CWE-306
AllowedMissing Authentication for Critical Function
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
3570 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-8G64-6M2C-QGXH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-15 21:31 – Updated: 2025-07-15 21:31Vulnerability in the Oracle WebLogic Server product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Core). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0, 14.1.1.0.0 and 14.1.2.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via T3, IIOP to compromise Oracle WebLogic Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle WebLogic Server accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.5 (Confidentiality impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-30762"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-15T20:15:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle WebLogic Server product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Core). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0, 14.1.1.0.0 and 14.1.2.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via T3, IIOP to compromise Oracle WebLogic Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle WebLogic Server accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.5 (Confidentiality impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N).",
"id": "GHSA-8g64-6m2c-qgxh",
"modified": "2025-07-15T21:31:40Z",
"published": "2025-07-15T21:31:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30762"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2025.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8G86-97W6-2547
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:44 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:44The 'Find Phone' function in Nice smartphones with software versions earlier before Nice-AL00C00B0135 has an authentication bypass vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker may wipe and factory reset the phone by special steps. Due to missing authentication of the 'Find Phone' function, an attacker may exploit the vulnerability to bypass the 'Find Phone' function in order to use the phone normally.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-2708"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-11-22T19:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The \u0027Find Phone\u0027 function in Nice smartphones with software versions earlier before Nice-AL00C00B0135 has an authentication bypass vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker may wipe and factory reset the phone by special steps. Due to missing authentication of the \u0027Find Phone\u0027 function, an attacker may exploit the vulnerability to bypass the \u0027Find Phone\u0027 function in order to use the phone normally.",
"id": "GHSA-8g86-97w6-2547",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:44:54Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:44:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-2708"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-advisories/huawei-sa-20170125-01-smartphone-en"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/95911"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8GFG-VXCC-9FJ7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-08 15:31Unauthenticated functionality in CoolerControl/coolercontrold <4.0.0 allows unauthenticated attackers to view and modify potentially sensitive data via HTTP requests
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-5300"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-08T13:16:43Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Unauthenticated functionality in CoolerControl/coolercontrold \u003c4.0.0 allows unauthenticated attackers to view and modify potentially sensitive data via HTTP requests",
"id": "GHSA-8gfg-vxcc-9fj7",
"modified": "2026-04-08T15:31:44Z",
"published": "2026-04-08T15:31:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5300"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/coolercontrol/coolercontrol/-/blob/3.1.1/coolercontrold/src/api/router.rs?ref_type=tags"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/coolercontrol/coolercontrol/-/releases/4.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8H27-PW54-HG7G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-09 15:31 – Updated: 2025-09-09 15:31A code execution security issue exists in the affected product. An attacker with physical access could abuse the maintenance menu of the controller with a crafted payload. The security issue can result in arbitrary code execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-9160"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-09T13:15:32Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A code execution security issue exists in the affected product. An attacker with physical access could abuse the maintenance menu of the controller with a crafted payload. The security issue can result in arbitrary code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-8h27-pw54-hg7g",
"modified": "2025-09-09T15:31:18Z",
"published": "2025-09-09T15:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9160"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.rockwellautomation.com/en-us/trust-center/security-advisories/advisory.SD1746.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8H4P-VQHV-PVP3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-10 15:31 – Updated: 2026-05-10 15:31WordPress Plugin Download From Files version 1.48 and earlier contains an arbitrary file upload vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to upload malicious files by exploiting the AJAX fileupload action. Attackers can send POST requests to the admin-ajax.php endpoint with the download_from_files_617_fileupload action, manipulating the allowExt parameter to bypass file type restrictions and upload executable files like PHP shells to the web root.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-47940"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-10T13:16:30Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "WordPress Plugin Download From Files version 1.48 and earlier contains an arbitrary file upload vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to upload malicious files by exploiting the AJAX fileupload action. Attackers can send POST requests to the admin-ajax.php endpoint with the download_from_files_617_fileupload action, manipulating the allowExt parameter to bypass file type restrictions and upload executable files like PHP shells to the web root.",
"id": "GHSA-8h4p-vqhv-pvp3",
"modified": "2026-05-10T15:31:19Z",
"published": "2026-05-10T15:31:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47940"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/download-from-files"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/50287"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/wordpress-download-from-files-arbitrary-file-upload"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8HF9-3Q64-Q2QF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-12 15:08 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:50Summary
When dalfox is run in REST API server mode, the output, output-all, and debug fields in model.Options are JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker's request body, then propagated unchanged through dalfox.Initialize into the scan engine's logging path. The logger opens the attacker-supplied path with os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY and writes scan log lines to it. Critically, this file write block lives outside the IsLibrary guard in DalLog, so it executes even in server/library mode where file output was never intended to operate. Because no API key is required in the default configuration, an unauthenticated network caller can create or append to any file writable by the dalfox process on the host filesystem.
