CWE-352
AllowedCross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Abstraction: Compound · Status: Stable
The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.
14231 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-MX25-J3RC-6W2W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 21:58 – Updated: 2026-05-29 21:58Summary
modules/registration.php mode send_login regenerates a random password for user_uuid_assigned, stores its bcrypt hash in adm_users.usr_password, and emails the cleartext to that user. Every other state-changing mode in the same file (assign_member, assign_user, delete_user, create_user) calls SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']) first; the send_login branch does not. A page visited by a registration-administrator can issue the request as a top-level navigation, the browser sends the admin's SameSite=Lax cookies, and the server resets the chosen user's password without any further interaction from the admin.
Details
Vulnerable Code
modules/registration.php:124-138:
} elseif ($getMode === 'send_login') {
// User already exists and has a login than sent access data with a new password
$user = new User($gDb, $gProfileFields);
$user->readDataByUuid($getUserUUIDAssigned);
$user->sendNewPassword();
// delete the registration because it isn't necessary anymore
$registrationUser->notSendEmail();
$registrationUser->delete();
admRedirect(ADMIDIO_URL.FOLDER_MODULES.'/registration.php');
// => EXIT
}
The four sibling branches all begin with SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); — for example delete_user at lines 110-118:
} elseif ($getMode === 'delete_user') {
// check the CSRF token of the form against the session token
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
// delete registration
$registrationUser->delete();
echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success'));
exit();
}
User::sendNewPassword() (src/User/Entity/User.php) calls setPassword(PasswordUtils::generatePassword()) and persists the new hash before the email is queued; the password change happens unconditionally regardless of whether the e-mail send succeeds. This means even when the operator's SMTP is unconfigured, the victim's password is still reset.
The handler accepts GET (no enforcement of HTTP method, no $_POST requirement), so an <img src=...> or auto-submitting form is sufficient.
Exploitation Flow
- Attacker prepares a "pending registration" row anywhere they can — either by registering a self-controlled user account (the public registration flow creates these), or by waiting for an existing pending registration to be reachable.
- Attacker hosts a page that issues:
<img src="https://victim.example/admidio/modules/registration.php?mode=send_login&user_uuid={pending_registration_uuid}&user_uuid_assigned={victim_user_uuid}"> - A registration-administrator (someone with
isAdministratorRegistration()— usually the org admin) visits the page while logged in to Admidio. The browser sends their session cookie (Admidio's session cookie does not setSameSite=Strict). - Admidio's handler runs as that admin. It loads the assigned user, calls
User::sendNewPassword()which writes a fresh bcrypt hash toadm_users.usr_password, and queues the cleartext password to be e-mailed to the user. - The victim user's old password no longer works.
The cleartext lands in the victim's mailbox, not the attacker's, so the attacker does not get the password directly. The primary impact is therefore forced password reset (account lock-out / DoS for the victim) plus an information-disclosure side effect: the victim now has a password they did not request, and may be socially-engineered into believing the e-mail.
PoC
Tested locally against HEAD c5cde53. The reproducer confirms the password column changes server-side without any user interaction beyond an admin's GET to the crafted URL.
# 0. observe current admin password hash (the testadmin from install)
mariadb -h 127.0.0.1 -P 3399 -u admidio -p... admidio \
-e "SELECT usr_id, usr_login_name, LEFT(usr_password, 12) AS pwd FROM adm_users WHERE usr_id IN (2, 7);"
usr_id usr_login_name pwd
2 testadmin $2y$12$AB.h
7 victim $2y$12$L9q3
# 1. attacker creates a pending registration with user_uuid pointing at "victim"
mariadb ... admidio -e "INSERT INTO adm_registrations (reg_org_id, reg_usr_id, reg_timestamp)
VALUES (1, 7, NOW());"
# (the pending row gives the request a valid user_uuid for $registrationUser->delete())
# 2. crafted CSRF endpoint, hit from a third-party page in the admin's browser:
# no adm_csrf_token, GET only
curl -b $admin_cookie \
"http://127.0.0.1:8085/modules/registration.php?mode=send_login&user_uuid=$pending_uuid&user_uuid_assigned=<victim_uuid>"
# 3. observe the victim's password hash has changed
mariadb ... admidio \
-e "SELECT usr_id, usr_login_name, LEFT(usr_password, 12) AS pwd FROM adm_users WHERE usr_id=7;"
usr_id usr_login_name pwd
7 victim $2y$12$w5lQ
The hash before the attack was $2y$12$L9q3...; after the attack it is $2y$12$w5lQ.... The victim's previously-known password no longer authenticates them.
