CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8324 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-5H74-7W4C-G92X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-08 21:30 – Updated: 2024-02-15 18:30An OS command injection vulnerability exists in Akaunting v3.1.3 and earlier. An attacker can manipulate the company locale when installing an app to execute system commands on the hosting server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-22836"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-08T20:15:52Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An OS command injection vulnerability exists in Akaunting v3.1.3 and earlier. An attacker can manipulate the company locale when installing an app to execute system commands on the hosting server.",
"id": "GHSA-5h74-7w4c-g92x",
"modified": "2024-02-15T18:30:40Z",
"published": "2024-02-08T21:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-22836"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://akaunting.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/akaunting/akaunting/releases/tag/3.1.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/u32i/cve/tree/main/CVE-2024-22836"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5H76-37RV-2MFQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-03 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-03 18:30TOTOLINK N300RT wireless router firmware versions prior to V3.4.0-B20250430 (discovered in V2.1.8-B20201030.1539) contain an OS command injection vulnerability in the Boa formWsc handling functionality. An unauthenticated attacker can send specially crafted requests to trigger command execution via the targetAPSsid request parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-34319"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-03T17:15:51Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "TOTOLINK N300RT wireless router firmware versions prior to\u00a0V3.4.0-B20250430 (discovered in V2.1.8-B20201030.1539) contain an OS command injection vulnerability in the Boa formWsc handling functionality. An unauthenticated attacker can send specially crafted requests to trigger command execution via the targetAPSsid request parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-5h76-37rv-2mfq",
"modified": "2025-12-03T18:30:25Z",
"published": "2025-12-03T18:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34319"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://totolink.tw/support_view/N300RT"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.totolink.net/home/menu/detail/menu_listtpl/download/id/154/ids/36.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/totolink-n300rt-boa-formwsc-rce"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-5H82-G2M2-RMRV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-01 00:01 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:00Multiple command injection vulnerabilities exist in the web_server action endpoints functionalities of Robustel R1510 3.3.0. A specially-crafted network request can lead to arbitrary command execution. An attacker can send a sequence of requests to trigger these vulnerabilities.The /action/import_https_cert_file/ API is affected by command injection vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-33313"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-30T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Multiple command injection vulnerabilities exist in the web_server action endpoints functionalities of Robustel R1510 3.3.0. A specially-crafted network request can lead to arbitrary command execution. An attacker can send a sequence of requests to trigger these vulnerabilities.The `/action/import_https_cert_file/` API is affected by command injection vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-5h82-g2m2-rmrv",
"modified": "2022-07-13T00:00:41Z",
"published": "2022-07-01T00:01:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-33313"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2022-1572"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5H8C-8CCP-8GMH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-01 06:30 – Updated: 2025-03-27 17:45Versions of the package mt7688-wiscan before 0.8.3 are vulnerable to Command Injection due to improper input sanitization in the 'wiscan.scan' function.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "mt7688-wiscan"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-25916"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-02-08T21:48:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-01T05:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Versions of the package mt7688-wiscan before 0.8.3 are vulnerable to Command Injection due to improper input sanitization in the \u0027wiscan.scan\u0027 function.",
"id": "GHSA-5h8c-8ccp-8gmh",
"modified": "2025-03-27T17:45:07Z",
"published": "2023-02-01T06:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25916"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/simenkid/mt7688-wiscan/commit/ff6d6567c65b4e972916a8fbc4533212f20a2fa5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/simenkid/mt7688-wiscan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/simenkid/mt7688-wiscan/blob/master/index.js%23L22"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-MT7688WISCAN-3177394"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "mt7688-wiscan is vulnerable to Command Injection due to improper input sanitization"
}