Severity
High (CVSS 3.1: 8.2)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L
- Attack Vector: Network — server binds to
0.0.0.0:6664by default. - Attack Complexity: Low — no preconditions; all trigger options (
output,output-all,debug) are fully attacker-supplied in the JSON body. - Privileges Required: None —
--api-keydefaults to"", so the auth middleware is never registered. - User Interaction: None.
- Scope: Unchanged — the file write stays within the dalfox process's OS authority.
- Confidentiality Impact: None — this is a write-only primitive; no data is returned to the caller.
- Integrity Impact: High — the attacker has full control over which file path is opened, enabling creation of new files or corruption of existing files anywhere the dalfox process has write permission. While the log content format is semi-fixed, the file path is entirely attacker-determined, making the integrity violation complete with respect to file targeting.
- Availability Impact: Low — corrupting application configuration files or log files on the host can degrade the availability of other services relying on those files.
Affected Component
cmd/server.go—init()(line 51):--api-keydefaults to""— no auth by defaultpkg/server/server.go—setupEchoServer()(line 68): auth middleware only registered whenAPIKey != ""pkg/server/server.go—postScanHandler()(lines 173–191):rq.Options(includingOutputFile,OutputAll,Debug) passed toScanFromAPIwithout sanitizationlib/func.go—Initialize()(line 107):OutputFileexplicitly propagated from caller options;OutputAll(line 167) andDebug(line 176) likewiseinternal/printing/logger.go—DalLog()(lines 230–244):os.OpenFile(options.OutputFile, os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)executes outside theIsLibraryguard
CWE
- CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
- CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path
- CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type (write-path variant)
Description
output, output-all, and debug Are Fully Attacker-Controlled
model.Options exposes all three trigger fields with JSON tags:
// pkg/model/options.go:88,85,88
OutputFile string `json:"output,omitempty"`
OutputAll bool `json:"output-all,omitempty"`
Debug bool `json:"debug,omitempty"`
postScanHandler binds the entire Req.Options from the JSON body and passes it directly to ScanFromAPI:
// pkg/server/server.go:173-191
rq := new(Req)
if err := c.Bind(rq); err != nil { ... }
go ScanFromAPI(rq.URL, rq.Options, *options, sid)
Initialize explicitly copies all three fields into newOptions:
// lib/func.go:107, 167, 176
"OutputFile": {&newOptions.OutputFile, options.OutputFile},
...
"OutputAll": {&newOptions.OutputAll, options.OutputAll},
...
"Debug": {&newOptions.Debug, options.Debug},
The File Write Is Not Guarded by IsLibrary
Initialize always sets IsLibrary: true (line 20) and Silence: true (line 44) in its returned options — the intent being that the scan engine runs in embedded/library mode during API calls, suppressing terminal I/O. DalLog does respect this for stderr output: lines 203–228 route logs to ScanResult.Logs (not stderr) when IsLibrary is true. However, the file write block at lines 230–244 is positioned after and outside that if-else:
// internal/printing/logger.go
mutex.Lock()
if options.IsLibrary {
options.ScanResult.Logs = append(options.ScanResult.Logs, text) // API path
} else {
// stderr printing (CLI path)
}
// ← file write is here, unconditionally — no IsLibrary check
if options.OutputFile != "" {
var fdtext string
if ftext != "" {
fdtext = ftext
f, err := os.OpenFile(options.OutputFile,
os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "output file error (file)")
}
defer f.Close()
if _, err := f.WriteString(fdtext + "\n"); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "output file error (write)")
}
}
}
mutex.Unlock()
The ftext variable is populated whenever allWrite is true (options.Debug || options.OutputAll). Since both are attacker-supplied, both conditions are trivially satisfied.
