CWE-434

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-0440"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-434",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-03-07T09:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Catch Themes Demo Import WordPress plugin before 2.1.1 does not validate one of the file to be imported, which could allow high privivilege admin to upload an arbitrary PHP file and gain RCE even in the case of an hardened blog (ie DISALLOW_UNFILTERED_HTML, DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT and DISALLOW_FILE_MODS constants set to true)",
  "id": "GHSA-8h3q-6j29-4729",
  "modified": "2022-03-17T00:02:56Z",
  "published": "2022-03-08T00:00:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0440"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/2239095f-8a66-4a5d-ab49-1662a40fddf1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.3.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "microweber/microweber"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.3.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-4732"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-434"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-12-27T21:41:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-12-27T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type in GitHub repository microweber/microweber prior to 1.3.2.",
  "id": "GHSA-8h43-xg5g-9cj7",
  "modified": "2023-01-10T00:46:33Z",
  "published": "2022-12-27T15:30:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-4732"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/microweber/microweber/commit/0d279ac81052ce7ee97c18c811a9b8e912189da0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/microweber/microweber"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/d5be2e96-1f2f-4357-a385-e184cf0119aa"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Microweber vulnerable to unrestricted malicious uploads"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "typo3/cms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.7.23"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "typo3/cms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.5.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-434"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-06-07T18:32:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Due to missing file extensions in $GLOBALS[\u0027TYPO3_CONF_VARS\u0027][\u0027BE\u0027][\u2018fileDenyPattern\u2019], backend users are allowed to upload *.phar, *.shtml, *.pl or *.cgi files which can be executed in certain web server setups. A valid backend user account is needed in order to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nDerivatives of Debian GNU Linux are handling *.phar files as PHP applications since PHP 7.1 (for unofficial packages) and PHP 7.2 (for official packages).\n\nThe file extension *.shtml is bound to server side includes which are not enabled per default in most common Linux based distributions. File extension *.pl and *.cgi require additional handlers to be configured which is also not the case in most common distributions (except for /cgi-bin/ location).",
  "id": "GHSA-8h4m-r4wm-xj7r",
  "modified": "2024-06-07T18:32:42Z",
  "published": "2024-06-07T18:32:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TYPO3/typo3/commit/095ae4ab6869d0f7dc7befedb851cdd7ad0c7ebf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TYPO3/typo3/commit/9990278ce7cf8e4d6b8bf31edec6787722d38b0f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/typo3/cms/2019-01-22-7.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/TYPO3/typo3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2019-008"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "TYPO3 Arbitrary Code Execution via File List Module"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-12153"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-434"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-05T06:16:05Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Featured Image via URL plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation function in all versions up to, and including, 0.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to upload arbitrary files on the affected site\u0027s server which may make remote code execution possible.",
  "id": "GHSA-8h55-3657-fgg7",
  "modified": "2025-12-05T06:31:30Z",
  "published": "2025-12-05T06:31:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12153"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/featured-image-via-url"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9687a88f-ac5b-4746-a68c-91c358b5fb87?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-41833"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-434"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-11-11T05:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Zoho ManageEngine Patch Connect Plus before 90099 is vulnerable to unauthenticated remote code execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-8h8p-qpmp-fmvf",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:20:27Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:20:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41833"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pitstop.manageengine.com/portal/en/community/topic/unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-solved"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.manageengine.com/sccm-third-party-patch-management/kb/unauthenticated-remote-code-execution.