CWE-345

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "defaults-deep"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.2.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-16486"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:49:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "All versions of `defaults-deep` are vulnerable to prototype pollution. Provided certain input `defaults-deep` can add or modify properties of the `Object` prototype. These properties will be present on all objects.\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nAs no patch is currently available for this vulnerability it is our recommendation to select another module that can provide this functionality.",
  "id": "GHSA-pjxw-22xf-6pwc",
  "modified": "2023-09-12T21:05:03Z",
  "published": "2019-02-07T18:16:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16486"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/380878"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pjxw-22xf-6pwc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jonschlinkert/defaults-deep"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/778"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Prototype Pollution in defaults-deep"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-31877"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-11-28T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue in the component MSI.TerminalServer.exe of MSI Center v1.0.41.0 allows attackers to escalate privileges via a crafted TCP packet.",
  "id": "GHSA-pmw2-qfvq-r2cq",
  "modified": "2025-04-25T21:30:49Z",
  "published": "2022-11-28T15:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31877"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patsch.dev/2022/07/08/cve-2022-31877-privilege-escalation-in-msi-centers-msi-terminalserver-exe"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://msi.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-43616"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-11-13T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The npm ci command in npm 7.x and 8.x through 8.1.3 proceeds with an installation even if dependency information in package-lock.json differs from package.json. This behavior is inconsistent with the documentation, and makes it easier for attackers to install malware that was supposed to have been blocked by an exact version match requirement in package-lock.json.",
  "id": "GHSA-ppxp-px5q-gwqm",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:20:36Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:20:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-43616"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/npm/cli/issues/2701"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/npm/cli/commit/457e0ae61bbc55846f5af44afa4066921923490f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v7/commands/npm-ci"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/icatalina/CVE-2021-43616"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/NXNVFKOF5ZYH5NIRWHKN6O6UBCHDV6FE"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://medium.com/cider-sec/this-time-we-were-lucky-85c0dcac94a0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20211210-0002"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-5482"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-01T18:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Insufficient data validation in USB in Google Chrome prior to 119.0.6045.105 allowed a remote attacker to perform out of bounds memory access via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)",
  "id": "GHSA-pq78-6h8h-rcf4",
  "modified": "2025-04-30T15:30:42Z",
  "published": "2023-11-01T18:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5482"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2023/10/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_31.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://crbug.com/1492381"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/2MHLJRFWZNY6BFOW25Q4FEESVWZKS4C2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/EBA4KD5ZSV6XWWFLVR5UBYKKNOYMH33H"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/PHWLT3M2AQDFD7RNAM3NJMYUC5KHMO5V"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202311-11"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202312-07"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202401-34"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2023/dsa-5546"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "aiosmtpd"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-27305"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-03-13T15:33:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-12T21:15:58Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\naiosmtpd is vulnerable to inbound SMTP smuggling. SMTP smuggling is a novel vulnerability based on not so novel interpretation differences of the SMTP protocol. By exploiting SMTP smuggling, an attacker may send smuggle/spoof e-mails with fake sender addresses, allowing advanced phishing attacks. This issue also existed in other SMTP software like Postfix (https://www.postfix.org/smtp-smuggling.html).\n\n### Details\nDetailed information on SMTP smuggling can be found in the full blog post (https://sec-consult.com/blog/detail/smtp-smuggling-spoofing-e-mails-worldwide/) or on the Postfix homepage (https://www.postfix.org/smtp-smuggling.html). (and soon on the official website https://smtpsmuggling.com/)  \n\n### Impact\nWith the right SMTP server constellation, an attacker can send spoofed e-mails to inbound/receiving aiosmtpd instances.",
  "id": "GHSA-pr2m-px7j-xg65",
  "modified": "2025-01-22T18:45:42Z",
