CWE-347
AllowedImproper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.
1127 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-F67F-6CW9-8MQ4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 21:51 – Updated: 2026-01-13 21:51Summary
A flaw in Hono’s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the JWT header’s alg value to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly specify an algorithm. This could enable JWT algorithm confusion and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted.
Details
When verifying JWTs using JWKs or a JWKS endpoint, the middleware selected the verification algorithm based on the JWK’s alg field if present, but otherwise fell back to the alg value provided in the unverified JWT header.
Because the alg field in a JWK is optional and often omitted in real-world JWKS configurations, this behavior could allow an attacker to control the algorithm used for verification. In some environments, this may lead to authentication or authorization
bypass through crafted tokens.
The practical impact depends on application configuration, including which algorithms are accepted and how JWTs are used for authorization decisions.
Impact
In affected configurations, an attacker may be able to forge JWTs with attacker-controlled claims, potentially resulting in authentication or authorization bypass.
Applications that do not use the JWK/JWKS middleware, do not rely on JWT-based authentication, or explicitly restrict allowed algorithms are not affected.
Resolution
Update to the latest patched release.
Breaking change:
As part of this fix, the JWT middleware now requires the alg option to be explicitly specified. This prevents algorithm confusion by ensuring that the verification algorithm is not derived from untrusted JWT header values.
Applications upgrading must update their configuration accordingly.
Before (vulnerable configuration)
import { jwt } from 'hono/jwt'
app.use(
'/auth/*',
jwt({
secret: 'it-is-very-secret',
// alg was optional
})
)
After (patched configuration)
import { jwt } from 'hono/jwt'
app.use(
'/auth/*',
jwt({
secret: 'it-is-very-secret',
alg: 'HS256', // required
})
)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "hono"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.11.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22817"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-13T21:51:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-13T20:16:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA flaw in Hono\u2019s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the JWT header\u2019s `alg` value to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly specify an algorithm. This could enable **JWT algorithm confusion** and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen verifying JWTs using JWKs or a JWKS endpoint, the middleware selected the verification algorithm based on the JWK\u2019s `alg` field if present, but otherwise fell back to the `alg` value provided in the unverified JWT header.\n\nBecause the `alg` field in a JWK is optional and often omitted in real-world JWKS configurations, this behavior could allow an attacker to control the algorithm used for verification. In some environments, this may lead to authentication or authorization\nbypass through crafted tokens.\n\nThe practical impact depends on application configuration, including which algorithms are accepted and how JWTs are used for authorization decisions.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn affected configurations, an attacker may be able to forge JWTs with attacker-controlled claims, potentially resulting in authentication or authorization bypass.\n\nApplications that do not use the JWK/JWKS middleware, do not rely on JWT-based authentication, or explicitly restrict allowed algorithms are not affected.\n\n## Resolution\n\nUpdate to the latest patched release.\n\n**Breaking change:**\n\nAs part of this fix, the JWT middleware now requires the `alg` option to be explicitly specified. This prevents algorithm confusion by ensuring that the verification algorithm is not derived from untrusted JWT header values.\n\nApplications upgrading must update their configuration accordingly.\n\n### Before (vulnerable configuration)\n\n```ts\nimport { jwt } from \u0027hono/jwt\u0027\n\napp.use(\n \u0027/auth/*\u0027,\n jwt({\n secret: \u0027it-is-very-secret\u0027,\n // alg was optional\n })\n)\n```\n\n### After (patched configuration)\n\n```ts\nimport { jwt } from \u0027hono/jwt\u0027\n\napp.use(\n \u0027/auth/*\u0027,\n jwt({\n secret: \u0027it-is-very-secret\u0027,\n alg: \u0027HS256\u0027, // required\n })\n)\n```",
"id": "GHSA-f67f-6cw9-8mq4",
"modified": "2026-01-13T21:51:45Z",
"published": "2026-01-13T21:51:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-f67f-6cw9-8mq4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22817"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/cc0aa7ae327ed84cc391d29086dec2a3e44e7a1f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Hono JWT Middleware\u0027s JWT Algorithm Confusion via Unsafe Default (HS256) Allows Token Forgery and Auth Bypass"
}
GHSA-F6RC-73VX-29H5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-31 21:32 – Updated: 2024-08-15 15:30An issue was discovered in filestash v0.4. The usage of the ssh.InsecureIgnoreHostKey() disables host key verification, possibly allowing attackers to obtain sensitive information via a man-in-the-middle attack.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-41258"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-295",
