CWE-269
DiscouragedImproper Privilege Management
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
5632 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-7JFM-6PHC-JJWH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-01 21:31 – Updated: 2025-04-04 21:30An issue in BambooHR Build v.25.0210.170831-83b08dd allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via the /saml/index.php?r=" HTTP GET parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-29033"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-01T21:15:43Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue in BambooHR Build v.25.0210.170831-83b08dd allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via the /saml/index.php?r=\" HTTP GET parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-7jfm-6phc-jjwh",
"modified": "2025-04-04T21:30:50Z",
"published": "2025-04-01T21:31:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29033"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nikolas-ch/CVEs/tree/main/Bamboohr_25.0210.170831-83b08dd/OpenRedirect"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7JJJ-CRJF-8WCH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-10 00:00 – Updated: 2022-09-11 00:00Custom permission misuse vulnerability in SystemUI prior to SMR Sep-2022 Release 1 allows attacker to use some protected functions with SystemUI privilege.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-36861"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-09T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Custom permission misuse vulnerability in SystemUI prior to SMR Sep-2022 Release 1 allows attacker to use some protected functions with SystemUI privilege.",
"id": "GHSA-7jjj-crjf-8wch",
"modified": "2022-09-11T00:00:30Z",
"published": "2022-09-10T00:00:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36861"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb?year=2022\u0026month=09"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7JMC-V9FW-3RGR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-02 18:31 – Updated: 2025-06-20 21:31Insecure Permission vulnerability in Cosy+ devices running a firmware 21.x below 21.2s10 or a firmware 22.x below 22.1s3 are executing several processes with elevated privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-33894"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-02T18:16:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Insecure Permission vulnerability in Cosy+ devices running a firmware 21.x below 21.2s10 or a firmware 22.x below 22.1s3 are executing several processes with elevated privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-7jmc-v9fw-3rgr",
"modified": "2025-06-20T21:31:59Z",
"published": "2024-08-02T18:31:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-33894"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.syss.com/posts/hacking-a-secure-industrial-remote-access-gateway"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hmsnetworks.blob.core.windows.net/nlw/docs/default-source/products/cybersecurity/security-advisory/hms-security-advisory-2024-07-29-001--ewon-several-cosy--vulnerabilities.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ewon.biz/products/cosy/ewon-cosy-wifi"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.hms-networks.com/cyber-security"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Aug/23"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7JP9-VGMQ-C8R5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-13 21:30 – Updated: 2024-07-08 21:16An issue in AdGuardHome v0.93 to latest allows unprivileged attackers to escalate privileges via overwriting the AdGuardHome binary.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.93"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.107.51"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-36586"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-06-13T23:18:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-13T19:15:51Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue in AdGuardHome v0.93 to latest allows unprivileged attackers to escalate privileges via overwriting the AdGuardHome binary.",
"id": "GHSA-7jp9-vgmq-c8r5",
"modified": "2024-07-08T21:16:28Z",
"published": "2024-06-13T21:30:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36586"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-compile/security-advisories/blob/master/vulns/CVE-2024-36586.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "AdGuardHome privilege escalation vulnerability"
}
GHSA-7JVG-H36R-GM38
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-27 18:32 – Updated: 2023-03-07 21:30A piece of Huawei whole-home intelligence software has an Incorrect Privilege Assignment vulnerability. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow attackers to access restricted functions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-48284"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-27T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A piece of Huawei whole-home intelligence software has an Incorrect Privilege Assignment vulnerability. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow attackers to access restricted functions.",
"id": "GHSA-7jvg-h36r-gm38",
"modified": "2023-03-07T21:30:18Z",
"published": "2023-02-27T18:32:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48284"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-advisories/2023/huawei-sa-ipavihwhis-1556afc2-en"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7JXC-J2VF-9MCR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-05 21:32 – Updated: 2024-08-01 15:31An issue in Secnet Security Network Intelligent AC Management System v.1.02.040 allows a local attacker to escalate privileges via the password component.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-30977"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269",
"CWE-276"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-05T21:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue in Secnet Security Network Intelligent AC Management System v.1.02.040 allows a local attacker to escalate privileges via the password component.",
"id": "GHSA-7jxc-j2vf-9mcr",
"modified": "2024-08-01T15:31:37Z",
"published": "2024-04-05T21:32:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-30977"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wodi98k/zip_crack/blob/main/SecnetAC.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.secnet.cn/newsdetail/388.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7M49-JJGQ-FMQF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:25 – Updated: 2022-07-02 00:00Privilege escalation vulnerability in McAfee Data Loss Prevention (DLP) ePO extension prior to 11.5.3 allows a low privileged remote attacker to create new rule sets via incorrect validation of user credentials.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7305"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-08-13T03:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Privilege escalation vulnerability in McAfee Data Loss Prevention (DLP) ePO extension prior to 11.5.3 allows a low privileged remote attacker to create new rule sets via incorrect validation of user credentials.",
"id": "GHSA-7m49-jjgq-fmqf",
"modified": "2022-07-02T00:00:22Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:25:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7305"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kc.mcafee.com/corporate/index?page=content\u0026id=SB10326"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7M72-MH5R-6J3R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-25 19:35 – Updated: 2023-02-15 22:01Impact
An issue was discovered in Rancher versions from 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.16 and from 2.6.0 up to and including 2.6.9, where an authorization logic flaw allows privilege escalation via project role template binding (PRTB) and -promoted roles. This issue is not present in Rancher 2.7 releases.
