands when processing `navigation.datetime` values received via WebSocket delta messages.\n\n### Details\n**Product:** Signal K set-system-time plugin \n**Repository:** https://github.com/SignalK/set-system-time \n\nFile: `index.js`, lines 60-71\n\n```javascript\n stream.onValue(function (datetime) {\n var child\n if (process.platform == \u0027win32\u0027) {\n console.error(\"Set-system-time supports only linux-like os\u0027s\")\n } else {\n if( ! plugin.useNetworkTime(options) ){\n const useSudo = typeof options.sudo === \u0027undefined\u0027 || options.sudo\n const setDate = `date --iso-8601 -u -s \"${datetime}\"` // \u2190 VULNERABLE\n const command = useSudo\n ? `if sudo -n date \u0026\u003e /dev/null ; then sudo ${setDate} ; else exit 3 ; fi`\n : setDate\n child = require(\u0027child_process\u0027).spawn(\u0027sh\u0027, [\u0027-c\u0027, command]) // \u2190 EXECUTES SHELL\n```\n\nThe vulnerability has three components:\n\n1. **Unsanitized Input**: The `datetime` value from `navigation.datetime` Signal K path is directly interpolated into a shell command without validation\n2. **Shell Execution**: The command is executed via `spawn(\u0027sh\u0027, [\u0027-c\u0027, command])`, which interprets shell metacharacters\n3. **Sudo Privileges**: The plugin can execute with root privileges if `sudo` is misconfigured, instructions to limit passwordless sudo to the /bin/date binary helps mitigate this but RCE can still be achieved with the privileges of the user that installed it.\n\n### PoC\n#### Exploitation Requirements\n\n- Signal K server with security enabled, if disabled credentials not required\n- Valid user credentials with `readwrite` or `admin` permissions\n- set-system-time plugin installed and enabled\n- Signal K server installed on a Linux OS\n- Passwordless sudo configured, official instructions will do this for the `date` command which is enough to satisfy the if condition\n\n\n```Python\n\"\"\"\nRun provided POC:\n python3 poc.py --host signalkserver_IP -u username -p password\n\nPayload: Creates /tmp/signalk-RCE.txt to prove code execution\n\"\"\"\n```\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker that has write privileges either through security on the Signal K server being disabled or valid credentials with read/write permissions can execute arbitrary commands on the server with the privileges of the SignalK process or root if sudo is misconfigured. This enables complete system compromise.\n\n### Recommendations\n\n- Replace shell-based execution with child_process.execFile() so user-controlled input is passed as arguments rather than interpreted by a shell.\n\n- Validate that navigation.datetime conforms to an expected ISO-8601 format to improve robustness.",
"id": "GHSA-p8gp-2w28-mhwg",
"modified": "2026-02-03T16:12:17Z",
"published": "2026-02-02T18:10:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/security/advisories/GHSA-p8gp-2w28-mhwg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23515"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/set-system-time/commit/75b11eae2de528bf89ede3fb1f7ed057ddbb4d24"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Signal K set-system-time plugin vulnerable to RCE - Command Injection"
}
GHSA-P8MM-644P-PHMH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-24 19:46 – Updated: 2026-03-27 21:19Summary
PinchTab v0.8.4 contains a Windows-only command injection issue in the orphaned Chrome cleanup path. When an instance is stopped, the Windows cleanup routine builds a PowerShell -Command string using a needle derived from the profile path. In v0.8.4, that string interpolation escapes backslashes but does not safely neutralize other PowerShell metacharacters.
If an attacker can launch an instance using a crafted profile name and then trigger the cleanup path, they may be able to execute arbitrary PowerShell commands on the Windows host in the security context of the PinchTab process user.
This is not an unauthenticated internet RCE. It requires authenticated, administrative-equivalent API access to instance lifecycle endpoints, and the resulting command execution inherits the permissions of the PinchTab OS user rather than bypassing host privilege boundaries.