  "published": "2024-03-13T15:33:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiosmtpd/security/advisories/GHSA-pr2m-px7j-xg65"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27305"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiosmtpd/commit/24b6c79c8921cf1800e27ca144f4f37023982bbb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiosmtpd"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/aiosmtpd/PYSEC-2024-221.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.postfix.org/smtp-smuggling.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "aiosmtpd vulnerable to SMTP smuggling"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-14115"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-03-10T17:41:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A command injection vulnerability exists in the Xiaomi Router AX3600. The vulnerability is caused by a lack of inspection for incoming data detection. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability to execute code.",
  "id": "GHSA-pr4r-p276-59px",
  "modified": "2022-03-17T00:02:06Z",
  "published": "2022-03-11T00:02:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14115"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://trust.mi.com/zh-CN/misrc/bulletins/advisory?cveId=37"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2016-3016"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-02-01T20:59:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Security Access Manager for Web processes patches, image backups and other updates without sufficiently verifying the origin and integrity of the code, which could allow an authenticated attacker to load malicious code.",
  "id": "GHSA-prq3-j8m2-5xg7",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:14:04Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:14:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3016"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21995518"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26327"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T00:33:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-19T23:16:26Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nDiscovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) include TXT records such as `lanHost`, `tailnetDns`, `gatewayPort`, and `gatewayTlsSha256`. TXT records are unauthenticated.\n\nPrior to the fix, some clients treated TXT values as authoritative routing/pinning inputs:\n\n- iOS and macOS: used TXT-provided host hints (`lanHost`/`tailnetDns`) and ports (`gatewayPort`) to build the connection URL.\n- iOS and Android: allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint (`gatewayTlsSha256`) to override a previously stored TLS pin.\n\nOn a shared/untrusted LAN, an attacker could advertise a rogue `_openclaw-gw._tcp` service. This could cause a client to connect to an attacker-controlled endpoint and/or accept an attacker certificate, potentially exfiltrating Gateway credentials (`auth.token` / `auth.password`) during connection.\n\n## Distribution / Exposure\n\nThe iOS and Android apps are currently alpha/not broadly shipped (no public App Store / Play Store release). Practical impact is primarily limited to developers/testers running those builds, plus any other shipped clients relying on discovery on a shared/untrusted LAN.\n\nCVSS can still be used for the technical (base) severity of the bug; limited distribution primarily affects environmental risk.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.2.13` (latest published on npm as of 2026-02-14)\n- Patched: planned for `\u003e= 2026.2.14` (not yet published at time of writing)\n\n## Fix\n\n- Clients now prefer the resolved service endpoint (SRV + A/AAAA) over TXT-provided routing hints.\n- Discovery-provided fingerprints no longer override stored TLS pins.\n- iOS/Android: first-time TLS pins require explicit user confirmation (fingerprint shown; no silent TOFU).\n- iOS/Android: discovery-based direct connects are TLS-only.\n- Android: hostname verification is no longer globally disabled (only bypassed when pinning).\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- d583782ee322a6faa1fe87ae52455e0d349de586\n\n## Credits\n\nThanks @simecek for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-pv58-549p-qh99",
  "modified": "2026-02-20T16:45:30Z",
  "published": "2026-02-18T00:33:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-pv58-549p-qh99"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26327"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/d583782ee322a6faa1fe87ae52455e0d349de586"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw allows unauthenticated discovery TXT records to steer routing and TLS pinning"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-28386"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-354"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-22T20:15:10Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSnap One OvrC Pro devices versions 7.2 and prior do not validate firmware updates correctly. The device only calculates the MD5 hash of the firmware and does not check using a private-public key mechanism. The lack of complete PKI system firmware signature could allow attackers to upload arbitrary firmware updates, resulting in code execution.\n\n\n\n\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-pvcj-xvm2-wgmw",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T04:16:37Z",