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.12.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.13.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45089"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-434",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-12T15:08:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T18:16:24Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWhen dalfox is run in REST API server mode, the `output`, `output-all`, and `debug` fields in `model.Options` are JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker\u0027s request body, then propagated unchanged through `dalfox.Initialize` into the scan engine\u0027s logging path. The logger opens the attacker-supplied path with `os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY` and writes scan log lines to it. Critically, this file write block lives outside the `IsLibrary` guard in `DalLog`, so it executes even in server/library mode where file output was never intended to operate. Because no API key is required in the default configuration, an unauthenticated network caller can create or append to any file writable by the dalfox process on the host filesystem.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High** (CVSS 3.1: 8.2)\n\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L`\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network \u2014 server binds to `0.0.0.0:6664` by default.\n- **Attack Complexity:** Low \u2014 no preconditions; all trigger options (`output`, `output-all`, `debug`) are fully attacker-supplied in the JSON body.\n- **Privileges Required:** None \u2014 `--api-key` defaults to `\"\"`, so the auth middleware is never registered.\n- **User Interaction:** None.\n- **Scope:** Unchanged \u2014 the file write stays within the dalfox process\u0027s OS authority.\n- **Confidentiality Impact:** None \u2014 this is a write-only primitive; no data is returned to the caller.\n- **Integrity Impact:** High \u2014 the attacker has full control over which file path is opened, enabling creation of new files or corruption of existing files anywhere the dalfox process has write permission. While the log content format is semi-fixed, the file path is entirely attacker-determined, making the integrity violation complete with respect to file targeting.\n- **Availability Impact:** Low \u2014 corrupting application configuration files or log files on the host can degrade the availability of other services relying on those files.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- `cmd/server.go` \u2014 `init()` (line 51): `--api-key` defaults to `\"\"` \u2014 no auth by default\n- `pkg/server/server.go` \u2014 `setupEchoServer()` (line 68): auth middleware only registered when `APIKey != \"\"`\n- `pkg/server/server.go` \u2014 `postScanHandler()` (lines 173\u2013191): `rq.Options` (including `OutputFile`, `OutputAll`, `Debug`) passed to `ScanFromAPI` without sanitization\n- `lib/func.go` \u2014 `Initialize()` (line 107): `OutputFile` explicitly propagated from caller options; `OutputAll` (line 167) and `Debug` (line 176) likewise\n- `internal/printing/logger.go` \u2014 `DalLog()` (lines 230\u2013244): `os.OpenFile(options.OutputFile, os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)` executes outside the `IsLibrary` guard\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-306**: Missing Authentication for Critical Function\n- **CWE-73**: External Control of File Name or Path\n- **CWE-434**: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type (write-path variant)\n\n## Description\n\n### `output`, `output-all`, and `debug` Are Fully Attacker-Controlled\n\n`model.Options` exposes all three trigger fields with JSON tags:\n\n```go\n// pkg/model/options.go:88,85,88\nOutputFile  string `json:\"output,omitempty\"`\nOutputAll   bool   `json:\"output-all,omitempty\"`\nDebug       bool   `json:\"debug,omitempty\"`\n```\n\n`postScanHandler` binds the entire `Req.Options` from the JSON body and passes it directly to `ScanFromAPI`:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go:173-191\nrq := new(Req)\nif err := c.Bind(rq); err != nil { ... }\ngo ScanFromAPI(rq.URL, rq.Options, *options, sid)\n```\n\n`Initialize` explicitly copies all three fields into `newOptions`:\n\n```go\n// lib/func.go:107, 167, 176\n\"OutputFile\": {\u0026newOptions.OutputFile, options.OutputFile},\n...\n\"OutputAll\":  {\u0026newOptions.OutputAll, options.OutputAll},\n...