Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-78

Allowed

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.

8322 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-P75F-6FP4-P57W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:58 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:25
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI: Missing Authentication for Critical Function and Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') in praisonai
Details

Unauthenticated PraisonAI UI MCP connect endpoint executes attacker-chosen local commands

Summary

PraisonAI v4.6.48 exposes the PraisonAIUI MCP client management API through the default UI host apps without authentication. A remote unauthenticated client can send POST /api/mcp/connect with a command and args field. The endpoint passes those values into the MCP stdio client, which starts the attacker-selected local process as the PraisonAI UI service user.

The issue is reachable through PraisonAI's hosted UI integration (praisonai ui, praisonai ui agents, praisonai claw, and any app using praisonai.integration.host_app.create_host_app() / build_host_app()). praisonai ui and related Typer UI commands bind to 0.0.0.0 by default.

Affected Versions

Confirmed affected:

  • praisonai v4.6.48
  • Commit tested: d5f1114aaf1a2e9f121a6e66b929149ca2201f1d
  • Tag tested: v4.6.48
  • Pinned UI dependency: aiui==0.3.121 from src/praisonai/uv.lock

Likely affected:

  • Any PraisonAI release that exposes aiui / praisonaiui create_app() through the PraisonAI UI host apps without authentication and includes the mcp dependency. I only confirmed the latest release during this audit.

Severity

Reasoning:

  • AV: the vulnerable endpoint is an HTTP API route.
  • AC: a single POST request is sufficient.
  • PR: default UI host apps do not require credentials unless opt-in auth is configured.
  • UI: no victim interaction is needed after the server is running.
  • S: code executes in the PraisonAI UI server process context.
  • C/I/A: arbitrary local command execution permits secret exfiltration, file tampering, and service disruption.

Root Cause

PraisonAI depends on MCP by default and exposes PraisonAIUI via optional UI extras:

  • src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:11 includes base dependencies.
  • src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:19 includes mcp>=1.20.0.
  • src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:25 defines the ui extra with aiui>=0.3.121,<0.4.
  • src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:197 defines the claw extra with aiui[all]>=0.3.121,<0.4.

PraisonAI's UI commands bind externally by default and launch aiui run:

  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:114 sets host="0.0.0.0" for praisonai ui.
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:163 passes that host to aiui run.
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:186, :204, and :222 also default subcommands to 0.0.0.0.
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/claw.py:41 defines the full dashboard command.
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/claw.py:93 launches aiui run with the selected host.

PraisonAI's default apps create the PraisonAIUI Starlette app without forcing authentication:

  • src/praisonai/praisonai/ui_chat/default_app.py:18 calls configure_host(...).
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/ui_chat/default_app.py:142 exports app = create_host_app().
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/claw/default_app.py:63 calls configure_host(...).
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/claw/default_app.py:128 exports app = create_host_app().
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/integration/host_app.py:174 imports praisonaiui.server.create_app.
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/integration/host_app.py:180 returns create_app().

In aiui==0.3.121, the exposed server registers the MCP routes and auth is opt-in:

  • praisonaiui/server.py:1483 defines api_mcp_connect.
  • praisonaiui/server.py:1488 reads attacker-controlled JSON.
  • praisonaiui/server.py:1491 accepts either command or url.
  • praisonaiui/server.py:1496 calls connect_mcp_server(body).
  • praisonaiui/server.py:2516 defines create_app(..., require_auth=False, ...).
  • praisonaiui/server.py:2550 adds AuthEnforcementMiddleware, but it only enforces auth when AUTH_ENFORCE=true.
  • praisonaiui/server.py:2769 registers /api/mcp/servers.
  • praisonaiui/server.py:2770 registers /api/mcp/connect.

The MCP feature converts the request body into a local process launch:

  • praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:325 defines connect_server(self, server_config).
  • praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:330 chooses stdio transport when command is present.
  • praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:332 constructs StdioMCPClient(command=server_config["command"], args=server_config.get("args", [])).
  • praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:360 calls client.connect(), which invokes the MCP stdio transport and starts the process.

Minimal PoC

PoC file: poc/praisonai-aiui-mcp-connect-rce.py

The PoC runs the PraisonAI host app in-process, sends the unauthenticated HTTP request, and asks the server to execute /usr/bin/touch /tmp/praisonai_host_app_mcp_touch_marker.txt. It does not contact an LLM provider and uses no credentials.