What Gets Written
Log lines of the form:
[*] Starting scan [SID:<id>] / URL: <attacker-supplied-url>
[I] Checking BAV
[E] connection refused
[DEBUG] <internal state>
...
The URL appears verbatim in log messages, giving the attacker partial influence over the written content. While the format is not fully arbitrary (fixed prefixes like [*], [I], [E]), the file path is entirely attacker-controlled. The flags O_CREATE (creates the file if absent) and O_APPEND (never truncates) mean the attacker can:
- Create new files at arbitrary paths
- Append log content to existing files (corrupting configs, auth files, cron entries if the line happens to match syntax)
No Defense at Any Layer
The same opt-in API key gap applies here as in all prior findings:
// pkg/server/server.go:68-70
if options.ServerType == "rest" && options.APIKey != "" {
e.Use(apiKeyAuth(options.APIKey, options))
}
There is no path allowlist, no IsLibrary guard on the file write, and no stripping of OutputFile from API-sourced requests anywhere in the codebase.
Proof of Concept
# Step 1 — Start dalfox REST server (default: no API key)
go run . server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 16664 --type rest
# Step 2 — Verify health (unauthenticated)
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:16664/health
# Expected: {"code":200,"msg":"ok"}
# Step 3 — Trigger arbitrary file creation with attacker-controlled path
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16664/scan \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:1/?x=1",
"options": {
"output": "/tmp/dalfox_sink_poc.log",
"output-all": true,
"debug": true,
"use-headless": false
}
}'
# Step 4 — Verify file was created and written to by the dalfox process
sleep 2
cat /tmp/dalfox_sink_poc.log
# Expected:
# [*] Starting scan [SID:...] / URL: http://127.0.0.1:1/?x=1
# [I] Checking BAV
# [E] ...
No X-API-KEY header is required. Replace /tmp/dalfox_sink_poc.log with any path writable by the dalfox process: /var/www/html/injected.txt, /etc/cron.d/dalfox, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (appending log lines that won't break key format but pollute the file), etc.
Impact
- Arbitrary file creation: The attacker can create files at any path on the dalfox host filesystem accessible to the dalfox process, including web-serving directories, cron drop-in directories, and application config directories.
- Arbitrary file append/corruption: Existing files can have log-format lines appended, degrading parsers that expect strict formats (sshd_config, crontab, /etc/hosts, application config files).
- Partial content control via URL: The scan target URL appears verbatim in log output; combined with creative path targeting, this may enable injection into certain file formats.
- No authentication required in the default deployment.
- When dalfox runs under a privileged account (e.g., in a CI pipeline or as root in a container), the blast radius extends to system-wide files.
Recommended Remediation
Option 1: Strip filesystem-dangerous fields from API-sourced requests (preferred)
Nullify all fields that touch the local filesystem before passing options to ScanFromAPI. This is the same remediation recommended for the found-action RCE and custom-payload-file file-read findings and should be applied as a single consolidated patch:
// pkg/server/server.go — in postScanHandler, before ScanFromAPI:
rq.Options.OutputFile = ""
rq.Options.OutputAll = false // safe to leave user value; file write is blocked by OutputFile=""
rq.Options.CustomPayloadFile = ""
rq.Options.CustomBlindXSSPayloadFile = ""
rq.Options.FoundAction = ""
rq.Options.FoundActionShell = ""
rq.Options.HarFilePath = ""
Option 2: Guard the file write with IsLibrary in DalLog
Move the OutputFile write block inside the else branch so it only executes in non-library (CLI) mode:
// internal/printing/logger.go — restructure the if-else:
if options.IsLibrary {
options.ScanResult.Logs = append(options.ScanResult.Logs, text)
} else {
// existing stderr printing logic...
