Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-509

Allowed

Replicating Malicious Code (Virus or Worm)

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

Replicating malicious code, including viruses and worms, will attempt to attack other systems once it has successfully compromised the target system or the product.

4 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

CVE-2026-106123 (GCVE-0-2026-106123)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-06 18:11 – Updated: 2026-10-06 19:29
VLAI
Title
RabbitMQ Java client: plaintext broker credentials leaked in exception message from ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load()
Summary
The RabbitMQ Java client library allows Java and JVM-based applications to connect to and interact with RabbitMQ nodes. Prior to 5.35.0, ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load() includes the raw uri value in wrapped exceptions when AMQP URI parsing fails. Because the URI may contain a plaintext username and password, startup logs, application performance monitoring systems, CI logs, and copied stack traces can disclose broker credentials to users who should not have access to them. This issue is fixed in version 5.35.0.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-10-06 19:25 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-509 - Replicating Malicious Code (Virus or Worm)
Impacted products
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2017-16127 (GCVE-0-2017-16127)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2018-06-07 02:00 – Updated: 2024-09-16 22:51
VLAI
Summary
The module pandora-doomsday infects other modules. It's since been unpublished from the registry.
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
  • CWE-509 - Replicating Malicious Code (Virus or Worm) (CWE-509)
References
URL Tags
https://nodesecurity.io/advisories/482 x_refsource_MISC
Impacted products
Date Public
2018-04-26 00:00
Show details on NVD website

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GHSA-428F-MH7W-6W2X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-09-01 18:56 – Updated: 2023-09-07 20:44
VLAI
Summary
pandora-doomsday is malware
Details

The pandora-doomsday package is a malicious package that adds itself to the package.json of other packages discovered on the victim host and attempts to publish the package.

It has been removed from the npm registry.

Recommendation

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer.

The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Show details on source website

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        "name": "pandora-doomsday"
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GHSA-H6W7-QMCM-Q6XR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 16:19 – Updated: 2026-10-07 16:19
VLAI
Summary
RabbitMQ Java client: plaintext broker credentials leaked in exception message from ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load()
Details

Summary

When property-file/Map-based ConnectionFactory setup fails while parsing the uri key, the library wraps the underlying exception with the raw connection string — including the plaintext username and password — baked verbatim into the new exception's message.

Details

ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load(ConnectionFactory, Map<String,String>, String) (src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.java, lines 142-155):

String uri = properties.get(prefix + "uri");
if (uri != null) {
    try {
        cf.setUri(uri);
    } catch (URISyntaxException e) {
        throw new IllegalArgumentException("Error while setting AMQP URI: " + uri, e);
    } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
        throw new IllegalArgumentException("Error while setting AMQP URI: " + uri, e);
    } catch (KeyManagementException e) {
        throw new IllegalArgumentException("Error while setting AMQP URI: " + uri, e);
    }
}

uri is the full AMQP URI — amqp(s)://username:password@host:port/vhost — concatenated verbatim into the exception message on any of the three catch branches. No masking/redaction exists anywhere in this class or in ConnectionFactory.setUri(). This is the library's documented Spring-Boot/ops-config entry point (ConnectionFactory.load(...), available since 4.4.0), not obscure internal code.

RabbitMQ's own AMQP URI spec (rabbitmq.com/docs/uri-spec) explicitly warns the password "should avoid leaking... the full URI should not appear in exception messages or log records." A sibling method twenty lines away (ConnectionFactory.setUri(URI)) already avoids this exact mistake for a different malformed-URI case — this path wasn't caught by that same care.

Note: KeyManagementException is declared in the throws clause but not actually reachable via the current setUri(String) → setUri(URI) call chain — the two real, reachable leak surfaces are the URISyntaxException branch (trivial, deterministic, scheme-independent) and the NoSuchAlgorithmException branch (real but narrower — amqps:// only, requires a restricted/FIPS-style default TLS provider).

PoC

Map<String, String> props = new HashMap<>();
props.put("uri", "amqp://svc-account:P@ssW0rd With Space!@broker.internal:5672/prod");
ConnectionFactory cf = new ConnectionFactory();
ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load(cf, props, "");

Throws:

java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Error while setting AMQP URI: amqp://svc-account:P@ssW0rd With Space!@broker.internal:5672/prod

A password containing a space is entirely ordinary under common corporate password policies, and java.net.URI rejects such input outright — this isn't a contrived edge case.