Observed output from the tested checkout with aiui==0.3.121 and mcp==1.25.0 available:

[19:19:55] server.py:229 WARNING No auth_token provided for Gateway server. Generated temporary token: gw_****650a. For production, set GATEWAY_AUTH_TOKEN.
[19:19:55] mcp.py:135 ERROR Failed to connect to MCP stdio server: 'tuple' object has no attribute 'initialize'
HTTP_STATUS= 200
RESPONSE= {"server":{"name":"poc-stdio-process-0","transport":"stdio","status":"error","tools":[],"last_error":"Connection failed"}}
SUCCESS_AT_ATTEMPT= 0
MARKER_EXISTS= True
MARKER_PATH= /tmp/praisonai_host_app_mcp_touch_marker.txt

The MCP handshake fails because aiui==0.3.121 is not compatible with the locked mcp==1.25.0 return shape, but the attacker-selected process is already started. Process startup can race the immediate teardown caused by this version mismatch, so the checked-in PoC retries the same unauthenticated request until /usr/bin/touch wins scheduling and creates the marker. The marker file proves local command execution despite the reported MCP connection error.

Exploit Scenario

An operator runs:

pip install "praisonai[ui]"
praisonai ui

Because praisonai ui binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and the generated app does not require authentication by default, any host that can reach the UI port can send:

POST /api/mcp/connect
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "name": "evil",
  "command": "/usr/bin/touch",
  "args": ["/tmp/pwned-by-ui-mcp"]
}

In a real attack, the command can be replaced with a shell, a credential exfiltration command, a file modification command, or a payload that starts a long-lived process as the PraisonAI UI server user.

Novelty / Non-Duplicate Analysis

Searched sources:

  • OSV query for PyPI praisonai: 51 advisories returned.
  • OSV query for PyPI aiui: 0 advisories returned.
  • OSV query for PyPI praisonaiui: 0 advisories returned.
  • GitHub Advisory Database search for exact /api/mcp/connect, api_mcp_connect, StdioMCPClient, connect_mcp_server, and praisonaiui.features.mcp.
  • NVD API searches for PraisonAI StdioMCPClient, PraisonAI api_mcp_connect, PraisonAI /api/mcp/connect, PraisonAIUI /api/mcp/connect, and aiui StdioMCPClient: 0 results.
  • GitHub issue/PR searches in MervinPraison/PraisonAI for exact endpoint/function/class terms. Only one unrelated PR was returned for /api/mcp/connect; no issue/PR matched api_mcp_connect, StdioMCPClient, connect_mcp_server, or praisonaiui.features.mcp.
  • Broad web searches for exact endpoint, file, class, and function terms returned no matching public vulnerability report.

Why this is distinct from known PraisonAI advisories:

  • Not the excluded praisonai serve agents --api-key /agents auth bypass. This report targets POST /api/mcp/connect in the PraisonAIUI host app.
  • Not GHSA-9gm9-c8mq-vq7m / CVE-2026-34935 or GHSA-9qhq-v63v-fv3j / CVE-2026-41497. Those involve MCPHandler.parse_mcp_command() command parsing. This finding uses praisonaiui.server.api_mcp_connect -> praisonaiui.features.mcp.connect_mcp_server -> StdioMCPClient.
  • Not GHSA-pj2r-f9mw-vrcq / CVE-2026-40159. That advisory concerns sensitive environment variables inherited by untrusted MCP subprocesses. This finding is unauthenticated network-triggered local process execution.
  • Not GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj or GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq. Those concern unauthenticated legacy/generated agent servers. This is a distinct UI route and a distinct sink that starts arbitrary local processes.
  • Not GHSA-9cr9-25q5-8prj, GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw, or other MCP server file-read/path-traversal advisories. This path is the UI MCP client connector, not PraisonAI's MCP server tool dispatcher.