// file write belongs here, not after the if-else
if options.OutputFile != "" && ftext != "" {
f, err := os.OpenFile(options.OutputFile, os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)
...
}
}
This fix addresses the root structural cause — the file write was intended for CLI mode only, and gating it on !IsLibrary matches that intent. Option 1 is still recommended as the primary fix; Option 2 adds defence-in-depth but requires care to not break legitimate CLI usage.
Option 3: Require --api-key at server startup
As with the other server-mode findings, making authentication mandatory eliminates the unauthenticated attack surface entirely:
// cmd/server.go — in runServerCmd:
if serverType == "rest" && apiKey == "" {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "ERROR: --api-key is required when running in REST server mode.")
os.Exit(1)
}
All three options should be applied together.
Credit
Emmanuel David
Github:- https://github.com/drmingler.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.12.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.13.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45089"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-434",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-12T15:08:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T18:16:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen dalfox is run in REST API server mode, the `output`, `output-all`, and `debug` fields in `model.Options` are JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker\u0027s request body, then propagated unchanged through `dalfox.Initialize` into the scan engine\u0027s logging path. The logger opens the attacker-supplied path with `os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY` and writes scan log lines to it. Critically, this file write block lives outside the `IsLibrary` guard in `DalLog`, so it executes even in server/library mode where file output was never intended to operate. Because no API key is required in the default configuration, an unauthenticated network caller can create or append to any file writable by the dalfox process on the host filesystem.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High** (CVSS 3.1: 8.2)\n\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L`\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network \u2014 server binds to `0.0.0.0:6664` by default.\n- **Attack Complexity:** Low \u2014 no preconditions; all trigger options (`output`, `output-all`, `debug`) are fully attacker-supplied in the JSON body.\n- **Privileges Required:** None \u2014 `--api-key` defaults to `\"\"`, so the auth middleware is never registered.\n- **User Interaction:** None.\n- **Scope:** Unchanged \u2014 the file write stays within the dalfox process\u0027s OS authority.\n- **Confidentiality Impact:** None \u2014 this is a write-only primitive; no data is returned to the caller.\n- **Integrity Impact:** High \u2014 the attacker has full control over which file path is opened, enabling creation of new files or corruption of existing files anywhere the dalfox process has write permission. While the log content format is semi-fixed, the file path is entirely attacker-determined, making the integrity violation complete with respect to file targeting.\n- **Availability Impact:** Low \u2014 corrupting application configuration files or log files on the host can degrade the availability of other services relying on those files.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- `cmd/server.go` \u2014 `init()` (line 51): `--api-key` defaults to `\"\"` \u2014 no auth by default\n- `pkg/server/server.go` \u2014 `setupEchoServer()` (line 68): auth middleware only registered when `APIKey != \"\"`\n- `pkg/server/server.go` \u2014 `postScanHandler()` (lines 173\u2013191): `rq.Options` (including `OutputFile`, `OutputAll`, `Debug`) passed to `ScanFromAPI` without sanitization\n- `lib/func.go` \u2014 `Initialize()` (line 107): `OutputFile` explicitly propagated from caller options; `OutputAll` (line 167) and `Debug` (line 176) likewise\n- `internal/printing/logger.go` \u2014 `DalLog()` (lines 230\u2013244): `os.OpenFile(options.OutputFile, os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)` executes outside the `IsLibrary` guard\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-306**: Missing Authentication for Critical Function\n- **CWE-73**: External Control of File Name or Path\n- **CWE-434**: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type (write-path variant)\n\n## Description\n\n### `output`, `output-all`, and `debug` Are Fully Attacker-Controlled\n\n`model.Options` exposes all three trigger fields with JSON tags:\n\n```go\n// pkg/model/options.go:88,85,88\nOutputFile string `json:\"output,omitempty\"`\nOutputAll bool `json:\"output-all,omitempty\"`\nDebug bool `json:\"debug,omitempty\"`\n```\n\n`postScanHandler` binds the entire `Req.Options` from the JSON body and passes it directly to `ScanFromAPI`:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go:173-191\nrq := new(Req)\nif err := c.Bind(rq); err != nil { ... }\ngo ScanFromAPI(rq.URL, rq.Options, *options, sid)\n```\n\n`Initialize` explicitly copies all three fields into `newOptions`:\n\n```go\n// lib/func.go:107, 167, 176\n\"OutputFile\": {\u0026newOptions.OutputFile, options.OutputFile},\n...