Details
Issue 1 — PowerShell command string built with interpolated user-influenced data (internal/bridge/cleanup_windows.go in v0.8.4):
func findPIDsByPowerShell(needle string) []int {
escaped := strings.ReplaceAll(needle, `\`, `\\`)
cmd := exec.Command("powershell", "-NoProfile", "-Command",
fmt.Sprintf(`Get-CimInstance Win32_Process -Filter "Name='chrome.exe'" | `+
`Where-Object { $_.CommandLine -like '*%s*' } | `+
`Select-Object -ExpandProperty ProcessId`, escaped))
}
The needle value is interpolated directly into a PowerShell command string. Escaping backslashes alone is not sufficient to make arbitrary user-controlled content safe inside a PowerShell expression.
Issue 2 — needle is derived from launchable profile names:
The cleanup path uses:
findPIDsByPowerShell(fmt.Sprintf("--user-data-dir=%s", profileDir))
The profile directory is derived from the instance/profile name used during launch. In v0.8.4, profile name validation rejected path traversal characters such as /, \, and .., but it did not comprehensively block PowerShell metacharacters such as single quotes or statement separators.
Issue 3 — Trigger path is reachable through normal instance lifecycle APIs:
The attack path described in the report uses:
POST /instances/launchwith a craftednamePOST /instances/{id}/stopto trigger the cleanup routine
That means exploitability depends on access to privileged orchestration endpoints, not on local shell access.
PoC
Environment assumptions
- PinchTab
v0.8.4 - Windows host
- Valid API token with access to instance lifecycle endpoints
Example sequence
curl -X POST http://HOST:9867/instances/launch \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"name": "poc'\''; Start-Process calc; $x='\''",
"mode": "headless"
}'
Then:
curl -X POST http://HOST:9867/instances/<INSTANCE_ID>/stop \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>"
If the payload survives the launch path and reaches the vulnerable cleanup code, the injected PowerShell executes when the Windows cleanup routine runs.
Impact
- Arbitrary PowerShell command execution on Windows as the PinchTab process user.
- Full compromise of data and processes accessible to that user account.
- Possible persistence or host-level follow-on actions within the same user security context.
- Potential repeated execution in restart-heavy environments if the vulnerable cleanup path is triggered repeatedly.
Scope And Limits
- Windows only.
- Requires authenticated, administrative-equivalent API access to instance lifecycle endpoints.
- Does not by itself elevate beyond the privileges of the Windows user running PinchTab.
- This is stronger than a policy bypass or low-risk hardening gap, but narrower than unauthenticated remote code execution.
Suggested Remediation
- Do not interpolate user-influenced values into PowerShell
-Commandstrings. - Pass search terms through environment variables or structured arguments instead of code generation.
- Keep strict validation on profile names, but do not rely on input validation alone as the primary defense.
- Add regression tests covering PowerShell metacharacters in profile-derived values on Windows.
Steps to Reproduce:
Environment Setup: Target: PinchTab v0.8.4 (Windows build) Platform: Windows only
1. Launch Instance with Malicious Profile Name
curl -X POST http://[server-ip]:9867/instances/launch \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"name": "poc'\''; Start-Process calc; $x='\''",
"mode": "headless"
}'
2. Stop Instance to Trigger Injection
curl -X POST http://[server-ip]:9867/instances/<INSTANCE_ID>/stop \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>"
Additional Observation — Repeated Execution (DoS Amplification)
In environments where instances are automatically restarted (e.g., always-on mode), the cleanup routine is triggered repeatedly.
Because the injection occurs during cleanup, the payload is executed on every restart cycle: Continuous spawning of calc.exe processes Resource exhaustion System instability or crash
Impact
This vulnerability allows an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary PowerShell commands on the Windows host running PinchTab. Impact - full host compromise including command execution, persistence, and data access; Root Cause - user-controlled input (profile name) is embedded into a PowerShell command without proper neutralization of special characters; Remediation - avoid constructing shell commands using string interpolation, enforce strict input validation (allowlist), and use structured command execution instead of powershell -Command.