Recommended Fix

  1. Remove arbitrary command/args from the remote HTTP API. MCP stdio servers should be configured only from trusted local configuration, not caller-supplied JSON.
  2. Require authentication and authorization on /api/mcp/connect, /api/mcp/disconnect/*, and /api/mcp/servers regardless of AUTH_ENFORCE.
  3. Change UI command defaults from 0.0.0.0 to 127.0.0.1, or require an explicit --unsafe-expose style flag when binding externally without auth.
  4. If remote MCP registration is a required feature, allow only URL-based transports with SSRF protections, or maintain an administrator-configured allowlist of commands.
  5. Add regression tests that unauthenticated requests to /api/mcp/connect cannot start a subprocess, including when AUTH_ENFORCE is unset.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.48"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-57124"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:58:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "# Unauthenticated PraisonAI UI MCP connect endpoint executes attacker-chosen local commands\n\n## Summary\n\nPraisonAI v4.6.48 exposes the PraisonAIUI MCP client management API through the default UI host apps without authentication. A remote unauthenticated client can send `POST /api/mcp/connect` with a `command` and `args` field. The endpoint passes those values into the MCP stdio client, which starts the attacker-selected local process as the PraisonAI UI service user.\n\nThe issue is reachable through PraisonAI\u0027s hosted UI integration (`praisonai ui`, `praisonai ui agents`, `praisonai claw`, and any app using `praisonai.integration.host_app.create_host_app()` / `build_host_app()`). `praisonai ui` and related Typer UI commands bind to `0.0.0.0` by default.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nConfirmed affected:\n\n- `praisonai` v4.6.48\n- Commit tested: `d5f1114aaf1a2e9f121a6e66b929149ca2201f1d`\n- Tag tested: `v4.6.48`\n- Pinned UI dependency: `aiui==0.3.121` from `src/praisonai/uv.lock`\n\nLikely affected:\n\n- Any PraisonAI release that exposes `aiui` / `praisonaiui` `create_app()` through the PraisonAI UI host apps without authentication and includes the `mcp` dependency. I only confirmed the latest release during this audit.\n\n## Severity\n\nReasoning:\n\n- `AV`: the vulnerable endpoint is an HTTP API route.\n- `AC`: a single POST request is sufficient.\n- `PR`: default UI host apps do not require credentials unless opt-in auth is configured.\n- `UI`: no victim interaction is needed after the server is running.\n- `S`: code executes in the PraisonAI UI server process context.\n- `C/I/A`: arbitrary local command execution permits secret exfiltration, file tampering, and service disruption.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nPraisonAI depends on MCP by default and exposes PraisonAIUI via optional UI extras:\n\n- `src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:11` includes base dependencies.\n- `src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:19` includes `mcp\u003e=1.20.0`.\n- `src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:25` defines the `ui` extra with `aiui\u003e=0.3.121,\u003c0.4`.\n- `src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:197` defines the `claw` extra with `aiui[all]\u003e=0.3.121,\u003c0.4`.\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s UI commands bind externally by default and launch `aiui run`:\n\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:114` sets `host=\"0.0.0.0\"` for `praisonai ui`.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:163` passes that host to `aiui run`.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:186`, `:204`, and `:222` also default subcommands to `0.0.0.0`.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/claw.py:41` defines the full dashboard command.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/claw.py:93` launches `aiui run` with the selected host.\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s default apps create the PraisonAIUI Starlette app without forcing authentication:\n\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/ui_chat/default_app.py:18` calls `configure_host(...)`.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/ui_chat/default_app.py:142` exports `app = create_host_app()`.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/claw/default_app.py:63` calls `configure_host(...)`.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/claw/default_app.py:128` exports `app = create_host_app()`.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/integration/host_app.py:174` imports `praisonaiui.server.create_app`.\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/integration/host_app.py:180` returns `create_app()`.\n\nIn `aiui==0.3.121`, the exposed server registers the MCP routes and auth is opt-in:\n\n- `praisonaiui/server.py:1483` defines `api_mcp_connect`.\n- `praisonaiui/server.py:1488` reads attacker-controlled JSON.\n- `praisonaiui/server.py:1491` accepts either `command` or `url`.\n- `praisonaiui/server.py:1496` calls `connect_mcp_server(body)`.\n- `praisonaiui/server.py:2516` defines `create_app(..., require_auth=False, ...)`.\n- `praisonaiui/server.py:2550` adds `AuthEnforcementMiddleware`, but it only enforces auth when `AUTH_ENFORCE=true`.\n- `praisonaiui/server.py:2769` registers `/api/mcp/servers`.\n- `praisonaiui/server.py:2770` registers `/api/mcp/connect`.\n\nThe MCP feature converts the request body into a local process launch:\n\n- `praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:325` defines `connect_server(self, server_config)`.\n- `praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:330` chooses stdio transport when `command` is present.