Impact

Default Spring Boot startup-failure logging, an APM/error tracker, a CI job log, or an engineer pasting a stack trace into an internal or public ticket now holds the plaintext broker password, in a system typically far less access-controlled than wherever the credential is normally stored. Note the underlying URISyntaxException also carries the same string in its own message, chained as the cause of RabbitMQ's IllegalArgumentException — so removing RabbitMQ's own + uri concatenation alone would not fully close this; the raw secret-bearing string also shouldn't be handed to new URI() for error-reporting purposes at all.

Suggested fix: don't include the raw uri string in the wrapped exception's message — redact the userinfo component (or omit the URI entirely) before including it in any exception text.

Show details on source website

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  "details": "### Summary\nWhen property-file/Map-based `ConnectionFactory` setup fails while parsing the `uri` key, the library wraps the underlying exception with the raw connection string \u2014 including the plaintext username and password \u2014 baked verbatim into the new exception\u0027s message.\n\n### Details\n`ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load(ConnectionFactory, Map\u003cString,String\u003e, String)` (`src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.java`, lines 142-155):\n\n    String uri = properties.get(prefix + \"uri\");\n    if (uri != null) {\n        try {\n            cf.setUri(uri);\n        } catch (URISyntaxException e) {\n            throw new IllegalArgumentException(\"Error while setting AMQP URI: \" + uri, e);\n        } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {\n            throw new IllegalArgumentException(\"Error while setting AMQP URI: \" + uri, e);\n        } catch (KeyManagementException e) {\n            throw new IllegalArgumentException(\"Error while setting AMQP URI: \" + uri, e);\n        }\n    }\n\n`uri` is the full AMQP URI \u2014 `amqp(s)://username:password@host:port/vhost` \u2014 concatenated verbatim into the exception message on any of the three catch branches. No masking/redaction exists anywhere in this class or in `ConnectionFactory.setUri()`. This is the library\u0027s documented Spring-Boot/ops-config entry point (`ConnectionFactory.load(...)`, available since 4.4.0), not obscure internal code.\n\nRabbitMQ\u0027s own AMQP URI spec (rabbitmq.com/docs/uri-spec) explicitly warns the password \"should avoid leaking... the full URI should not appear in exception messages or log records.\" A sibling method twenty lines away (`ConnectionFactory.setUri(URI)`) already avoids this exact mistake for a different malformed-URI case \u2014 this path wasn\u0027t caught by that same care.\n\nNote: `KeyManagementException` is declared in the throws clause but not actually reachable via the current `setUri(String)` \u2192 `setUri(URI)` call chain \u2014 the two real, reachable leak surfaces are the `URISyntaxException` branch (trivial, deterministic, scheme-independent) and the `NoSuchAlgorithmException` branch (real but narrower \u2014 `amqps://` only, requires a restricted/FIPS-style default TLS provider).\n\n### PoC\n    Map\u003cString, String\u003e props = new HashMap\u003c\u003e();\n    props.put(\"uri\", \"amqp://svc-account:P@ssW0rd With Space!@broker.internal:5672/prod\");\n    ConnectionFactory cf = new ConnectionFactory();\n    ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load(cf, props, \"\");\n\nThrows:\n\n    java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Error while setting AMQP URI: amqp://svc-account:P@ssW0rd With Space!@broker.internal:5672/prod\n\nA password containing a space is entirely ordinary under common corporate password policies, and `java.net.URI` rejects such input outright \u2014 this isn\u0027t a contrived edge case.\n\n### Impact\nDefault Spring Boot startup-failure logging, an APM/error tracker, a CI job log, or an engineer pasting a stack trace into an internal or public ticket now holds the plaintext broker password, in a system typically far less access-controlled than wherever the credential is normally stored. Note the underlying `URISyntaxException` also carries the same string in its own message, chained as the cause of RabbitMQ\u0027s `IllegalArgumentException` \u2014 so removing RabbitMQ\u0027s own `+ uri` concatenation alone would not fully close this; the raw secret-bearing string also shouldn\u0027t be handed to `new URI()` for error-reporting purposes at all.\n\nSuggested fix: don\u0027t include the raw `uri` string in the wrapped exception\u0027s message \u2014 redact the userinfo component (or omit the URI entirely) before including it in any exception text.",
  "id": "GHSA-h6w7-qmcm-q6xr",
  "modified": "2026-10-07T16:19:22Z",
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      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106123"
    },
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      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/2052"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/daca1875cdb8b8c0acce78f71103b21a05478446"
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    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client"
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    {
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      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/releases/tag/v5.35.0"
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      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "RabbitMQ Java client: plaintext broker credentials leaked in exception message from ConnectionFactoryConfigurator.load()"
}

Mitigation
Operation

Antivirus software scans for viruses or worms.

Mitigation
Installation

Always verify the integrity of the software that is being installed.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.