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-31T21:15:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in filestash v0.4. The usage of the ssh.InsecureIgnoreHostKey() disables host key verification, possibly allowing attackers to obtain sensitive information via a man-in-the-middle attack.",
"id": "GHSA-f6rc-73vx-29h5",
"modified": "2024-08-15T15:30:53Z",
"published": "2024-07-31T21:32:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41258"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/nyxfqq/ed8c2ba3398c9e28cd8dbf0902bd8edf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F7Q4-PWC6-W24P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-02 09:31 – Updated: 2025-11-04 16:51In the Elliptic package 6.5.6 for Node.js, EDDSA signature malleability occurs because there is a missing signature length check, and thus zero-valued bytes can be removed or appended.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.5.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "elliptic"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.5.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-42459"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-08-05T13:21:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-02T07:16:10Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "In the Elliptic package 6.5.6 for Node.js, EDDSA signature malleability occurs because there is a missing signature length check, and thus zero-valued bytes can be removed or appended.",
"id": "GHSA-f7q4-pwc6-w24p",
"modified": "2025-11-04T16:51:32Z",
"published": "2024-08-02T09:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42459"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/indutny/elliptic/pull/317"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/indutny/elliptic/commit/accb61e9c1a005e5c8ff96a8b33893100bb42d11"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/indutny/elliptic/commit/c0690b36be043ee73c1780ae4b7df48632b11cf9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/indutny/elliptic"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20241004-0005"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Elliptic\u0027s EDDSA missing signature length check"
}
GHSA-F7WW-C7V4-G682
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:02 – Updated: 2022-06-04 00:00A flaw was found in the RPM package in the read functionality. This flaw allows an attacker who can convince a victim to install a seemingly verifiable package or compromise an RPM repository, to cause RPM database corruption. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data integrity. This flaw affects RPM versions before 4.17.0-alpha.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-3421"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-05-19T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in the RPM package in the read functionality. This flaw allows an attacker who can convince a victim to install a seemingly verifiable package or compromise an RPM repository, to cause RPM database corruption. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data integrity. This flaw affects RPM versions before 4.17.0-alpha.",
"id": "GHSA-f7ww-c7v4-g682",
"modified": "2022-06-04T00:00:32Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:02:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3421"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1927747"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/TMGXO3W6DHPO62GJ4VVF5DEUX5DRUR5K"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/VHRPNBCRPDJHHQE3MBPSZK4H7X2IM7AC"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/YILPBTPSBRYL4POBI3F4YUSVPSOQNJBY"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202107-43"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F9VH-CWPR-5M8F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-28 18:31 – Updated: 2026-01-16 15:31A potential security vulnerability has been identified in the HP Linux Imaging and Printing Software documentation. This potential vulnerability is due to the use of a weak code signing key, Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-43023"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-28T18:15:25Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A potential security vulnerability has been identified in the HP Linux Imaging and Printing Software documentation. This potential vulnerability is due to the use of a weak code signing key, Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA).",
"id": "GHSA-f9vh-cwpr-5m8f",
"modified": "2026-01-16T15:31:22Z",
"published": "2025-07-28T18:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43023"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.hp.com/us-en/document/ish_12804224-12804228-16/hpsbpi04033"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/08/22/4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-FC26-M9PF-V56Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:52 – Updated: 2026-06-18 13:52PraisonAI LinearBot processes unsigned webhooks when LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET is missing
Summary
PraisonAI's LinearBot starts a public webhook listener on 0.0.0.0 and treats
LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET as optional. When the secret is absent, startup only logs
a warning and _handle_webhook() skips Linear-Signature verification entirely.