Note: Consult Rancher documentation for more information about cluster and project roles and KB 000020097 for information about -promoted roles.
This privilege escalation is possible for users with access to the escalate verb on PRTBs (projectroletemplatebindings.management.cattle.io), including users with * verbs on PRTBs (see notes below for more information). These users can escalate permissions for any -promoted resource (see the table below for a full enumeration) in any cluster where they have a PRTB granting such permissions in at least one project in the cluster.
On a default Rancher setup, only the following roles have such permissions:
- Project Owner
- Manage Project Members
These roles have permissions to affect the following resources:
| Resource | API Group | Affected Rancher version |
|---|---|---|
| navlinks | ui.cattle.io | 2.6 |
| nodes | "" | 2.6 |
| persistentvolumes | "" | 2.5, 2.6 |
| persistentvolumes | core | 2.5, 2.6 |
| storageclasses | storage.k8s.io | 2.5, 2.6 |
| apiservices | apiregistration.k8s.io | 2.5, 2.6 |
| clusterrepos | catalog.cattle.io | 2.5, 2.6 |
clusters (local only) |
management.cattle.io | 2.5, 2.6 |
Notes:
- During the calculation of the CVSS score,
privileges requiredwas considered ashighbecause, by default,standard useranduser-baseusers in Rancher do not havecreate,patchandupdatepermissions onroletemplates. - If a role template with access to those objects was already created by another user in the cluster, then this issue can be exploited by users without the mentioned permissions from point 1.
Workarounds
If updating Rancher to a patched version is not possible, then the following workarounds must be observed to mitigate this issue:
- Only grant Project Owner and Manage Project Members roles to trusted users.
- Minimize the creation of custom roles that contain the
escalate,*or write verbs (create,delete,patch,update) onprojectroletemplatebindingsresource, and only grant such custom roles to trusted users. - Minimize the number of users that have permissions to
create,patchandupdateroletemplates.
Patches
Patched versions include releases 2.5.17 and 2.6.10 and later versions. This issue is not present in Rancher 2.7 releases.
Detection
The following script was developed to list role template bindings that give written access to the affected resources listed above. It is highly recommended to run the script in your environment and review the list of identified roles and role template bindings for possible signs of exploitation of this issue. The script requires jq installed and a kubeconfig with access to Rancher local cluster; it can also be executed in Rancher's kubectl shell.
#!/bin/bash
help="
Usage: bash find_promoted_resource.sh \n \n
Requires: \n
- jq installed and on path \n
- A kubeconfig pointing at rancher's local cluster (can also run from rancher's kubectl shell) \n \n
Outputs a list of roletemplates and roletemplate bindings which give write access to promoted resources.