GHSA-5H9C-FGJ7-7WW4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-23 15:30 – Updated: 2023-01-04 18:31A command injection vulnerability exists in Rocket.Chat-Desktop <3.8.14 that could allow an attacker to pass a malicious url of openInternalVideoChatWindow to shell.openExternal(), which may lead to remote code execution (internalVideoChatWindow.ts#L17). To exploit the vulnerability, the internal video chat window must be disabled or a Mac App Store build must be used (internalVideoChatWindow.ts#L14). The vulnerability may be exploited by an XSS attack because the function openInternalVideoChatWindow is exposed in the Rocket.Chat-Desktop-API.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-44567"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-23T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A command injection vulnerability exists in Rocket.Chat-Desktop \u003c3.8.14 that could allow an attacker to pass a malicious url of openInternalVideoChatWindow to shell.openExternal(), which may lead to remote code execution (internalVideoChatWindow.ts#L17). To exploit the vulnerability, the internal video chat window must be disabled or a Mac App Store build must be used (internalVideoChatWindow.ts#L14). The vulnerability may be exploited by an XSS attack because the function openInternalVideoChatWindow is exposed in the Rocket.Chat-Desktop-API.",
"id": "GHSA-5h9c-fgj7-7ww4",
"modified": "2023-01-04T18:31:00Z",
"published": "2022-12-23T15:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-44567"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/1781102"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5HCQ-HMPH-MW8W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:19 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:19An issue was discovered in Mutt before 1.10.1 and NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. They allow remote IMAP servers to execute arbitrary commands via backquote characters, related to the mailboxes command associated with a manual subscription or unsubscription.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-14354"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-07-17T17:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Mutt before 1.10.1 and NeoMutt before 2018-07-16. They allow remote IMAP servers to execute arbitrary commands via backquote characters, related to the mailboxes command associated with a manual subscription or unsubscription.",
"id": "GHSA-5hcq-hmph-mw8w",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:19:07Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:19:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14354"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/commit/95e80bf9ff10f68cb6443f760b85df4117cb15eb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:2526"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/muttmua/mutt/commit/185152818541f5cdc059cbff3f3e8b654fc27c1d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2018/08/msg00001.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://neomutt.org/2018/07/16/release"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201810-07"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/3719-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/3719-2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/3719-3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2018/dsa-4277"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.mutt.org/news.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/104925"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5HF2-VHJ6-GJ9M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-30 16:41 – Updated: 2026-03-30 21:26Summary
Nginx-UI contains an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability that allows any authenticated user to access, modify, and delete resources belonging to other users. The application's base Model struct lacks a user_id field, and all resource endpoints perform queries by ID without verifying user ownership, enabling complete authorization bypass in multi-user environments.
Severity
High - CVSS 3.1 Score: 8.8 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Note: Original score was 7.5. The score was updated to 8.8 after discovering that sensitive data (DNS API tokens, ACME private keys) is stored in plaintext, which when combined with IDOR allows immediate credential theft without decryption.
Product
nginx-ui
Affected Versions
All versions up to and including v2.3.3
CWE
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Description
Exposed DNS Provider Credentials
The dns.Config structure (internal/cert/dns/config_env.go) contains API credentials:
type Configuration struct {
Credentials map[string]string `json:"credentials"` // API tokens here
Additional map[string]string `json:"additional"`
}
| Provider | Credential Fields | Impact if Leaked |
|---|---|---|
| Cloudflare | CF_API_TOKEN |
Full DNS zone control |
| Alibaba Cloud DNS | ALICLOUD_ACCESS_KEY, ALICLOUD_SECRET_KEY |
Full DNS control + potential IAM access |
| Tencent Cloud DNS | TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_ID, TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_KEY |
Full DNS control |
| AWS Route53 | AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY |
Route53 + potential AWS access |
| GoDaddy | GODADDY_API_KEY, GODADDY_API_SECRET |
DNS record modification |
Combined Attack: IDOR + Plaintext Storage
When the IDOR vulnerability is combined with plaintext storage, attackers can directly extract API tokens from other users' resources:
Attack Chain:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. Attacker authenticates with low-privilege account │
│ 2. Uses IDOR to enumerate: /api/dns_credentials/1,2,3... │
│ 3. Reads plaintext API tokens directly from HTTP response │
│ 4. No decryption needed - tokens stored in cleartext │
│ 5. Uses stolen tokens to: │
│ - Modify DNS records (domain hijacking) │
│ - Issue fraudulent SSL certificates │
│ - Pivot to cloud infrastructure │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
PoC: Extracting Plaintext Credentials via IDOR
# Attacker with low-privilege token accessing admin's DNS credential
curl -H "Authorization: $ATTACKER_TOKEN" \
https://nginx-ui.example.com/api/dns_credentials/1
# Response contains PLAINTEXT API token (no decryption required):
{
"id": 1,
"name": "Production Cloudflare",
"provider": "cloudflare",
"config": {
"credentials": {
"CF_API_TOKEN": "yhyQ7xR...plaintext_token_visible..."