An unauthenticated network caller who can reach the webhook endpoint can submit
a forged Linear-Event: AgentSession request. The forged request is parsed,
scheduled for background processing, dispatched to _handle_agent_session(),
and passed into BotSessionManager.chat(). The bot then attempts to post the
agent response back to Linear under the configured bot token.
The local PoV is offline and deterministic. It does not contact Linear. It calls the webhook handler directly, monkey-patches the outbound Linear comment path, and proves both sides of the boundary:
- no secret configured: unsigned forged webhook returns
200, invokes the agent session path once, and attempts one Linear comment; - secret configured: missing and bad signatures both return
401and do not invoke the agent; - secret configured with valid HMAC: request returns
200and invokes the agent, proving the control path still works.
Affected Product
- Repository:
MervinPraison/PraisonAI - Package:
praisonai - Components:
src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/linear.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/bots_cli.py
Validated affected:
- live
main/ latest observed releasev4.6.58:1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e - previous local current checkout:
2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1 v4.6.57v4.6.56v4.5.50
Sampled tags where the LinearBot component was not present:
v4.5.49v4.5.51v4.6.9v4.6.10
Suggested affected range: LinearBot-bearing releases with the fail-open
signature behavior, at least 4.5.50 and >= 4.6.56, <= 4.6.58. The
component appears non-contiguously in sampled tags, so maintainers should
confirm the exact packaged version history before publishing a final range.
Root Cause
LinearBot.__init__() accepts an empty signing secret and falls back to an
empty environment value:
self._signing_secret = signing_secret or os.environ.get("LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "")
start() treats the missing secret as a warning instead of refusing to expose
the webhook listener:
if not self._signing_secret:
logger.warning("LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET not set - webhook signatures will not be verified")
self._site = web.TCPSite(self._runner, "0.0.0.0", self._webhook_port)
_handle_webhook() only verifies the request if the secret is truthy:
if self._signing_secret:
signature = request.headers.get("Linear-Signature", "")
if not self._verify_signature(raw_body, signature):
return web.Response(status=401, text="Invalid signature")
With no secret configured, the code continues to JSON parsing, accepts a caller
supplied webhookTimestamp, reads the caller supplied Linear-Event header,
and schedules processing:
event_type = request.headers.get("Linear-Event", "")
task = asyncio.create_task(self._process_webhook(event_type, body))
return web.Response(status=200, text="OK")
For AgentSession, the forged body is routed to the agent:
if event_type == "AgentSession":
await self._handle_agent_session(body)
...
response = await self._session_mgr.chat(self._agent, user_id, message.content)
await self._send_comment(...)
The CLI has the same fail-open posture: start_linear() loads
LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET, prints a warning when it is missing, then reports a
public http://0.0.0.0:<port>/webhook endpoint with verification disabled.
Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
PraisonAI's Linear Bot documentation tells operators to set
LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET, pass it to praisonai bot linear, copy the Linear
webhook signing secret, and use it for HMAC-SHA256 verification. The same page
says missing secrets disable signature verification, while its best-practices
section says webhook secrets ensure authenticity.
Linear's webhook documentation says receivers should ensure requests were sent
by Linear by verifying the Linear-Signature HMAC over the raw body, then
checking that webhookTimestamp is recent. The timestamp check alone is not an
authentication boundary because an attacker can supply a current timestamp in a
forged body.
The implementation itself also confirms the intended boundary: when a secret is configured, missing and bad signatures are rejected before agent dispatch. The bug is the missing-secret fail-open mode on a public webhook server, not the signature algorithm.