"
if [[ $1 == "-h" || $1 == "--help" ]]
then
echo -e $help
exit 0
fi
# first, get the current roletemplates so that we only issue a get once
kubectl get roletemplates.management.cattle.io -o json >> script_templates.json
# find roles which have write access to a promoted resource. Filter on roleTemplates which fulfill all requirements:
# Have a project context
# Have some rules
# Have one/more of the target api groups, or a * in the api groups
# Have one/more of the target resources, or a * in the resources
# Have a verb that is not read access (i.e. a verb that is not get/list/watch)
roles=$(jq --argjson apiGroups '["", "ui.cattle.io", "core", "storage.k8s.io", "apiregistration.k8s.io", "catalog.cattle.io", "management.cattle.io"]' --argjson resources '["navlinks", "persistentvolumes", "nodes", "storageclasses", "apiservices", "clusterrepos", "clusters"]' --argjson verbs '["get", "list", "watch"]' '.items[] | select(.context=="project" and (.rules | length >= 1)) | select( .rules[] | select( (($apiGroups - .apiGroups | length < 7) or (.apiGroups | index("*"))) and (($resources - .resources | length < 7) or (.resources | index("*"))) and (.verbs - $verbs | length > 0)) | length >= 1 ) | .metadata.name' script_templates.json | jq -s )
# log promoted roles which give direct write access so they can be easily fixed
echo "The following role templates give direct write access to a promoted resource:"
echo $roles
echo -e ""
# find any roles which inherit first-level roles. Mostly a BFS which radiates outward from the known bad roles
old_roles="[]"
new_roles="$roles"
old_length=$(echo $old_roles | jq 'length')
new_length=$(echo $new_roles | jq 'length')
# if our last loop found nothing new, it's safe to stop
while [[ $old_length != $new_length ]];
do
# set old values to what we currently know about
old_roles=$new_roles
old_length=$new_length
# update new values with anything that inherits a "bad" role we know about
new_roles=$(jq --argjson roles "$old_roles" --argjson roleLen "$old_length" '.items[] | .metadata.name as $NAME | select (( $roles | index($NAME)) or ((.roleTemplateNames | length > 0 ) and ($roles - .roleTemplateNames | length < $roleLen))) | .metadata.name ' script_templates.json | jq -s)
new_length=$(echo $new_roles | jq 'length')
done
roles=$new_roles
# log all roles which can give write access, even if it's not first level
echo -e "The following role templates give write access to a promoted resource directly or through inheritance:"
echo $roles
echo -e ""
kubectl get projectroletemplatebindings.management.cattle.io -A -o json >> script_bindings.json
role_template_bindings=$(jq --argjson roleTemplates "$roles" '.items[] | .roleTemplateName as $TemplateName | select($roleTemplates | index($TemplateName)) | .metadata.name' script_bindings.json | jq -s)
# since these bindings could be for users or groups, we need to include all fields which could help identify the subject. But they won't all be present, which makes the list look less pretty
echo -e "The following is a list of bindings which give access to promoted resource, with the format of: bindingName, projectName, userName, userPrincipalName, groupName, groupPrincipalName: "
echo $(jq --argjson bindings "$role_template_bindings" '.items[] | .metadata.name as $BindingName | select ( $bindings | index($BindingName)) | .metadata.name, .projectName, .userName?, .userPrincipalName?, .groupName?, .groupPrincipalName?' script_bindings.json | jq -s)
unset old_roles
unset new_roles
unset roles
unset role_template_bindings
rm script_templates.json
rm script_bindings.json
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Reach out to SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries.
- Open an issue in Rancher repository.
- Verify our support matrix and product support lifecycle
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/rancher/rancher"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.5.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/rancher/rancher"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-43759"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269",
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-01-25T19:35:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-07T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nAn issue was discovered in Rancher versions from 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.16 and from 2.6.0 up to and including 2.6.9, where an authorization logic flaw allows privilege escalation via project role template binding (PRTB) and `-promoted` roles. This issue is not present in Rancher 2.7 releases.\n\nNote: Consult Rancher [documentation](https://ranchermanager.docs.rancher.com/how-to-guides/new-user-guides/authentication-permissions-and-global-configuration/manage-role-based-access-control-rbac/cluster-and-project-roles) for more information about cluster and project roles and [KB 000020097](https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000020097) for information about `-promoted` roles.