  "published": "2023-05-22T21:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28386"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-23-136-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.control4.com/docs/product/ovrc-software/release-notes/english/latest/ovrc-software-release-notes-rev-p.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@budibase/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "3.38.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T21:42:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe Budibase AI chat-link handoff flow (`GET/POST /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff`) binds an **external chat identity** (Slack/Discord/MS Teams/Telegram) to a **Budibase user account**. The confirmation endpoint is on a **public route** (no CSRF middleware, no auth-group gate) and the only credential it checks is a `confirmationToken` that is **already rendered in plaintext into the HTML confirmation page** the victim views. There is no binding between the confirmation token and the requester\u0027s Budibase session at preparation time, and no CSRF token on the POST.\n\nConsequently, an attacker who creates a chat-link session for **their own** external chat identity (or any identity they can mint in their chat platform) can induce a victim Budibase user (same tenant) to submit the confirmation POST -\u003e for example by sending them a link that auto-submits, or by XSS/CSRF on a co-tenanted page -\u003e and the victim\u0027s `globalUserId` becomes bound to the attacker\u0027s external identity. The attacker then sends messages to the AI agent from their chat platform and is **acting as the victim user** inside Budibase automations/agent operations, inheriting the victim\u0027s permissions on agent operations, knowledge sources, and any downstream automation steps keyed off the linked identity.\n\n---\n\n### Affected\n\n| Component | Path | Lines |\n|---|---|---|\n| Public handoff routes (no auth-group middleware) | `packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts` | `23` (`GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff`), `27` (`POST .../handoff`) |\n| Confirmation controller | `packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts` | `124-177` (`confirmChatLinkSession`); the binding at `153-173` |\n| Confirmation token rendered into HTML | `packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts` | `40-60` (`renderLinkConfirmationPage`); the hidden input at `55` |\n| Session creation (attacker side) | `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts` | `138-171` (`createChatIdentityLinkSession`), `173-188` (`prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation`) |\n| Upsert of identity link | `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts` | `201-250` (`upsertChatIdentityLink`) |\n\n**Affected versions:** `master` at commit `3c8d1b4023`.\n\n**Reachable over HTTP by:** the GET and POST are on `publicRoutes` (no auth-group middleware). The POST requires `ctx.isAuthenticated` at runtime (`controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:142`) -\u003e so the victim must be logged into Budibase when the POST fires (achievable via standard CSRF if cookies are sent cross-origin, or via phishing that lures the victim to submit).\n\n---\n\n### Root cause\n\n**Issue 1 -\u003e The handoff routes are public and unauthenticated at the middleware layer.**\n\n```ts\n// packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:23, 27\npublicRoutes.get(\"/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff\", ai.handoffChatLinkSession)\npublicRoutes.post(\"/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff\", ai.confirmChatLinkSession)\n```\n\n`publicRoutes` has **no group middleware** (`endpointGroups/standard.ts:24-25` calls `endpointGroupList.group()` with no middleware and then `.lockMiddleware()`). The routes do not have a per-route `authorized(...)`. There is **no CSRF middleware** on these routes -\u003e Budibase\u0027s CSRF synchroniser token is enforced only for state-changing verbs on authenticated routes that are not in `NO_CSRF_ENDPOINTS`; the public-routes path bypasses it.\n\n**Issue 2 -\u003e The confirmation token is exposed to anyone who views the GET page.**\n\n```ts\n// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:40-60\nconst renderLinkConfirmationPage = (session, action) =\u003e {\n  ...\n  return `\u003c!doctype html\u003e...\n    \u003cform method=\"post\" action=\"${helpers.escapeHtml(action)}\"\u003e\n      \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"confirmationToken\" value=\"${helpers.escapeHtml(session.confirmationToken)}\"\u003e\n      \u003cbutton type=\"submit\"\u003eConfirm\u003c/button\u003e\n    \u003c/form\u003e\n  ...`\n}\n```\n\nThe `confirmationToken` (a `newid()` UUIDv4 generated by `prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation`) is rendered into a hidden form input. Anyone who loads the GET page sees the token in the page source.\n\n**Issue 3 -\u003e The POST binds the **currently-authenticated user** to the external identity based solely on the confirmation token.**\n\n```ts\n// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:124-177\nexport async function confirmChatLinkSession(ctx) {\n  ...\n  if (!ctx.isAuthenticated) { throw new HTTPError(\"Authentication is required to link chat identity\", 401) }\n  if (!session.confirmationToken || ctx.request.body?.confirmationToken !== session.confirmationToken) {\n    throw new HTTPError(\"Link confirmation is invalid or has expired\", 400)\n  }\n\n  const currentGlobalUserId = getCurrentGlobalUserId(ctx)        // \u003c- victim\u0027s ID\n  const consumedSession = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.consumeChatIdentityLinkSession(token)\n  ...\n  await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.upsertChatIdentityLink({\n    provider: consumedSession.provider,\n    externalUserId: consumedSession.externalUserId,              // \u003c- attacker\u0027s chat identity\n    externalUserName: consumedSession.externalUserName,\n    ...\n    globalUserId: currentGlobalUserId,                            // \u003c- bound to victim\n    linkedBy: currentGlobalUserId,\n  })\n  ...\n}\n```\n\nThere is **no binding between the session and the requester\u0027s Budibase identity at preparation time**. `prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation` (`sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:173-188`) stores the `confirmationToken` keyed by `token` with no user-id field. Whoever is authenticated when the POST fires (and supplies the correct `confirmationToken`) gets bound.