The same call against user_uuid_assigned=<admin's uuid> resets the admin's own password — locking out the registration-administrator from their own account.
Impact
A registration-administrator who visits a hostile page is silently coerced into resetting any user's password.
- Account lockout / DoS. The victim user (which can be the admin themselves, or any other user with a registration row routed through this admin) loses access; their stored password is replaced with a server-generated one that only lands in the victim's mailbox.
- Phish-flavoured social engineering. The unsolicited "your new Admidio password is …" e-mail is a credible-looking message that the attacker can pair with a phishing site to harvest the new password.
- Self-targetable. Because the attacker also controls the public self-registration flow, they can reliably create a
pending_registrationrow whoseuser_uuid_assignedpoints at any chosen victim.
UI:R reflects that an admin must visit a page; PR:N because the attacker needs no Admidio credentials; I:H because user authentication state is destroyed; A:L because the affected user is locked out of an account but the platform stays up.
Recommended Fix
Add a CSRF check at the top of the branch and require POST:
} elseif ($getMode === 'send_login') {
// check the CSRF token of the form against the session token
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] !== 'POST') {
throw new Exception('SYS_INVALID_PAGE_VIEW');
}
$user = new User($gDb, $gProfileFields);
$user->readDataByUuid($getUserUUIDAssigned);
$user->sendNewPassword();
...
}
A regression test should issue GET /modules/registration.php?mode=send_login&... from a session that has no current page (no in-session form key) and assert that usr_password is unchanged.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.0.9"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "admidio/admidio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47228"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T21:58:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`modules/registration.php` mode `send_login` regenerates a random password for `user_uuid_assigned`, stores its bcrypt hash in `adm_users.usr_password`, and emails the cleartext to that user. Every other state-changing mode in the same file (`assign_member`, `assign_user`, `delete_user`, `create_user`) calls `SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST[\u0027adm_csrf_token\u0027])` first; the `send_login` branch does not. A page visited by a registration-administrator can issue the request as a top-level navigation, the browser sends the admin\u0027s `SameSite=Lax` cookies, and the server resets the chosen user\u0027s password without any further interaction from the admin.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\n`modules/registration.php:124-138`:\n\n```php\n} elseif ($getMode === \u0027send_login\u0027) {\n // User already exists and has a login than sent access data with a new password\n $user = new User($gDb, $gProfileFields);\n $user-\u003ereadDataByUuid($getUserUUIDAssigned);\n $user-\u003esendNewPassword();\n\n // delete the registration because it isn\u0027t necessary anymore\n $registrationUser-\u003enotSendEmail();\n $registrationUser-\u003edelete();\n admRedirect(ADMIDIO_URL.FOLDER_MODULES.\u0027/registration.php\u0027);\n // =\u003e EXIT\n}\n```\n\nThe four sibling branches all begin with `SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST[\u0027adm_csrf_token\u0027]);` \u2014 for example `delete_user` at lines 110-118:\n\n```php\n} elseif ($getMode === \u0027delete_user\u0027) {\n // check the CSRF token of the form against the session token\n SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST[\u0027adm_csrf_token\u0027]);\n\n // delete registration\n $registrationUser-\u003edelete();\n echo json_encode(array(\u0027status\u0027 =\u003e \u0027success\u0027));\n exit();\n}\n```\n\n`User::sendNewPassword()` (`src/User/Entity/User.php`) calls `setPassword(PasswordUtils::generatePassword())` and persists the new hash before the email is queued; the password change happens unconditionally regardless of whether the e-mail send succeeds. This means even when the operator\u0027s SMTP is unconfigured, the victim\u0027s password is still reset.\n\nThe handler accepts `GET` (no enforcement of HTTP method, no `$_POST` requirement), so an `\u003cimg src=...\u003e` or auto-submitting form is sufficient.\n\n### Exploitation Flow\n\n1. Attacker prepares a \"pending registration\" row anywhere they can \u2014 either by registering a self-controlled user account (the public registration flow creates these), or by waiting for an existing pending registration to be reachable.\n2. Attacker hosts a page that issues:\n `\u003cimg src=\"https://victim.example/admidio/modules/registration.php?mode=send_login\u0026user_uuid={pending_registration_uuid}\u0026user_uuid_assigned={victim_user_uuid}\"\u003e`\n3. A registration-administrator (someone with `isAdministratorRegistration()` \u2014 usually the org admin) visits the page while logged in to Admidio. The browser sends their session cookie (Admidio\u0027s session cookie does not set `SameSite=Strict`).\n4. Admidio\u0027s handler runs as that admin. It loads the assigned user, calls `User::sendNewPassword()` which writes a fresh bcrypt hash to `adm_users.usr_password`, and queues the cleartext password to be e-mailed to the user.\n5. The victim user\u0027s old password no longer works.