Additionally, because the injection is triggered during the cleanup routine, environments with automatic instance restart behavior may repeatedly execute the injected payload, leading to uncontrolled process creation and resource exhaustion. This enables a reliable denial-of-service condition in addition to remote code execution.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/cmd/pinchtab"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33623"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-24T19:46:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T21:17:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nPinchTab `v0.8.4` contains a Windows-only command injection issue in the orphaned Chrome cleanup path. When an instance is stopped, the Windows cleanup routine builds a PowerShell `-Command` string using a `needle` derived from the profile path. In `v0.8.4`, that string interpolation escapes backslashes but does not safely neutralize other PowerShell metacharacters.\n\nIf an attacker can launch an instance using a crafted profile name and then trigger the cleanup path, they may be able to execute arbitrary PowerShell commands on the Windows host in the security context of the PinchTab process user.\n\nThis is not an unauthenticated internet RCE. It requires authenticated, administrative-equivalent API access to instance lifecycle endpoints, and the resulting command execution inherits the permissions of the PinchTab OS user rather than bypassing host privilege boundaries.\n\n### Details\n**Issue 1 \u2014 PowerShell command string built with interpolated user-influenced data (`internal/bridge/cleanup_windows.go` in `v0.8.4`):**\n\n```\nfunc findPIDsByPowerShell(needle string) []int {\n escaped := strings.ReplaceAll(needle, `\\`, `\\\\`)\n cmd := exec.Command(\"powershell\", \"-NoProfile\", \"-Command\",\n fmt.Sprintf(`Get-CimInstance Win32_Process -Filter \"Name=\u0027chrome.exe\u0027\" | `+\n `Where-Object { $_.CommandLine -like \u0027*%s*\u0027 } | `+\n `Select-Object -ExpandProperty ProcessId`, escaped))\n}\n```\n\nThe `needle` value is interpolated directly into a PowerShell command string. Escaping backslashes alone is not sufficient to make arbitrary user-controlled content safe inside a PowerShell expression.\n\n**Issue 2 \u2014 `needle` is derived from launchable profile names:**\n\nThe cleanup path uses:\n\n```\nfindPIDsByPowerShell(fmt.Sprintf(\"--user-data-dir=%s\", profileDir))\n```\n\nThe profile directory is derived from the instance/profile name used during launch. In `v0.8.4`, profile name validation rejected path traversal characters such as `/`, `\\`, and `..`, but it did not comprehensively block PowerShell metacharacters such as single quotes or statement separators.\n\n**Issue 3 \u2014 Trigger path is reachable through normal instance lifecycle APIs:**\n\nThe attack path described in the report uses:\n\n1. `POST /instances/launch` with a crafted `name`\n2. `POST /instances/{id}/stop` to trigger the cleanup routine\n\nThat means exploitability depends on access to privileged orchestration endpoints, not on local shell access.\n\n### PoC\n**Environment assumptions**\n\n- PinchTab `v0.8.4`\n- Windows host\n- Valid API token with access to instance lifecycle endpoints\n\n**Example sequence**\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST http://HOST:9867/instances/launch \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cTOKEN\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"name\": \"poc\u0027\\\u0027\u0027; Start-Process calc; $x=\u0027\\\u0027\u0027\",\n \"mode\": \"headless\"\n }\u0027\n```\n\nThen:\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST http://HOST:9867/instances/\u003cINSTANCE_ID\u003e/stop \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cTOKEN\u003e\"\n```\n\nIf the payload survives the launch path and reaches the vulnerable cleanup code, the injected PowerShell executes when the Windows cleanup routine runs.\n\n### Impact\n1. Arbitrary PowerShell command execution on Windows as the PinchTab process user.\n2. Full compromise of data and processes accessible to that user account.