\n\n**Issue 4 -\u003e `assertSessionMatchesInstance` only checks workspace ID, not user.**\n\n```ts\n// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:17-27\nconst assertSessionMatchesInstance = ({ workspaceId, instance }) =\u003e {\n  if (!workspaceId || workspaceId !== instance) {\n    throw new HTTPError(\"Link token is not valid for this workspace\", 400)\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe check confirms the session belongs to the same workspace as the URL `instance` param -\u003e useful for preventing cross-workspace confusion but useless against same-tenant identity confusion.\n\n---\n\n### Reproduction\n\n**Step-by-step attack**\n\n1. **Attacker (tenant T) provisions a chat-link session for their own external identity.** Via the agent channel provisioning flow (e.g. `POST /api/agent/:agentId/slack/provision` or via the Discord/MS Teams/Telegram provisioning endpoints), the attacker obtains a chat-link `token` bound to **their own** Slack user ID. The session is stored in Redis keyed by `token`, scoped to tenant T.\n\n2. **Attacker triggers `prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation`.** Either by GETting the handoff page themselves (if they have a Budibase session) or via an internal API. The `confirmationToken` is generated and stored.\n\n3. **Attacker crafts a phishing/auto-submit page** that POSTs to `/api/chat-links/\u003cinstance\u003e/\u003ctoken\u003e/handoff` with the leaked `confirmationToken` in the body. Example:\n\n   ```html\n   \u003cform id=\"f\" method=\"post\" action=\"https://victim.budibase.app/api/chat-links/app_xxx/linktoken/handoff\"\u003e\n     \u003cinput name=\"confirmationToken\" value=\"\u003cleaked-token\u003e\"\u003e\n   \u003c/form\u003e\n   \u003cscript\u003edocument.getElementById(\u0027f\u0027).submit()\u003c/script\u003e\n   ```\n\n4. **Victim (a Budibase user in tenant T, e.g. an admin) is lured to the attacker page** while logged into Budibase. Their browser sends the POST cross-origin. If the Budibase auth cookie is sent on cross-site requests (`SameSite=Lax` by default allows top-level POST navigations, which a form-submit is), the request is authenticated as the victim.\n\n5. **The victim\u0027s `globalUserId` is now bound to the attacker\u0027s Slack identity.** When the attacker DMs the AI agent from Slack, the agent\u0027s operations run as the victim user -\u003e with the victim\u0027s permissions on agent operations, knowledge sources, file uploads, and any downstream automation steps keyed off the linked identity.\n\n**Mitigating factors:**\n- `SameSite=Lax` cookies block cross-site POSTs from sub-resources (fetch / XHR) but **allow** top-level form-POST navigations. A phishing page that submits the form via `document.form.submit()` (a top-level navigation) succeeds. So the CSRF works with the default cookie policy.\n- The attack is **same-tenant only** (`session.tenantId !== context.getTenantId()` is checked in the sdk).\n- The attacker must induce the victim to click a link (standard phishing). No silent drive-by.\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n| Capability | Available |\n|---|---|\n| Bind an attacker-controlled chat identity to a victim\u0027s Budibase account | \u2705 |\n| Send messages to the AI agent as the victim user (Slack/Discord/MS Teams/Telegram) | \u2705 |\n| Inherit the victim\u0027s permissions on agent operations | \u2705 |\n| Trigger automations / agent operations that the victim is authorised for | \u2705 |\n| Read knowledge sources the victim has access to | \u2705 |\n\nThe severity depends on what the agent can do as the victim. For an admin victim, this is full tenant administration via chat. For a regular user, it is impersonation within the agent subsystem. The bound identity persists until manually unlinked, so the attacker retains ongoing access.\n\nThis is a same-tenant, user-interaction-required primitive. It is below the \"unauthenticated RCE\" threshold but above \"hardening\" -\u003e it is a real authentication-confusion vulnerability on a sensitive identity-binding operation.\n\n---\n\n### Fix\n\n**Recommended layered fixes:**\n\n1. **Bind the confirmation token to the requester\u0027s Budibase session at preparation time.** In `prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation`, store the `globalUserId` of the requester alongside the `confirmationToken`. In `confirmChatLinkSession`, verify that `getCurrentGlobalUserId(ctx)` matches the stored requester. This breaks the CSRF / cross-user confusion.\n\n2. **Add a CSRF token to the confirmation POST.** The standard Budibase CSRF synchroniser token (`x-csrf-token` header, validated against the session\u0027s `csrfToken`) should be enforced on `POST /api/chat-links/.../handoff`. Move the route out of `publicRoutes` to an authenticated route group so CSRF applies (the GET can remain public for the redirect-to-login flow; the POST should be authenticated + CSRF-protected).\n\n3. **Add a per-session nonce that is bound to the requester\u0027s browser** (e.g. a signed cookie set on the GET, validated on the POST) to prevent cross-origin submission even when `SameSite=Lax` allows it.\n\n4. **Require user re-authentication (re-entry of password / step-up auth)** for sensitive identity-binding operations, similar to how password change requires re-auth.",
  "id": "GHSA-pvcr-8mvp-w8qr",
  "modified": "2026-07-24T21:42:51Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T21:42:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-pvcr-8mvp-w8qr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/19194"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/362e6c654fb4da6e123c734333da2d6cbdcdb7ef"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.39.30"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": " Budibase: Chat-Link Handoff Identity Confusion (Same-Tenant Account-Link CSRF)"
}