\n\nThe cleartext lands in the *victim\u0027s* mailbox, not the attacker\u0027s, so the attacker does not get the password directly. The primary impact is therefore forced password reset (account lock-out / DoS for the victim) plus an information-disclosure side effect: the victim now has a password they did not request, and may be socially-engineered into believing the e-mail.\n\n## PoC\n\nTested locally against HEAD `c5cde53`. The reproducer confirms the password column changes server-side without any user interaction beyond an admin\u0027s `GET` to the crafted URL.\n\n```\n# 0. observe current admin password hash (the testadmin from install)\nmariadb -h 127.0.0.1 -P 3399 -u admidio -p... admidio \\\n -e \"SELECT usr_id, usr_login_name, LEFT(usr_password, 12) AS pwd FROM adm_users WHERE usr_id IN (2, 7);\"\nusr_id usr_login_name pwd\n2 testadmin $2y$12$AB.h\n7 victim $2y$12$L9q3\n\n# 1. attacker creates a pending registration with user_uuid pointing at \"victim\"\nmariadb ... admidio -e \"INSERT INTO adm_registrations (reg_org_id, reg_usr_id, reg_timestamp)\n VALUES (1, 7, NOW());\"\n# (the pending row gives the request a valid user_uuid for $registrationUser-\u003edelete())\n\n# 2. crafted CSRF endpoint, hit from a third-party page in the admin\u0027s browser:\n# no adm_csrf_token, GET only\ncurl -b $admin_cookie \\\n \"http://127.0.0.1:8085/modules/registration.php?mode=send_login\u0026user_uuid=$pending_uuid\u0026user_uuid_assigned=\u003cvictim_uuid\u003e\"\n\n# 3. observe the victim\u0027s password hash has changed\nmariadb ... admidio \\\n -e \"SELECT usr_id, usr_login_name, LEFT(usr_password, 12) AS pwd FROM adm_users WHERE usr_id=7;\"\nusr_id usr_login_name pwd\n7 victim $2y$12$w5lQ\n```\n\nThe hash before the attack was `$2y$12$L9q3...`; after the attack it is `$2y$12$w5lQ...`. The victim\u0027s previously-known password no longer authenticates them.\n\nThe same call against `user_uuid_assigned=\u003cadmin\u0027s uuid\u003e` resets the admin\u0027s own password \u2014 locking out the registration-administrator from their own account.\n\n## Impact\n\nA registration-administrator who visits a hostile page is silently coerced into resetting any user\u0027s password.\n\n* **Account lockout / DoS.** The victim user (which can be the admin themselves, or any other user with a registration row routed through this admin) loses access; their stored password is replaced with a server-generated one that only lands in the victim\u0027s mailbox.\n* **Phish-flavoured social engineering.** The unsolicited \"your new Admidio password is \u2026\" e-mail is a credible-looking message that the attacker can pair with a phishing site to harvest the new password.\n* **Self-targetable.** Because the attacker also controls the public self-registration flow, they can reliably create a `pending_registration` row whose `user_uuid_assigned` points at any chosen victim.\n\n`UI:R` reflects that an admin must visit a page; `PR:N` because the *attacker* needs no Admidio credentials; `I:H` because user authentication state is destroyed; `A:L` because the affected user is locked out of an account but the platform stays up.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd a CSRF check at the top of the branch and require POST:\n\n```php\n} elseif ($getMode === \u0027send_login\u0027) {\n // check the CSRF token of the form against the session token\n SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST[\u0027adm_csrf_token\u0027]);\n\n if ($_SERVER[\u0027REQUEST_METHOD\u0027] !== \u0027POST\u0027) {\n throw new Exception(\u0027SYS_INVALID_PAGE_VIEW\u0027);\n }\n\n $user = new User($gDb, $gProfileFields);\n $user-\u003ereadDataByUuid($getUserUUIDAssigned);\n $user-\u003esendNewPassword();\n ...\n}\n```\n\nA regression test should issue `GET /modules/registration.php?mode=send_login\u0026...` from a session that has no current page (no in-session form key) and assert that `usr_password` is unchanged.",
"id": "GHSA-mx25-j3rc-6w2w",
"modified": "2026-05-29T21:58:44Z",
"published": "2026-05-29T21:58:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-mx25-j3rc-6w2w"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Admidio\u0027s CSRF in registration `send_login` mode resets arbitrary user passwords"
}
GHSA-MX34-89F5-9X9V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-01 03:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 05:19The WP ERP | Complete HR solution with recruitment & job listings | WooCommerce CRM & Accounting plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in versions up to, and including, 1.6.3. This is due to missing or incorrect nonce validation on the handle_leave_calendar_filter, add_enable_disable_option_save, leave_policies, process_bulk_action, and process_crm_contact functions. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to modify the plugins settings via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-36735"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-01T03:15:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The WP ERP | Complete HR solution with recruitment \u0026 job listings | WooCommerce CRM \u0026 Accounting plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in versions up to, and including, 1.6.3. This is due to missing or incorrect nonce validation on the handle_leave_calendar_filter, add_enable_disable_option_save, leave_policies, process_bulk_action, and process_crm_contact functions. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to modify the plugins settings via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.",
"id": "GHSA-mx34-89f5-9x9v",
"modified": "2024-04-04T05:19:33Z",