\n3. Possible persistence or host-level follow-on actions within the same user security context.\n4. Potential repeated execution in restart-heavy environments if the vulnerable cleanup path is triggered repeatedly.\n\n### Scope And Limits\n1. Windows only.\n2. Requires authenticated, administrative-equivalent API access to instance lifecycle endpoints.\n3. Does not by itself elevate beyond the privileges of the Windows user running PinchTab.\n4. This is stronger than a policy bypass or low-risk hardening gap, but narrower than unauthenticated remote code execution.\n\n### Suggested Remediation\n1. Do not interpolate user-influenced values into PowerShell `-Command` strings.\n2. Pass search terms through environment variables or structured arguments instead of code generation.\n3. Keep strict validation on profile names, but do not rely on input validation alone as the primary defense.\n4. Add regression tests covering PowerShell metacharacters in profile-derived values on Windows.\n\n\n\n\n### **Steps to Reproduce:**\n\n**Environment Setup:**\nTarget: PinchTab v0.8.4 (Windows build)\nPlatform: Windows only\n\n**1. Launch Instance with Malicious Profile Name**\n\n```\ncurl -X POST http://[server-ip]:9867/instances/launch \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cTOKEN\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"name\": \"poc\u0027\\\u0027\u0027; Start-Process calc; $x=\u0027\\\u0027\u0027\",\n \"mode\": \"headless\"\n }\u0027\n```\n\n**2. Stop Instance to Trigger Injection**\n\n```\ncurl -X POST http://[server-ip]:9867/instances/\u003cINSTANCE_ID\u003e/stop \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cTOKEN\u003e\"\n```\n\n### **Additional Observation \u2014 Repeated Execution (DoS Amplification)**\n\n**In environments where instances are automatically restarted (e.g., always-on mode), the cleanup routine is triggered repeatedly.**\n\nBecause the injection occurs during cleanup, the payload is executed on every restart cycle:\nContinuous spawning of calc.exe processes\nResource exhaustion\nSystem instability or crash\n\n### **Impact**\n\nThis vulnerability allows an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary PowerShell commands on the Windows host running PinchTab. Impact - full host compromise including command execution, persistence, and data access; Root Cause - user-controlled input (profile name) is embedded into a PowerShell command without proper neutralization of special characters; Remediation - avoid constructing shell commands using string interpolation, enforce strict input validation (allowlist), and use structured command execution instead of powershell -Command.\n\nAdditionally, because the injection is triggered during the cleanup routine, environments with automatic instance restart behavior may repeatedly execute the injected payload, leading to uncontrolled process creation and resource exhaustion. This enables a reliable denial-of-service condition in addition to remote code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-p8mm-644p-phmh",
"modified": "2026-03-27T21:19:09Z",
"published": "2026-03-24T19:46:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/security/advisories/GHSA-p8mm-644p-phmh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33623"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/commit/25b3374bdcdf0dad32c44d5d726bf953238cd8bd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PinchTab: OS Command Injection via Profile Name in Windows Cleanup Routine Enables Arbitrary Command Execution"
}
GHSA-P8Q4-PVX5-WJX2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-10 12:31R-SOFT DMS is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in the Optical Character Recognition (OCR) module. Multiple command execution functions accept user-controllable file paths without proper sanitization before passing them to the system shell via SSH. In current infrastructure the URL encoding neutralizes the injection during the standard web upload flow. An authenticated attacker who is able to trigger the OCR functionality for the uploaded file can execute OS commands within the context of a root user.