\n- `praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:332` constructs `StdioMCPClient(command=server_config[\"command\"], args=server_config.get(\"args\", []))`.\n- `praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:360` calls `client.connect()`, which invokes the MCP stdio transport and starts the process.\n\n## Minimal PoC\n\nPoC file: `poc/praisonai-aiui-mcp-connect-rce.py`\n\nThe PoC runs the PraisonAI host app in-process, sends the unauthenticated HTTP request, and asks the server to execute `/usr/bin/touch /tmp/praisonai_host_app_mcp_touch_marker.txt`. It does not contact an LLM provider and uses no credentials.\n\nObserved output from the tested checkout with `aiui==0.3.121` and `mcp==1.25.0` available:\n\n```text\n[19:19:55] server.py:229 WARNING No auth_token provided for Gateway server. Generated temporary token: gw_****650a. For production, set GATEWAY_AUTH_TOKEN.\n[19:19:55] mcp.py:135 ERROR Failed to connect to MCP stdio server: \u0027tuple\u0027 object has no attribute \u0027initialize\u0027\nHTTP_STATUS= 200\nRESPONSE= {\"server\":{\"name\":\"poc-stdio-process-0\",\"transport\":\"stdio\",\"status\":\"error\",\"tools\":[],\"last_error\":\"Connection failed\"}}\nSUCCESS_AT_ATTEMPT= 0\nMARKER_EXISTS= True\nMARKER_PATH= /tmp/praisonai_host_app_mcp_touch_marker.txt\n```\n\nThe MCP handshake fails because `aiui==0.3.121` is not compatible with the locked `mcp==1.25.0` return shape, but the attacker-selected process is already started. Process startup can race the immediate teardown caused by this version mismatch, so the checked-in PoC retries the same unauthenticated request until `/usr/bin/touch` wins scheduling and creates the marker. The marker file proves local command execution despite the reported MCP connection error.\n\n## Exploit Scenario\n\nAn operator runs:\n\n```bash\npip install \"praisonai[ui]\"\npraisonai ui\n```\n\nBecause `praisonai ui` binds to `0.0.0.0` by default and the generated app does not require authentication by default, any host that can reach the UI port can send:\n\n```http\nPOST /api/mcp/connect\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n  \"name\": \"evil\",\n  \"command\": \"/usr/bin/touch\",\n  \"args\": [\"/tmp/pwned-by-ui-mcp\"]\n}\n```\n\nIn a real attack, the command can be replaced with a shell, a credential exfiltration command, a file modification command, or a payload that starts a long-lived process as the PraisonAI UI server user.\n\n## Novelty / Non-Duplicate Analysis\n\nSearched sources:\n\n- OSV query for PyPI `praisonai`: 51 advisories returned.\n- OSV query for PyPI `aiui`: 0 advisories returned.\n- OSV query for PyPI `praisonaiui`: 0 advisories returned.\n- GitHub Advisory Database search for exact `/api/mcp/connect`, `api_mcp_connect`, `StdioMCPClient`, `connect_mcp_server`, and `praisonaiui.features.mcp`.\n- NVD API searches for `PraisonAI StdioMCPClient`, `PraisonAI api_mcp_connect`, `PraisonAI /api/mcp/connect`, `PraisonAIUI /api/mcp/connect`, and `aiui StdioMCPClient`: 0 results.\n- GitHub issue/PR searches in `MervinPraison/PraisonAI` for exact endpoint/function/class terms. Only one unrelated PR was returned for `/api/mcp/connect`; no issue/PR matched `api_mcp_connect`, `StdioMCPClient`, `connect_mcp_server`, or `praisonaiui.features.mcp`.\n- Broad web searches for exact endpoint, file, class, and function terms returned no matching public vulnerability report.\n\nWhy this is distinct from known PraisonAI advisories:\n\n- Not the excluded `praisonai serve agents --api-key` `/agents` auth bypass. This report targets `POST /api/mcp/connect` in the PraisonAIUI host app.\n- Not GHSA-9gm9-c8mq-vq7m / CVE-2026-34935 or GHSA-9qhq-v63v-fv3j / CVE-2026-41497. Those involve `MCPHandler.parse_mcp_command()` command parsing. This finding uses `praisonaiui.server.api_mcp_connect -\u003e praisonaiui.features.mcp.connect_mcp_server -\u003e StdioMCPClient`.\n- Not GHSA-pj2r-f9mw-vrcq / CVE-2026-40159. That advisory concerns sensitive environment variables inherited by untrusted MCP subprocesses. This finding is unauthenticated network-triggered local process execution.\n- Not GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj or GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq. Those concern unauthenticated legacy/generated agent servers. This is a distinct UI route and a distinct sink that starts arbitrary local processes.\n- Not GHSA-9cr9-25q5-8prj, GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw, or other MCP server file-read/path-traversal advisories. This path is the UI MCP client connector, not PraisonAI\u0027s MCP server tool dispatcher.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. Remove arbitrary `command`/`args` from the remote HTTP API. MCP stdio servers should be configured only from trusted local configuration, not caller-supplied JSON.\n2. Require authentication and authorization on `/api/mcp/connect`, `/api/mcp/disconnect/*`, and `/api/mcp/servers` regardless of `AUTH_ENFORCE`.\n3. Change UI command defaults from `0.0.0.0` to `127.0.0.1`, or require an explicit `--unsafe-expose` style flag when binding externally without auth.\n4. If remote MCP registration is a required feature, allow only URL-based transports with SSRF protections, or maintain an administrator-configured allowlist of commands.\n5. Add regression tests that unauthenticated requests to `/api/mcp/connect` cannot start a subprocess, including when `AUTH_ENFORCE` is unset.",
  "id": "GHSA-p75f-6fp4-p57w",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:25:16Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T13:58:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-p75f-6fp4-p57w"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: Missing Authentication for Critical Function and Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027) in praisonai"
}