\n\nThis privilege escalation is possible for users with access to the `escalate` verb on PRTBs (`projectroletemplatebindings.management.cattle.io`), including users with `*` verbs on PRTBs (see notes below for more information). These users can escalate permissions for any `-promoted` resource (see the table below for a full enumeration) in any cluster where they have a PRTB granting such permissions in at least one project in the cluster.\n\nOn a default Rancher setup, only the following roles have such permissions:\n\n1. Project Owner\n2. Manage Project Members\n\nThese roles have permissions to affect the following resources:\n\n| Resource | API Group | Affected Rancher version |\n| - | - | - |\n| navlinks | ui.cattle.io | 2.6 |\n| nodes | \"\" | 2.6 |\n| persistentvolumes | \"\" | 2.5, 2.6 |\n| persistentvolumes | core | 2.5, 2.6 |\n| storageclasses | storage.k8s.io | 2.5, 2.6 |\n| apiservices | apiregistration.k8s.io | 2.5, 2.6 |\n| clusterrepos | catalog.cattle.io | 2.5, 2.6 |\n| clusters (`local` only) | management.cattle.io | 2.5, 2.6 |\n\nNotes:\n\n1. During the calculation of the CVSS score, `privileges required` was considered as `high` because, by default, `standard user` and `user-base` users in Rancher do not have `create`, `patch` and `update` permissions on `roletemplates`.\n2. If a role template with access to those objects was already created by another user in the cluster, then this issue can be exploited by users without the mentioned permissions from point 1.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf updating Rancher to a patched version is not possible, then the following workarounds must be observed to mitigate this issue:\n\n1. Only grant Project Owner and Manage Project Members roles to trusted users.\n5. Minimize the creation of custom roles that contain the `escalate`, `*` or write verbs (`create`, `delete`, `patch`, `update`) on `projectroletemplatebindings` resource, and only grant such custom roles to trusted users.\n6. Minimize the number of users that have permissions to `create`, `patch` and `update` `roletemplates`.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatched versions include releases 2.5.17 and 2.6.10 and later versions. This issue is not present in Rancher 2.7 releases.\n\n### Detection\n\nThe following script was developed to list role template bindings that give written access to the affected resources listed above. It is highly recommended to run the script in your environment and review the list of identified roles and role template bindings for possible signs of exploitation of this issue. The script requires `jq` installed and a `kubeconfig` with access to Rancher local cluster; it can also be executed in Rancher\u0027s kubectl shell.\n\n```shell\n#!/bin/bash\n\nhelp=\"\nUsage: bash find_promoted_resource.sh \\n \\n\n\nRequires: \\n\n- jq installed and on path \\n\n- A kubeconfig pointing at rancher\u0027s local cluster (can also run from rancher\u0027s kubectl shell) \\n \\n\n\nOutputs a list of roletemplates and roletemplate bindings which give write access to promoted resources.\n\"\n\nif [[ $1 == \"-h\" || $1 == \"--help\" ]]\nthen\n\techo -e $help\n\texit 0\nfi\n\n# first, get the current roletemplates so that we only issue a get once\nkubectl get roletemplates.management.cattle.io -o json \u003e\u003e script_templates.json\n\n# find roles which have write access to a promoted resource. Filter on roleTemplates which fulfill all requirements:\n# Have a project context\n# Have some rules\n# Have one/more of the target api groups, or a * in the api groups\n# Have one/more of the target resources, or a * in the resources\n# Have a verb that is not read access (i.e. a verb that is not get/list/watch)\nroles=$(jq --argjson apiGroups \u0027[\"\", \"ui.cattle.io\", \"core\", \"storage.k8s.io\", \"apiregistration.k8s.io\", \"catalog.cattle.io\", \"management.cattle.io\"]\u0027 --argjson resources \u0027[\"navlinks\", \"persistentvolumes\", \"nodes\", \"storageclasses\", \"apiservices\", \"clusterrepos\", \"clusters\"]\u0027 --argjson verbs \u0027[\"get\", \"list\", \"watch\"]\u0027 \u0027.items[] | select(.context==\"project\" and (.rules | length \u003e= 1)) | select( .rules[] | select( (($apiGroups - .apiGroups | length \u003c 7) or (.apiGroups | index(\"*\"))) and (($resources - .resources | length \u003c 7) or (.resources | index(\"*\"))) and (.verbs - $verbs | length \u003e 0)) | length \u003e= 1 ) | .metadata.name\u0027 script_templates.json | jq -s )\n\n# log promoted roles which give direct write access so they can be easily fixed\necho \"The following role templates give direct write access to a promoted resource:\"\necho $roles\necho -e \"\"\n\n# find any roles which inherit first-level roles. Mostly a BFS which radiates outward from the known bad roles \nold_roles=\"[]\"\nnew_roles=\"$roles\"\nold_length=$(echo $old_roles | jq \u0027length\u0027)\nnew_length=$(echo $new_roles | jq \u0027length\u0027)\n# if