Local PoV
Run against the latest observed release checkout:
python3 submission-bundle/praisonai-prai-cand-013-linear-webhook-signature-fail-open/poc/pov_prai_cand_013_linear_webhook_signature_fail_open.py --repo artifacts/repos/praisonai-v4.6.58
Expected output includes:
{
"candidate": "PRAI-CAND-013",
"ok": true,
"cases": {
"no_secret_unsigned_forged_webhook": {
"http_status": 200,
"signing_secret_configured": false,
"session_calls": [
{
"user_id": "linear-system",
"content": "Issue: Forged Linear AgentSession event\n\nPRAI-CAND-013 local forged webhook payload"
}
],
"sent_comments": [
{
"issue_id": "issue-prai-cand-013",
"comment": "agent response",
"session_id": "prai-cand-013-session"
}
]
},
"secret_missing_signature_control": {
"http_status": 401,
"session_calls": []
},
"secret_bad_signature_control": {
"http_status": 401,
"session_calls": []
},
"secret_valid_signature_control": {
"http_status": 200,
"session_calls": [
{
"user_id": "linear-system"
}
]
}
}
}
Stored evidence:
evidence/pov-v4.6.58.jsonevidence/pov-live-main-v4.6.58.jsonevidence/pov-current-head.jsonevidence/version-sweep.tsv
Impact
If a PraisonAI operator starts LinearBot with a Linear token but omits
LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET, any network caller that can reach the webhook endpoint
can spoof Linear webhook events and invoke the configured agent through the
Linear integration.
For the AgentSession event path, this lets the attacker supply issue title and
description content that becomes the agent input. Depending on the configured
agent and tools, this can cause unauthorized LLM/tool execution, consume paid
model quota, create or update Linear comments under the bot identity, and drive
the bot into workflows intended only for authenticated Linear events.
This report does not claim arbitrary code execution by default. The concrete boundary crossed is unauthenticated remote agent invocation through a forged Linear webhook.
Suggested Fix
Fail closed for public webhook listeners:
- Refuse to start LinearBot when
LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRETis missing, unless an explicit development-only option such as--insecure-skip-webhook-signature-verificationis provided. - In
_handle_webhook(), reject requests when no signing secret is configured instead of silently skipping verification. - Preserve raw-body HMAC verification and constant-time comparison for the configured-secret path.
- Treat timestamp freshness as replay protection after signature validation, not as a replacement for authentication.
- Prefer loopback binding by default, or require an explicit host flag for public binding.
- Add regression tests:
- no signing secret rejects startup or rejects webhook requests;
- missing signature with a configured secret returns
401; - invalid signature with a configured secret returns
401; - valid HMAC with a configured secret returns success;
- stale timestamp after valid HMAC returns
401; - the CLI does not advertise a public unauthenticated webhook by default.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.6.56"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.59"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-306",
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:52:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# PraisonAI LinearBot processes unsigned webhooks when `LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is missing\n\n## Summary\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s LinearBot starts a public webhook listener on `0.0.0.0` and treats\n`LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET` as optional. When the secret is absent, startup only logs\na warning and `_handle_webhook()` skips `Linear-Signature` verification entirely.\n\nAn unauthenticated network caller who can reach the webhook endpoint can submit\na forged `Linear-Event: AgentSession` request. The forged request is parsed,\nscheduled for background processing, dispatched to `_handle_agent_session()`,\nand passed into `BotSessionManager.chat()`. The bot then attempts to post the\nagent response back to Linear under the configured bot token.\n\nThe local PoV is offline and deterministic. It does not contact Linear. It calls\nthe webhook handler directly, monkey-patches the outbound Linear comment path,\nand proves both sides of the boundary:\n\n- no secret configured: unsigned forged webhook returns `200`, invokes the\n agent session path once, and attempts one Linear comment;\n- secret configured: missing and bad signatures both return `401` and do not\n invoke the agent;\n- secret configured with valid HMAC: request returns `200` and invokes the\n agent, proving the control path still works.