}
}
}
Updated CVSS Score with Plaintext Storage
The plaintext storage increases the confidentiality impact:
CVSS 3.1 Score: 8.8 (High)
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Scope Changed (S:C): Impact extends to external services (DNS providers, cloud platforms)
- High Confidentiality (C:H): Plaintext API tokens immediately usable
- High Integrity (I:H): DNS records, certificates can be modified
- High Availability (A:H): Services can be disrupted via DNS/certificate manipulation
Attack Scenario: Certificate Hijacking
1. Attacker creates low-privilege account on nginx-ui
2. Uses IDOR to enumerate all DNS credentials: /api/dns_credentials/1,2,3...
3. Steals Cloudflare API token from admin's credential
4. Uses token to:
- Modify DNS records
- Issue fraudulent Let's Encrypt certificates
- Intercept traffic to victim domains
Credit
Discovered by security researcher during authorized security audit.
Recommendation
Immediate Mitigation
- Add User Ownership to Models
// model/model.go
type Model struct {
ID uint64 `gorm:"primary_key" json:"id"`
UserID uint64 `gorm:"index" json:"user_id"` // Add this field
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updated_at"`
DeletedAt *gorm.DeletedAt `gorm:"index" json:"deleted_at,omitempty"`
}
- Filter Queries by Current User
// api/certificate/dns_credential.go
func GetDnsCredential(c *gin.Context) {
id := cast.ToUint64(c.Param("id"))
currentUser := c.MustGet("user").(*model.User)
d := query.DnsCredential
dnsCredential, err := d.Where(
d.ID.Eq(id),
d.UserID.Eq(currentUser.ID), // Add user filter
).First()
if err != nil {
cosy.ErrHandler(c, err)
return
}
// ...
}
- Add Authorization Middleware
// middleware/authorization.go
func RequireOwnership(resourceType string) gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
currentUser := c.MustGet("user").(*model.User)
resourceID := cast.ToUint64(c.Param("id"))
// Check if resource belongs to current user
ownerID, err := getResourceOwner(resourceType, resourceID)
if err != nil || ownerID != currentUser.ID {
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
"message": "Access denied",
})
return
}
c.Next()
}
}
Database Migration
-- Add user_id column to all resource tables
ALTER TABLE dns_credentials ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;
ALTER TABLE certs ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;
ALTER TABLE acme_users ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;
ALTER TABLE sites ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;
ALTER TABLE streams ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;
ALTER TABLE configs ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;
-- Set default owner for existing resources
UPDATE dns_credentials SET user_id = 1 WHERE user_id IS NULL;
UPDATE certs SET user_id = 1 WHERE user_id IS NULL;
-- Add foreign key constraint
ALTER TABLE dns_credentials ADD CONSTRAINT fk_dns_credentials_user
FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users(id);
Long-term Improvements
- Implement role-based access control (RBAC)
- Add audit logging for resource access
- Implement resource sharing functionality with explicit permissions
- Add integration tests for authorization checks
Remediation for Plaintext Storage
Immediate Fix: Encrypt Sensitive Fields
Apply the same serializer:json[aes] pattern used for S3 credentials to DNS and ACME data:
model/dns_credential.go:
type DnsCredential struct {
Model
Name string `json:"name"`
Config *dns.Config `json:"config,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json[aes]"` // Add AES encryption
Provider string `json:"provider"`
ProviderCode string `json:"provider_code" gorm:"index"`
}
model/acme_user.go:
type AcmeUser struct {
Model
// ...
Key PrivateKey `json:"-" gorm:"serializer:json[aes]"` // Add AES encryption
// ...