This issue was fixed in version v3.19-2862 and v3.17-2580.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41880"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T10:16:24Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "R-SOFT DMS is vulnerable to\u00a0OS Command Injection in the Optical Character Recognition (OCR) module. Multiple command execution functions accept user-controllable file paths without proper sanitization before passing them to the system shell via SSH. In current infrastructure the URL encoding neutralizes the injection during the standard web upload flow. An authenticated attacker who\u00a0is able to trigger the OCR functionality for the uploaded file can execute OS commands within the context of a root user.\n\nThis issue was fixed in version\u00a0v3.19-2862\u00a0and v3.17-2580.",
"id": "GHSA-p8q4-pvx5-wjx2",
"modified": "2026-07-10T12:31:43Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T12:31:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41880"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert.pl/posts/2026/07/CVE-2026-41876"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-P8W2-3JVP-85X5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-20 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-20 18:31Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, versions 8.5 through 8.6 contain a command injection vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to arbitrary command execution with root privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22761"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-20T17:16:31Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, versions 8.5 through 8.6 contain a command injection vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to arbitrary command execution with root privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-p8w2-3jvp-85x5",
"modified": "2026-04-20T18:31:48Z",
"published": "2026-04-20T18:31:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22761"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000450699/dsa-2026-060-security-update-for-dell-powerprotect-data-domain-multiple-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P8XM-2G2X-WX76
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-13 15:31 – Updated: 2025-09-13 15:31A vulnerability was detected in Wavlink WL-WN578W2 221110. This impacts the function sub_404DBC of the file /cgi-bin/wireless.cgi. The manipulation of the argument macAddr results in os command injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-10359"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-13T13:15:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was detected in Wavlink WL-WN578W2 221110. This impacts the function sub_404DBC of the file /cgi-bin/wireless.cgi. The manipulation of the argument macAddr results in os command injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-p8xm-2g2x-wx76",
"modified": "2025-09-13T15:31:04Z",
"published": "2025-09-13T15:31:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10359"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ZZ2266/.github.io/blob/main/WAVLINK/WL-WN578W2/wireless.cgi/add_mac"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ZZ2266/.github.io/tree/main/WAVLINK/WL-WN578W2/wireless.cgi/add_mac#proof-of-concept-poc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.323773"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.323773"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.643444"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-P92H-63R7-C5HJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-31 00:30 – Updated: 2025-11-06 18:32Nagios XI versions prior to 2024R2 contain a command injection vulnerability in the WinRM plugin. Insufficient validation of user-supplied parameters allows an authenticated administrator to inject shell metacharacters that are incorporated into backend command invocations. Successful exploitation enables arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the Nagios XI web application user and can be leveraged to modify configuration, exfiltrate data, disrupt monitoring operations, or execute commands on the underlying host operating system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-34284"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-30T22:15:48Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Nagios XI versions prior to\u00a02024R2\u00a0contain a command injection vulnerability in the WinRM plugin. Insufficient validation of user-supplied parameters allows an authenticated administrator to inject shell metacharacters that are incorporated into backend command invocations. Successful exploitation enables arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the Nagios XI web application user and can be leveraged to modify configuration, exfiltrate data, disrupt monitoring operations, or execute commands on the underlying host operating system.",
"id": "GHSA-p92h-63r7-c5hj",
"modified": "2025-11-06T18:32:49Z",
"published": "2025-10-31T00:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34284"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nagios.com/changelog/nagios-xi"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nagios.com/products/security/#nagios-xi"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nagios-xi-authenticated-command-injection-via-winrm-plugin"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-P94R-3R37-VM3P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:20 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:20A command injection vulnerability was reported in the Integrated Management Module (IMM) of legacy IBM System x 3550 M3 and IBM System x 3650 M3 servers that could allow the execution of operating system commands over an authenticated SSH or Telnet session.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-3723"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-11-12T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A command injection vulnerability was reported in the Integrated Management Module (IMM) of legacy IBM System x 3550 M3 and IBM System x 3650 M3 servers that could allow the execution of operating system commands over an authenticated SSH or Telnet session.",
"id": "GHSA-p94r-3r37-vm3p",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:20:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:20:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3723"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/LEN-66347"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-P953-88VF-5GFV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:42 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:42ELECOM WRC-300FEBK-S allows an attacker with administrator rights to execute arbitrary OS commands via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-20648"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-12T07:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "ELECOM WRC-300FEBK-S allows an attacker with administrator rights to execute arbitrary OS commands via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-p953-88vf-5gfv",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:42:05Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:42:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20648"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN47580234/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.elecom.co.jp/news/security/20210126-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.