\n\n## Affected Product\n\n- Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n- Package: `praisonai`\n- Components:\n - `src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/linear.py`\n - `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/bots_cli.py`\n\nValidated affected:\n\n- live `main` / latest observed release `v4.6.58`:\n `1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e`\n- previous local current checkout:\n `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`\n- `v4.6.57`\n- `v4.6.56`\n- `v4.5.50`\n\nSampled tags where the LinearBot component was not present:\n\n- `v4.5.49`\n- `v4.5.51`\n- `v4.6.9`\n- `v4.6.10`\n\nSuggested affected range: LinearBot-bearing releases with the fail-open\nsignature behavior, at least `4.5.50` and `\u003e= 4.6.56, \u003c= 4.6.58`. The\ncomponent appears non-contiguously in sampled tags, so maintainers should\nconfirm the exact packaged version history before publishing a final range.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`LinearBot.__init__()` accepts an empty signing secret and falls back to an\nempty environment value:\n\n```python\nself._signing_secret = signing_secret or os.environ.get(\"LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET\", \"\")\n```\n\n`start()` treats the missing secret as a warning instead of refusing to expose\nthe webhook listener:\n\n```python\nif not self._signing_secret:\n logger.warning(\"LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET not set - webhook signatures will not be verified\")\n\nself._site = web.TCPSite(self._runner, \"0.0.0.0\", self._webhook_port)\n```\n\n`_handle_webhook()` only verifies the request if the secret is truthy:\n\n```python\nif self._signing_secret:\n signature = request.headers.get(\"Linear-Signature\", \"\")\n if not self._verify_signature(raw_body, signature):\n return web.Response(status=401, text=\"Invalid signature\")\n```\n\nWith no secret configured, the code continues to JSON parsing, accepts a caller\nsupplied `webhookTimestamp`, reads the caller supplied `Linear-Event` header,\nand schedules processing:\n\n```python\nevent_type = request.headers.get(\"Linear-Event\", \"\")\ntask = asyncio.create_task(self._process_webhook(event_type, body))\nreturn web.Response(status=200, text=\"OK\")\n```\n\nFor `AgentSession`, the forged body is routed to the agent:\n\n```python\nif event_type == \"AgentSession\":\n await self._handle_agent_session(body)\n...\nresponse = await self._session_mgr.chat(self._agent, user_id, message.content)\nawait self._send_comment(...)\n```\n\nThe CLI has the same fail-open posture: `start_linear()` loads\n`LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET`, prints a warning when it is missing, then reports a\npublic `http://0.0.0.0:\u003cport\u003e/webhook` endpoint with verification disabled.\n\n## Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s Linear Bot documentation tells operators to set\n`LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET`, pass it to `praisonai bot linear`, copy the Linear\nwebhook signing secret, and use it for HMAC-SHA256 verification. The same page\nsays missing secrets disable signature verification, while its best-practices\nsection says webhook secrets ensure authenticity.\n\nLinear\u0027s webhook documentation says receivers should ensure requests were sent\nby Linear by verifying the `Linear-Signature` HMAC over the raw body, then\nchecking that `webhookTimestamp` is recent. The timestamp check alone is not an\nauthentication boundary because an attacker can supply a current timestamp in a\nforged body.\n\nThe implementation itself also confirms the intended boundary: when a secret is\nconfigured, missing and bad signatures are rejected before agent dispatch. The\nbug is the missing-secret fail-open mode on a public webhook server, not the\nsignature algorithm.\n\n## Local PoV\n\nRun against the latest observed release checkout:\n\n```bash\npython3 submission-bundle/praisonai-prai-cand-013-linear-webhook-signature-fail-open/poc/pov_prai_cand_013_linear_webhook_signature_fail_open.py --repo artifacts/repos/praisonai-v4.6.58\n```\n\nExpected output includes:\n\n```json\n{\n \"candidate\": \"PRAI-CAND-013\",\n \"ok\": true,\n \"cases\": {\n \"no_secret_unsigned_forged_webhook\": {\n \"http_status\": 200,\n \"signing_secret_configured\": false,\n \"session_calls\": [\n {\n \"user_id\": \"linear-system\",\n \"content\": \"Issue: Forged Linear AgentSession event\\n\\nPRAI-CAND-013 local forged webhook payload\"\n }\n ],\n \"sent_comments\": [\n {\n \"issue_id\": \"issue-prai-cand-013\",\n \"comment\": \"agent response\",\n \"session_id\": \"prai-cand-013-session\"\n }\n ]\n },\n \"secret_missing_signature_control\": {\n \"http_status\": 401,\n \"session_calls\": []\n },\n \"secret_bad_signature_control\": {\n \"http_status\": 401,\n \"session_calls\": []\n },\n \"secret_valid_signature_control\": {\n \"http_status\": 200,\n \"session_calls\": [\n {\n \"user_id\": \"linear-system\"\n }\n ]\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nStored evidence:\n\n- `evidence/pov-v4.6.58.json`\n- `evidence/pov-live-main-v4.6.58.json`\n- `evidence/pov-current-head.json`\n- `evidence/version-sweep.tsv`\n\n## Impact\n\nIf a PraisonAI operator starts LinearBot with a Linear token but omits\n`LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET`, any network caller that can reach the webhook endpoint\ncan spoof Linear webhook events and invoke the configured agent through the\nLinear integration.