}
Data Migration
Existing plaintext data must be re-saved to trigger encryption:
func MigrateSensitiveData() error {
// Migrate DNS credentials
var dnsCreds []model.DnsCredential
query.DnsCredential.Find(&dnsCreds)
for _, cred := range dnsCreds {
query.DnsCredential.Save(&cred) // Re-save triggers AES encryption
}
// Migrate ACME users
var acmeUsers []model.AcmeUser
query.AcmeUser.Find(&acmeUsers)
for _, user := range acmeUsers {
query.AcmeUser.Save(&user)
}
return nil
}
Summary of Required Changes
| File | Line | Current | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
model/dns_credential.go |
7 | serializer:json |
serializer:json[aes] |
model/acme_user.go |
Key field | serializer:json |
serializer:json[aes] |
References
- CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
- OWASP IDOR Prevention Cheat Sheet
- PortSwigger: IDOR Vulnerabilities
Disclosure Timeline
- 2026-03-13: Vulnerability discovered through source code audit
- 2026-03-13: Vulnerability successfully reproduced in local Docker environment
- 2026-03-13: All IDOR operations verified: READ, MODIFY, DELETE
- 2026-03-13: Security advisory prepared
- [Pending]: Report submitted to nginx-ui maintainers
- [Pending]: CVE ID requested
- [Pending]: Patch developed and tested
- [Pending]: Public disclosure (21-90 days after vendor notification)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.99"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33030"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-30T16:41:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-30T18:16:19Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nNginx-UI contains an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability that allows any authenticated user to access, modify, and delete resources belonging to other users. The application\u0027s base `Model` struct lacks a `user_id` field, and all resource endpoints perform queries by ID without verifying user ownership, enabling complete authorization bypass in multi-user environments.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High** - CVSS 3.1 Score: **8.8 (High)**\n\nVector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n**Note**: Original score was 7.5. The score was updated to 8.8 after discovering that sensitive data (DNS API tokens, ACME private keys) is stored in plaintext, which when combined with IDOR allows immediate credential theft without decryption.\n\n## Product\n\nnginx-ui\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nAll versions up to and including v2.3.3\n\n## CWE\n\nCWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key\n\n## Description\n\n### Exposed DNS Provider Credentials\n\nThe `dns.Config` structure (`internal/cert/dns/config_env.go`) contains API credentials:\n\n```go\ntype Configuration struct {\n Credentials map[string]string `json:\"credentials\"` // API tokens here\n Additional map[string]string `json:\"additional\"`\n}\n```\n\n| Provider | Credential Fields | Impact if Leaked |\n|----------|------------------|------------------|\n| Cloudflare | `CF_API_TOKEN` | Full DNS zone control |\n| Alibaba Cloud DNS | `ALICLOUD_ACCESS_KEY`, `ALICLOUD_SECRET_KEY` | Full DNS control + potential IAM access |\n| Tencent Cloud DNS | `TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_ID`, `TENCENTCLOUD_SECRET_KEY` | Full DNS control |\n| AWS Route53 | `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` | Route53 + potential AWS access |\n| GoDaddy | `GODADDY_API_KEY`, `GODADDY_API_SECRET` | DNS record modification |\n\n### Combined Attack: IDOR + Plaintext Storage\n\nWhen the IDOR vulnerability is combined with plaintext storage, attackers can directly extract API tokens from other users\u0027 resources:\n\n```\nAttack Chain:\n\u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2510\n\u2502 1. Attacker authenticates with low-privilege account \u2502\n\u2502 2. Uses IDOR to enumerate: /api/dns_credentials/1,2,3... \u2502\n\u2502 3. Reads plaintext API tokens directly from HTTP response \u2502\n\u2502 4. No decryption needed - tokens stored in cleartext \u2502\n\u2502 5. Uses stolen tokens to: \u2502\n\u2502 - Modify DNS records (domain hijacking) \u2502\n\u2502 - Issue fraudulent SSL certificates \u2502\n\u2502 - Pivot to cloud infrastructure \u2502\n\u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2518\n```\n\n### PoC: Extracting Plaintext Credentials via IDOR\n\n```bash\n# Attacker with low-privilege token accessing admin\u0027s DNS credential\ncurl -H \"Authorization: $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" \\\n https://nginx-ui.example.com/api/dns_credentials/1\n\n# Response contains PLAINTEXT API token (no decryption required):\n{\n \"id\": 1,\n \"name\": \"Production Cloudflare\",\n \"provider\": \"cloudflare\",\n \"config\": {\n \"credentials\": {\n \"CF_API_TOKEN\": \"yhyQ7xR...plaintext_token_visible...