GHSA-P7F9-M8RP-XWWW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 22:28 – Updated: 2022-10-08 00:00
VLAI
Details

Multiple camera devices by UDP Technology, Geutebrück and other vendors are vulnerable to command injection, which may allow an attacker to remotely execute arbitrary code.

Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-33553"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-09-13T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Multiple camera devices by UDP Technology, Geutebr\u00c3\u00bcck and other vendors are vulnerable to command injection, which may allow an attacker to remotely execute arbitrary code.",
  "id": "GHSA-p7f9-m8rp-xwww",
  "modified": "2022-10-08T00:00:17Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T22:28:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-33553"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/icsa-21-208-03"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.randorisec.fr/fr/udp-technology-ip-camera-vulnerabilities"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P7HF-43G5-XHVW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-25 21:31 – Updated: 2024-10-29 21:30
VLAI
Details

MangoOS before 5.2.0 was discovered to contain an authenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability via the Active Process Command feature.

Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-37845"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-25T19:15:03Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "MangoOS before 5.2.0 was discovered to contain an authenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability via the Active Process Command feature.",
  "id": "GHSA-p7hf-43g5-xhvw",
  "modified": "2024-10-29T21:30:48Z",
  "published": "2024-10-25T21:31:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37845"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/herombey/Disclosures/blob/main/CVE-2024-37845%20RCE.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/herombey/Disclosures/tree/main"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P7JM-PV37-VMRP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-22 12:30 – Updated: 2025-07-22 12:30
VLAI
Details

WRC-BE36QS-B and WRC-W701-B contain an improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability in WebGUI. If exploited, an arbitrary OS command may be executed by a remote attacker who can log in to WebGUI.

Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
8.6 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-53472"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-22T10:15:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "WRC-BE36QS-B and WRC-W701-B contain an improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027) vulnerability in WebGUI. If exploited, an arbitrary OS command may be executed by a remote attacker who can log in to WebGUI.",
  "id": "GHSA-p7jm-pv37-vmrp",
  "modified": "2025-07-22T12:30:43Z",
  "published": "2025-07-22T12:30:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53472"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jvn.jp/en/vu/JVNVU91615135"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.elecom.co.jp/news/security/20250722-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P7PW-3RG9-HPXM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-17 18:33 – Updated: 2024-09-17 18:33
VLAI
Details

There is a command injection vulnerability that may allow an attacker to inject malicious input on the device's operating system.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-45682"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-17T18:15:04Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "There is a command injection vulnerability that may allow an attacker to inject malicious input on the device\u0027s operating system.",
  "id": "GHSA-p7pw-3rg9-hpxm",
  "modified": "2024-09-17T18:33:26Z",
  "published": "2024-09-17T18:33:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45682"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-24-261-02"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P7Q5-CVW2-CC4P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-09 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:55
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability has been identified in SCALANCE LPE9403 (All versions < V2.1). The web based management of affected device does not properly validate user input, making it susceptible to command injection. This could allow an authenticated remote attacker to access the underlying operating system as the root user.