\n\"Debug\":      {\u0026newOptions.Debug, options.Debug},\n```\n\n### The File Write Is Not Guarded by `IsLibrary`\n\n`Initialize` always sets `IsLibrary: true` (line 20) and `Silence: true` (line 44) in its returned options \u2014 the intent being that the scan engine runs in embedded/library mode during API calls, suppressing terminal I/O. `DalLog` does respect this for stderr output: lines 203\u2013228 route logs to `ScanResult.Logs` (not stderr) when `IsLibrary` is true. However, the file write block at lines 230\u2013244 is positioned **after and outside** that `if-else`:\n\n```go\n// internal/printing/logger.go\nmutex.Lock()\nif options.IsLibrary {\n    options.ScanResult.Logs = append(options.ScanResult.Logs, text)  // API path\n} else {\n    // stderr printing (CLI path)\n}\n\n// \u2190 file write is here, unconditionally \u2014 no IsLibrary check\nif options.OutputFile != \"\" {\n    var fdtext string\n    if ftext != \"\" {\n        fdtext = ftext\n        f, err := os.OpenFile(options.OutputFile,\n            os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)\n        if err != nil {\n            fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"output file error (file)\")\n        }\n        defer f.Close()\n        if _, err := f.WriteString(fdtext + \"\\n\"); err != nil {\n            fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"output file error (write)\")\n        }\n    }\n}\nmutex.Unlock()\n```\n\nThe `ftext` variable is populated whenever `allWrite` is true (`options.Debug || options.OutputAll`). Since both are attacker-supplied, both conditions are trivially satisfied.\n\n### What Gets Written\n\nLog lines of the form:\n\n```\n[*] Starting scan [SID:\u003cid\u003e] / URL: \u003cattacker-supplied-url\u003e\n[I] Checking BAV\n[E] connection refused\n[DEBUG] \u003cinternal state\u003e\n...\n```\n\nThe URL appears verbatim in log messages, giving the attacker partial influence over the written content. While the format is not fully arbitrary (fixed prefixes like `[*] `, `[I] `, `[E] `), the **file path is entirely attacker-controlled**. The flags `O_CREATE` (creates the file if absent) and `O_APPEND` (never truncates) mean the attacker can:\n- Create new files at arbitrary paths\n- Append log content to existing files (corrupting configs, auth files, cron entries if the line happens to match syntax)\n\n### No Defense at Any Layer\n\nThe same opt-in API key gap applies here as in all prior findings:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go:68-70\nif options.ServerType == \"rest\" \u0026\u0026 options.APIKey != \"\" {\n    e.Use(apiKeyAuth(options.APIKey, options))\n}\n```\n\nThere is no path allowlist, no `IsLibrary` guard on the file write, and no stripping of `OutputFile` from API-sourced requests anywhere in the codebase.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# Step 1 \u2014 Start dalfox REST server (default: no API key)\ngo run . server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 16664 --type rest\n\n# Step 2 \u2014 Verify health (unauthenticated)\ncurl -s http://127.0.0.1:16664/health\n# Expected: {\"code\":200,\"msg\":\"ok\"}\n\n# Step 3 \u2014 Trigger arbitrary file creation with attacker-controlled path\ncurl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16664/scan \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  --data \u0027{\n    \"url\": \"http://127.0.0.1:1/?x=1\",\n    \"options\": {\n      \"output\": \"/tmp/dalfox_sink_poc.log\",\n      \"output-all\": true,\n      \"debug\": true,\n      \"use-headless\": false\n    }\n  }\u0027\n\n# Step 4 \u2014 Verify file was created and written to by the dalfox process\nsleep 2\ncat /tmp/dalfox_sink_poc.log\n# Expected:\n# [*] Starting scan [SID:...] / URL: http://127.0.0.1:1/?x=1\n# [I] Checking BAV\n# [E] ...\n```\n\nNo `X-API-KEY` header is required. Replace `/tmp/dalfox_sink_poc.log` with any path writable by the dalfox process: `/var/www/html/injected.txt`, `/etc/cron.d/dalfox`, `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` (appending log lines that won\u0027t break key format but pollute the file), etc.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Arbitrary file creation**: The attacker can create files at any path on the dalfox host filesystem accessible to the dalfox process, including web-serving directories, cron drop-in directories, and application config directories.\n- **Arbitrary file append/corruption**: Existing files can have log-format lines appended, degrading parsers that expect strict formats (sshd_config, crontab, /etc/hosts, application config files).\n- **Partial content control via URL**: The scan target URL appears verbatim in log output; combined with creative path targeting, this may enable injection into certain file formats.\n- **No authentication required** in the default deployment.\n- When dalfox runs under a privileged account (e.g., in a CI pipeline or as root in a container), the blast radius extends to system-wide files.\n\n## Recommended Remediation\n\n### Option 1: Strip filesystem-dangerous fields from API-sourced requests (preferred)\n\nNullify all fields that touch the local filesystem before passing options to `ScanFromAPI`. This is the same remediation recommended for the `found-action` RCE and `custom-payload-file` file-read findings and should be applied as a single consolidated patch:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go \u2014 in postScanHandler, before ScanFromAPI:\nrq.Options.OutputFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.OutputAll = false          // safe to leave user value; file write is blocked by OutputFile=\"\"\nrq.Options.CustomPayloadFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.CustomBlindXSSPayloadFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.FoundAction = \"\"\nrq.Options.FoundActionShell = \"\"\nrq.Options.HarFilePath = \"\"\n```\n\n### Option 2: Guard the file write with `IsLibrary` in `DalLog`\n\nMove the `OutputFile` write block inside the `else` branch so it only executes in non-library (CLI) mode:\n\n```go\n// internal/printing/logger.go \u2014 restructure the if-else:\nif options.IsLibrary {\n    options.ScanResult.Logs = append(options.ScanResult.Logs, text)\n} else {\n    // existing stderr printing logic...