\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Updated CVSS Score with Plaintext Storage\n\nThe plaintext storage increases the confidentiality impact:\n\n**CVSS 3.1 Score: 8.8 (High)**\n\nVector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n- **Scope Changed (S:C)**: Impact extends to external services (DNS providers, cloud platforms)\n- **High Confidentiality (C:H)**: Plaintext API tokens immediately usable\n- **High Integrity (I:H)**: DNS records, certificates can be modified\n- **High Availability (A:H)**: Services can be disrupted via DNS/certificate manipulation\n\n---\n\n### Attack Scenario: Certificate Hijacking\n\n```\n1. Attacker creates low-privilege account on nginx-ui\n2. Uses IDOR to enumerate all DNS credentials: /api/dns_credentials/1,2,3...\n3. Steals Cloudflare API token from admin\u0027s credential\n4. Uses token to:\n - Modify DNS records\n - Issue fraudulent Let\u0027s Encrypt certificates\n - Intercept traffic to victim domains\n```\n\n## Credit\n\nDiscovered by security researcher during authorized security audit.\n\n## Recommendation\n\n### Immediate Mitigation\n\n1. **Add User Ownership to Models**\n\n```go\n// model/model.go\ntype Model struct {\n ID uint64 `gorm:\"primary_key\" json:\"id\"`\n UserID uint64 `gorm:\"index\" json:\"user_id\"` // Add this field\n CreatedAt time.Time `json:\"created_at\"`\n UpdatedAt time.Time `json:\"updated_at\"`\n DeletedAt *gorm.DeletedAt `gorm:\"index\" json:\"deleted_at,omitempty\"`\n}\n```\n\n2. **Filter Queries by Current User**\n\n```go\n// api/certificate/dns_credential.go\nfunc GetDnsCredential(c *gin.Context) {\n id := cast.ToUint64(c.Param(\"id\"))\n currentUser := c.MustGet(\"user\").(*model.User)\n\n d := query.DnsCredential\n dnsCredential, err := d.Where(\n d.ID.Eq(id),\n d.UserID.Eq(currentUser.ID), // Add user filter\n ).First()\n\n if err != nil {\n cosy.ErrHandler(c, err)\n return\n }\n // ...\n}\n```\n\n3. **Add Authorization Middleware**\n\n```go\n// middleware/authorization.go\nfunc RequireOwnership(resourceType string) gin.HandlerFunc {\n return func(c *gin.Context) {\n currentUser := c.MustGet(\"user\").(*model.User)\n resourceID := cast.ToUint64(c.Param(\"id\"))\n\n // Check if resource belongs to current user\n ownerID, err := getResourceOwner(resourceType, resourceID)\n if err != nil || ownerID != currentUser.ID {\n c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{\n \"message\": \"Access denied\",\n })\n return\n }\n c.Next()\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Database Migration\n\n```sql\n-- Add user_id column to all resource tables\nALTER TABLE dns_credentials ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;\nALTER TABLE certs ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;\nALTER TABLE acme_users ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;\nALTER TABLE sites ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;\nALTER TABLE streams ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;\nALTER TABLE configs ADD COLUMN user_id BIGINT;\n\n-- Set default owner for existing resources\nUPDATE dns_credentials SET user_id = 1 WHERE user_id IS NULL;\nUPDATE certs SET user_id = 1 WHERE user_id IS NULL;\n\n-- Add foreign key constraint\nALTER TABLE dns_credentials ADD CONSTRAINT fk_dns_credentials_user\n FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users(id);\n```\n\n### Long-term Improvements\n\n1. Implement role-based access control (RBAC)\n2. Add audit logging for resource access\n3. Implement resource sharing functionality with explicit permissions\n4. Add integration tests for authorization checks\n\n---\n\n## Remediation for Plaintext Storage\n\n### Immediate Fix: Encrypt Sensitive Fields\n\nApply the same `serializer:json[aes]` pattern used for S3 credentials to DNS and ACME data:\n\n**model/dns_credential.go:**\n```go\ntype DnsCredential struct {\n Model\n Name string `json:\"name\"`\n Config *dns.Config `json:\"config,omitempty\" gorm:\"serializer:json[aes]\"` // Add AES encryption\n Provider string `json:\"provider\"`\n ProviderCode string `json:\"provider_code\" gorm:\"index\"`\n}\n```\n\n**model/acme_user.go:**\n```go\ntype AcmeUser struct {\n Model\n // ...\n Key PrivateKey `json:\"-\" gorm:\"serializer:json[aes]\"` // Add AES encryption\n // ...\n}\n```\n\n### Data Migration\n\nExisting plaintext data must be re-saved to trigger encryption:\n\n```go\nfunc MigrateSensitiveData() error {\n // Migrate DNS credentials\n var dnsCreds []model.DnsCredential\n query.DnsCredential.Find(\u0026dnsCreds)\n for _, cred := range dnsCreds {\n query.DnsCredential.Save(\u0026cred) // Re-save triggers AES encryption\n }\n\n // Migrate ACME users\n var acmeUsers []model.AcmeUser\n query.AcmeUser.Find(\u0026acmeUsers)\n for _, user := range acmeUsers {\n query.AcmeUser.Save(\u0026user)\n }\n\n return nil\n}\n```\n\n### Summary of Required Changes\n\n| File | Line | Current | Fix |\n|------|------|---------|-----|\n| `model/dns_credential.go` | 7 | `serializer:json` | `serializer:json[aes]` |\n| `model/acme_user.go` | Key field | `serializer:json` | `serializer:json[aes]` |\n\n## References\n\n- [CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html)\n- [OWASP IDOR Prevention Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Insecure_Direct_Object_Reference_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html)\n- [PortSwigger: IDOR Vulnerabilities](https://portswigger.net/web-security/access-control/idor)\n\n## Disclosure Timeline\n\n- **2026-03-13**: Vulnerability discovered through source code audit\n- **2026-03-13**: Vulnerability successfully reproduced in local Docker environment\n- **2026-03-13**: All IDOR operations verified: READ, MODIFY, DELETE\n- **2026-03-13**: Security advisory prepared\n- **[Pending]**: Report submitted to nginx-ui maintainers\n- **[Pending]**: CVE ID requested\n- **[Pending]**: Patch developed and tested\n- **[Pending]**: Public disclosure (21-90 days after vendor notification)",