\n\"OutputAll\": {\u0026newOptions.OutputAll, options.OutputAll},\n...\n\"Debug\": {\u0026newOptions.Debug, options.Debug},\n```\n\n### The File Write Is Not Guarded by `IsLibrary`\n\n`Initialize` always sets `IsLibrary: true` (line 20) and `Silence: true` (line 44) in its returned options \u2014 the intent being that the scan engine runs in embedded/library mode during API calls, suppressing terminal I/O. `DalLog` does respect this for stderr output: lines 203\u2013228 route logs to `ScanResult.Logs` (not stderr) when `IsLibrary` is true. However, the file write block at lines 230\u2013244 is positioned **after and outside** that `if-else`:\n\n```go\n// internal/printing/logger.go\nmutex.Lock()\nif options.IsLibrary {\n options.ScanResult.Logs = append(options.ScanResult.Logs, text) // API path\n} else {\n // stderr printing (CLI path)\n}\n\n// \u2190 file write is here, unconditionally \u2014 no IsLibrary check\nif options.OutputFile != \"\" {\n var fdtext string\n if ftext != \"\" {\n fdtext = ftext\n f, err := os.OpenFile(options.OutputFile,\n os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)\n if err != nil {\n fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"output file error (file)\")\n }\n defer f.Close()\n if _, err := f.WriteString(fdtext + \"\\n\"); err != nil {\n fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"output file error (write)\")\n }\n }\n}\nmutex.Unlock()\n```\n\nThe `ftext` variable is populated whenever `allWrite` is true (`options.Debug || options.OutputAll`). Since both are attacker-supplied, both conditions are trivially satisfied.\n\n### What Gets Written\n\nLog lines of the form:\n\n```\n[*] Starting scan [SID:\u003cid\u003e] / URL: \u003cattacker-supplied-url\u003e\n[I] Checking BAV\n[E] connection refused\n[DEBUG] \u003cinternal state\u003e\n...\n```\n\nThe URL appears verbatim in log messages, giving the attacker partial influence over the written content. While the format is not fully arbitrary (fixed prefixes like `[*] `, `[I] `, `[E] `), the **file path is entirely attacker-controlled**. The flags `O_CREATE` (creates the file if absent) and `O_APPEND` (never truncates) mean the attacker can:\n- Create new files at arbitrary paths\n- Append log content to existing files (corrupting configs, auth files, cron entries if the line happens to match syntax)\n\n### No Defense at Any Layer\n\nThe same opt-in API key gap applies here as in all prior findings:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go:68-70\nif options.ServerType == \"rest\" \u0026\u0026 options.APIKey != \"\" {\n e.Use(apiKeyAuth(options.APIKey, options))\n}\n```\n\nThere is no path allowlist, no `IsLibrary` guard on the file write, and no stripping of `OutputFile` from API-sourced requests anywhere in the codebase.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# Step 1 \u2014 Start dalfox REST server (default: no API key)\ngo run . server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 16664 --type rest\n\n# Step 2 \u2014 Verify health (unauthenticated)\ncurl -s http://127.0.0.1:16664/health\n# Expected: {\"code\":200,\"msg\":\"ok\"}\n\n# Step 3 \u2014 Trigger arbitrary file creation with attacker-controlled path\ncurl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16664/scan \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n --data \u0027{\n \"url\": \"http://127.0.0.1:1/?x=1\",\n \"options\": {\n \"output\": \"/tmp/dalfox_sink_poc.log\",\n \"output-all\": true,\n \"debug\": true,\n \"use-headless\": false\n }\n }\u0027\n\n# Step 4 \u2014 Verify file was created and written to by the dalfox process\nsleep 2\ncat /tmp/dalfox_sink_poc.log\n# Expected:\n# [*] Starting scan [SID:...] / URL: http://127.0.0.1:1/?x=1\n# [I] Checking BAV\n# [E] ...\n```\n\nNo `X-API-KEY` header is required. Replace `/tmp/dalfox_sink_poc.log` with any path writable by the dalfox process: `/var/www/html/injected.txt`, `/etc/cron.d/dalfox`, `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` (appending log lines that won\u0027t break key format but pollute the file), etc.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Arbitrary file creation**: The attacker can create files at any path on the dalfox host filesystem accessible to the dalfox process, including web-serving directories, cron drop-in directories, and application config directories.\n- **Arbitrary file append/corruption**: Existing files can have log-format lines appended, degrading parsers that expect strict formats (sshd_config, crontab, /etc/hosts, application config files).