\n\n    // file write belongs here, not after the if-else\n    if options.OutputFile != \"\" \u0026\u0026 ftext != \"\" {\n        f, err := os.OpenFile(options.OutputFile, os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)\n        ...\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThis fix addresses the root structural cause \u2014 the file write was intended for CLI mode only, and gating it on `!IsLibrary` matches that intent. Option 1 is still recommended as the primary fix; Option 2 adds defence-in-depth but requires care to not break legitimate CLI usage.\n\n### Option 3: Require `--api-key` at server startup\n\nAs with the other server-mode findings, making authentication mandatory eliminates the unauthenticated attack surface entirely:\n\n```go\n// cmd/server.go \u2014 in runServerCmd:\nif serverType == \"rest\" \u0026\u0026 apiKey == \"\" {\n    fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"ERROR: --api-key is required when running in REST server mode.\")\n    os.Exit(1)\n}\n```\n\nAll three options should be applied together.\n\n##Credit\n\nEmmanuel David\n\nGithub:- https://github.com/drmingler.",
  "id": "GHSA-8hf9-3q64-q2qf",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:50:06Z",
  "published": "2026-05-12T15:08:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/security/advisories/GHSA-8hf9-3q64-q2qf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45089"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/releases/tag/v2.13.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dalfox Server Mode has an Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Create/Append via `output` Option"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-45790"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-434"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-09-29T03:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An arbitrary file upload vulnerability was found in Metersphere v1.15.4. Unauthenticated users can upload any file to arbitrary directory, where attackers can write a cron job to execute commands.",
  "id": "GHSA-8hj2-qp52-8qvm",
  "modified": "2022-10-01T00:00:17Z",
  "published": "2022-09-30T00:00:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-45790"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/metersphere/metersphere/issues/8653"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-18643"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-434"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-01-07T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Rock RMS versions before 8.10 and versions 9.0 through 9.3 fails to properly validate files uploaded in the application. The only protection mechanism is a file-extension blacklist that can be bypassed by adding multiple spaces and periods after the file name. This could allow an attacker to upload ASPX code and gain remote code execution on the application. The application typically runs as LocalSystem as mandated in the installation guide. Patched in versions 8.10 and 9.4.",
  "id": "GHSA-8hmh-2f4f-8hr6",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:38:10Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:38:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-18643"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/160766/Rock-RMS-File-Upload-Account-Takeover-Information-Disclosure.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-4391"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-434"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-17T06:15:19Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Echo RSS Feed Post Generator plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation in the echo_generate_featured_image() function in all versions up to, and including, 5.4.8.1. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to upload arbitrary files on the affected site\u0027s server which may make remote code execution possible.",
  "id": "GHSA-8hqp-jvp3-493j",
  "modified": "2025-05-17T06:30:28Z",
  "published": "2025-05-17T06:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4391"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://codecanyon.net/item/echo-rss-feed-post-generator-plugin-for-wordpress/19486974"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/72de9f64-f3e0-4705-adc1-6c22076b382f?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-29093"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-434"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-04T16:15:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "File Upload vulnerability in Motivian Content Mangment System v.41.0.0 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the Content/Gallery/Images component.",
  "id": "GHSA-8hrc-27p3-wvxr",
  "modified": "2025-06-04T21:31:14Z",
  "published": "2025-06-04T18:30:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29093"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FraMarcuccio/CVE-2025-29093-Arbitrary-File-Upload/blob/main/README.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.linkedin.com/in/francesco-marcuccio-0433b9218"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}