\n\nFor the `AgentSession` event path, this lets the attacker supply issue title and\ndescription content that becomes the agent input. Depending on the configured\nagent and tools, this can cause unauthorized LLM/tool execution, consume paid\nmodel quota, create or update Linear comments under the bot identity, and drive\nthe bot into workflows intended only for authenticated Linear events.\n\nThis report does not claim arbitrary code execution by default. The concrete\nboundary crossed is unauthenticated remote agent invocation through a forged\nLinear webhook.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nFail closed for public webhook listeners:\n\n1. Refuse to start LinearBot when `LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is missing, unless an\n explicit development-only option such as\n `--insecure-skip-webhook-signature-verification` is provided.\n2. In `_handle_webhook()`, reject requests when no signing secret is configured\n instead of silently skipping verification.\n3. Preserve raw-body HMAC verification and constant-time comparison for the\n configured-secret path.\n4. Treat timestamp freshness as replay protection after signature validation,\n not as a replacement for authentication.\n5. Prefer loopback binding by default, or require an explicit host flag for\n public binding.\n6. Add regression tests:\n - no signing secret rejects startup or rejects webhook requests;\n - missing signature with a configured secret returns `401`;\n - invalid signature with a configured secret returns `401`;\n - valid HMAC with a configured secret returns success;\n - stale timestamp after valid HMAC returns `401`;\n - the CLI does not advertise a public unauthenticated webhook by default.",
"id": "GHSA-fc26-m9pf-v56q",
"modified": "2026-06-18T13:52:55Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T13:52:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-fc26-m9pf-v56q"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI LinearBot processes unsigned webhooks when LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET is missing"
}
GHSA-FC79-J7VW-6XJG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:01 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:01The signature verification routine in Enigmail before 2.0.7 interprets user ids as status/control messages and does not correctly keep track of the status of multiple signatures, which allows remote attackers to spoof arbitrary email signatures via public keys containing crafted primary user ids.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-12019"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-06-13T23:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The signature verification routine in Enigmail before 2.0.7 interprets user ids as status/control messages and does not correctly keep track of the status of multiple signatures, which allows remote attackers to spoof arbitrary email signatures via public keys containing crafted primary user ids.",
"id": "GHSA-fc79-j7vw-6xjg",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:01:32Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:01:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-12019"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/RUB-NDS/Johnny-You-Are-Fired"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/RUB-NDS/Johnny-You-Are-Fired/blob/master/paper/johnny-fired.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.enigmail.net/index.php/en/download/changelog"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2018/06/13/10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152703/Johnny-You-Are-Fired.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/Apr/38"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/04/30/4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FC9H-WHQ2-V747
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-15 15:30 – Updated: 2025-11-27 08:43The Elliptic prior to 6.6.0 for Node.js, in its for ECDSA implementation, does not correctly verify valid signatures if the hash contains at least four leading 0 bytes and when the order of the elliptic curve's base point is smaller than the hash, because of an _truncateToN anomaly. This leads to valid signatures being rejected. Legitimate transactions or communications may be incorrectly flagged as invalid.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "elliptic"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-48948"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-17T22:05:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-15T14:15:05Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "The Elliptic prior to 6.6.0 for Node.js, in its for ECDSA implementation, does not correctly verify valid signatures if the hash contains at least four leading 0 bytes and when the order of the elliptic curve\u0027s base point is smaller than the hash, because of an _truncateToN anomaly. This leads to valid signatures being rejected. Legitimate transactions or communications may be incorrectly flagged as invalid.",