\n- **Partial content control via URL**: The scan target URL appears verbatim in log output; combined with creative path targeting, this may enable injection into certain file formats.\n- **No authentication required** in the default deployment.\n- When dalfox runs under a privileged account (e.g., in a CI pipeline or as root in a container), the blast radius extends to system-wide files.\n\n## Recommended Remediation\n\n### Option 1: Strip filesystem-dangerous fields from API-sourced requests (preferred)\n\nNullify all fields that touch the local filesystem before passing options to `ScanFromAPI`. This is the same remediation recommended for the `found-action` RCE and `custom-payload-file` file-read findings and should be applied as a single consolidated patch:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go \u2014 in postScanHandler, before ScanFromAPI:\nrq.Options.OutputFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.OutputAll = false // safe to leave user value; file write is blocked by OutputFile=\"\"\nrq.Options.CustomPayloadFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.CustomBlindXSSPayloadFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.FoundAction = \"\"\nrq.Options.FoundActionShell = \"\"\nrq.Options.HarFilePath = \"\"\n```\n\n### Option 2: Guard the file write with `IsLibrary` in `DalLog`\n\nMove the `OutputFile` write block inside the `else` branch so it only executes in non-library (CLI) mode:\n\n```go\n// internal/printing/logger.go \u2014 restructure the if-else:\nif options.IsLibrary {\n options.ScanResult.Logs = append(options.ScanResult.Logs, text)\n} else {\n // existing stderr printing logic...\n\n // file write belongs here, not after the if-else\n if options.OutputFile != \"\" \u0026\u0026 ftext != \"\" {\n f, err := os.OpenFile(options.OutputFile, os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)\n ...\n }\n}\n```\n\nThis fix addresses the root structural cause \u2014 the file write was intended for CLI mode only, and gating it on `!IsLibrary` matches that intent. Option 1 is still recommended as the primary fix; Option 2 adds defence-in-depth but requires care to not break legitimate CLI usage.\n\n### Option 3: Require `--api-key` at server startup\n\nAs with the other server-mode findings, making authentication mandatory eliminates the unauthenticated attack surface entirely:\n\n```go\n// cmd/server.go \u2014 in runServerCmd:\nif serverType == \"rest\" \u0026\u0026 apiKey == \"\" {\n fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"ERROR: --api-key is required when running in REST server mode.\")\n os.Exit(1)\n}\n```\n\nAll three options should be applied together.\n\n##Credit\n\nEmmanuel David\n\nGithub:- https://github.com/drmingler.",
"id": "GHSA-8hf9-3q64-q2qf",
"modified": "2026-06-08T23:50:06Z",
"published": "2026-05-12T15:08:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/security/advisories/GHSA-8hf9-3q64-q2qf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45089"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/releases/tag/v2.13.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Dalfox Server Mode has an Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Create/Append via `output` Option"
}
GHSA-8HFC-FQ58-R658
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-20 00:31 – Updated: 2026-03-20 20:41Spring Boot applications with Actuator can be vulnerable to an "Authentication Bypass" vulnerability when an application endpoint that requires authentication is declared under a specific path, already configured for a Health Group additional path. This issue affects Spring Boot: from 4.0 before 4.0.3, from 3.5 before 3.5.11, from 3.4 before 3.4.15. This CVE is similar but not equivalent to CVE-2026-22733, as the conditions for exploit and vulnerable versions are different.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-actuator"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.4.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.4.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-actuator"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.5.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.boot:spring-boot-starter-actuator"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0-M1"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22731"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-288",
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-20T20:41:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T23:16:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Spring Boot applications with Actuator can be vulnerable to an \"Authentication Bypass\" vulnerability when an application endpoint that requires authentication is declared under a specific path, already configured for a Health Group additional path.\nThis issue affects Spring Boot: from 4.0 before 4.0.3, from 3.5 before 3.5.11, from 3.4 before 3.4.15.\nThis CVE is similar but not equivalent to CVE-2026-22733, as the conditions for exploit and vulnerable versions are different.",
"id": "GHSA-8hfc-fq58-r658",