our last loop found nothing new, it\u0027s safe to stop\nwhile [[ $old_length != $new_length ]];\ndo\n\t# set old values to what we currently know about\n\told_roles=$new_roles\n\told_length=$new_length\n\t# update new values with anything that inherits a \"bad\" role we know about\n\tnew_roles=$(jq --argjson roles \"$old_roles\" --argjson roleLen \"$old_length\" \u0027.items[] | .metadata.name as $NAME | select (( $roles | index($NAME)) or ((.roleTemplateNames | length \u003e 0 ) and ($roles - .roleTemplateNames | length \u003c $roleLen))) | .metadata.name \u0027 script_templates.json | jq -s)\n\tnew_length=$(echo $new_roles | jq \u0027length\u0027)\ndone\n\nroles=$new_roles\n\n# log all roles which can give write access, even if it\u0027s not first level\necho -e \"The following role templates give write access to a promoted resource directly or through inheritance:\"\necho $roles\necho -e \"\"\n\nkubectl get projectroletemplatebindings.management.cattle.io -A -o json \u003e\u003e script_bindings.json\nrole_template_bindings=$(jq --argjson roleTemplates \"$roles\" \u0027.items[] | .roleTemplateName as $TemplateName | select($roleTemplates | index($TemplateName)) | .metadata.name\u0027 script_bindings.json | jq -s)\n\n# since these bindings could be for users or groups, we need to include all fields which could help identify the subject. But they won\u0027t all be present, which makes the list look less pretty\necho -e \"The following is a list of bindings which give access to promoted resource, with the format of: bindingName, projectName, userName, userPrincipalName, groupName, groupPrincipalName: \"\necho $(jq --argjson bindings \"$role_template_bindings\" \u0027.items[] | .metadata.name as $BindingName | select ( $bindings | index($BindingName)) | .metadata.name, .projectName, .userName?, .userPrincipalName?, .groupName?, .groupPrincipalName?\u0027 script_bindings.json | jq -s)\n\nunset old_roles\nunset new_roles\nunset roles\nunset role_template_bindings\nrm script_templates.json\nrm script_bindings.json\n```\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n* Reach out to [SUSE Rancher Security team](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/policy) for security related inquiries.\n* Open an issue in [Rancher](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/issues/new/choose) repository.\n* Verify our [support matrix](https://www.suse.com/suse-rancher/support-matrix/all-supported-versions/) and [product support lifecycle](https://www.suse.com/lifecycle/)",
"id": "GHSA-7m72-mh5r-6j3r",
"modified": "2023-02-15T22:01:37Z",
"published": "2023-01-25T19:35:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-7m72-mh5r-6j3r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-43759"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1205293"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rancher/rancher"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Privilege escalation in project role template binding (PRTB) and -promoted roles"
}
GHSA-7M77-QR67-P2WH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-04 12:30 – Updated: 2025-09-04 15:30{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-36901"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-04T10:42:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "N/A",
"id": "GHSA-7m77-qr67-p2wh",
"modified": "2025-09-04T15:30:28Z",
"published": "2025-09-04T12:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-36901"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2025-09-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7M8X-QG2J-4M3V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-30 18:12 – Updated: 2026-06-30 18:12Summary
The Fission MessageQueueTrigger (MQT) scaler controller exposed two privilege-escalation primitives to any subject able to create MQTs in a namespace.
Details
1. Secret materialization. getEnvVarlist in pkg/mqtrigger/scalermanager.go read the Secret named in Spec.Secret using the controller's cluster-wide secrets/get RBAC and emitted each key as a literal EnvVar.Value, copying
the plaintext secret content into the connector Deployment's pod template. A subject holding messagequeuetriggers/create but not secrets/get could exfiltrate any Secret in the namespace by pointing an MQT at it.
2. PodSpec injection. Spec.PodSpec was merged into the controller-built connector PodSpec via util.MergePodSpec with no allowlist on which fields could come from the user. An MQT could substitute Containers[].Image (run any
image), override Command/Args, inject Env, add VolumeMounts + Volumes, override ServiceAccountName, and set HostNetwork/HostPID/HostIPC — turning messagequeuetriggers/create into effective deployments/create with an
arbitrary image and service account.
Impact
A tenant with only messagequeuetriggers.fission.io/create in a namespace could read any Secret in that namespace and run an arbitrary container image under an arbitrary service account, escalating well beyond their intended RBAC.