"published": "2023-07-01T03:30:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36735"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.nintechnet.com/25-wordpress-plugins-vulnerable-to-csrf-attacks"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.nintechnet.com/more-wordpress-plugins-and-themes-vulnerable-to-csrf-attacks"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.nintechnet.com/multiple-wordpress-plugins-fixed-csrf-vulnerabilities-part-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.nintechnet.com/multiple-wordpress-plugins-fixed-csrf-vulnerabilities-part-2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.nintechnet.com/multiple-wordpress-plugins-fixed-csrf-vulnerabilities-part-3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.nintechnet.com/multiple-wordpress-plugins-fixed-csrf-vulnerabilities-part-4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.nintechnet.com/multiple-wordpress-plugins-fixed-csrf-vulnerabilities-part-5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=2368462%40erp\u0026new=2368462%40erp\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/01b90498-0ddb-4eb3-b76d-de30ed03d7d0?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MX4H-4R93-47MH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-11 21:30 – Updated: 2025-03-12 18:32A Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in Openmrs 2.4.3 Build 0ff0ed allows attackers to execute arbitrary operations via a crafted GET request.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-25927"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-11T20:15:17Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in Openmrs 2.4.3 Build 0ff0ed allows attackers to execute arbitrary operations via a crafted GET request.",
"id": "GHSA-mx4h-4r93-47mh",
"modified": "2025-03-12T18:32:52Z",
"published": "2025-03-11T21:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25927"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/johnchd/CVEs/blob/main/OpenMRS/CVE-2025-25927%20-%20CSRF%20via%20GET.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MX4P-W3F8-75R5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-27 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:35Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in rui_mashita Aioseo Multibyte Descriptions allows Cross Site Request Forgery. This issue affects Aioseo Multibyte Descriptions: from n/a through 0.0.6.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-53327"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-27T14:15:55Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in rui_mashita Aioseo Multibyte Descriptions allows Cross Site Request Forgery. This issue affects Aioseo Multibyte Descriptions: from n/a through 0.0.6.",
"id": "GHSA-mx4p-w3f8-75r5",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:35:38Z",
"published": "2025-06-27T15:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53327"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/aioseo-multibyte-descriptions/vulnerability/wordpress-aioseo-multibyte-descriptions-plugin-0-0-6-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MX5V-6XW3-6P2W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-26 21:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:31Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in WPMU DEV Hummingbird.This issue affects Hummingbird: from n/a through 3.9.1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43117"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-26T21:15:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in WPMU DEV Hummingbird.This issue affects Hummingbird: from n/a through 3.9.1.",
"id": "GHSA-mx5v-6xw3-6p2w",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:31:53Z",
"published": "2024-08-26T21:30:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43117"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/hummingbird-performance/vulnerability/wordpress-hummingbird-plugin-3-9-1-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/hummingbird-performance/wordpress-hummingbird-plugin-3-9-1-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MX7R-HXJJ-47W7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:18 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:18Affected versions of Atlassian Jira Server and Data Center allow remote attackers to modify various resources via a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability, following an Information Disclosure vulnerability in the referrer headers which discloses a user's CSRF token. The affected versions are before version 8.5.10, and from version 8.6.0 before 8.13.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-39126"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-10-21T03:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Affected versions of Atlassian Jira Server and Data Center allow remote attackers to modify various resources via a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability, following an Information Disclosure vulnerability in the referrer headers which discloses a user\u0027s CSRF token. The affected versions are before version 8.5.10, and from version 8.6.0 before 8.13.2.",