Severity
9.9 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-27407"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-09T13:15:16Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability has been identified in SCALANCE LPE9403 (All versions \u003c V2.1). The web based management of affected device does not properly validate user input, making it susceptible to command injection. This could allow an authenticated remote attacker to access the underlying operating system as the root user.",
  "id": "GHSA-p7q5-cvw2-cc4p",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T03:55:10Z",
  "published": "2023-05-09T15:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27407"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-325383.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P7QF-FQJR-3JRQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:14 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:14
VLAI
Details

The CLI parser in Cisco NX-OS 4.1(2)E1(1), 6.2(11b), 6.2(12), 7.2(0)ZZ(99.1), 7.2(0)ZZ(99.3), and 9.1(1)SV1(3.1.8) on Nexus devices allows local users to execute arbitrary OS commands via crafted characters in a filename, aka Bug IDs CSCuv08491, CSCuv08443, CSCuv08480, CSCuv08448, CSCuu99291, CSCuv08434, and CSCuv08436.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2015-4237"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2015-07-03T10:59:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The CLI parser in Cisco NX-OS 4.1(2)E1(1), 6.2(11b), 6.2(12), 7.2(0)ZZ(99.1), 7.2(0)ZZ(99.3), and 9.1(1)SV1(3.1.8) on Nexus devices allows local users to execute arbitrary OS commands via crafted characters in a filename, aka Bug IDs CSCuv08491, CSCuv08443, CSCuv08480, CSCuv08448, CSCuu99291, CSCuv08434, and CSCuv08436.",
  "id": "GHSA-p7qf-fqjr-3jrq",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T03:14:03Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T03:14:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-4237"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAlert.x?alertId=39583"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1032775"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-P7VC-QHF7-X87J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-22 06:30 – Updated: 2025-01-22 06:30
VLAI
Details

Improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command ('OS Command Injection') issue exists in UD-LT2 firmware Ver.1.00.008_SE and earlier. If a user logs in to CLI of the affected product, an arbitrary OS command may be executed.

Severity
6.6 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-23237"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-22T06:15:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027) issue exists in UD-LT2 firmware Ver.1.00.008_SE and earlier. If a user logs in to CLI of the affected product, an arbitrary OS command may be executed.",
  "id": "GHSA-p7vc-qhf7-x87j",
  "modified": "2025-01-22T06:30:47Z",
  "published": "2025-01-22T06:30:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23237"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN15293958"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.iodata.jp/support/information/2025/01_ud-lt2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P7XG-G9WJ-P83P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:41 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:41
VLAI
Details

Usermin before 1.600 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary operating-system commands via unspecified vectors related to a user action.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2014-3883"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2014-06-21T15:55:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Usermin before 1.600 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary operating-system commands via unspecified vectors related to a user action.",
  "id": "GHSA-p7xg-g9wj-p83p",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T04:41:33Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T04:41:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-3883"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ipa.go.jp/security/ciadr/vul/20140620-jvn.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN48805624/index.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://jvndb.jvn.jp/jvndb/JVNDB-2014-000057"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-P7XV-5V8M-5XCW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-12 09:30 – Updated: 2023-12-12 09:30
VLAI
Details

A Huawei data communication product has a command injection vulnerability. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow attackers to gain higher privileges.

Severity
6.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-48616"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-12T08:15:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A Huawei data communication product has a command injection vulnerability. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow attackers to gain higher privileges.",
  "id": "GHSA-p7xv-5v8m-5xcw",
  "modified": "2023-12-12T09:30:32Z",
  "published": "2023-12-12T09:30:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48616"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wr3nchsr.github.io/huawei-netengine-ar617vw-auth-root-rce"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.

Mitigation MIT-22
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

  • Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
  • OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
  • This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
  • Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.

Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-4.3
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Implementation

Strategy: Output Encoding

While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).

Mitigation
Implementation

If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.

Mitigation MIT-27
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Parameterization

  • If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
  • Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
  • Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
  • Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.

Mitigation MIT-32
Operation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-32
Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
  • Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
  • If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
  • Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
  • In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.

Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Mitigation MIT-17
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Mitigation MIT-16
Operation Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection

An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.

CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters

An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.

CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers

An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.

CAPEC-6: Argument Injection

An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.

CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection

In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.

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