"id": "GHSA-fc9h-whq2-v747",
"modified": "2025-11-27T08:43:15Z",
"published": "2024-10-15T15:30:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-48948"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/indutny/elliptic/issues/321"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/indutny/elliptic/pull/322"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/indutny/elliptic/commit/34c853478cec1be4e37260ed2cb12cdbdc6402cf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.trailofbits.com/2025/11/18/we-found-cryptography-bugs-in-the-elliptic-library-using-wycheproof"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/indutny/elliptic"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20241220-0004"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Valid ECDSA signatures erroneously rejected in Elliptic"
}
GHSA-FCJ4-PM86-7GJW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-08 15:30 – Updated: 2024-02-08 15:30Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability in Snow Software Inventory Agent on Unix allows File Manipulation through Snow Update Packages.This issue affects Inventory Agent: through 7.3.1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-1150"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-08T13:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability in Snow Software Inventory Agent on Unix allows File Manipulation through Snow Update Packages.This issue affects Inventory Agent: through 7.3.1.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-fcj4-pm86-7gjw",
"modified": "2024-02-08T15:30:27Z",
"published": "2024-02-08T15:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1150"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.snowsoftware.com/s/feed/0D5Td000004YtMcKAK"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FF5X-X5CH-2X28
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:30 – Updated: 2025-12-03 21:30In verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature() in gmp_rsa_public_key.c in the gmp plugin in strongSwan 4.x and 5.x before 5.7.0, the RSA implementation based on GMP does not reject excess data in the digestAlgorithm.parameters field during PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification. Consequently, a remote attacker can forge signatures when small public exponents are being used, which could lead to impersonation when only an RSA signature is used for IKEv2 authentication. This is a variant of CVE-2006-4790 and CVE-2014-1568.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-16152"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-09-26T21:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In verify_emsa_pkcs1_signature() in gmp_rsa_public_key.c in the gmp plugin in strongSwan 4.x and 5.x before 5.7.0, the RSA implementation based on GMP does not reject excess data in the digestAlgorithm.parameters field during PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification. Consequently, a remote attacker can forge signatures when small public exponents are being used, which could lead to impersonation when only an RSA signature is used for IKEv2 authentication. This is a variant of CVE-2006-4790 and CVE-2014-1568.",
"id": "GHSA-ff5x-x5ch-2x28",
"modified": "2025-12-03T21:30:55Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16152"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2018/09/msg00032.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201811-16"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/3771-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2018/dsa-4305"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.strongswan.org/blog/2018/09/24/strongswan-vulnerability-%28cve-2018-16151%2C-cve-2018-16152%29.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.strongswan.org/blog/2018/09/24/strongswan-vulnerability-(cve-2018-16151,-cve-2018-16152).html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-11/msg00077.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-12/msg00001.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-03/msg00047.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-463: Padding Oracle Crypto Attack
An adversary is able to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key if a target system leaks data on whether or not a padding error happened while decrypting the ciphertext. A target system that leaks this type of information becomes the padding oracle and an adversary is able to make use of that oracle to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key by issuing on average 128*b calls to the padding oracle (where b is the number of bytes in the ciphertext block). In addition to performing decryption, an adversary is also able to produce valid ciphertexts (i.e., perform encryption) by using the padding oracle, all without knowing the encryption key.
CAPEC-475: Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation
An adversary exploits a cryptographic weakness in the signature verification algorithm implementation to generate a valid signature without knowing the key.