"modified": "2026-03-20T20:41:29Z",
"published": "2026-03-20T00:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22731"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-boot"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://spring.io/security/cve-2026-22731"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Spring Boot has an Authentication Bypass under Actuator Health groups paths"
}
GHSA-8HMQ-QQFM-9GX3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-23 00:30 – Updated: 2025-12-23 00:30SOUND4 IMPACT/FIRST/PULSE/Eco v2.x contains an unauthenticated vulnerability in the /usr/cgi-bin/restorefactory.cgi endpoint that allows remote attackers to reset device configuration. Attackers can send a POST request to the endpoint with specific data to trigger a factory reset and bypass authentication, gaining full system control.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-53964"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-22T22:16:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SOUND4 IMPACT/FIRST/PULSE/Eco v2.x contains an unauthenticated vulnerability in the /usr/cgi-bin/restorefactory.cgi endpoint that allows remote attackers to reset device configuration. Attackers can send a POST request to the endpoint with specific data to trigger a factory reset and bypass authentication, gaining full system control.",
"id": "GHSA-8hmq-qqfm-9gx3",
"modified": "2025-12-23T00:30:31Z",
"published": "2025-12-23T00:30:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53964"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20221207074555/https://www.sound4.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/51174"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/sound-impactfirstpulseeco-x-unauthenticated-factory-reset-vulnerability"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2022-5742.php"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8HVH-73Q5-G7PG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-24 21:30 – Updated: 2025-12-24 21:30FLIR Brickstream 3D+ 2.1.742.1842 contains an unauthenticated vulnerability in the ExportConfig REST API that allows attackers to download sensitive configuration files. Attackers can exploit the getConfigExportFile.cgi endpoint to retrieve system configurations, potentially enabling authentication bypass and privilege escalation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-25137"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-24T20:15:47Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "FLIR Brickstream 3D+ 2.1.742.1842 contains an unauthenticated vulnerability in the ExportConfig REST API that allows attackers to download sensitive configuration files. Attackers can exploit the getConfigExportFile.cgi endpoint to retrieve system configurations, potentially enabling authentication bypass and privilege escalation.",
"id": "GHSA-8hvh-73q5-g7pg",
"modified": "2025-12-24T21:30:31Z",
"published": "2025-12-24T21:30:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-25137"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45599"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2018-5495.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.brickstream.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8JMX-GWP7-3J43
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-21 21:31 – Updated: 2025-05-21 21:31The embedded web server lacks authentication and access controls, allowing unrestricted remote access. This could lead to configuration changes, operational disruption, or arbitrary code execution depending on the environment and exposed functionality.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-36535"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-21T20:15:31Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The embedded web server lacks authentication and access controls, allowing unrestricted remote access. This could lead to configuration changes, operational disruption, or arbitrary code execution depending on the environment and exposed functionality.",
"id": "GHSA-8jmx-gwp7-3j43",
"modified": "2025-05-21T21:31:41Z",
"published": "2025-05-21T21:31:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-36535"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.automationdirect.com/adc/shopping/catalog/communications/protocol_gateways/modbus_gateways/eki-1221-ce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-140-09"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
- Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
- In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
- In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].
CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier
This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.
CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values
An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.
CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation
An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.