"id": "GHSA-mx7r-hxjj-47w7",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:18:30Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:18:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-39126"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-71806"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MX85-W6RX-PFVF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-10 15:31 – Updated: 2024-06-10 15:31Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerability in Comtrend router WLD71-T1_v2.0.201820, affecting the GRG-4280us version. This vulnerability allows an attacker to force an end user to execute unwanted actions in a web application to which he is authenticated.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-5786"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-10T13:15:51Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerability in Comtrend router WLD71-T1_v2.0.201820, affecting the GRG-4280us version. This vulnerability allows an attacker to force an end user to execute unwanted actions in a web application to which he is authenticated.",
"id": "GHSA-mx85-w6rx-pfvf",
"modified": "2024-06-10T15:31:02Z",
"published": "2024-06-10T15:31:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5786"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/multiple-vulnerabilities-comtrend-router"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MX8C-52F3-FXR6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-27 12:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:34Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Saeed Sattar Beglou Hesabfa Accounting allows Cross Site Request Forgery. This issue affects Hesabfa Accounting: from n/a through 2.1.8.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-30815"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-27T11:15:42Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Saeed Sattar Beglou Hesabfa Accounting allows Cross Site Request Forgery. This issue affects Hesabfa Accounting: from n/a through 2.1.8.",
"id": "GHSA-mx8c-52f3-fxr6",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:34:07Z",
"published": "2025-03-27T12:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30815"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/hesabfa-accounting/vulnerability/wordpress-hesabfa-accounting-plugin-2-1-8-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MX8G-4R5P-3RP5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-05 00:00 – Updated: 2022-05-12 00:00Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Web UI of Secomea GateManager allows phishing attacker to issue get request in logged in user session.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-25778"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-04T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Web UI of Secomea GateManager allows phishing attacker to issue get request in logged in user session.",
"id": "GHSA-mx8g-4r5p-3rp5",
"modified": "2022-05-12T00:00:36Z",
"published": "2022-05-05T00:00:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25778"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.secomea.com/support/cybersecurity-advisory"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MX8J-59VF-FPFX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-09 09:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:25Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Huseyin Berberoglu WP Hide Pages plugin <= 1.0 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-44232"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-09T09:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Huseyin Berberoglu WP Hide Pages plugin \u003c=\u00a01.0 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-mx8j-59vf-fpfx",
"modified": "2024-04-04T08:25:46Z",
"published": "2023-10-09T09:30:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-44232"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/wp-hide-pages/wordpress-wp-hide-pages-plugin-1-0-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
- Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
Mitigation
Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
Mitigation
Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
Mitigation
Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
Mitigation
- Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller:
- When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
- Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
- This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
Mitigation
Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
Mitigation
Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-462: Cross-Domain Search Timing
An attacker initiates cross domain HTTP / GET requests and times the server responses. The timing of these responses may leak important information on what is happening on the server. Browser's same origin policy prevents the attacker from directly reading the server responses (in the absence of any other weaknesses), but does not prevent the attacker from timing the responses to requests that the attacker issued cross domain.
CAPEC-467: Cross Site Identification
An attacker harvests identifying information about a victim via an active session that the victim's browser has with a social networking site. A victim may have the social networking site open in one tab or perhaps is simply using the "remember me" feature to keep their session with the social networking site active. An attacker induces a payload to execute in the victim's browser that transparently to the victim initiates a request to the social networking site (e.g., via available social network site APIs) to retrieve identifying information about a victim. While some of this information may be public, the attacker is able to harvest this information in context and may use it for further attacks on the user (e.g., spear phishing).
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.