Fix
Fixed in #3367 and released in v1.24.0.
getEnvVarlistnow emitsEnvVar.ValueFrom.SecretKeyRefso the connector pod resolves values at start time under its own service account. The secret values are never written into the Deployment object and never logged.- A new allowlist,
MergeAllowedPodSpecFields(pkg/executor/util/merge_allowlist.go), accepts onlyNodeSelector,Tolerations,Affinity,RuntimeClassName, and per-containerResources. All other user-supplied fields are dropped at the controller layer, and the validating webhook rejects every populated non-allowlisted field with a clear error. The webhook and the merge helper share a single canonicalDisallowedPodSpecFieldsenumeration so they cannot drift.
Behavioural change
MQT authors that previously overrode the connector image, command, args, env, volumes, service account, or host namespaces via Spec.PodSpec will see those fields rejected at admission (or silently dropped if the webhook is disabled).
Allowlisted fields flow through unchanged.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.23.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/fission/fission"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.24.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-269",
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-30T18:12:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe Fission MessageQueueTrigger (MQT) scaler controller exposed two privilege-escalation primitives to any subject able to create MQTs in a namespace.\n\n### Details\n\n**1. Secret materialization.** `getEnvVarlist` in `pkg/mqtrigger/scalermanager.go` read the Secret named in `Spec.Secret` using the controller\u0027s cluster-wide `secrets/get` RBAC and emitted each key as a literal `EnvVar.Value`, copying\nthe plaintext secret content into the connector Deployment\u0027s pod template. A subject holding `messagequeuetriggers/create` but **not** `secrets/get` could exfiltrate any Secret in the namespace by pointing an MQT at it.\n\n**2. PodSpec injection.** `Spec.PodSpec` was merged into the controller-built connector PodSpec via `util.MergePodSpec` with no allowlist on which fields could come from the user. An MQT could substitute `Containers[].Image` (run any\nimage), override `Command`/`Args`, inject `Env`, add `VolumeMounts` + `Volumes`, override `ServiceAccountName`, and set `HostNetwork`/`HostPID`/`HostIPC` \u2014 turning `messagequeuetriggers/create` into effective `deployments/create` with an\n arbitrary image and service account.\n\n### Impact\n\nA tenant with only `messagequeuetriggers.fission.io/create` in a namespace could read any Secret in that namespace and run an arbitrary container image under an arbitrary service account, escalating well beyond their intended RBAC.\n\n### Fix\n\nFixed in [#3367](https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3367) and released in [v1.24.0](https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.24.0).\n\n- `getEnvVarlist` now emits `EnvVar.ValueFrom.SecretKeyRef` so the connector pod resolves values at start time under its own service account. The secret values are never written into the Deployment object and never logged.\n- A new allowlist, `MergeAllowedPodSpecFields` (`pkg/executor/util/merge_allowlist.go`), accepts only `NodeSelector`, `Tolerations`, `Affinity`, `RuntimeClassName`, and per-container `Resources`. All other user-supplied fields are\ndropped at the controller layer, and the validating webhook rejects every populated non-allowlisted field with a clear error. The webhook and the merge helper share a single canonical `DisallowedPodSpecFields` enumeration so they cannot\ndrift.\n\n### Behavioural change\n\nMQT authors that previously overrode the connector image, command, args, env, volumes, service account, or host namespaces via `Spec.PodSpec` will see those fields rejected at admission (or silently dropped if the webhook is disabled).\nAllowlisted fields flow through unchanged.",
"id": "GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v",
"modified": "2026-06-30T18:12:48Z",
"published": "2026-06-30T18:12:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/security/advisories/GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3367"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/commit/94bf5792396989fdd71961e8701833c8110da889"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fission/fission"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.24.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Fission: MessageQueueTrigger scaler manager materializes Secret values into Deployment envvars and accepts arbitrary user PodSpec"
}
Mitigation MIT-1
Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
Mitigation MIT-48
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights to entities in a software system.
Mitigation MIT-49
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
Consider following the principle of separation of privilege. Require multiple conditions to be met before permitting access to a system resource.
CAPEC-122: Privilege Abuse
An adversary is able to exploit features of the target that should be reserved for privileged users or administrators but are exposed to use by lower or non-privileged accounts. Access to sensitive information and functionality must be controlled to ensure that only authorized users are able to access these resources.
CAPEC-233: Privilege Escalation
An adversary exploits a weakness enabling them to elevate their privilege and perform an action that they are not supposed to be authorized to perform.
CAPEC-58: Restful Privilege Elevation
An adversary identifies a Rest HTTP (Get, Put, Delete) style permission method allowing them to perform various malicious actions upon server data due to lack of access control mechanisms implemented within the application service accepting HTTP messages.