"id": "GHSA-5hf2-vhj6-gj9m",
"modified": "2026-03-30T21:26:12Z",
"published": "2026-03-30T16:41:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-5hf2-vhj6-gj9m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33030"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.3.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "nginx-UI has Unencrypted Storage of DNS API Tokens and ACME Private Keys"
}
GHSA-5HQ6-2WP2-FFXX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:21 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:21In some Lenovo ThinkServer-branded servers, a command injection vulnerability exists in the BMC firmware download command. This allows a privileged user to download and execute arbitrary code inside the BMC. This can only be exploited by authorized privileged users.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-9086"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-11-16T14:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In some Lenovo ThinkServer-branded servers, a command injection vulnerability exists in the BMC firmware download command. This allows a privileged user to download and execute arbitrary code inside the BMC. This can only be exploited by authorized privileged users.",
"id": "GHSA-5hq6-2wp2-ffxx",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:21:05Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:21:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-9086"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/solutions/LEN-23836"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5J25-JX7F-2Q73
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:08 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:08Dell EMC OpenManage Enterprise-Modular (OME-M) versions prior to 1.10.00 contain a command injection vulnerability. A remote authenticated malicious user with high privileges could potentially exploit the vulnerability to execute arbitrary shell commands on the affected system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-5322"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-07-19T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Dell EMC OpenManage Enterprise-Modular (OME-M) versions prior to 1.10.00 contain a command injection vulnerability. A remote authenticated malicious user with high privileges could potentially exploit the vulnerability to execute arbitrary shell commands on the affected system.",
"id": "GHSA-5j25-jx7f-2q73",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:08:31Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:08:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5322"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000176929/dsa-2020-023-dell-emc-openmanage-enterprise-enterprise-modular-multiple-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-5J38-53R9-FFJ9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-07 21:31 – Updated: 2025-10-07 21:31Dell PowerProtect Data Domain with Data Domain Operating System (DD OS) of Feature Release versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.1.0.10, LTS2024 release Versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.25, LTS 2023 release versions 7.10.1.0 through 7.10.1.50, contain an Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to arbitrary command execution. Exploitation may allow privilege escalation to root.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-36567"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-07T20:15:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Dell PowerProtect Data Domain with Data Domain Operating System (DD OS) of Feature Release versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.1.0.10, LTS2024 release Versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.25, LTS 2023 release versions 7.10.1.0 through 7.10.1.50, contain an Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027) vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to arbitrary command execution. Exploitation may allow privilege escalation to root.",
"id": "GHSA-5j38-53r9-ffj9",
"modified": "2025-10-07T21:31:07Z",
"published": "2025-10-07T21:31:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-36567"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000348708/dsa-2025-159-security-update-for-dell-powerprotect-data-domain-multiple-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.